What do you know - I ran across the answer myself from Last Trad. on the Can the Orthodox be Saved discussion --
St. Joan of Arc prays and brings a dead baby back to life so that it might be baptized. -Baby said to have been dead for 3 days
In the Spring of 1430, Joan had just arrived in Lagny-sur-Marne, France, where she was to lead the French forces there against the English. It was there, in the midst of war, that the miracle occurred.
According to her own testimony, she was called upon to join some other young women who were praying in a Church beseeching God and the Blessed Virgin Mary on behalf of a dead baby, that it might be revived long enough to baptize it. Here is Joan's own testimony:
"I was told that the girls of the town were gathered before the statue of Our Lady and wanted me to come and pray to God and Our Lady to bring a baby back to life. So I went and prayed with the others. And finally life appeared in him, and he yawned three times. Then he was baptized, and soon afterwards he died, and was buried in consecrated ground.
For three days, I was told, he had shown no signs of life, and he was as black as my jacket. But when he yawned his color began to come back. And I was on my knees there with the other girls, praying before Our Lady."
Can someone explain how a saint raising the dead is compatible with the dogma of the particular judgment and predestination?
The question pertaining to the particular judgment regards -from the time of our Lord’s ascension- the dogma that all enter the particular judgment at the moment of death, and receive in that moment an immutable sentence. Therefore, if someone were raised from the dead, would not they die again, and enter into a 2nd particular judgment?
And if so, could not their eternal destiny be different then at their first judgment (eg., because the saved could fall into grave sin, or the damned could repent after such a resurrection)?
Or, if it be argued that such a one as would be resurrected by a saint, transpiring as it would only by a special act of God, such a resurrected person would be incapable of altering their eternal and original destiny, then it would need to be explained how this second earthly life would not represent a justification of condemned Protestant predestination (and additionally, an implicit confiscation of free will): There is nothing the resurrected can do to change his destiny.
My instinct tells me there must be some doctrinally correct harmonization which preserves Catholic dogma regarding the particular judgment in this account, or it would long since have been suppressed/condemned, yet the solution escapes me.
Can anyone help me out?