In his book Contra Cekadam, Fr. Chazal notes what he refers to as the traditional Dominican distinction between "per se" and "quoad nos," and says "[t]hings that have happened before God may not have yet happened before men" (page 93).
A heretical pope both "per se," ipso facto, falls out of the Church and ceases to be pope, and yet at the same time, "quoad nos" and in the external realm, in the body, remains in the seat until removed. This should be obvious. A pope who has fallen "per se" or ipso facto from the Church, and hence from the headship of the Church, remains where he is unless either he voluntarily leaves or someone declares him to have left and removes him. This is just what happens among men, "quoad nos."
"Sed contra — The fundamental logical inconsistency in this passage (of John of St. Thomas regarding the judgment of the Church being required) consists in the assertion that one who is manifestly a heretic and therefore separated from the Church quoad se, and accordingly judged so by private judgment, would, still be a member of the Church and the head because he remains to be so quoad nos, and therefore would still actually be a member of the Church and its head. John of St. Thomas’ distinction quoad se/ quoad nos is not a Thomistic distinction, and is a distinction only in the subjective order, and not in the order of being, and is therefore founded on a fallacy which fails to distinguish between what exists in the order of being, and is therefore prior and better known per se, as opposed to what is better known quoad nos. Hence, if the defection into heresy is manifest, or is at least visible and recognizable as such, then it is evident and by nature better known per se that he is separated from the Church, and consequently the heretic’s separation from the Church is true pe se, because it is true in the order of being, even if it is not always immediately or manifestly evident quoad nos. If the heretic’s separation is actually known by us, he is separated quoad nos, and since it is known as an evident fact, it is known to exist per se because, 'that which is non-existent cannot be known. One who is publicly seen to visibly separate himself from the Church by an act of manifest heresy, is publicly seen by that act to sever directly and per se the external bond which united him to the body as a member, and therefore he ceases to be a member simpliciter, i.e. without qualification, and therefore it cannot be said that the separation exists only in a qualified manner, i.e. quoad se, but not quoad nos, as if the separation is merely spiritual in the manner of an internal separation. Thus, it truly can be said of him, 'of himself (quoad se) he separates from the Church', by an actual visible severing of the external bond of union which effects a true and real ontological separation and exclusion from membership in the Church. It therefore does not follow, and is contradictory to say that the said separation which the heretic has accomplished of himself, being visibly a true and unqualified act of separation from external union and membership, is subject to the qualifying condition that the actual separation does not really take place unless, 'it be declared by the Church; even though of himself he separates from the Church,' for the reason that 'in respect to us (quoad nos) the separation is not understood to have taken place without this declaration.' John of St. Thomas’ error on this point is rooted in his failure to take into account the ambiguity of the terms upon which is based the 'distinction between truths prior to us and truths without qualification prior, which terms properly distinguish between the nature of what exists per se and is better known and prior without qualification, and what is known quoad nos. What is true per se is 'prior and better known in the order of being' and therefore 'without qualification prior' — whereas what is true quoad nos is qualified as 'what is prior and better known to man'. What John of St. Thomas says is only known quoad se, is actually known per se, and is per se prior and better known in the order of being. First of all, if the act of separation which has taken place is true in the order of being, then it is true per se. For that separation per se to be true in the order of being, it must be a visible act which directly and per se severs the external bond of union, and consequently it is necessarily a separation that is knowable quoad nos, even if it is not actually known to all. If the manifest act which necessarily causes separation from the Church is immediately seen and known, then it is known as evidently true to us (quoad nos), and therefore judged by us to have really taken place in the order of being, because the premises of that judgment, being primary and therefore basic truths, are manifestly true. A separation that exists per se is therefore known to exist quoad nos if the act causing that separation from the Church is immediately seen by us as evidently true, and accordingly forms the basis of our judgment. Then accordingly, from the immediately evident premises of our judgment, the separation is judged to be evidently true, being seen to be true in its evident principles. If the premises are immediately known (such as the cause of separation which is the act of heresy), and certain (such as the definition of what specifies the act as heretical), then they are certainly true, and consequently the judgment affirming that the heretic has separated himself from the Church necessarily follows as a conclusion from those premises, and is therefore known to be necessarily and certainly true in the order of being, because, 'that which is non-existent cannot be known'. The reason why this is true is that, 'Nothing is intelligible according to that it is in potency, but according to that it is in act, as is said in IX Metaph. Whence, since the possible intellect is in potency only in relation to intelligible being, it cannot be understood unless through its form which becomes by act'. Nothing is simply nothing at all, so there is nothing in the non-existent that can be known. Whatever is known, is known insofar as it is, and it is in virtue of its being in act through its form, and therefore exists in some manner, and is something, some being that can be known: apprehension is being, the notion of which is included in whatsoever one apprehends.' Therefore, a separation whose existence per se is necessarily contingent on an act that is visible and knowable as a true and certain external fact, is by that very contingency necessarily also a separation quoad nos, but if due to weakness of mind, some of us have not yet arrived at the truth of the heretic’s separation, then, for them only, it is not yet known quoad nos as a fact, since for them that knowledge is posterior and less known quoad nos than the fact which is prior and better known in the order of being per se. Yet since the one, who according to John of St. Thomas, is separated from the Church of himself, i.e. 'quoad se' but not quoad nos, is evidently separated per se from the Church in the order of being, then even if due to weakness of mind some of us do not subjectively grasp the evident truth of the reality of this separation in the order of being in the apprehension of our intellect and judge accordingly, the manifest heretic, nevertheless, being visibly separated per se from the body of the Church in the order of being, is separated from membership in the Church independently of whether or not some of us, or even most of us, actually arrive at knowledge of that truth which is per se plain as the light of day: 'For as the eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so is the reason in our soul to the things which are by nature most evident of all. Hence, Bellarmine says, “Often it happens, or certainly it can happen, that manifest heretics will simulate themselves as Catholics, likewise Jєωs, Turks, Pagans mix in with the faithful, and nevertheless they will not be of the Church”. Accordingly, one who in the order of being is not a true pope per se, is likewise not a pope in the order of being quoad nos, but will only appear to be pope to the weak-minded or the wilfully blind, but will not be pope because he is not of the Church."
Kramer, Paul. On the true and the false pope: The case against Bergoglio (pp. 169-173). Gondolin Press. Kindle Edition.
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