http://www.dailycatholic.org/11penhay.htm

        For the Eleventh Sunday after Pentecost we see how St. Paul gives witness that only through the grace of God has he been able to accomplish what God has aided, elevated and cured of sin. That is the message of the Gospel indicating that the deaf and blind man represents the spiritual blindness and deafness mankind has contracted by turning from God and embracing the chaotic din of the world, the flesh and the devil which, ironically, causes spiriritual deafness and dumbness. Really dumb! Yet, with just one word from our Lord "Ephpheta" the man in the gospel is healed. So also by absolution in the Sacrament of Penance by a valid, truly ordained priest, can one's soul be similarly healed.


Epistle: 1 Corinthians 15: 1-10

1 Now I make known unto you, brethren, the gospel which I preached to you, which also you have received, and wherein you stand;

2 By which also you are saved, if you hold fast after what manner I preached unto you, unless you have believed in vain.

3 For I delivered unto you first of all, which I also received: how that Christ died for our sins, according to the scriptures:

4 And that He was buried, and that He rose again the third day, according to the scriptures:

5 And that He was seen by Cephas; and after that by the eleven.

6 Then He was seen by more than five hundred brethren at once: of whom many remain until this present, and some are fallen asleep.

7 After that, He was seen by James, then by all the apostles.

    Commentary on Verse 7 He was seen by James. The time is not mentioned in the gospels. (Wi.)

8 And last of all, He was seen also by me, as by one born out of due time.

    Commentary on Verse 8 As by one born of due out of due time; not born at the ordinary term, meaning after Christ's ascension. He calls himself so out of humility, abortives being commonly imperfect and less than others. (Wi.)

9 For I am the least of the apostles, who am not worthy to be called an apostle, because I persecuted the church of God.

10 But by the grace of God, I am what I am; and His grace in me hath not been void, but I have labored more abundantly than all they: yet not I, but the grace of God with me.

    Commentary on Verse 10 I have labored more abundantly. He does not say better, or that he excelled them; and even as to his labors, he gives to the honor to God: Not I, but the grace of God with me. (Wi.)


Gospel: St. Mark 7: 31-37

31 At that time, Jesus going out of the coasts of Tyre, came by Sidon to the sea of Galilee, through the midst of the coasts of Decapolis.

32 And they bring to Him one deaf and dumb; and they besought Him that He would lay his hand upon him.

    Commentary on Verse 32 Dumb. The Greek signifies one that speaks little, or with difficulty. (Wi.) They besought Him. In the Greek it is, they beseech Him, which agrees so well with they bring, that we have every reason to believe that this was the original reading.

33 And taking him from the multitude apart, He put his fingers into his ears, and spitting, He touched his tongue:

34 And looking up to Heaven, He groaned, and said to him: Ephpheta, which is, Be thou opened.

    Commentary on Verse 34 Ephpheta, a Syriac word. Jesus Christ, in the cure of this man, uses many and various actions; but as of their own nature they are no ways equal to such a cure, they show: first, that the cure was miraculous; and secondly, the virtue, which His divinity communicated to His sacred body.(V.) We must not suppose that our Savior here groaned on account of any difficulty He experienced in working this miracle, but only from commiseration for the man, whom He was about to heal; as likewise to show, how very difficult is the cure of those who are spiritually deaf and dumb by sin. He was affected in a similar manner when He raised Lazarus to life, to show with what difficulty a man, dead and buried in sin by evil habits, can arise from that miserable state. (Dion Carth.)

35 And immediately his ears were opened, and the string of his tongue was loosed, and he spoke right.

36 And He charged them that they should tell no man. But the more He charged them, so much the more a great deal did they publish it.

37 And so much the more did they wonder, saying: He hath done all things well; He hath made both the deaf to hear, and the dumb to speak.

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2021.htm#article2

Article 2. Whether a human action deserves praise or blame, by reason of its being good or evil?

Objection 1. It would seem that a human action does not deserve praise or blame by reason of its being good or evil. For "sin happens even in things done by nature" (Phys. ii, 8). And yet natural things are not deserving of praise or blame (Ethic. iii, 5). Therefore a human action does not deserve blame, by reason of its being evil or sinful; and, consequently, neither does it deserve praise, by reason of its being good.

Objection 2. Further, just as sin occurs in moral actions, so does it happen in the productions of art: because as stated in Phys. ii, 8 "it is a sin in a grammarian to write badly, and in a doctor to give the wrong medicine." But the artist is not blamed for making something bad: because the artist's work is such, that he can produce a good or a bad thing, just as he lists. Therefore it seems that neither is there any reason for blaming a moral action, in the fact that it is evil.

Objection 3. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil is "weak and incapable." But weakness or inability either takes away or diminishes guilt. Therefore a human action does not incur guilt from being evil.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Virt. et Vit. i) that "virtuous deeds deserve praise, while deeds that are opposed to virtue deserve censure and blame." But good actions are virtuous; because "virtue makes that which has it, good, and makes its action good" (Ethic. ii, 6): wherefore actions opposed to virtue are evil. Therefore a human action deserves praise or blame, through being good or evil.

I answer that, Just as evil is more comprehensive than sin, so is sin more comprehensive than blame. For an action is said to deserve praise or blame, from its being imputed to the agent: since to praise or to blame means nothing else than to impute to someone the malice or goodness of his action. Now an action is imputed to an agent, when it is in his power, so that he has dominion over it: because it is through his will that man has dominion over his actions, as was made clear above (1, 1,2). Hence it follows that good or evil, in voluntary actions alone, renders them worthy of praise or blame: and in such like actions, evil, sin and guilt are one and the same thing.

Reply to Objection 1. Natural actions are not in the power of the natural agent: since the action of nature is determinate. And, therefore, although there be sin in natural actions, there is no blame.

Reply to Objection 2. Reason stands in different relations to the productions of art, and to moral actions. In matters of art, reason is directed to a particular end, which is something devised by reason: whereas in moral matters, it is directed to the general end of all human life. Now a particular end is subordinate to the general end. Since therefore sin is a departure from the order to the end, as stated above (Article 1), sin may occur in two ways, in a production of art. First, by a departure from the particular end intended by the artist: and this sin will be proper to the art; for instance, if an artist produce a bad thing, while intending to produce something good; or produce something good, while intending to produce something bad. Secondly, by a departure from the general end of human life: and then he will be said to sin, if he intend to produce a bad work, and does so in effect, so that another is taken in thereby. But this sin is not proper to the artist as such, but as man. Consequently for the former sin the artist is blamed as an artist; while for the latter he is blamed as a man. On the other hand, in moral matters, where we take into consideration the order of reason to the general end of human life, sin and evil are always due to a departure from the order of reason to the general end of human life. Wherefore man is blamed for such a sin, both as man and as a moral being. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "in art, he who sins voluntarily is preferable; but in prudence, as in the moral virtues," which prudence directs, "he is the reverse."

Reply to Objection 3. Weakness that occurs in voluntary evils, is subject to man's power: wherefore it neither takes away nor diminishes guilt.