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Author Topic: Don Curzio Nitoglia on Abortive Vaccines  (Read 5260 times)

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Offline 2Vermont

Re: Don Curzio Nitoglia on Abortive Vaccines
« Reply #20 on: December 03, 2020, 04:50:24 AM »
Quote from: ElAusente on December 02, 2020, 08:46:44 PM
In order for material cooperation to be licit, one must apply the same principles as for indirect voluntary. I believe that is the point of the Italian post. However, I am confused as to how double effect could be applied retroactively.

When I consult Prümmer's Handbook of Moral Theology, the four criteria he gives for licit indirect voluntary are: "1. the act is good in itself or at least indifferent; 2. its immediate effect is good; 3. the intention of the agent is good ; 4. the agent has a proportionately grave reason for acting."
I am also confused as to how double effect is applied retroactively here.  

I like how you refer to the pre Vatican II Catholic Moral Theology handbooks.  This is interesting and does seem to have a different slant than the information posted in the OP.  From what I have read so far, it is number 4 that is difficult.
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Offline SeanJohnson

Re: Don Curzio Nitoglia on Abortive Vaccines
« Reply #21 on: December 03, 2020, 06:13:17 AM »
Quote from: 2Vermont on December 03, 2020, 04:50:24 AM
I am also confused as to how double effect is applied retroactively here.  

I like how you refer to the pre Vatican II Catholic Moral Theology handbooks.  This is interesting and does seem to have a different slant than the information posted in the OP.  From what I have read so far, it is number 4 that is difficult.

I am confused by the confusion, since the whole point of Nitoglia's article is to pre-empt recourse to double effect in the matter of using abortive vaccines (as SSPX defenders have done previously on this forum).
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Offline Benzel

Re: Don Curzio Nitoglia on Abortive Vaccines
« Reply #22 on: December 03, 2020, 09:48:29 AM »
Quote from: ElAusente on December 02, 2020, 08:46:44 PM
In order for material cooperation to be licit, one must apply the same principles as for indirect voluntary. I believe that is the point of the Italian post. However, I am confused as to how double effect could be applied retroactively.

When I consult Prümmer's Handbook of Moral Theology, the four criteria he gives for licit indirect voluntary are: "1. the act is good in itself or at least indifferent; 2. its immediate effect is good; 3. the intention of the agent is good ; 4. the agent has a proportionately grave reason for acting."
That is a correct quote from Prümmer's handbook, which the SSPX has always used in its seminars. Those four requirements for the application of the principle of the cause of double effect are on page 46, number 57, volume 1.

On that same page Prümmer says about the first requirement ("the action is good in itself at least indifferent"): "you must see the purpose of the action or moral object, which is what the action is directed by its own nature and immediately (...) I speak, however, of a moral but not a physical object because the same physical act done by different people can have different moral objects ". Fr. Prümmer gives this example: "Killing a man is an act whose physical object is the violent destruction of human life (...) but it can be morally good (...) or morally bad".
According to this, it is possible that Fr. Nitoglia, in his text, confuses the physical object with the moral object. He says this is the moral object: "inoculating a liquid made with aborted fetuses explicitly to package the vaccine", but I think that it rather refers to the physical object. The moral object in this case is "inoculating a vaccine", and this object is morally good. "Inoculating a liquid" would be the physical object and "made with aborted fetuses explicitly to package the vaccine" would be a morally very relevant circuмstance. 
Following Prümmer, the first requirement for the moral principle of the cause of double effect (also called "indirect voluntary" by some moralists) would be fulfilled.

Regarding the second requirement (its immediate effect is good), Prümmer says that "the bad effect must not be before but after the good one." Example: "you cannot kill the fetus in the womb to save the life of the mother." This requirement is violated by the manufacturer of the vaccine because abortion is a (bad) means of obtaining the (good) vaccine. But it happens in a different way with the one who receives the vaccine, since he does not do evil to achieve good.
There is no doubt about the third requirement (the intention of the agent is good), since the intention of the person receiving the vaccine is to protect themselves against the disease.

Regarding the fourth requirement (the agent has a proportionately grave reason for acting) it seems to me that the SSPX may have made a serious mistake in its text, since it is possible that Covid is less dangerous than what is said "officially". This point must be settled by competent Catholic scientists. It may happen, then, that for many people the danger of Covid is not so important as to make material cooperation with the crime of abortion. This cooperation is the bad effect of receiving the vaccine.
The SSPX also did not take into account in its article the serious evil of the scandal: if Catholics can easily resort to the principle of the cause of double effect to receive the vaccine, there will be an immense scandal because Catholics will appear before the world collaborating with the crime of abortion (not only with the precise abortions made to make the vaccine, but against the crime and sin of abortion itself, with all abortions).

So far my doubts about the text of Fr. Nitoglia.

Archbishop Vigano and others also say that this type of vaccination can never be received, but they do not explain precisely why, even in very serious cases, the principle of the cause of double effect cannot be applied with respect to these vaccines. 
The response of the Vatican of the year 2005 says that material cooperation in this is exceptionally possible. I'm not sure. Did this docuмent make Fr. Scott change his mind on this matter?
Those who deny that the principle of the cause of double effect can be applied in this case should say which precise premises of the 2005 docuмent are false. This would be nice so that we can have a final judgment on this difficult question. As I said, i do not yet have a final judgment.
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Offline SeanJohnson

Re: Don Curzio Nitoglia on Abortive Vaccines
« Reply #23 on: December 03, 2020, 10:25:47 AM »
Quote from: Benzel on December 03, 2020, 09:48:29 AM
That is a correct quote from Prümmer's handbook, which the SSPX has always used in its seminars. Those four requirements for the application of the principle of the cause of double effect are on page 46, number 57, volume 1.

On that same page Prümmer says about the first requirement ("the action is good in itself at least indifferent"): "you must see the purpose of the action or moral object, which is what the action is directed by its own nature and immediately (...) I speak, however, of a moral but not a physical object because the same physical act done by different people can have different moral objects ". Fr. Prümmer gives this example: "Killing a man is an act whose physical object is the violent destruction of human life (...) but it can be morally good (...) or morally bad".
According to this, it is possible that Fr. Nitoglia, in his text, confuses the physical object with the moral object. He says this is the moral object: "inoculating a liquid made with aborted fetuses explicitly to package the vaccine", but I think that it rather refers to the physical object. The moral object in this case is "inoculating a vaccine", and this object is morally good. "Inoculating a liquid" would be the physical object and "made with aborted fetuses explicitly to package the vaccine" would be a morally very relevant circuмstance.
Following Prümmer, the first requirement for the moral principle of the cause of double effect (also called "indirect voluntary" by some moralists) would be fulfilled.

Regarding the second requirement (its immediate effect is good), Prümmer says that "the bad effect must not be before but after the good one." Example: "you cannot kill the fetus in the womb to save the life of the mother." This requirement is violated by the manufacturer of the vaccine because abortion is a (bad) means of obtaining the (good) vaccine. But it happens in a different way with the one who receives the vaccine, since he does not do evil to achieve good.
There is no doubt about the third requirement (the intention of the agent is good), since the intention of the person receiving the vaccine is to protect themselves against the disease.

Regarding the fourth requirement (the agent has a proportionately grave reason for acting) it seems to me that the SSPX may have made a serious mistake in its text, since it is possible that Covid is less dangerous than what is said "officially". This point must be settled by competent Catholic scientists. It may happen, then, that for many people the danger of Covid is not so important as to make material cooperation with the crime of abortion. This cooperation is the bad effect of receiving the vaccine.
The SSPX also did not take into account in its article the serious evil of the scandal: if Catholics can easily resort to the principle of the cause of double effect to receive the vaccine, there will be an immense scandal because Catholics will appear before the world collaborating with the crime of abortion (not only with the precise abortions made to make the vaccine, but against the crime and sin of abortion itself, with all abortions).

So far my doubts about the text of Fr. Nitoglia.

Archbishop Vigano and others also say that this type of vaccination can never be received, but they do not explain precisely why, even in very serious cases, the principle of the cause of double effect cannot be applied with respect to these vaccines.
The response of the Vatican of the year 2005 says that material cooperation in this is exceptionally possible. I'm not sure. Did this docuмent make Fr. Scott change his mind on this matter?
Those who deny that the principle of the cause of double effect can be applied in this case should say which precise premises of the 2005 docuмent are false. This would be nice so that we can have a final judgment on this difficult question. As I said, i do not yet have a final judgment.

Just a couple asides:

1) Unless there has been a recent change, the SSPX teaches Merkelbach in its seminaries, not Prummer.  I know this because I asked a former Asst. to the District Superior why they didn’t use St. Alphonsus, and he said he didn’t know, but they use Merkelbach.

2) Prummer lists the 4 criteria for double effect differently than most others, and consequently, he may arrive at different answers in various cases.

3) What is unanimously agreed upon seems to be that no matter whose criteria for the application of double effect are used (resulting in failing the test on 1-3 of tge 4 criteria), everyone is in agreement that double effect cannot be used to justify the use of abortive vaccines.

4) But if double effect cannot be used, on what other basis could the use of abortive vaccines be justified (ie.  You can’t just say “remote material cooperation,” which is the same as “indirect voluntary,” because indirect voluntary must always pass the double effect test).
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Offline SeanJohnson

Re: Don Curzio Nitoglia on Abortive Vaccines
« Reply #24 on: December 03, 2020, 10:47:56 AM »
Quote from: SeanJohnson on December 03, 2020, 10:25:47 AM
Just a couple asides:

1) Unless there has been a recent change, the SSPX teaches Merkelbach in its seminaries, not Prummer.  I know this because I asked a former Asst. to the District Superior why they didn’t use St. Alphonsus, and he said he didn’t know, but they use Merkelbach.

2) Prummer lists the 4 criteria for double effect differently than most others, and consequently, he may arrive at different answers in various cases.

3) What is unanimously agreed upon seems to be that no matter whose criteria for the application of double effect are used (resulting in failing the test on 1-3 of tge 4 criteria), everyone is in agreement that double effect cannot be used to justify the use of abortive vaccines.

4) But if double effect cannot be used, on what other basis could the use of abortive vaccines be justified (ie.  You can’t just say “remote material cooperation,” which is the same as “indirect voluntary,” because indirect voluntary must always pass the double effect test).

Uh-oh:

Did the SSPX just delete its post-2005 PAL compliant article from SSPX.org and upload a 2020 hybrid of Fr. Scott’s 2000 article???

http://archives.sspx.org/Catholic_FAQs/catholic_faqs__morality.htm#vaccinationfromabortions

Where is the declaration of Fr. Scott in 2000 in this article that, were the civil authorities to require abortive vaccines for school enrollment, parents would have to refuse???

Is it licit to allow one’s children to be vaccinated for Rubella?

Answer: There are two particular problems involved with the Rubella vaccination. The first is that there are only two vaccines presently available, and both are derived from fetal cell lines. The second is that the frequency and danger of Congenital Rubella Syndrome, contracted by the fetuses of pregnant mothers infected with the virus, is such as to have brought about a public health policy of universal vaccination for the good of society as a whole. In order to answer these questions, the following principles have to be considered.

Licitness of vaccines derived from fetal cell lines

There is no doubt that it is illicit to prepare, promote, or market vaccines fabricated by the use of cell cultures from aborted babies, since such deliberate use of abortion by-products is a formal cooperation in the abortion. However, the present question is much more delicate. It is whether or not it is permissible to use such vaccines produced and marketed by someone else. If there are alternatives, we manifestly must protest the killing of the innocent by using the alternatives. However, what if they are the only ones that are readily available, as in the case of rubella? Can the principles of double effect be applied? Here are the principles: when only a good effect is directly willed, and a bad effect is simply permitted, but not directly willed in itself, it is permissible, so long as the good effect does not come from the bad effect, and so long as there is a proportionate reason to tolerate the bad effect. In such an instance, it is possible to permit an evil, not directly willed in itself, and this is called the indirect voluntary.

The good effect in this case is the immunization against the infectious disease. The bad effect is the abortion, the killing of the innocent. Here one could argue that the person who seeks the vaccination does not will the abortion, but simply uses the cells that are obtained as a by-product or indirect consequence of it. After all, the abortion was not performed in order to produce fetal cells to produce a vaccine, but for entirely different reasons. However, although the abortion is only indirectly voluntary, nevertheless the Catholic sense tells the faithful that they ought never to use the by-products of abortions for any reason at all, for by so doing they promote the mass murder of the innocent which is destroying modern society and all sense of morality. There must always be a proportionate reason to use the indirect voluntary, that is to permit something evil which is not directly willed. Here the reasonable gain obtained by the use of the double effect is not in any way proportionate to the horrible evil of abortion and the scandal of using them is immense.

If a person is not aware of the fact that fetal cells are being used in the culture of the vaccines that he or she is giving to his children, then clearly there is no moral fault involved. However, if he is aware of this, then he is morally obliged to refuse such vaccinations on principle, until such time as they can be obtained from cultures which are morally licit. Moreover, it is not permissible to remain in wilful ignorance on such a question. If there is a positive reason to suspect that fetal cells are indeed involved in the production of the vaccine, then a person is morally obliged to clarify the matter, and find out if this is indeed true or not.

Illicit vaccines the only ones available

However, the reality is more complicated yet. It is clear that if a Catholic has a choice in the matter, he is bound to choose a vaccine that is not derived from a fetal cell line, for he does not want any kind of participation in the crime of a voluntary abortion, even one done fifty years ago. However, what is he to do if he seems to have no choice. This question has become a very difficult one from the fact that several vaccines are not available in any other form but that derived from an aborted fetus, in particular rubella (contained in the MMR), Chicken Pox (Varicella) and Hepatitis A. Is one morally obliged to forgo such a vaccination, otherwise necessary for health? Also, if one is bound by civil law to receive or give such a vaccination, must one refuse to accept such a vaccination for one’s children under pain of sin?

This question was well treated by the Pontifical Academy for Life, in a docuмent approved by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, and dated June 9, 2005. This docuмent makes the necessary distinctions. The first is between formal and material cooperation. It is never permitted, for any reason, to cooperate formally in another’s immoral action, in this case the abortion, for the evil would be directly willed. Examples of formal cooperation include the staff who willingly help with the abortion or the original researchers who requested the aborted fetal tissue for their research, or the drug companies who promoted it. However, those who simply use the vaccines as by products of the cell line do not necessarily cooperate formally in the abortion.

Material cooperation exists when a person shares in some way in an evil action, for example by taking advantage of its consequences, but without sharing its evil intent. Examples of material cooperation include the staff who prepare the operating theatre or the nurse who prepares the patient, neither of them knowing the exact nature of the procedure to be performed. Material cooperation can be immoral, if done without sufficient reason. However, it can also be permissible and moral, for the will does not directly consent to the evil, for it is a case of the indirect voluntary or double effect. A typical situation would be the cab driver who drops off a person at a certain address, not knowing that it is a house of ill repute, or why he was going there. However, for material cooperation to be permissible, it must be done for a good and proportionately grave reason, in proportion to the gravity of the evil and the proximity of cooperation in it.

The principles of double effect must be applied, namely provided that the good effect (in this case the use of the vaccine) does not come directly from the bad effect (the murder of the innocent), but is simply a by product of this immoral act. Moreover, the material cooperation can be immediate, as in the nurse who takes care of the patient before or after the procedure, or it can be mediate because not directly involved in the abortion. Moreover this mediate material cooperation can also be very remote, and far removed from the abortion itself, as in the case of those who use vaccines that were developed from a fetal cell line some fifty years old. In cases of remote material cooperation, it is not such a grave reason that is required for there to be a proportionate reason for the material cooperation. This is not to deny the very grave evil of abortion, but simply to recognize that the material cooperation, is extremely far removed from the abortion done so many years ago. The absence of any other vaccine and the need of the vaccine for one’s health would be sufficient reason. The reason for this given by the above mentioned docuмent is that in this case, given the remoteness of the material cooperation, “the duty to avoid passive material cooperation is not obligatory if there is grave inconvenience”. Danger to health or problems with civil law constitute such a grave inconvenience, which is a proportionate reason to permit such far removed passive, material cooperation, as the docuмent states.

This being said, the development of vaccines from fetal cell lines is gravely immoral, and we have the duty to actively oppose it as much as we can, in order to avoid any formal cooperation. This is how the above mentioned docuмent describes this grave obligation: 

Therefore, doctors and fathers of families have a duty to take recourse to alternative vaccines (if they exist), putting pressure on the political authorities and health systems so that other vaccines without moral problems become available…They should oppose by all means…the vaccines which do not yet have morally acceptable alternatives, creating pressure so that alternative vaccines are prepared, which are not connected with the abortion of a human fetus…

Despite this, it would be excessive and wrong to deny that the material cooperation in the use of such vaccines is very remote, so that where there is no alternative to such vaccines, and where the health of children or of the community at large requires it, it is not only permissible to use such vaccines for which there is no alternative, but sometimes even obligatory. This would be the case of a woman planning to marry, who had never been vaccinated against rubella and who did not have any natural immunity. It would be a moral obligation to receive the vaccine, even derived from fetal cell line, in order to protect her own unborn children from the possibility of abortion or of serious deformities due to infection with the rubella virus. Her duty to protect her unborn children is the grave reason that permits and, where there is no alternative even makes obligatory, the very remote mediate material cooperation involved.

Obligatory for the good of society?

The final question that needs to be considered is whether this Rubella vaccine, obligatory for women contemplating marriage who have never developed a natural immunity to German Measles, should be obligatory also for all children. The argument in favor of it is that universal immunization against rubella is the only way to protect against Congenital Rubella Syndrome, and consequently necessary for the good of society. The argument is that unvaccinated children can be carriers of the virus, with which pregnant women can later become infected. This argument is accepted by the above-mentioned article of the Pontifical Academy for Life, which has this to say in footnote 15: ”In this case, the parents who did not accept the vaccination of their own children become responsible for the malformations in question, and for the subsequent abortion of foetuses, when they have been discovered to be malformed”.

However, there are good reasons to question this particular conclusion. If it is true that quasi-universal vaccinations against diseases such as Tuberculosis and Polio were able to effectively eliminate these very serious diseases from the developed world, the same does not necessarily apply to Rubella. The first difference is that, unlike these life-threatening diseases, it is in itself a minor and harmless disease. The second difference is that the natural immunity developed by infection with the virus as a child is much more effective than the artificial immunity created by vaccination. The third difference is that despite decades of vaccination, German Measles is still endemic in the community. The fourth reason is that there is a very easy way for the portion of the community in danger to be protected: women should seek the vaccine before marriage. If they refuse to do so, the rest of the community cannot be held responsible. Furthermore, it would be preposterous to argue that because some young girls decide to perform immoral acts that expose them to falling pregnant before marriage, then the whole community is bound to be vaccinated. This would be to justify immoral behaviour and make it the rule of our action. Fifthly, rubella is in itself an immoral vaccination, and consequently only permissible in cases of real need – women exposed to pregnancy who have not had contact with the Rubella virus itself. Sixthly, why should parents expose their children (especially boys) to the possible complications of vaccinations, when there is no benefit for the children themselves, and when in fact it would be much better, especially for girls, to have contact with the virus while they are young.

In conclusion, in the case of routine vaccine of children with MMR (Measles, Mumps and Rubella, of which only Rubella is derived from fetal cell lines) there is certainly no obligation to have the vaccine, since it is not strictly necessary, either for one’s own health or for that of the community. If it is desired, then it would certainly be best to request the Measles and Mumps portions separately from the Rubella, thus making a statement of moral principle, and this should be done whenever possible. Nevertheless, if the MMR combination is the only one offered, and if parents have good reason to administer this vaccine (even if it be only the good of society) or if it is considered to be obligatory by public health authorities or for school entrance, then they are not to be troubled in conscience by allowing it to be administered to their children. However, since there are many good reasons to refuse the Rubella vaccine altogether for children, and since it is certainly preferable to make a stand on moral principle, no parent is to be troubled or disturbed because he decides that his children are not to receive the Rubella or the MMR on account of the immoral origin of the Rubella portion of the vaccine. It is perfectly licit in such a case to insist on an exemption of conscience on the grounds of religion. [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]
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