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Fr. Gallus Maria Manser traces St. Thomas's thought on the question of woman and its far-reaching implications, concluding that the Angelic Doctor's views are, in the end, truly the Christian ones

“But it will always remain true in general: there is nothing more unnatural and repulsive than when men become effeminate and women play men’s roles. And the reason lies in their different natures, which are the measure of their different activities and tasks… What Aristotle confirms about those Spartan women is also instructive for our time: that times of women’s emancipation have always also been times of the moral decline of women and, quite logically, of the disintegration of the family and the state!” - Fr. Gallus Maria Manser

Fr. Manser’s Biography
Born in 1866 in Brülisau, Switzerland, an alpine village located in the canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden, Gallus Maria Manser was a Dominican theologian, neo-scholastic philosopher and professor at the Collegium Canisianum.1

Manser attended a Benedictine grammar school in Einsideln, after which he studied philosophy in Monza and theology in Milan (1888–90). Once he deepened his study of St. Thomas, he detached himself from Molinism which he had previously espoused. In 1892, he was ordained to the priesthood and five years later admitted to the Dominican order.

In 1899, he was appointed Professor of Logic, Ontology and the History of Medieval Philosophy at the Collegium Canisianum. In addition to holding the chair for forty-three years, Manser twice served as Dean of the Faculty of Theology and four times as Rector of the University (1914–18). In 1941, he was appointed President of the newly founded Freiburg Philosophical Society.

Father Manser is known for the following three works:

• Das Wesen des Thomismus “The Essence of Thomism”, (1932)
• Das Naturrecht in thomist “Natural Law in Thomism”, (1944)
• Angewandtes Naturrecht “Applied Natural Law”, (1947)

In 1950, Manser died and went to his eternal reward, leaving behind an impressive body of work.

Editors’ Note
The following translation is as faithful to the original German text as possible, maintaining the original emphases and style. With that said, this is by no means the official and final English translation of the text, although we believe it to be a credible and respectable one.
Now, without further ado, The Journal of American Reform is pleased to present Father Gallus Maria Manser’s 1919 overview of the views of Saint Thomas on the woman question.

The Woman Question According to Thomas Aquinas by Dr. G. M. Manser, O.P.
Introduction
Lay friends have asked me to explain St. Thomas’s teaching on the position of women. I have attempted to fulfill this request in the following brief lines. These are written without polemical intent, but not without the intention of correcting some views erroneously attributed to Thomas Aquinas on the woman question, taking them from the context of his teaching. They are not written with the immodest intention of effectively opposing the prevailing trend of the times, which seeks to thrust women everywhere into public and political life and activity. It is too late for that anyway. They only intend to provide some orientation and to make it easier for some in our camp to form their personal opinions on the pressing questions to come. Let us salvage what can still be salvaged in the present confusion. Without and against our will, the exalted priestess of the house will be torn from her ancestral sanctuary. The mighty storm of upheaval, ignited by Europe’s defection from Christ, which is raging against us from all sides and will likely shatter the last pillars of Christian marriage, family, and school, may overwhelm us Catholics. But it should not sweep us away and make us complicit in the impending ruin. Then, if the dawn of a new age seeking Christ ever breaks again, it will judge us not as “apostates,” but only as “downtrodden” and as valiant fighters who remained unwaveringly loyal to their banner. In any case, we will have done our duty!


The history of woman is more than any other a long history of suffering. It tells us of two equally extreme positions that women occupied among different peoples at different times, two positions that often merged into one another as reactions, and which, despite their opposition, nevertheless both repeatedly led down the same path of unbearable suffering and led to humiliations. This is proof that both positions are unnatural and can never give woman what is rightfully hers and what is capable of making her happy.



a) Often enough, woman was nothing more than the common, despised slave of the house, entirely at the mercy of the tyrannical man, the victim of his whims and passions. It was the position in which woman, as Weiss says,2 had only duties towards man, but no rights, and man had no duties, only rights. With human dignity, the source of all natural respect, she was also denied all moral power, all right to trust and moral reliability. What the Greek poet Menander said about woman: “Never give a woman good advice, for she herself always advises evil deeds.”3 was perhaps the bitterest thing that could be said about her. It was not only barbaric peoples who imposed this dishonorable servitude on women, but also, at times, Sparta, Athens, and Rome. Aristotle, the greatest political theorist of antiquity, did attempt to grant women a more dignified position. For him, she is by nature a “free person” (I. Pol. 1), whom men should treat with love and kindness (VIII. Eth. Nic. 12). But this remained largely theoretical. And in the end, with him as with the Romans and even the ancient Germanic peoples, reason of state had the final word in all dispositions concerning woman and whatever had to be dear and precious to her. It is also telling enough that a Jew influenced by Philo of Alexandria, who was quite familiar with the Old Testament, still considered woman the source of sensuality and evil at the time of Christ’s birth.4



b) A second, no less one-sided view assigned to women the position of ruler, along with the rights and duties of men. Since a woman’s little finger often means as much as her whole hand, even the absolute equality with men that the Sociologists had voluntarily offered her was not enough. She wanted to rule, in the home and more than once in politics as well.5 This misguided path of women was not entirely self-inflicted. Men’s passions contributed to it, not only the false gallantry of Romanticism, which idolized women for less than honorable reasons, but even earlier.6 More often than not, this unbridled lust for power was an exaggerated, but explainable reaction to the pitiful oppression on the part of the man, or at least to his reprehensible neglect. As is well known, Rome experienced such a women’s emancipation during the imperial period, and the lament of the poet Horace: “Now the woman is master, but the man sighs in silence and grumbles in the circle of his friends, yet he obeys,”7 was bitter enough. Not only in the home and in society did women call the shots, as Tacitus reports, but also in politics.8 Women in Sparta had won a similar position for themselves in the 5th century BC.9 There, too, women’s emancipation was partly a consequence of earlier subjugation and partly the effect of protracted wars, which kept men away from the hearth for extended periods. Aristotle and Plutarch ironically recount how the brazen, exuberant Spartan women of that time boasted of masculine heroic virtues, accused men of cowardice, and then, at the first sign of trouble, when they scarcely caught sight of the enemy campfires, lost their minds in fear.10 However, women have not always been so cowardly in war! But it will always remain true in general: there is nothing more unnatural and repulsive than when men become effeminate and women play men’s roles. And the reason lies in their different natures, which are the measure of their different activities and tasks. Here, natural law emerges in all its starkness! What Aristotle confirms about those Spartan women is also instructive for our time:11 that times of women’s emancipation have always also been times of the moral decline of women and, quite logically, of the disintegration of the family and the state!

Thomas Aquinas does not grant woman either of these two extreme positions. He is too sober, too serious, too far-sighted, too Christian for that. He considers woman neither an “angel” nor a “slave.” To him, she is a human being, like man, fallen like him and earlier than he, but with less responsibility than he, because he is her head, not his “slave,” but his “friend” and companion, just like him: called to eternal happiness. Let us define Aquinas’s position even more precisely: his standpoint on the woman question is the Christian one, which he maintains and defends for woman: I. with regard to her origin, II. as wife and companion, III. in her civic and social life, and finally IV. as a child of God.

I. The Origin of Woman
The origin of woman can be spoken of in a twofold sense: the creation of the first woman and the generation of those that follow.

We know the creation of the first woman only from the original revelation. True to his Christian standpoint, Thomas Aquinas therefore develops his understanding of the first woman created from Holy Scripture. The immediate premises on which he bases his conclusions are those verses from the first book of Genesis: “God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them” (1:27). “It is not good for man to be alone. Let us make a helper for him in his likeness” (2:18). “And the Lord God made a woman from the rib that he had taken from Adam” (2:22). Expressed in thesis form, Aquinas’s doctrine concerning the first woman created is as follows:

• Just as Adam was the first man, so too God created Eve, the first woman, immediately and directly himself (S. Th. I. 92. 4).
• By creating the first woman from man, He created her of the same essence as him, “idem secundum speciem,” that is, with the same human nature that Adam possessed (I. 92. 2 ad 2). Woman belongs neither to a higher level of being than he does, nor to a lower one; she is a human being, just as he is.
• Man is the principle and end of woman. “vir est principium mulieris et finis” (I. 93. 4 ad 1). The principle: for this reason God created woman from Adam, so that man might be the principle of the entire human race, and so that he might love woman all the more intimately, remaining united with her in indissoluble fidelity and domestic cooperation. As Christ is the head of the Church, so man is the head of woman (1. 92. 2). But the end of woman is man because, for his sake, she was created by God the Lord as his helper for the propagation of the human race (I. 92. 1).
• Consequently, even in the original state, before sin, before God spoke to the sinful woman: “Thou shalt be under the power of the man” (Gen. 3:16), there was a subordination of woman to man, her head and principle; he surpassed woman in intellectual acuity even in the original state. This submission, however, was not a “servile” one, but a “domestic” one, which serves woman’s own benefit and welfare, and which is grounded in the differently participated human nature of the two sexes: “naturaliter femina subjecta est viro, quia naturaliter in homine magis abundat discretio rationis” (I. 92. 1 ad 2).
• But both, man and woman, are the special image of God, for woman too possesses a spiritual soul, “intellectualem naturam.” Only insofar as the image of God is particularly pronounced in man — insofar as he is the principle and goal of woman, just as God is the principle and goal of the universe (I. 93. 4. ad 1) — is the image of God more especially pronounced in man.

These doctrines make little impression on Christian thinkers. We have long known them and grown accustomed to them. But viewed in the light of cultural history, in the light of all that ancient and modern paganism said about the nature and position of women — all that was base and vile — these statements suddenly acquire a monumental significance. And Thomas Aquinas even stands in contrast to some ecclesiastical writers of the patristic period. According to him, all the aforementioned statements are valid even independently of original sin. Even without original sin, man and woman would have had sɛҳuąƖ relations with one another and begotten children, albeit without being subject to the consequences of the first sin (II. Sent. D. 20. g. 2. a. 2.); for all this is good in itself, lies in human nature, which could not be altered by original sin (ibid. a. 1). The opposing view of Gregory of Nyssa and other Platonizing early Christian writers, who considered everything sɛҳuąƖ to be contemptible in itself and consequently attributed it to the first sin — a view initially even embraced by the great Augustine —12 Thomas rejects as unnatural (1. 98. 2). Clearly, his position is more natural, healthier, and more humane!

Serious reproaches have been leveled against Thomas because of his view on the generation of women.

He is said to have called the woman born in marriage a “mutilated” or “misbegotten” man! And indeed, following Aristotle’s De Animal generatum, I. II. c. 3, and elsewhere, he speaks of woman as a “vir occasionatus”!

This expression might elicit a mocking smile from some. Others, to be sure, took it more seriously. They found in this view the deepest denigration of women. They could not conceive that the prince of the Scholastics could simply regard the birth of a female being as something “accidental”, as a kind of “deformity”. They had the dark suspicion that Thomas, misled by the pagan Aristotle — who in any case did not think clearly about providence — might have considered woman as a being that was not, or would not be, part of the intention of divine providence.

Let us also make a confession here. If Thomas had really taught anything of the kind, one would, in our view, have to be not merely outraged at him but astonished. Obviously, such a theory would be in direct contradiction with what he teaches about the creation of the first woman. Surely he could not call monstrosities special images of God! And if, according to him, the birth of every female human being were a “deformity,” or something “accidental” not willed by God, a “misfortune,” how could Thomas then maintain the view that even without sin, in a state of innocence, where deformities and misfortunes could not possibly exist, there would have been human procreation, and indeed an equal number of males and females (I. 99. 2.)? And remarkably, even where he calls woman a “vir occasionatus,” he raises this very objection we have made and most decisively rejects the idea that “vir occasionatus” meant anything “defective” (I. 99. 2. ad 1) or “unnatural” for woman (II. Sent. D. 20. q. 2. a. 1). Therefore, something must be wrong with the above interpretation given to the famous “vir occasionatus.”

And indeed, it is not true! Anyone who has read St. Thomas himself knows why it is not true! His view has a completely different meaning. Let us outline it briefly.

In the interacting natural causes, there is a twofold distinct order: the causal activity of an individual being, “naturae particularis,” on another, and the causal activity of the universe, “naturae universalis” (II. Sent. D. 20. g. II. a. 1 ad 1):

• The first category includes the reproductive activity of man and woman. Man and woman behave as active and passive principles (I. 98. 2; III. 67. 4 ad 3). It is characteristic of every active principle to produce an effect similar to itself (II. Sent. D. 20. q. II. a. 1); hence the famous axiom “omne agens agit sibi simile” (I. 19. 2), upon which, according to Christian philosophy, not only all creative and created activity is based, but also the Trinitarian generation in God (I. 27. 4). From this, however, it logically follows that the more powerful and perfect an active principle is, the more similar its effect will be to itself, that is, the more perfect it will imprint its own form upon the effect, by virtue of which it is active (De Verit. 25. 5). Thus, if man is the active principle in generation, and he is the only active principle (III. 67. 4 ad 3), then his human-masculine nature or form, which participates in him, always tends in itself to the generation of a male being (De Verit. 5. 9 ad 9; 1. 92. 2. ad 1). If, nevertheless, a female being is generated, this lies outside the natural tendency of the active principle — praeter intentionem naturae particularis — ; thus, for the active principle in question, it is something “accidental”, a “vir occasionatus”. This effect must therefore be attributed to other causes, be they external or internal: such as the weakness of the active principle, or the extraordinary influence of the imagination, which, being strongly impressed and shaken, is capable of producing profound bodily changes (II. Sent. D. 20. g. II. a. 1 ad 2). With the latter, Thomas invokes a principle to explain the question that, as is well known, has been glorified by great modern poets in the same field and that plays a major role in the extraordinary phenomena of hypnotism.
• The origin of woman is different in the order of universal causality. There, woman is in no way something “accidental,” “femina non est aliquid occasionatum” (I. 92. 2. ad 1), nor is woman to be considered something “defective,” “nec corruptio.” Rather, her origin is an effect of general natural causality, which depends on God (ibid.). Since she is necessary for the propagation of mankind and the preservation of the species, she is ordained for this purpose by divine providence “per providentiam divinam” (II. Sent. D. 20. g. II. a. 1. ad 1), which is why God created her in the beginning, just as he created man (I. 92. 2. ad 1).

Thomas, therefore, no more removes the development of woman from divine providence than that of man, nor is woman in any way “accidental” in the plan of divine providence, or even a “monstrosity.”

The problem of “sex determination” remains unresolved to this day. Even modern physiology has not solved it. Perhaps it never will be solved. We do not consider ourselves called upon to go further into this question, although the theory of St. Thomas indeed contains promising points of comparison with modern hypotheses. In any case, even the hypothesis which Landois considers the most probable13 does not save us from the “game of chance” unless the higher providential governance of God is also invoked — and that is precisely what Thomas Aquinas did. This, too, was a “Christian” thought!

II. The Wife and Mother
Marriage, says Thomas, is the union of man and woman with the intention of bearing and raising children for the glory of God (IV. C. G. 78). A good woman recently wrote: “The most sacred thing to us is the family, and those who kindle and tend the embers of the holy hearth should not be torn from their and our sanctuary.” This is not only a perfectly sound but also a glorious statement. This agrees completely with Thomas Aquinas (I. 92. 1). The family circle is the center of women’s activity. Motherhood is a woman’s first and main vocation. And even virginity, praised to God and considered more exalted than marriage (II-II. 152. 4), is only so on the condition that provision is made for the propagation of the human race (ibid. 2. ad 1). But motherhood, according to Thomas, consists not merely in bearing children, but above all in raising them to the glorification of God (II-II. 102. 1). The more frivolous use of the words “father” and “mother” today for the animal kingdom would hardly have the approval of Aquinas. “Father” and “mother,” in the truly strict sense of the word, can only be rational beings who know the goal and the means to that end and can guide the child, through instruction and guidance, to the goal, that is, to the glory of God. Thus, the family circle is truly a “sanctuary.” A high conception of the names “father” and “mother,” so dear and fierce to us!

This conception of the family already sheds light on the legal and social position that Thomas accords to the wife and mother in the family, even after the Fall. Certainly, the wife and mistress is subject to her husband, “vir est caput mulieris” (I. 92. 2). He teaches this on the authority of Holy Scripture (Com. in I. Cor. 11. 3). He derives this from the nature of both. In agreement with Augustine,14 he considers man more perfect in body and soul than woman (II. Sent. D. 21. g. II. a. 1; III. C. G. 123), because he is the active principle, and she the passive one (in I. Cor. 11. 3). Since woman is inherently weaker, she was first tempted in Paradise (II-II. 165. 2 ad 1). He also derives the same submission from the relationship between Christ and the Church, the model of Christian marriage. As the Church is subject to Christ, her Head, so the wife is to her husband (III. C. G. 123). — However, this subordination is not servile — servilis — , where the dominant party exploits the dominated for its own benefit, but a domestic one, for the benefit of the subordinate itself (I. 92. 1. ad 2). And since man and woman possess the same human nature and only participate in it to different degrees, this inequality is merely one of degree — inequalitas quantitatis (IV. Sent. D. 32. g. I. a. 3).

In addition, there is also a certain equality between husband and wife. Just as two friends, each according to their own nature, are active in one and the same friendship, and yet are equal to one another, for otherwise they would not be friends (III. Sent. D. 28. g. I. a. 3 ad 3), so too are wife and husband. The principle of equality of proportion applies to them, meaning that although they are unequal in nature and sex, they are equal to each other with regard to what corresponds to the nature of each spouse and therefore to their different sexes, and thus both have the same rights and duties towards each other (IV. Sent. D. 32. g. I. a. 3). Thus, Thomas succeeds in proclaiming complete legal equality between spouses — precisely in the area where, in antiquity, the woman lacked rights vis-à-vis the man: namely, with regard to sɛҳuąƖ relations. (II-II. 32. 8 ad 2).

This equality allows him to further understand the relationship between father and mother, husband and wife, in a much higher, nobler sense. The marital bond is a bond of friendship. It signifies perfect friendship, “perfecta amicitia” (Com. in Is. c. 4), indeed, it seems to be the highest friendship, “maxima amicitia,” on earth (III. C. G. 123). Anyone who knows how ideally and sublimely Thomas constructed the concept of friendship also knows what this means for the position of woman as wife and mother. Friendship is the most perfect benevolence, that is, the most perfect love (III. Sent. D. 27. g. 2. a. 1). Five things are characteristic of a friend: he desires that his friend exist and live; he wishes him only good things; he does him only good things; he interacts with him lovingly and lives peacefully with him (II-II 25. 7). Above all, however, he is his comforting refuge in fearful hours of grief (I-II 28. 1 ad 2) and the confidant of his secrets (IV. C. G. 21). This, according to Thomas, is how the relationship between husband and wife should be!

But the highest thing that can be said of the Christian woman as wife and mother, he said following the words of Ephesians verse 32, “Marriage is a great sacrament, but I speak of Christ and the Church.” St. Thomas, when speaking about our question, does not express any thought so frequently as that Pauline saying.15 As the Church is to Christ, so is woman to man! What a sublime conception of woman’s dignity! How can there still be talk of degradation and humiliation in her position as wife and mother? Where is the slave of antiquity? What fruitful, tender, noble, and pure love, and what unbreakable fidelity and mutual support, should not bind the two spouses together?

In a time that has already frequently discarded the indissolubility of marriage and threatens monogamy, the unity of marriage, with outright attacks, it is perhaps appropriate to point out with what mastery Thomas, in his Summa contra Gentiles, defends these two pillars of the domestic sanctuary. And this seems all the more justified here since both theses are essentially nothing other than a vigorous defense of woman. We will, however, only briefly outline the evidence.

The dissolution of marriage, says Thomas, is detrimental to: 1) the preservation of private property within one and the same family; 2) it violates the equality of women, who, having lost their beauty and fertility, find it more difficult to establish a new household than a divorced man; 3) it is against the welfare of children; 4) it is against the friendship that should bind spouses; 5) it is contrary not only to natural law but also to divine law, and above all to the indissoluble union of Christ and the Church; 6) finally, it endangers domestic peace, the maintenance of orderly household affairs, and is a source of strife and enmity among relatives, not infrequently the cause of marital infidelity (III. C. G. 123).

The situation is similar with polygamy. While it is not, like polyandry (multiple husbands), contrary to the primary purpose of marriage, procreation, which is why it was occasionally permitted by dispensation in the Old Testament (III. C. G. 125), polygamy is: 1) contrary to the equality of women with men; 2) contrary to friendship between spouses. Here, the woman is reduced again to the role of servant and maid; 3) contrary to the care for children; and finally, 4) a source of bitter domestic disputes (III. C. G. 124).

These brief remarks demonstrate how concerned Thomas was with the dignified position of women in the family. The unity, equality, and indissolubility of marriage are, for him, the three pillars upon which the happiness of the domestic hearth, the family, rests.

Educators have often argued amongst themselves about whether the father or the mother is more important in rearing children. The influence of the mother — her deeply feminine nature, her kindness, gentleness, concern for even the smallest child’s needs, and her religious depth — usually only becomes clear to us when we are dealing with children whose mothers have been taken from them early by a harsh fate. They are withered flowers, deprived of the necessary sunshine of youth. Thomas Aquinas unhesitatingly assigns the primary task of raising children to the mother, “feminis maxime incuмbit officium educandae prolis” (IV. Sent. D. 27. g. I. a. 1. g. II). And he makes the insightful observation: “guamvis pater sit dignior, guam mater, tamen circa prolem magis officiosa est mater guam pater” (IV. Sent. D. 27. g. I. a. 1).

But he, too, was aware of the gap that fatherless child-rearing leaves for later life, not only because of the frequently lacking strength of character and will, but also because of a certain narrowness and limitation of the intellectual horizon. The father’s intellect sees further than the mother’s, and therefore the stricter, punitive, restraining, guiding authority of the father is just as necessary for the successful upbringing of children as his influence on instruction (III. C. G. 122 and 123).

III. The Civil Status of Women
After what has been said, hardly anyone would expect Thomas Aquinas to advocate the civil equality of women with men.

According to him, as the creation account demonstrates, God created woman, the most sacred and venerable source of humanity, with her subordination to man. This subordination according to him is anchored in the nature of woman, “naturaliter femina subjecta est viro” (I. 92. 1 ad 2). It is thus grounded in divine decrees and in the order of natural law. If woman is by nature more imperfect than man and therefore subject to him under natural law, this subordination cannot refer solely to marriage and domestic life, for nature always remains the same, but must also extend to civil, public, and political life. However, if she is civilly subject to man, then there can be no talk of civil equality between the two. Hence the curious phenomenon in Thomas Aquinas that, where he speaks of the “domestic submission” (subjectio oeconomica) of women, he also simply calls them “civil” (civilis) (I. 92. 1 ad 2). For him, they are one and the same.

This conception of the civic-public position of women is so self-evident to Thomas Aquinas that, to our knowledge, he never addressed the question of the civic equality of women with men ex professo. However, he touches upon this matter — particularly in the context of public ecclesiastical offices and functions, to which he flatly denies women any right or eligibility — consistently basing his position on Holy Scripture and the subordination of woman to man under natural law.

The words of the Apostle to the Gentiles, Paul, in 1 Corinthians 14:34: “Women should remain silent in the churches,” and 1 Timothy 2:12, “but not to teach as a woman should, nor to exalt herself above a man,” constitute the scriptural proofs on which Thomas relies. The natural subordination of woman to man as head serves him as a rational basis for his view. Because woman is subject to man, “quia mulier statum subjectionis habet,” she is absolutely unfit to receive ecclesiastical ordination and even if such powers were conferred upon her, they would be invalid (IV Sent. D. 25. g. II. a. 1.). For the same reason, she cannot receive the power of the keys, neither consecration nor jurisdictional authority (IV Sent. D. 19. g. I. a. 1. g. III. ad 4.). He decides no differently with regard to the office of public teaching. Privately, she may teach (Com. in I Timoth. II. 11.). Publicly, however learned and holy she may be, is forbidden to her, as a synod of Carthage already decided (III. 67. 4 ad 1). Aquinas even sees women exercising their public teaching office a moral danger, a point of view that may seem narrow-minded, but which will be completely clear to those who look deeper and take life according to its inner difficulties. The main reason, however, why he denies women the right to public teaching within the Church is and always remains the same: their subordination to men, “principaliter propter conditionem feminei sexus, qui debet esse subditus viro” (II-II. 177. 2.). This is also the reason why it was fitting that Christ assumed the nature of man, and not that of the weaker sex, for He came as head of the Church, as teacher, leader, and defender of humankind (III. Sent. D. 12. g. III. a. 1).

Even though Thomas, in the passages above, speaks only of public-ecclesiastical offices and positions, it is nevertheless clear to everyone that the motives which he adduces speak against any civil equality of the woman with the man. Moreover, he explicitly denies women the title of “full citizen,” stating, “mulieres, quibus non competiter simpliciter esse cives” (I-II. 105. 3. ad 1).

Without a doubt, our time will raise many objections to St. Thomas’s theory. People will point to the changed circuмstances and the hardships of the age, to the multitudes of politically well-trained working women whom we need to prevent the revolution. It will be said that the political equality of women with men will come without us. It can unfortunately be rightly pointed out that large numbers of working-class women have already become estranged from the domestic hearth, and that they were torn from their ancestral sanctuary without being protected. There are also not a few among our stalwart Catholic working women who hope, despite the public and political activity into which they will be thrown with political equality, to preserve the noble feminine virtues and to protect the Christian spirit of the family, the nucleus of the state and the common good.

And indeed, much can be said for these worthy working women, who have often been true heroines of faith and virtue even before. But heroic lineages generally do not last many decades, and heroic deeds can be expected of individuals, not of the general public. Once introduced, however, misguided political principles persist and have an effect for centuries. And what then, when circuмstances are stronger than people, and the Christian family is lost to us through the entanglement of housewives with political squabbles? And should we, because unfortunately a large number of working-class mothers have been torn from the sanctuary of the family and bear the superhuman, double-burden of housewife and factory worker on their shoulders, also abandon the rest and deprive them of domestic peace and happiness? Should we therefore expose the family to further dangers? And all this simply because of the highly dubious political successes that are expected from the political equality of women? Won’t the leaders of the coup simply mobilize just as many, or even more, new troops? And when the wife and mother one day goes to the polls herself, and is embroiled in political squabbles at home, in the streets, and at election rallies, or even holds political office, will she still exert the same moral influence on her husband and voting sons as before? Will she still play the role of the wise counselor behind the throne? Will she still have the same interest in charitable works? Will she still accomplish the great things she has done so far?

However, all these considerations, interesting in themselves, miss the point. They amount to purely utilitarian considerations. There is something in women’s political equality and their involvement in the passionate political arena that contradicts the noblest aspect of their high calling as women and mothers, something that violates the divinely created nature of womanhood. We Catholics are strong by nothing but our principles. Therein lie the roots of our strength. The changing times do not alter these principles. What is contrary to the divine and natural laws will always have its consequences. The history of women clearly demonstrates this. Let others stray from the paths of the natural order; that is their business. We should not be complicit in this transgression!

IV. Woman as a Child of God
After the humiliation, contempt, and disgrace that women had to endure in antiquity, only Christianity could restore her rights and dignity. Christianity alone will continue to protect them. Neo-paganism will not treat them any more nobly than the old paganism. All the hymns and praise of women’s rights, women’s freedom, and civic equality will ultimately throw women back into their old misery when the spirit of Christianity fades more and more from society, and this world sun withdraws its life-giving, radiant, and transfiguring rays from women’s domestic and social activities. The de-Christianized man will once again exploit the de-Christianized woman for his own purposes. Ultimately, he is always the stronger sex, however one may deny any natural-law subordination; that changes nothing about reality, and where power reigns over law and honor, the weaker party will have to ask for slave chains!

According to Thomas Aquinas, Christianity truly bestowed the most sublime dignity upon woman. It first restored her natural rights. Then, however, it added a higher, supernatural dignity to her natural one.

Indeed, woman fell first, and not only did she drag man down with her, but her pride against God was greater than Adam’s. But man also fell, and his responsibility was greater, because he was her head and therefore more perfect than she (II-II. 163. 4). In the life of grace acquired through holy Baptism, however, the woman is fully equal in rank to the man; there is no difference between man and woman (Comm. in I Cor. c. 11), according to the words of the Apostle to the Gentiles: “There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, neither man nor woman, for you are all one in Christ Jesus” (Comm. on Gal. 3:28). Also, God can bestow the gift of prophecy upon the woman, as upon the man (II-II. 177. 2 ad 2), and at times the woman surpasses many men with regard to supernatural gifts and illuminations: “cuм quandoque mulier inveniatur melior quantum ad animam multis viris” (IV Sent. D. 25. q. II. a. 1 ad 1).

The dignity of women was given particular prominence in Mary. As the mother of the Redeemer, she possessed the highest degree of purity and grace that could befall any creature in heaven or on earth (III. Sent. D. 12. g. III. a. 2). She has glorified the entire female sex (III. 31. 4). Just as it is to the glory of the male race that Christ assumed male nature, so it is to the great glorification of the female race that he assumed human nature from a woman (ibid. ad 1). Thus, both sexes received their glorification in the Incarnation of Christ (III. Sent. D. 12. g. III. a. 2). The first man was brought forth by God without male and female; the first woman came from the man without female; It was fitting for Christ, the Redeemer, to come as a man from woman without man, so that the female sex would not be despised, “ne tamen sexus femineus contemneretur” (III. 31. 4).

Here, as everywhere in his pronouncements on woman and in his entire position on the woman question, Aquinas relies on the great Aurelius Augustine. The prince of Scholasticism stands on the shoulders of the prince of the Church Fathers!

At the outset, we called St. Thomas’s view of woman “Christian.” We hope to have provided brief evidence that it truly is. Therein lies the greatness and powerful strength of this view. In this alone also lies our strength amidst the surging storms that are currently raging over the unfortunate European family of nations and that threaten Christian marriage and family, the venerable sanctuary of woman, more than ever. Here too, the Word applies, and nowhere more so than here: There is no other name under heaven given to mankind by which we must be saved (Acts 4:12).

1
The following biography is drawn from the following two sources: Bibliothèque de Genève. “Gallus Maria Manser.” Iconographie, Bibliothèque de Genève; Eßer, Ambrosius. “Manser, Gallus Maria (Taufname: Joseph Anton)” In Neue Deutsche Biographie 16 (1990): 77–78. Deutsche Biographie.
2
Weiss, Apologie des Christentums, I (1888), p. 401.
3
Ibid., p. 447.
4
Philo of Alexandria, De opificio mundi, §36.
5
Weiss, Apologie des Christentums, I, p. 402.
6
Ibid., p. 444.
7
Horace, Carmina [Odes] 3.24.19.
8
Tacitus, Annales 2.55; 4.33.
9
Cf. Wilhelm Onken, Die Staatslehre des Aristoteles, vol. I, p. 262.
10
Ibid. pp. 263-4.
11
Aristotle, Politics II.6.
12
St. Augustine, De bono conjugali 2, PL 40:374–75; cf. J. Mausbach, Die Ethik des heiligen Augustinus, I, p. 319.
13
L. Landois, Lehrbuch der Physiologie des Menschen (1916), II, pp. 923–4.
14
Cf. Mausbach, [Die Ethik des heiligen Augustinus], I, 224n3.
15
St. Thomas, IV Sent. D. 33, q. 1, a. 1; Summa Theologiae I, q. 92, aa. 2–3; Summa contra Gentiles III, ch. 123; IV, ch. 78; Commentary on Ephesians 5:32; Commentary on 1 Corinthians, ch. 7.