In regards to Jorge Bergoglio, he was invalidly elected, and today he is prevented from acquiring the papacy through universal and peaceful acceptance because of his public heresy.  Public heresy is a divine impediment.

So Francis was invalidly elected because the resignation procedures related to Benedict weren't followed?


And when did Francis commit public heresy?

Francis was invalidly elected because Benedict XVI did not renounce the papal office.

To your second question, really?

I think a question of equal merit, to piggyback off of Pax Vobis, would be:

When has Francis, by word or deed, professed a heresy that his conciliar predecessors Benedict XVI and JP2 and Paul VI etc, did NOT also profess? Are you able to provide specific examples?

I can be morally certain that he's not Pope, but not dogmatically certain, but in no case can my certainty (regardless of the degree) remove him from office.  That's the entire point of sedeprivationism.

Your moral certitude does not remove Jorge Bergoglio from office.  This is true.  However, you have made a judgment based on sufficient evidence, and therefore you reject his authority.  Sedeprivationism holds that Jorge Bergoglio holds some claim to the office.  This is where I disagree.  He holds no claim to the office.  That he has a sign on his door indicating "pope" is purely accidental.

You (and Ladislaus) make the distinction between moral and dogmatic certainty.  Ok, these 2 types do exist.  But I don't think dogmatic certainty applies here, because we're not talking about "faith and morals" in a dogmatic sense.  We're talking about sin/morality.


Secondly, to judge one guilty of manifest, formal heresy has to do with morals, and the DENIAL of dogma, but declaring someone a heretic isn't a dogmatic decree, but govt/moral one. 

Dogmatic certainty has to do with an article of faith; a part of Divine Revelation; what I must believe.  Moral certainty has to do with what I must do (i.e. what the Church decides or tells me how to act).

In this case, the judgement is not of a dogma, so there's no dogmatic certainty.  The judgement is one of morals, a violation of faith, so it's related to moral certainty.  It's not a LESS CERTAIN situation, but only a certainty of a different type.  A judgement of this type couldn't be dogmatic, because it has nothing to do with Revelation, Scripture or Tradition.



A private judgement couldn't be considered 'morally certain', but only FACTUALLY certain.  Or legally certain.

If you're using Canon Law to make a judgement, then you can only be legally certain.  Canon Law is a human/govt creation and, while it deals with morals, it is not a 'morally certain' guideline, unless the Church decides formally. 


The second issue is, you're not even a canon lawyer and your "certainty" regarding your legal interpretations is (even if accurate) not certain at all, but only probable.  If a number of canon lawyers agreed with you, then your opinion would rise to the level of "legally certain".  But still, this is not morally certain, which only the Church can have.

Morally certain implies that one sins by NOT following or by doing something which is commanded or prohibited.  So say that you can be "morally certain" of your own opinion, and thus, your PERSONAL conscience is bound only...this is anti-catholic and the definition of protestant private interpretation.  Catholics don't/can't "bind" their own conscience; you go ask a priest or an authority, and THEY bind your conscience...but only based on a rule that the Church has put into practice.  A priest/bishop (especially in Tradition, where they have no jurisdiction) is not allowed to bind anyone's conscience of their own decision, except in confession.

"Some argue that we cannot know if the 'Pope' is a formal or merely a material heretic, because only God can judge the interior, and heresy is a matter of interior rejection of Catholic doctrine, not merely exterior. It’s amazing to me that any Catholic could make this argument, but many do, among many supposedly traditional priests and laymen dedicated to defending conciliar pontiffs.' It utterly destroys the visible nature of the Church. The question is entirely in the external forum, thus it relies solely on externally verifiable evidences, as in every other legal proceeding. If this argument were valid, no one could ever have been condemned as a heretic, or indeed could be condemned of any crime at all, either by the Church or by secular authorities, since the guilty intention essential to any crime could never be judged. The fundamental principle of reason is that people are responsible for their actions. If a criminal act is committed, it is assumed, until proven otherwise, that the person is liable for it. This is stated in canon law (2200:2):

'Posita externa legis violatione, dolus in foro externo praesumitur, donec contrarium probetur.'

'When an external violation of the law has been posited, criminal intent is presumed in the external forum, until the contrary is proved.'

It is further argued that, in the case of heresy, dolus consists in the pertinacious rejection of Catholic teaching, which cannot be assumed merely from a denial of a doctrine. This is true, but pertinacity can also, and must also, be inferred from the person’s actions. That is why one or two admonitions are mentioned by St. Paul. These admonitions do not need to be formal and explicit, to judge that pertinacity is present, at least they do not need to be made by every individual. If the public evidence is sufficient for a moral certitude of pertinacity, then the conclusion follows."