Medical consciousness

Scientists, not [tied?] to pharmaceutical companies, teach and demonstrate, after laboratory research, that in vaccines there are also cells of fetuses aborted expressly with abortion procured (and not accidentally by miscarriage) for the packaging of the vaccine serum. Moreover, their effectiveness is very doubtful and the dangers of serious side effects are admitted by many researchers. So the issue of vaccines has at least three problems of conscience, the first of which is a boulder.

There are hundreds of scientific publications on this topic and I refer the reader to them, which have been summarized in http://wwwrenovatio21.com of November 22, 2020.

With regard to the vaccine for covid/19 researchers also teach that it contains micro organisms that can change the behavior of humans, making it tele-guided as if it were a robot, so there is also this other ethical problem, that of artificial intelligence.

Moral theology

Recently, a study has been published in the U.S., which to resolve the question of whether or not it is licit to get vaccinated, applies the doctrine that is studied in moral theology a) on action with double effect and b) on cooperation only material to the formal sin of others.

In short, it is argued that it is not licit to manufacture vaccines with aborted fetuses expressly for the packaging of vaccine serums, but it is stated that it is licit to be vaccinated with them because it would be only material cooperation (getting vaccinated) to the formal sin of others (getting aborted women to produce vaccines with aborted fetuses).

Action with double effect

The problem a) of the cause with two effects and b) of material cooperation to the formal sin of others is the following:

is it licit a) to place an action, from which two effects are expected to follow: one good or at least indifferent and the other bad and then b) to cooperate only materially to the possible sin made by others?

Moral theology (see S. Th., I-II, qq. 18-20) teaches that an indirect voluntary act or in question is morally bad, if the agent foresees at least confusingly the bad effect of the good or indifferent act (for example, if I drink I foresee that I will get drunk and that I will blaspheme, now despite this I drink equally and blaspheme even if stunned without having full warning and deliberate consent in the act of blaspheming. Well, blasphemy was intentional in cause or indirectly and therefore I have seriously sinned).

However, exceptionally, moralists add that this can be licit, only if four conditions are met: 1°) the act must be good in itself, if it is bad it is forbidden as sinful; 2°) the operating subject must aim at the good effect and not at the bad one, that is he must have a morally good intention and the bad effect must not be wanted or foreseen directly, but only allowed indirectly; 3°) the two effects must not be connected between them so that the good effect (end) is born from the bad one (middle), because you cannot do the bad to obtain the good, the good end does not justify the bad means; 4°) there must be a serious, just and proportionate reason to allow and not want the bad effect.

Material cooperation to the formal sin of others

Formal cooperation, direct or positive to the sin of others, is always illegal in itself; material, indirect and negative cooperation may be lawful under certain conditions. In fact, it is not an action in the strict sense, but a negative behavior (silence, tolerance) in the face of the sin of others, not acting establishes no causality and does not involve any guilt in the evil that others do. However, it is an omission, so if there is a duty to act and to speak then the omission becomes a sin. It is lawful only if the rules of the indirect voluntary or in cause or on the omission of bad effects in a morally good act are verified.

The indirect or involved voluntary exists when something is not wanted in itself, but is only allowed to happen; however if you want something as a means to an end (for example, abortion of the fetus to treat the mother or to make a vaccine) the action is not lawful. If the effect of the volunteer in question is bad, it is imputed to the agent, if he predicted it at least in confusion (for example, Noah who did not know the effects of wine, was not guilty of his drunkenness) and if you had the power to omit the cause (if they block me with force and make me drink with violence a bottle of grappa I am not guilty of drunkenness).

The moralists explain that in material cooperation action is not directed to the sin of others, but the action of the co-operator (getting vaccinated) is exploited by the sinner (making vaccines with aborted fetuses) without the knowledge of the co-operator, as pure physical action without the knowledge of the co-operator, as pure physical action without any moral consent (for example, I sell a knife to Tizio who will kill Caius with it, without my having foreseen it; I get vaccinated without knowing that the vaccine contains aborted fetuses).

Different is the case of formal cooperation, but only implicit, ie that is not wanted inwardly, but lends itself physically and externally even if the act is intrinsically bad (for example, the nurse who works physically with the doctor to an abortion, even if it does not approve morally and inwardly, sins; who sacrifices outwardly to idols, even if inwardly abhors idolatry, sins). In fact it is never allowed to commit something that is sinful in itself, even if inwardly disagrees.

Divine Revelation (II Book of Maccabees, VI, 18, ff. ) narrates the magnificent and most current example given to us by the ninety year old scribe Eleazar, poured into the sacred Scriptures, who preferred to die rather than pretend only to eat pork: in fact, when the Syriacs opened his mouth to force him to eat pork, he resisted; since the Jєωs present, who loved him, dictated pure meat to him, telling him to pretend to eat pork, he replied that he could not pretend to have become a heathen and preferred to be martyred...but "where are the Maccabees? "Monsignor Lefebvre was asked in grief after the pan-ecuмenist day of Assisi in April 1986.

The material cooperation to the formal sin of others could be lawful, but it must be traced back to the indirect voluntary and the bad effect coming from a good act. In practice one must consider, if they occur, all four conditions that we have seen above, since only in this case is it licit to cooperate materially to the formal sin of others.

For example, if I rent a house to a doctor, whose abortion I know will be practiced there, I cannot do it, but I must avoid the bad effect that comes from renting my house, which will be used for the abortive practice.

Moreover, if the act has only bad effects, it is always illegal. Now many scientists believe that the vaccine anticovid/19 does not have any positive element, but there are many, if not all, seriously dangerous to health.

Solution of the problem

Now, if the above moral principles are applied to the case of the anticovid/19 vaccine, the result is that an indirect or voluntary act is morally bad, if the agent at least confusingly foresees the bad effect of the good or indifferent act; however, it can be lawful, only if four conditions are met: 1°) the act must be good in itself, if it is bad it is forbidden as sinful; 2°) the operating subject must aim at the good effect and not at the bad one, that is to say he must have a morally good intention and the bad effect must not be wanted or foreseen directly but only allowed indirectly; 3°) the two effects must not be connected between them so that the good effect is born from the bad one, because you cannot do the bad to obtain the good, the good end does not justify the bad means; 4°) there must be a serious, just and sufficiently proportionate reason to allow the bad effect.

Now, we see one by one the four conditions, in the case of the vaccine, except the second which is not strictly relevant to the morality of the act of vaccination:

1) the act must be good in itself, if it is bad is prohibited as sinful: inoculating a liquid made with aborted fetuses explicitly to package the vaccine is a bad act. This first condition alone makes the act of vaccination immoral and illegal. In addition, the vaccine anticovid/19 was conceived in the perspective of Transhumanism, which aims to create man with artificial intelligence instead of God: "Eritis sicut Dii" (Gen. III, 5). Finally, the side effects of vaccines are very dangerous for health.

2°) The two effects must not be linked together so that the good effect is born from the bad, because you can not do evil to get the good, the good end does not justify the bad means; now without aborted fetuses (half) you do not get the vaccine and prevention from covid/19 (end). So the supposed good effect (prevention of covid) comes directly from the bad one (liquid made with aborted fetuses). This condition alone also makes the act morally bad.

3°) There must be a serious, just and sufficiently proportionate reason to allow the bad effect (preventing a virus is not a reason to allow abortion, the vaccine is not a curative or life-saving medicine, but should be pure prevention of a flu).

Therefore, you can not apply the double-acting cause to vaccination.

d. Curzio Nitoglia

In the other two COVID19 vaccine threads, someone asked the question (paraphrasing), “How is using the organs of murder victims in transplants any different than using HEK293?”

It isn’t.

Both fail to meet the requirements for applying double effect described above.

Additionally, even the conciliar catechism implicitly forbids the use of organs harvested from murder victims when it declares:

“It is not morally acceptable if the donor or his proxy has not given explicit consent (no. 2296).”
http://www.scborromeo.org/ccc/para/2296.htm

Obviously, murder victims do not give consent to have their organs harvested.

Almost 17 years ago (2003?) I was working in an ER and was ordered to give a (fetal tissue) rabies vaccine. I called my NO priest spiritual director  to see if it was legitimate to give and he gave me the old " you are long distanced from the original abortion with the cell line used in the vaccine"- so it was ok by him. Prior to his "ordination" this priest was a lawyer . I still knew deep down that this wasn't right . Incredibly the hospital pharmacy had the rabies vaccine without the fetal cell line ( they had it back then- I don't know if they have it now) and it was easily accessible and usually stocked in ER so it wasn't much of a problem- I did not know this up front. God saved me from that one.
After this and few other events I quit the ER for good as I knew it was just another place where I could not protect my soul. It is a rare place in medicine that there aren't spiritual pitfalls, but most go unrecognized.

Fr. Gerald Kelly, S.J,  was arguing in his book Medico-Moral Problems (Imprimatur 1957, 1st edition 9/1958, 2nd online edition 1959) that nurses could participate in "illicit operations" under certain circuмstances.

See pp. 332-335 here: http://obrascatolicas.com/livros/Teologia/d-Medico-Moral%20Problems-%20Kelly%20SJ.pdf

His conclusion (I.e., Since the cooperation in evil is material, nurses participating in abortions can be justified in certain circuмstances) is unpersuasive.  It fails the double effect standard even more blatantly than the use of abortive vaccines.  And the remoteness argument does not even arise.  Neither does the indirect argument.

Nevertheless, he is given credit by some for taking medical moral theology in new directions:



I can't help thinking this Jesuit's conclusions were but another sign of the times: Late 50's; published 1 month before Pius XII died; 3.5 years before Vatican II; Jesuits already had legions of modernists within their ranks; and most importantly, he side-steps the double effect analysis completely; etc.

I’m not sure that double effect is what most of the vax condoners use.  They argue remote material participation ... which can be justified under certain conditions.

Yes, but they should, because to raise the material cooperation in evil argument is to necessarily invite the double effect test.

Direct voluntary = formal cooperation in evil; indirect voluntary = material cooperation in evil.

Material cooperation can sometimes be permissible, but to ascertain whether or not it is, one must conduct the double effect test.

In other words, those advocating or objecting on the basis of material cooperation in evil are actually/necessarily arguing from double effect (whether they perceive it or not).

It is for this reason that they stipulate the good to be derived must be proportionate to the evil permitted.  They just aren't carrying the analysis far enough.

So, for example, Fr. Scott says even if the act were only direct-involuntary (i.e., material) cooperation in evil, "There must always be a proportionate reason to use the indirect voluntary. that is, to permit something evil which is not directly willed.  Here the reasonable gain obtained by the use of the double effect, if it truly were indirectly willed only, which it is not) would not in any way be proportionate to the horrible evil of abortion, and the scandal would be immense."

And Don Nitoglia argues:

"Now, if the above moral principles are applied to the case of the anticovid/19 vaccine, the result is that an indirect or voluntary act is morally bad, if the agent at least confusingly foresees the bad effect of the good or indifferent act; however, it can be lawful, only if four conditions are met: 1°) the act must be good in itself, if it is bad it is forbidden as sinful; 2°) the operating subject must aim at the good effect and not at the bad one, that is to say he must have a morally good intention and the bad effect must not be wanted or foreseen directly but only allowed indirectly; 3°) the two effects must not be connected between them so that the good effect is born from the bad one, because you cannot do the bad to obtain the good, the good end does not justify the bad means; 4°) there must be a serious, just and sufficiently proportionate reason to allow the bad effect.

In other words, it is insufficient to state that "one can use the COVID19 vaccine because it is only material cooperation in evil," until one performs the double effect test and meets that standard.  Or stated differently, by arguing material cooperation in evil is permitted, one is asserting the cooperation has met the threshold for double effect.

Otherwise, without applying the double effect standard, material cooperation in evil would ALWAYS be permissible (which is crazy).

To only address, for example, only proportionality (as the incomplete material cooperationists often do), would be to ignore criteria 3 (i.e., the good effect cannot come directly from the evil act), which would be the same as saying that you can do evil so that good may come (which is rejected by all approved moralists).

Anyone who wises to justify material cooperation in evil must necessarily pass the double effect test (which is why Don Nitoglia is discussing it).

He says in applying the principle of double effect that the act in question is making a vaccine from aborted fetal cells, but isn't the act under consideration the taking of a vaccine?

2°) The two effects must not be linked together so that the good effect is born from the bad, because you can not do evil to get the good, the good end does not justify the bad means; now without aborted fetuses (half) you do not get the vaccine and prevention from covid/19 (end). So the supposed good effect (prevention of covid) comes directly from the bad one (liquid made with aborted fetuses). This condition alone also makes the act morally bad.

If the act in question is taking a vaccine, then prior abortion was not an effect of the act in question. It’s the principle of double _effect_ after all.

...which is shown not to apply.

2°) The two effects must not be linked together so that the good effect is born from the bad, because you can not do evil to get the good, the good end does not justify the bad means; now without aborted fetuses (half) you do not get the vaccine

Correction:  Without the aborted fetuses (half) you do not get the fetal cells....which lead to cloned cells....which lead to the vaccine.
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In other words, this argument is a summary of the scientific process.  The cloning aspect has not been adequately described/analyzed.

Correction:  Without the aborted fetuses (half) you do not get the fetal cells....which lead to cloned cells....which lead to the vaccine.
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In other words, this argument is a summary of the scientific process.  The cloning aspect has not been adequately described/analyzed.

Pax, you keep referring to cloning, but I have never heard the word cloning used when people speak of vaccine production. Now I am not so knowledgeable but I wonder if you should be speaking rather of cell culture, which is growing or dividing of the cells, which seems to be what happens with the growth of an in utero child. Maybe someone more knowlegable can answer this.
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Also I have to ask that when you quote you don't copy and paste but use the quote function which makes for ease of finding that quote in context and whom you are quoting.  e.g. as the above quote as opposed to 

Correction:  Without the aborted fetuses (half) you do not get the fetal cells....which lead to cloned cells....which lead to the vaccine.
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In other words, this argument is a summary of the scientific process.  The cloning aspect has not been adequately described/analyzed.