If there's a minister performing a Baptism and in his mind saying, I don't intend to do it, but at the same time he IS doing it, well, isn't he intending to DO it?  Of course he is.  He's trying to say in his mind, "I do not want this Baptism to be valid," but he most certainly is intending to perform the ceremony, since, well, he's actually doing it.

If there's a minister performing a Baptism and in his mind saying, I don't intend to do it, but at the same time he IS doing it, well, isn't he intending to DO it?  Of course he is.  He's trying to say in his mind, "I do not want this Baptism to be valid," but he most certainly is intending to perform the ceremony, since, well, he's actually doing it.

You mix up "do what the Church does" with "outwardly act as if doing what the Church does".

The condemnation of Alexander VIII shows that there is a difference.

Also, Ludwig Ott confirms that since that condemnation virtually all theologians agree that the intentio mere externa does not suffice.

You mix up "do what the Church does" with "outwardly act as if doing what the Church does".

The condemnation of Alexander VIII shows that there is a difference.

Also, Ludwig Ott confirms that since that condemnation virtually all theologians agree that the intentio mere externa does not suffice.

No, I disagree.  When I have time, I'll dig up the citations.  There are varying opinions of where the divide lies between the external and the internal.  Anything in the intellect and will are internal.  In someone intending to simulate the Sacrament, there's a divided internal intention.

If you were right, then the proposition would have not been condemned.

No, there's disagreement regarding the terms of what was condemned.

While I do not support Ibranyi in most things, this is the most thorough treatment of the subject that I've found.

http://www.johnthebaptist.us/jbw_english/docuмents/books/rjmi/br45_ministers_intention.pdf

It's filled with citations and traces the entire history of the question.

This spin towards the subjectivized intention theory (internal vs. external is the wrong distinction) goes hand-in-hand with the subjectivism that eventually uprooted EENS dogma and lead to the subjectivist revolution at Vatican II.

I pick up a loaded gun, aim it at a person, and I pull the trigger, but I internally say "I do not wish this person to die," was there no intention to kill the person?  Nonsense.  By the very fact that the shooter intended to do the actions that would inevitably result in the death of the victim, he intended to kill the victim.  If you intend the cause, then you also thereby intend the effect.  So the shooter intended the death of the person.  It matters not that he thought within himself, "oh, I hope this person doesn't die and don't want him to die."

Or it's like saying that I'm going to go about scrubbing my car with soap and water, but internally think, "I don't really want this car to be cleaned."  But your'e doing the action that makes the car clean.  So is it intended or not to clean the car?  Which is the primary form of human intention and volition here, the performing of the action that causes the car to be clean or the idle (half insane?) thought that despite doing exactly what is required to clean the car, I do not wish for it to be cleaned?

I become intoxicated and sit down behind the wheel of my car and start driving.  I have the thought, "I hope I don't kill someone in this state."  Then I go and kill someone.  I have committed the sin of murder.  By intending the POSSIBILITY that I might kill someone, I intended the murder "in potentia", or in its cause even if I did not really want the end to happen on some EMOTIONAL level.  Again, by intending the cause, you intend the effect.  But the intellect and the will, by performing the cause, willed also the effect, all emotions aside.

When I am tempted to some sin, I can say inside, "I do not want to commit this sin," but then I go ahead and do it.  It's ultimately in the DOING it that the will and intention manifest themselves.  It's a human act of volition, despite the wishful thinking of not REALLY wanting it.

It's also like doing something while holding your fingers crossed behind your back, "see, I don't really mean to do this."

DOING it is proof of the pudding, so to speak.  Intention is at the level of the will, not the emotions.

This is precisely what I liken the scenario of an infiltrator performing a Sacrament but then thinking inside, "I do not wish to perform the Sacrament."

Yes, it would be interesting to see the Latin of Apostolicae Curae, but Pope Leo XIII clearly states that a presumed intention results in the Sacrament TRULY being conferred.

In the practical order, PRESUMPTION and EXTERNAL INTENTION amount to the same thing, but in REALITY (or TRULY), it's theoretically possible with subjectivist intention theory, that, say, Archbishop Lefebvre was not validly ordained a priest by Lienart, because Lienart was a Mason who, let's say, withheld his internal intention.  In that case, all of the SSPX bishops and priests, and many of the sedevacantist spinoff bishops and priests are all invalid ... in reality.  But Ibranyi does a good job of outlining here that if the Rite of the Church is performed, it assumes the intention of the Church.

There's really no other explanation for how atheists can validly baptized.  In no way, shape, or form can they have any other intention than, "I'm doing this thing that Catholics do." (most likely with the intention of humoring the Catholics requesting it or consoling them).  There can be no question whatsoever of their intending the Sacramental effect.  It's the same way that a priest who doesn't believe in transubstantiation (and considers it to be just words) still validly offers Mass by performing the Rites of the Church, which the CHURCH intends to confer the Sacrament.

Yes, it would be interesting to see the Latin of Apostolicae Curae, but Pope Leo XIII clearly states that a presumed intention results in the Sacrament TRULY being conferred.

In the practical order, PRESUMPTION and EXTERNAL INTENTION amount to the same thing, but in REALITY (or TRULY), it's theoretically possible with subjectivist intention theory, that, say, Archbishop Lefebvre was not validly ordained a priest by Lienart, because Lienart was a Mason who, let's say, withheld his internal intention.  In that case, all of the SSPX bishops and priests, and many of the sedevacantist spinoff bishops and priests are all invalid ... in reality.  But Ibranyi does a good job of outlining here that if the Rite of the Church is performed, it assumes the intention of the Church.

There's really no other explanation for how atheists can validly baptized.  In no way, shape, or form can they have any other intention than, "I'm doing this thing that Catholics do." (most likely with the intention of humoring the Catholics requesting it or consoling them).  There can be no question whatsoever of their intending the Sacramental effect.  It's the same way that a priest who doesn't believe in transubstantiation (and considers it to be just words) still validly offers Mass by performing the Rites of the Church, which the CHURCH intends to confer the Sacrament.

So, given the Mormons use and have always used the Trinitarian formula (and water), does it matter that their belief of said Trinity is different?  If, up until 2000 or so, the Church accepted these baptisms as valid, why wouldn't these same principles apply?  If they don't, wouldn't that mean that the Church allowed invalid baptisms? And why would we, as Traditionalists, want to accept the decision of the Vatican II Sect on this matter?

While I do not support Ibranyi in most things, this is the most thorough treatment of the subject that I've found.

By
The Precious Blood of Jesus Christ,
The Grace of the God of the Holy Catholic Church,
The Mediation of the Blessed Virgin Mary,
Our Lady of Good Counsel and Crusher of Heretics,
The Protection of Saint Joseph,
Patriarch of the Holy Family,
The Intercession of Saint Michael the Archangel

and the cooperation of

Richard Joseph Michael Ibranyi

 

Quote from:  Pope Leo XIII, Apostolicae Curae

33. “With this inherent defect of ‘form’ is joined the defect of ‘intention’ which is equally essential to the Sacrament. The Church does not judge about the mind and intention, in so far as it is something by its nature internal; but in so far as it is manifested externally she is bound to judge concerning it. A person who has correctly and seriously used the requisite matter and form to effect and confer a sacrament is presumed for that very reason to have intended to do (intendisse) what the Church does. On this principle rests the doctrine that a Sacrament is truly conferred by the ministry of one who is a heretic or unbaptized, provided the Catholic rite be employed.

In the first underlined sentence Pope Leo teaches that if a minister uses a Catholic rite and the proper matter and form, the “sacrament is presumed” to be confected. But in the very next sentence he says that it is a doctrine that the “Sacrament is truly conferred” when a minister uses a Catholic rite, which implies the use of the proper form and matter. Why this contradiction?

There is no contradiction. We are held to understand what Leo teaches to be in agreement with e.g. what the Holy Office of Alexander VIII said. And before that, we are held to understand what Leo teaches as not self-contradicting.

In the given case the intention is merely presumed, as Leo explains. He gives the reason why:

The Church does not judge about the mind and intention, in so far as it is something by its nature internal; but in so far as it is manifested externally she is bound to judge concerning it.

Leo names one way, how an improper intention can become manifest: When the rite is changed. Changing the rite, is a sign that the intention is changed. That doesn't mean that there are no other ways how an improper intention can become manifest. An improper intention can obviously become manifest, e.g. if the minister proclaims it in advance. If he does so, he may be joking, but then the whole thing would be dubious, and lack of the proper intention presumed.

Then Leo mentions the "doctrine that a Sacrament is truly conferred when ...”. This doctrine does not include the idea of Ibranyi, that the presumption of a proper intention now miraculously turns into a certainty. This doctrine just puts the validity of baptisms of certain heretics etc. on the same plane with the validity of baptisms in the Catholic Church. In so far as no improper intention is manifest, a proper intention is presumed.

There is no contradiction at all. And there is no contradiction between Pope Leo XIII and the condemnation of the Holy Office of Pope Alexander VIII.