Fr. Pagliarani actually did give the anti-vax moral position a significant weapon by way of his cornea analogy.
He argued that it's acceptable to use the cornea from a person who was "killed" (probably meant "killed" in the sense of "murdered").
But if the person indicates on his donor card that he does NOT wish to be an organ donor, is it still permitted, Father? Is it permitted to steal his remains against his wishes? This is the argument made by Father Ripperger. That it's unlawful possession (theft) of someone else's remains against their will.
Secondly, let's say there's a clinic down in Tijuana that puts out contracts to the drug lords to kill people off and bring their bodies in right away for organ transplants.
Is it permissible to go down to said clinic and get a cornea from one of those bodies? Of course not. You are participating in an immoral enterprise. You can't just say, "well, I don't agree with their murder operations" so it's OK for me to go get a cornea. This is the argument made by Archbishop Vigano, and Bishop Williamson agrees with it. Or it's like buying a car from a car lot where they specilize in stolen vehicles. By paricipating in their immoral enterprises (either the Tijuana clinic or the stolen car dealer), you're actually a CAUSE of their immoral activity by giving them the motive or incentive, the final cause for their activity. By your going down there, you're incentivizing them to kill even more people for organs.
Neither one of these scenarios can be rightly classified as remote material participation. Taking the cornea from a murder victim who designates on his donor card that he wishes to be an organ donor, that is in fact remote material cooperation. But that is NOT what's happening here. What's happening here is like the other two scenarios combined that I mentioned.