You are listening to an anonymous forum poster (who has no idea what they are talking about), and which contradicts what the rest of the planet attests to as a matter of fact, to form doubt there really was an abortion??

Abortions were illegal in the Netherlands until 1984, EXCEPT TO SAVE THE LIFE OF THE MOTHER:

https://www.google.com/amp/s/medicalxpress.com/news/2020-10-fetal-cells-1970s-power-medical.amp

Me too (for the reasons adduced by Fr. Scott).

Can’t wait to read your reasons.

But presuming we were wrong, the double effect analysis by Fr. Nitoglia would be insurmountable anyway.

Here's my thinking, and this has been touched on earlier a bit in discussions on this topic.

Let's say there's a gang who steals cars and then have a car lot where they sell this stuff.  Well, really wanting to get an extremely cheap car, I go to their lot and buy one, despite knowing that they're stolen.  I could say, "well, I don't condone their theft of the cars and I disagree with it and I wish they hadn't done it."  Do you, really?  No, you don't.  You're implicitly actually in formal agreement with what they did because you're reaping the benefits of their evil actions in getting a cheap car.  You're implicitly in formal cooperation with their evil deed.  This is not just a merely material cooperation.  Also, by creating a market for these stolen goods, you're also in cooperation with the evildoers by providing a formal motive for their evil activity.  It's similar to when you tempt someone to sin.  If I were to take pictures of naked women and put them in front of some young man's face, in inciting the evil, I would now be a formal cooperator in the resulting sin.  You can't just say, "well, I didn't really want him to consent."  We've also raised this issue before in the context of Sacramental theology.  If I take a loaded gun, put it against an innocent person's head, and pull the trigger, I can't just argue "well, I wanted to pull the trigger but I didn't want the person to die."  That's nonsense.  In willing the cause of death, you're also willing the death itself.  Consequently, in willing and participating in a formal cause/motive of the evildoers' actions (in the car stealing scenario), one is a participant in the formal motive behind the evil act, and are therefore a formal cooperator in the evil.  You can't just say, "I really want cheap cars, but I don't agree with these guys stealing them."  In wanting the one, you are implicitly wanting the other ... just as in the pulling the trigger scenario beforehand.  Just because the purchase of the car happened after the theft in time, it does not mean that your purchase of the automobile is not also a contributing cause of the theft and therefore entails formal cooperation.  While being posterior in time, it's still anterior from the perspective of causality.

And NOW, if we recognize that this isn't merely material cooperation in evil, suddenly double effect does play a role, and then I would agree with the rest of Fr. Nitoglia's analysis.  Now, there must be some principle of double effect to justify it, and then the criteria related to double effect come into play ... such as proportionality.  Going back to the car lot scenario.  If I'm practically dying of starvation and I need a car to be able to make some money, and the only one I can afford comes from that lot of stolen cars, I can purchase the car to ensure my survival even if it has the double effect of providing motivation to the car thieves.  But in the case of abortion, there's no proportionate justifying cause ... since one can never take an innocent life, even if in order to save millions of lives.

Here's my thinking, and this has been touched on earlier a bit in discussions on this topic.

Let's say there's a gang who steals cars and then have a car lot where they sell this stuff.  Well, really wanting to get an extremely cheap car, I go to their lot and buy one, despite knowing that they're stolen.  I could say, "well, I don't condone their theft of the cars and I disagree with it and I wish they hadn't done it."  Do you, really?  No, you don't.  You're implicitly actually in formal agreement with what they did because you're reaping the benefits of their evil actions in getting a cheap car.  You're implicitly in formal cooperation with their evil deed.  This is not just a merely material cooperation.  Also, by creating a market for these stolen goods, you're also in cooperation with the evildoers by providing a formal motive for their evil activity.  It's similar to when you tempt someone to sin.  If I were to take pictures of naked women and put them in front of some young man's face, in inciting the evil, I would now be a formal cooperator in the resulting sin.  You can't just say, "well, I didn't really want him to consent."  We've also raised this issue before in the context of Sacramental theology.  If I take a loaded gun, put it against an innocent person's head, and pull the trigger, I can't just argue "well, I wanted to pull the trigger but I didn't want the person to die."  That's nonsense.  In willing the cause of death, you're also willing the death itself.  Consequently, in willing and participating in a formal cause/motive of the evildoers' actions (in the car stealing scenario), one is a participant in the formal motive behind the evil act, and are therefore a formal cooperator in the evil.  You can't just say, "I really want cheap cars, but I don't agree with these guys stealing them."  In wanting the one, you are implicitly wanting the other ... just as in the pulling the trigger scenario beforehand.  Just because the purchase of the car happened after the theft in time, it does not mean that your purchase of the automobile is not also a contributing cause of the theft and therefore entails formal cooperation.  While being posterior in time, it's still anterior from the perspective of causality.

And NOW, if we recognize that this isn't merely material cooperation in evil, suddenly double effect does play a role, and then I would agree with the rest of Fr. Nitoglia's analysis.  Now, there must be some principle of double effect to justify it, and then the criteria related to double effect come into play ... such as proportionality.  Going back to the car lot scenario.  If I'm practically dying of starvation and I need a car to be able to make some money, and the only one I can afford comes from that lot of stolen cars, I can purchase the car to ensure my survival even if it has the double effect of providing motivation to the car thieves.  But in the case of abortion, there's no proportionate justifying cause ... since one can never take an innocent life, even if in order to save millions of lives.

But in the case of abortion, there's no proportionate justifying cause ... since one can never take an innocent life, even if in order to save millions of lives.

Ladislaus:
Let's say there's a gang who steals cars and then have a car lot where they sell this stuff.  Well, really wanting to get an extremely cheap car, I go to their lot and buy one, despite knowing that they're stolen.

Ladislaus:
If I take a loaded gun, put it against an innocent person's head, and pull the trigger, I can't just argue "well, I wanted to pull the trigger but I didn't want the person to die."  That's nonsense.  In willing the cause of death, you're also willing the death itself.  Consequently, in willing and participating in a formal cause/motive of the evildoers' actions (in the car stealing scenario), one is a participant in the formal motive behind the evil act, and are therefore a formal cooperator in the evil.

Here's the problem. The babies whose cells were used to develop vaccines were killed 50 years ago. Unless you believe in retrocausality, no action done today can have an effect that took place 50 years ago.