How should attempted ѕυιcιdє be treated in a Catholic state?
St. Augustine says that "if one kills oneself, one kills a man." That's clearly correct.
My first issue is that given that ѕυιcιdє is intrinsically more repulsive than murder, while also being more pitiable, I think that there is some distinction to be made between the two. Where does this distinction lie, and what impact, if any, should it have on positive law? My initial thought is that our repulsion and pity are evoked by our immediate understanding of such a soul's destination in the afterlife. If that is the case, then this particular distinction need have no impact on positive law. Maybe there are other distinctions though.
Extending the principle, if one attempts to kill onself, one attempts to kill a man. And this is where it appears to run into real difficulties, especially if we argue from the consequent back to the principle.
First of all, attempted murder has sometimes historically been punishable by death, and I'd be hard pressed to say there isn't justice in that. But it would be absurd to punish attempted ѕυιcιdє by death, wouldn't it? To restate the problem: the death penalty for attempted murder is arguably just, while the death penalty for attempted ѕυιcιdє is inarguably absurd. So does that reveal a flaw in the (extended) principle?
Secondly, pondering on how attempted murder and attempted ѕυιcιdє could be effectively treated in positive law leads one to suspect that the causes of each are typically different. It seems that while punishment of attempted murder can lead to expiation and repentance, many conceivable punishments for attempted ѕυιcιdє could well result in another suicidal bout. Since a man attempts to kills himself because he finds life unendurable, perhaps as the result of a pathology, then possibly making his life even more unendurable in the name of justice might be more likely to lead to further pathological attempts and possibly the loss of his soul. If this is so, then shouldn't positive law respond very differently to attempted ѕυιcιdє and attempted murder, and doesn't this point to an important difference between the two?
Finally, when faced with an attempted ѕυιcιdє, there does not seem to be an instinctive demand for justice, as with attempted murder, but only, again, a kind of sickening pity. Our emotional reaction to attempted ѕυιcιdє doesn't actively alter the nature of it, clearly, but it could indicate that the crime is really of a different nature, or at least has a different cause and therefore demands a different response.
To my mind, all of this causes some complexities for St. Augustine's argument, which, however, is still clearly correct. On the other hand, maybe I simply drank too much coffee today.
I'm looking for help in resolving these questions, and suggestions for how a Catholic state should punish attempted ѕυιcιdє.