In virtue of the fundamental principle that the faculties, habits, and acts are specified by their object, in the definition of free will we must consider its specifying object, and say with the Thomists that liberty is the dominating indifference of the will with regard to good proposed to it by the reason as not in every respect good. The essence of liberty consists in the dominating indifference of the will with regard to every object proposed by the reason as at the moment good in one aspect, and not good in another, according to the formula of St. Thomas: "If the will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it will not tend to this of necessity."16 There is then indifference in willing or not willing this object, a potential indifference in the faculty and an actual indifference in the free act which is not necessarily inclined toward it. Even when, in fact, the will actually wills this object, when it is already determined to will this, it is still inclined freely toward this with a dominating indifference that is no longer potential but actual. In like manner, the divine liberty that is already determined maintains us in existence. Liberty therefore arises from the infinite disproportion prevailing between the will that is specified by universal good, and a particular good which is good in one aspect, not good or insufficient in another. The Thomists also say in opposition to Suarez, that not even by His absolute power can God move our will of necessity to will a certain object, the indifference of judgment remaining as it is, so long as we judge the object to be good in one aspect and not so in another. The reason is that it implies a contradiction for the will to will of necessity the object proposed to it by the intellect as indifferent or as absolutely out of proportion to its scope.17


Garrigou-Lagrange, Rev. Fr. Reginald. Predestination: The Meaning of Predestination in Scripture and the Church (p. 321). TAN Books. Kindle Edition.

There are several more distinctions that help clarify the point under consideration.

To begin with, good is the object of the will, and truth is the object of the intellect.  The two operations of the will are to desire and to chose; the to operations of the intellect are to consider and to judge.

The Practical Good: Now, within man there is a sensitive appetite (the desires of the flesh), and an intellectual appetite (the judgements of reason).  Our free will stands midway between the two and has the ability to choose either.  For example, our lower nature desires to eat the cherry pie, while our intellect judges that we should eat the vegetables.  In the end, we chose (second act of the will) one or the other. This is the battle between the lower nature and higher nature - the flesh and the spirit - that St. Paul speaks of in Romans, chapter 8. 

This act of the will pertains directly to choosing a practical good (I should do this, and not do that) not to a speculative good, that is, to a truth (I should believe this, and not believe that).

Antecedent and Consequent Actual Grace: Another distinction is between antecedent actual grace and consequent actual grace.  Antecedent grace enlightens the mind to the truth and moves the will to choose the good.  If the person chooses in accord with the antecedent grace, consequent actual grace is given to help the person carry out the good.

The Speculative Good, or Truth: Now, just as some acts pertain directly to the practical good (I should do this and not that), others pertain directly to the the speculative good, or to the truth (I should believe this and not that).  The intellect and will, and the two forms of actual grace, are both involved in this act as well.  Let's use an example to illustrate the point

A Moslem hears the Gospel peached.  He is given an antecedent actual grace which 1) provides his mind with the light to "see" the truth and 2) moves his will to believe it (belief involves a choice of the will).

Yet, at the same time, the Moslem thinks to himself, if I accept this truth, I will have to convert to Catholicism, and if I do that, I will be disowned by my family and possibly be put to death.  He is left with three possibilities:

1) He can embrace the truth in spite of the consequences, at which point he will be given consequent actual grace to help him carry it out. 

2) He can accept the truth interiorly without revealing it publicly ("if he will not confess Me before men, neither will I confess him before My Father"; "he who loves father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me").

3) Or, since the will remains free, he can refuse to believe the truth.

God never forces the will to choose the good or to believe the truth, but he gives everyone the antecedent actual grace needed to make the right choice.



God would only cause it in the sense of giving the antecedent actual grace that moved the person's will to desire to say the Rosary.  But the will nevertheless remains free to cooperate or not.  If his desire to watch the football game is greater than his desire to say the Rosary, you can bet that he will choose to say the Rosary after the game, or chose to not say it at all.



If God forced the person's will to choose to say the Rosary, and forced him to carry it out, neither the choice nor the act would be free, nor would either be meritorious.  God moves us to do what is good and to choose what is true, but he doesn't force either of necessity.



 

If God forced the person's will to choose to say the Rosary, and forced him to carry it out, neither the choice nor the act would be free, nor would either be meritorious.  God moves us to do what is good and to choose what is true, but he doesn't force either of necessity.

By a truly efficacious grace is meant one that will be (is) infallibly followed by the act to which it tends, e.g. contrition. If you receive such a grace, even before your will consents to it, that grace is infallibly “sure of success;” it will infallibly procure your consent, produce that act – of contrition.

On https://libgen.is/ (current alias domains are libgen.rs, libgen.is, libgen.st) I found a collection of works of Garrigou-Lagrange, more than 7000 pages, including "Predestination".

Type "Garrigou-Lagrange" (without quotes).
Select "Search in Fields ... Author(s)"
Search!

The list of results has one entry: "Reverend Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange Collection"

https://libgen.is/search.php?req=Garrigou-Lagrange&lg_topic=libgen&open=0&view=simple&res=25&phrase=1&column=title

Click on one of the Mirrors [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] (at the right side of the entry) for the download-page.
To download, click the GET-Link, on top of the page.

It's an ePub-File of ~7MB.

I used https://www.freeconvert.com/epub-to-pdf, to create a searchable ~36MB PDF.

There are several more distinctions that help clarify the point under consideration.

To begin with, good is the object of the will, and truth is the object of the intellect.  The two operations of the will are to desire and to chose; the to operations of the intellect are to consider and to judge.

The Practical Good: Now, within man there is a sensitive appetite (the desires of the flesh), and an intellectual appetite (the judgements of reason).  Our free will stands midway between the two and has the ability to choose either.  For example, our lower nature desires to eat the cherry pie, while our intellect judges that we should eat the vegetables.  In the end, we chose (second act of the will) one or the other. This is the battle between the lower nature and higher nature - the flesh and the spirit - that St. Paul speaks of in Romans, chapter 8. 

This act of the will pertains directly to choosing a practical good (I should do this, and not do that) not to a speculative good, that is, to a truth (I should believe this, and not believe that).

Antecedent and Consequent Actual Grace: Another distinction is between antecedent actual grace and consequent actual grace.  Antecedent grace enlightens the mind to the truth and moves the will to choose the good.  If the person chooses in accord with the antecedent grace, consequent actual grace is given to help the person carry out the good.

The Speculative Good, or Truth: Now, just as some acts pertain directly to the practical good (I should do this and not that), others pertain directly to the the speculative good, or to the truth (I should believe this and not that).  The intellect and will, and the two forms of actual grace, are both involved in this act as well.  Let's use an example to illustrate the point

A Moslem hears the Gospel peached.  He is given an antecedent actual grace which 1) provides his mind with the light to "see" the truth and 2) moves his will to believe it (belief involves a choice of the will).

Yet, at the same time, the Moslem thinks to himself, if I accept this truth, I will have to convert to Catholicism, and if I do that, I will be disowned by my family and possibly be put to death.  He is left with three possibilities:

1) He can embrace the truth in spite of the consequences, at which point he will be given consequent actual grace to help him carry it out. 

2) He can accept the truth interiorly without revealing it publicly ("if he will not confess Me before men, neither will I confess him before My Father"; "he who loves father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me").

3) Or, since the will remains free, he can refuse to believe the truth.

God never forces the will to choose the good or to believe the truth, but he gives everyone the antecedent actual grace needed to make the right choice.



God would only cause it in the sense of giving the antecedent actual grace that moved the person's will to desire to say the Rosary.  But the will nevertheless remains free to cooperate or not.  If his desire to watch the football game is greater than his desire to say the Rosary, you can bet that he will choose to say the Rosary after the game, or chose to not say it at all.



If God forced the person's will to choose to say the Rosary, and forced him to carry it out, neither the choice nor the act would be free, nor would either be meritorious.  God moves us to do what is good and to choose what is true, but he doesn't force either of necessity.



 

But, what about man's freely willed decision to cooperate with grace? What about the voto mentioned by the Council of Trent. God foreknows the will, the voto.

. . . 

God would prefer to predestine all men, since he wills to do so. But he is limited by man, since the predestined have to freely assent to the call (excepting exceptions). God cannot predestine someone who doesn't want to assent (or who later backs down).

I don't understand why St. Thomas doesn't infer that God's foreknowledge of this assent of the predestined is key to solve the "mystery" of predestination.

St. Augustine, A Treatise on the Predestination of the Saints, Book II

Chapter 23.—Why for the People of Tyre and Sidon, Who Would Have Believed, the Miracles Were Not Done Which Were Done in Other Places Which Did Not Believe.

. . . But can we say that even the Tyrians and Sidonians would have refused to believe such mighty works done among them, or would not have believed them if they had been done, when the Lord Himself bears witness to them that they would have repented with great humility if those signs of divine power had been done among them? And yet in the day of judgment they will be punished; although with a less punishment than those cities which would not believe the mighty works done in them. For the Lord goes on to say, “Nevertheless, I say unto you, it shall be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon in the day of judgment than for you.”( Matt. xi. 22 . ) Therefore the former shall be punished with greater severity, the latter with less; but yet they shall be punished. Again, if the dead are judged even in respect of deeds which they would have done if they had lived, assuredly since these would have been believers if the gospel had been preached to them with so great miracles, they certainly ought not to be punished; but they will be punished. It is therefore false that the dead are judged in respect also of those things which they would have done if the gospel had reached them when they were alive. And if this is false, there is no ground for saying, concerning infants who perish because they die without baptism, that this happens in their case deservedly, because God foreknew that if they should live and the gospel should be preached to them, they would hear it with unbelief. It remains, therefore, that they are kept bound by original sin alone, and for this alone they go into condemnation; and we see that in others in the same case this is not remitted, except by the gratuitous grace of God in regeneration; and that, by His secret yet righteous judgment—because there is no unrighteousness with God—that some, who even after baptism will perish by evil living, are yet kept in this life until they perish, who would not have perished if bodily death had forestalled their lapse into sin, and so come to their help. Because no dead man is judged by the good or evil things which he would have done if he had not died, otherwise the Tyrians and Sidonians would not have suffered the penalties according to what they did; but rather according to those things that they would have done, if those evangelical mighty works had been done in them, they would have obtained salvation by great repentance, and by the faith of Christ.


Augustine, Saint. The Complete Works of St. Augustine: Cross-linked to the Bible and with in-line footnotes (pp. 9460-9461). Kindle Edition.

Thanks a lot, Decem! Given your comments, especially Reply #30, and Garrigou Lagrange's Predestination (first two and a half pages of Part III, Chapter VIII THE DIVINE MOTION AND THE FREEDOM OF OUR SALUTARY ACTS), I've come to understand the point of the Thomists/Augustinians.

St. Augustine, A Treatise on the Predestination of the Saints, Book II

Chapter 33.—God Gives Both Initiatory and Persevering Grace According to His Own Will.

From all which it is shown with sufficient clearness that the grace of God, which both begins a man’s faith and which enables it to persevere unto the end, is not given according to our merits, but is given according to His own most secret and at the same time most righteous, wise, and beneficent will; since those whom He predestinated, them He also called,( Rom viii. 30 . ) with that calling of which it is said, “The gifts and calling of God are without repentance.”( Rom. xi. 29 . ) To which calling there is no man that can be said by men with any certainty of affirmation to belong, until he has departed from this world; but in this life of man, which is a state of trial upon the earth,( Job vii. 1 . ) he who seems to stand must take heed lest he fall.( 1 Cor. x. 12 . ) Since (as I have already said before)[ 584 ] those who will not persevere are, by the most foreseeing will of God, mingled with those who will persevere, for the reason that we may learn not to mind high things, but to consent to the lowly, and may “work out our own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God that worketh in us both to will and to do for His good pleasure.”( Phil. ii. 12, 13 . ) We therefore will, but God worketh in us to will also. We therefore work, but God worketh in us to work also for His good pleasure. This is profitable for us both to believe and to say,—this is pious, this is true, that our confession be lowly and submissive, and that all should be given to God. Thinking, we believe; thinking, we speak; thinking, we do whatever we do;( 2 Cor. iii. 5 . ) but, in respect of what concerns the way of piety and the true worship of God, we are not sufficient to think anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God.[ 585 ] For “our heart and our thoughts are not in our own power;” whence the same Ambrose who says this says also: “But who is so blessed as in his heart always to rise upwards? And how can this be done without divine help? Assuredly, by no means. Finally,” he says, “the same Scripture affirms above, ‘Blessed is the man whose help is of Thee; O Lord,( Ps. lxxxiv. 5 [LXX.] ) ascent is in his heart.’”[ 586 ] Assuredly, Ambrose was not only enabled to say this by reading in the holy writings, but as of such a man is to be without doubt believed, he felt it also in his own heart. Therefore, as is said in the sacraments of believers, that we should lift up our hearts to the Lord, is God’s gift; for which gift they to whom this is said are admonished by the priest after this word to give thanks to our Lord God Himself; and they answer that it is “meet and right so to do.” [ 587 ] For, since our heart is not in our own power, but is lifted up by the divine help, so that it ascends and takes cognizance of those things which are above,( Col. iii. 1 . ) where Christ is sitting at the right hand of God, and, not those things that are upon the earth, to whom are thanks to be given for so great a gift as this unless to our Lord God who doeth this,—who in so great kindness has chosen us by delivering us from the abyss of this world, and has predestinated us before the foundation of the world?

Augustine, Saint. The Complete Works of St. Augustine: Cross-linked to the Bible and with in-line footnotes (pp. 9478-9479). Kindle Edition.

". . . there would have been no reason for introducing this unwonted and unhelpful change, if the translators had not been intending to get rid of even the slightest hint of the Catholic doctrine of predestination, and to insinuate the idea of universal salvation instead. There is thus a Pelagian tinge to this flight from an idea of a distinction between some men and others." Iota Unum, translated by Rev. Fr. John P. Parsons (Sarto House, 1996).