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Author Topic: The Fourth Sunday of Advent  (Read 259 times)

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The Fourth Sunday of Advent
« on: December 17, 2015, 11:30:59 AM »
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  • http://www.dailycatholic.org/4advhay.htm

    "Make straight His paths"

    The commentary for the Fourth Sunday of Advent lays out the expectations of the great Light in the darkness Who will redeem man as has been foretold with the immediate precursor of the Messias being St. John the Baptist proclaiming the Lord by being the Voice of one crying in the wilderness in fulfilling the prophecy of Isaias that "all flesh shall see salvation" by alerting the world to pray and repent, to "make straight His paths." A manifestation that God depends on man for cooperation in abiding by His holy will.


    Epistle: 1 Corinthians 4: 1-5

    1 Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries of God.

        Commentary on Verse 1 Mysteries of God. That is, the dogmas of faith, revealed by the Almighty. (Estius)

    2 Here now it is required among the dispensers, that a man be found faithful.

    3 But to me it is a very small thing to be judged by you, or by man's day; but neither do I judge my own self.

        Commentary on Verse 3Or by human judgment. Literally, by human day. The sense, says Saint Jerome, is, by any human judgment, or by men, whose judgment is in the day, or time of this life: but God judges in His day, after this life, and chiefly at the last day of judgment. – Neither do I judge myself, so as to look upon myself absolutely certain of the state of my soul, or that I am for certain justified, though I am not conscious to myself of any thing, because I am to be judged by an omniscient God, the great searcher of hearts, who perhaps may discover faults, which I, partial to myself, overlook. Now if Saint Paul durst not say, he was justified, what presumption is it for others to pretend to an absolute certainty, that they are just in the sight of God! (Witham)

    4 For I am not conscious to myself of any thing, yet am I not hereby justified; but He that judgeth me, is the Lord.

        Commentary on Verse 4For I am not conscious. This great apostle of the Gentiles, though conscious to himself of no breach of duty, still does not dare to call himself just. How different is the conduct of this apostle, from those wicked impostors, who teach, that a man is justified by believing himself so. (Estius) – If this privileged apostle was afraid to form any judgment of his own heart and thoughts, whether they were pure or not, but left the trial thereof to the day of judgment, the day of his death, how presumptuous are they, who dare to pronounce on their election and predestination!

    5 Therefore judge not before the time; until the Lord come, who both will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of the hearts; and then shall every man have praise from God.

        Commentary on Verse 5Judge not, & c. He gives them an admonition against rash and false judgments, and hints at those among them, who said, this man is better, this man is greater than such a one, & c. See Saint Chrysostom. (Witham)


    Gospel: St. Luke 3: 1-6

    1 At that time, in the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius Caesar, Pontius Pilate being governor of Judea, and Herod being tetrarch of Galilee, and Philip his brother tetrarch of Iturea, and the country of Trachonitis, and Lysanias tetrarch of Abilina;

        Commentary on Verse 1 Pilate being governor of Judea, literally, procurator; i.e. with a subordination to the president of Syria. (Witham) – This was Herod Antipas, son of herod the great, mentioned in Chapter 1: 5.

    2 Under the high priests Annas and Caiphas; the word of the Lord was made unto John, the son of Zachary, in the desert.

        Commentary on Verse 2 Under the high priests, Annas and Caiphas. There was properly but one high priest at the time; and Caiphas had this office and title all the ten years that Pilate governed Judea. See Josephus, lib. 18. Antiq. Chapter 3. – In these short notes I shall not pretend to examine the chronological difficulties, as to Christ’s birth, death & c. (Witham)

    3 And he came into all the country about the Jordan, preaching the baptism of penance for the remission of sins;

        Commentary on Verse 3 To all who read, it is plain, that Saint John [the Baptist] not only preached baptism, but likewise conferred it upon many; yet, he could not give baptism to the remission of sins. (Saint Gregory, homily 20) – When the victim was not yet immolated, how could they obtain remission of sins? How could Saint Luke say, preaching the baptism of penance, for the remission of sins? The ignorant Jєωs not considering the greatness of their transgressions, Saint John came exhorting them to acknowledge their sins, and do penance for them; that being converted, and truly contrite, they might seek after their Redeemer, and thus obtain remission of their offences. (Saint Chrysostom, homily 10 in Matthew) – From these words originated an opinion, that the baptism of John remitted sins. The Prudentius, in his hymn on Saint John:
        Hortatur ille primus, et Doctor novae
        Fuit salutis, nam sancto in flumine
        Veterum pictas lavit errorum notas.
        The fallacy of this sentiment, now universally exploded, may be detected from two passages of Scripture: 1. Where John himself declares that he does not baptize with the Holy Ghost; and secondly, in the Acts, (Chapter 19) where Saint Paul orders those who had only been baptized by John, and had not heard of the Holy Ghost, to be rebaptized. We must then conclude, that Saint John’s baptism was only a ceremony or initiation, by which they enrolled themselves as his disciples, to do penance, as a preparation for the remission of sins by means of the second baptism, viz. of Jesus Christ. (Jansenius, Evan. Conc.)

    4 As it was written in the book of the sayings of Isaias the prophet: A voice of one crying in the wilderness: Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make straight His paths.

    5 Every valley shall be filled; and every mountain and hill shall be brought low; and the crooked shall be made straight; and the rough ways plain;

        Commentary on Verse 5 Every valley, & c. If these words, in one sense, were a prediction of the deliverance of the Israelites from their captivity, (Isaias 40: 30) and an admonition to level the roads for those that were to return, they also signified the redemption of mankind from the slavery of sin; and that all obstacles, which retarded this benefit, should be removed, and also that the proud should be depressed, and the humble receive graces. (Witham)

    6 And all flesh shall see the salvation of God.

        Commentary on Verse 6 This text is given according to the Septuagint.


    http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2017.htm#article7

    Article 7. Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded?


    Objection 1. It would seem that the act of the sensitive appetite is not commanded. For the Apostle says (Romans 7:15): "For I do not that good which I will": and a gloss explains this by saying that man lusts, although he wills not to lust. But to lust is an act of the sensitive appetite. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to our command.

    Objection 2. Further, corporeal matter obeys God alone, to the effect of formal transmutation, as was shown in the I, 65, 4; I, 91, 02; I, 110, 2. But the act of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a formal transmutation of the body, consisting in heat or cold. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to man's command.

    Objection 3.
    Further, the proper motive principle of the sensitive appetite is something apprehended by sense or imagination. But it is not always in our power to apprehend something by sense or imagination. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to our command.

    On the contrary,
    Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi.] says: "That which obeys reason is twofold, the concupiscible and the irascible," which belong to the sensitive appetite. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason.

    I answer that, An act is subject to our command, in so far as it is in our power, as stated above (Article 5). Consequently in order to understand in what manner the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason, we must consider in what manner it is in our power. Now it must be observed that the sensitive appetite differs from the intellective appetite, which is called the will, in the fact that the sensitive appetite is a power of a corporeal organ, whereas the will is not. Again, every act of a power that uses a corporeal organ, depends not only on a power of the soul, but also on the disposition of that corporeal organ: thus the act of vision depends on the power of sight, and on the condition of the eye, which condition is a help or a hindrance to that act. Consequently the act of the sensitive appetite depends not only on the appetitive power, but also on the disposition of the body.

    Now whatever part the power of the soul takes in the act, follows apprehension. And the apprehension of the imagination, being a particular apprehension, is regulated by the apprehension of reason, which is universal; just as a particular active power is regulated by a universal active power. Consequently in this respect the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason. On the other hand, condition or disposition of the body is not subject to the command of reason: and consequently in this respect, the movement of the sensitive appetite is hindered from being wholly subject to the command of reason.

    Moreover it happens sometimes that the movement of the sensitive appetite is aroused suddenly in consequence of an apprehension of the imagination of sense. And then such movement occurs without the command of reason: although reason could have prevented it, had it foreseen. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2) that the reason governs the irascible and concupiscible not by a "despotic supremacy," which is that of a master over his slave; but by a "politic and royal supremacy," whereby the free are governed, who are not wholly subject to command.

    Reply to Objection 1. That man lusts, although he wills not to lust, is due to a disposition of the body, whereby the sensitive appetite is hindered from perfect compliance with the command of reason. Hence the Apostle adds (Romans 7:15): "I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind." This may also happen through a sudden movement of concupiscence, as stated above.

    Reply to Objection 2.
    The condition of the body stands in a twofold relation to the act of the sensitive appetite. First, as preceding it: thus a man may be disposed in one way or another, in respect of his body, to this or that passion. Secondly, as consequent to it: thus a man becomes heated through anger. Now the condition that precedes, is not subject to the command of reason: since it is due either to nature, or to some previous movement, which cannot cease at once. But the condition that is consequent, follows the command of reason: since it results from the local movement of the heart, which has various movements according to the various acts of the sensitive appetite.

    Reply to Objection 3. Since the external sensible is necessary for the apprehension of the senses, it is not in our power to apprehend anything by the senses, unless the sensible be present; which presence of the sensible is not always in our power. For it is then that man can use his senses if he will so to do; unless there be some obstacle on the part of the organ. On the other hand, the apprehension of the imagination is subject to the ordering of reason, in proportion to the strength or weakness of the imaginative power. For that man is unable to imagine the things that reason considers, is either because they cannot be imagined, such as incorporeal things; or because of the weakness of the imaginative power, due to some organic indisposition.

    "I receive Thee, redeeming Prince of my soul. Out of love for Thee have I studied, watched through many nights, and exerted myself: Thee did I preach and teach. I have never said aught against Thee. Nor do I persist stubbornly in my views. If I have ever expressed myself erroneously on this Sacrament, I submit to the judgement of the Holy Roman Church, in obedience of which I now part from this world." Saint Thomas Aquinas the greatest Doctor of the Church