The vague and ambiguous posing of your questions makes me wonder what you are truly trying to prove. These are questions you already know the answer to, but you seem insistent on melding the definitions to somehow "catch" people to prove that it is "morally indifferent' to use fetal cell lines in vaccines. You have used the cover of stem cells, human cells, placental cells and umbilical cells to diffuse the true object which is fetal (baby) cells which will never be morally indifferent.
If moral philosophy involves this type of trickery, I'm glad I'm no scholar- you are just wrong.
This is why multi-volumed manuals of moral theology exist: because it is necessary to consider actions and their morality in se. For example, murder is wrong in se; therefore the act of murder can never be justified by double effect (i.e., since murder is wrong in se, there are no circuмstances under which it can be morally done). Morally indifferent or even morally good actions can be sinful based on circuмstances. For example, it is morally indifferent to mow the lawn, but to do so on Sunday would be morally wrong; nonetheless, even though it is wrong in that particular instance, the act of mowing the lawn is in se morally indifferent.
I ask these quetions and make these points because I believe they are relevant to the discussion at hand as to whether taking a vaccine in which fetal cells were used in the production can be justified as remote material cooperation in evil or not. Since taking a vaccine is morally indifferent and since using human cells to make vaccines is morally indifferent, it seems that the question is indeed one of cooperation in evil, cooperation in abortion after the fact.
You may dislike such discussion or find it distasteful, but there is along Catholic tradition of approaching moral problems in such a manner as this.