First things first. By point of clarification, I may have muddied the waters and jumped the gun a little with my comments on canon 2200, so to avoid any confusion or dispel any that has already occurred:
I don't mean to say that the canon allows
pertinacity to be assumed. It means that once the crime is certain (in this case, heresy) the offender is to be presumed to have committed it with the required malice and culpability (i.e., he is not be presumed to be ignorant or acting under coercion). It does not mean that the requisite properties which would make a material act formal are to be presumed, those still must be established for the crime to be certain in the first place, and for canon 2200 to even apply. In other words, if Sean's grandma inadvertently expresses an heresy, we don't assume pertinacity. But once pertinacity is established, we assume, for practical and legal purposes that she is guilty of the crime, and cannot claim some other excuse.
So, Maccabes...
I said:
formal heresy is a fact the moment that it occurs. Heresy does not become formal only when the Church declares it to be formal. A formal heretic *may* undergo a trial and *may* have an excommunication inflicted upon him by a superior, but the effect of such an excommunication is quite distinct from the fact of his formal heresy, which naturally must exist prior to any such penalties that may be inflicted upon him by a superior. Think about it. Can a person be judged an heretic if they weren't already an heretic? The judgment of the law proceeds the fact of the crime.
To which you replied:
This is only true when ALL of the accidents, causes, effects, and intentions are in reality together at that moment; like someone intentionally dropping a glass on concrete to see if it would break into pieces and it does. The accidents, causes, effects, and intentions are ALL there in that act.
I agree. Put simply, if the required elements are present which make heresy formal, then it is formal at the moment that those elements are present. At that moment, it becomes a fact, i.e., something that is true. Additionally, at the moment that a person formally holding to heresy professes it publicly, the heresy is manifest, and this also is a fact, i.e., something that is true.
But, as you can imagine, we part ways when you say this:
This is not the same when an [accused] states an alleged heresy. All of the accidents, causes, effects, and intentions are NOT there together for someone to externally judge the severe sentence; you do NOT know clearly the context (accidents); you do NOT know the causes that arrived for that person to say such a thing; you only know the effects because of what the catechism teaches on that statement; you also do NOT know the intention that prompted that statement (evolution of moral decadence).
First of all, I don't think there's anything alleged about Francis' heresies. It is public knowledge that the man has publicly participated in non-Catholic worship. There are many other heretical statements (no Catholic God, Our Lady might have felt tricked into being the Mother of God, atheists can go to Heaven, etc.) as well. Whether or not he has professed heresy really isn't up for debate. What remains to be established (and what we are discussing) is whether or not the formal aspect which would make him an heretic. That is, is he pertinacious, i.e., does he know what the Church teaches on any of these issues?
Therefore, you do NOT have ALL of the accidents, causes, effects, and intentions together to externally judge that act. Further, the highest act of charity for the soul is to presume that it is not in malice nor the evil purported; however, to hold with concern while still maintaing God's authority with the [Pope]. In other words, you have no right to inflict a public judgement without all of the facts; presumption and assumption on another individual is a malice and slander in itself. Simply said.
You mean that I do not have all that is required to judge the
internal forum of the act. The external is publicly known and indisputable. I have just listed several of Francis' professed heresies. I agree we are bound in charity to assume the most favorable interpretation of a person's actions, and I appreciate the caution that most Catholics take in examining this issue, in fact I deem it necessary because it's clearly the desire of the Church that we treat other members of the Church with God's love. Nevertheless, we are never required to assume against reason; Our Lord warned us of wolves in sheep's clothing-- a warning that He would not have given if we were incapable or forbidden to use our intellect informed by the external facts we observe to make certain judgements and decisions.
There is no evidence to suggest that Francis' heresies are the result of some excusing factor, or even some diminishing factor. On the other hand, there
is evidence that supports him
knowing what the Church teaches on these issues. Even considering that modernists had made their way into the seminaries by the time he was there, you must contend that on each of his heresies, that he is invincibly ignorant. So, from the age of reason until now, the teaching of the Church on every single one of the issues which he publicly doubts or denies were never made sufficiently clear to him. This is why I brought up the issue of certainty, which I will get to addressing a little later in this post.
As to your use of the world "public judgement," let me be very clear that I don't intend to, nor do I consider myself capable of binding
anyone to
any conclusion I may have privately reached on the nature of the crisis, whether it's the illegitimacy of the new mass or any other conclusion common among traditionalists. I am publicly
sharing these private judgements (which bind only my own conscience), but that is quite different than issuing a "public judgement" which seems to suggest that I have some sort of authority that I don't.
As concerns the Inquisition, I would not say that an investigation is to be discarded or disallowed. But the Canon Law is plain enough. No trial or declaration is necessary for one to lose his office or be declared an heretic. Such a trial and declaration will eventually come about, because the Church in Her benevolence could never allow Her faithful to continue on scattering, unsure of who their pastors are.
To which you replied:
Not to have a trial or declaration from the authority of the Church FIRST would lead to anarchy; the Church never endorses such rash judgement from Her children.
No, it wouldn't. If it would, then the Church is a provocateur of anarchy, since Her own law provides that in the event of a cleric publicly defecting from the faith, he tacitly resigns his office
without any need for such a trial (canon 188/4). Furthermore, by virtue of canon 2314, all heretics incur a
latae sententiae excommunication, that is, excommunication by the fact of their heresy, quite distinct from
ferendae sententiae excommunication, which must be inflicted by a superior. You are simply mistaken on this point.
"Neither do I say he is innocent.
I say he is a modernist, and therefore incapable of spotting contradiction.
Pius X said evolution was the primary characteristic of modernism.
Hence, the false doctrines to them are "developments" which "evolve" with the "living Church," rather than contradictions.
Hence, they are material heretics, not formal.
Therefore, they do not lose the Chair.
Bishop Williamson has been teaching this for the last 35 years."
No person is inherently incapable of spotting contradiction, unless the person is insane, in which case he can't hold office by virtue of his insanity. A person can be so decadent and degrade their reason and their faith so often and so drastically that it could be practically impossible to recover, but the fact remains that their degradation of the gifts God gave them is due to their own fault, and at some point they knew the truth, and have now abandoned it. That is the definition of an heretic, you know. A baptised person who once held the Catholic faith and now denies (a part of) it. Someone who never held the faith to begin with is not an heretic, even though they may not be a Catholic.
Neither can you use an heresy to excuse an heresy. I agree that they view doctrine as evolving. That does not forgive them for holding to such evolutions! Their holding to such an evolution is a heresy, and if they are aware that the Church teaches an immutable truth, they are pertinacious in believing in such an evolution.
Catholics, to remain Catholic, must also submit to the rule of faith, i.e., they must proceed with docility and submission to the teaching authority of the Church. This principle is what forgives a Catholic who materially holds an heresy; if he desires to submit to the teaching of the Church and is simply unaware of what that teaching is, he is saved from being a formal heretic by virtue of his ignorance, and he is saved from being a material heretic by virtue of his submission to the teaching authority of the Church.
Which brings me to another subject that really must be clarified, i.e.,
material heresy vs.
formal heresy, and
material heretics vs.
formal heretics.
It seems evident enough that everyone involved in this discussion appreciates that there are two constituents which make a thing: form and matter. A table may be made of wood (it's material constituent) but unless it has legs to stand upon and a flat surface to eat upon (it's formal constituent), it lacks the form of a table, and is therefore not a table. From here, I'll quote
John Daly who will illumine for us the relationship between material heresy and material heretics with more precision than I could hope to: (emphases added)
With regard to the sin of heresy, it was said that the matter was the intellectual error involved in assenting to a heterodox proposition, while the form was the obstinate attachment of the will. And once again this distinction usefully clarified the fact that one who assents to a heterodox proposition by inadvertence, without obstinate attachment of the will, was not guilty of the sin of heresy (just as a pile of wood, while holding the material constituent to be a table, but lacking the formal constituent, is not a table).
What muddied the waters was the misleading linguistic development by which material heresy was said to make the person professing it a material heretic. No conclusion could seem more natural to the layman, but it does not in fact follow in logic. A retired lion-trainer is not, after all, a man who trains retired lions! And a serious problem arises when one designates as a material heretic anyone who assents, without moral guilt, to a heretical proposition. The first is that you have created a category which comprises two quite distinct sorts of member and you therefore run the risk of confusing the two. For according to that definition, a good Catholic who inadvertently holds a condemned doctrine, not realising that it is condemned is a material heretic. And so too is a Protestant if he is invincibly ignorant of the Church's status. And while it is true that there is a resemblance between the two cases (for both indeed hold in their minds unorthodox doctrine and neither is culpable in the eyes of God for doing so), nevertheless there is also a huge gulf between them. For the former is a Catholic, habitually adhering to the Catholic rule of faith, whereas the latter is a non-Catholic, with no knowledge of the correct rule of faith and tossed about on the treacherous sea of private opinion.
The inevitable consequence of this misleading assimilation of two such different sorts of person is that they will gradually come to be considered truly alike. This could happen in either of two ways. Mistaken Catholics could be regarded as no better than Protestants in good faith (and some “hard-liners” have practically taken this view, arguing that the most innocent error creates a presumption of heretical animus - a notion we have already seen to be false). More common has been the no less calamitous view that a Protestant, if invincibly ignorant of the status of the Church, is no worse off than a Catholic who inadvertently makes an incorrect doctrinal statement - as though adherence to the Catholic rule of faith, i.e. submission to the Magisterium, were irrelevant, whereas in fact it is what juridical membership of the Church depends on.
Correctly, the material element involved in being a heretic is conscious dissent from the Catholic rule of faith, while the formal element is the perverse state of the will which this entails. The distinction thus made, a Catholic who inculpably advances a heretical proposition by inadvertence may perhaps be said to have advanced a material heresy; but he cannot be called a material heretic. He is not a heretic in any sense. A heretic is one who dissents altogether from the Catholic rule of faith, and he will be called a material heretic if he is invincibly ignorant of the authority of the Church which he rejects, and a formal heretic if the Church's authority has been sufficiently proposed to him, so that his dissent from it is culpable. (This is clearly explained by Cardinal Billot: De Ecclesia Christi, ed. 4, pp. 289-290)
So according to the correct usage of the term, as outlined above, a Catholic can never become a material heretic. He is not invincibly ignorant of the Church's authority, and any conscious dissent from her teachings will therefore make him a formal heretic. Material heretics are exclusively those baptised non-Catholics who err in good faith. That is why Dr Ludwig Ott notes that “public heretics, even those who err in good faith (material heretics), do not belong to the body of the Church, that is to the legal commonwealth of the Church. (Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, p.311)
And in fact Dr Ott's preferred expression - “heretics who err in good faith” is the one used in the Code of Canon Law (Canon 731), which completely eschews the potentially misleading term “material heretics”
I think it bears mentioning that a lot of the confusion on the issue of heretics and heresy stems from conflating two distinct sciences which deal with these subjects: moral theology and canon law. The moralists concern themselves with whether or not a person is guilty before God. The moralists are naturally dealing with the internal forum. The Canonists deal with the laws of the Church, which are based on externals-- only God judges the internal forum. This current discussion has very little to do with what the moralists have to say.
Mithrandylan, I do understand that sedevacantists weigh heavily on canon law and ecclesiastical law; however, if I can offer to you that those two are very much below and only support the Moral Law.
In an example, as many people in the world say that God does not belong in politics. It is actually quite the opposite. Politics are made from policies; and policies and made from morals; and God governs morals; therefore, God has everything to do with politics. Similarly, it is the Moral Law that governs Canon Law and Ecclesiastical Law; so morals, and the moralists, have everything to do with this discussion.
Of course, and I did not mean to place undue emphasis on the distinct sciences, since as you say, they are very much related and supporting one another. I simply mean to point out that whether or not a person is guilty before God for a
particular offense is distinct from whether or not they are guilty of a crime/offense, or ought to be considered guilty of a crime/offense for which they are rendered non-members of the Church. These are two distinct issues, and we are dealing with both of them, I admit, but we must not confuse them.
I understand that in your example you are trying to make cause and effect relationship, however, it is NOT plain "common sense", really, to assume that.
In your example, if one opens a door, it cannot mean that you wanted to open it; the door could have a spring on it and the person was trying to close it. Or, it was not latched properly, and a large wind or fan within the house opened it at the right time that the person had his hand on it in order to close it; but another person saw it and thought otherwise.
Likewise, if you take the dog out for a walk in an area that the dog was NOT suppose to pea because of landlord rules, and the dog did it anyway, it was NOT your intention; but another person saw it and thought otherwise.
Also, if one went to mass today, it could have been in reason under duress from a threat from his wife or mother, if he did not go there, there would be a consequence; but another person saw it and thought otherwise.
Conclusion, one cannot rashly judge without ALL of the facts; that is why the Holy Catholic Church reserves judgement to Herself, instituted by Christ. "I would rather be judged by God; than by men."
Actually, my argument of opening the door was to point out that a positive action performed is an action intended. It is true in the absolute sense that there are other possible explanations, but as concerns moral certainty (which I will be getting to) there must be evidence (a reason) to believe what is believed. Humans commonly perform actions that they intend to. Exceptionally, a person may perform a deliberate action (distinct from accidents like vehicle collisiosn) without the requisite intention (sleepwalking, insanity, etc.) but some sort of evidence must be present to question whether or not an intent was lacking. We can see this principle at work with the sacraments. If a Catholic minister performs a Catholic rite, it is assumed that he intended to do so. If, on the other hand, some manifest observation casts doubt onto the intention, at that point (and only at that point) may we doubt that there was an intention to perform the act.
This is where we must realize that moral certainty gives us license to act, and informs our intellect on what judgements to make. If you see your neighbor murder someone, you are morally certain that he is a murderer, and you ought to consider him one and act accordingly. You do not need to wait until the judge passes a sentence on him and you do not need to wait until judgement day for God to find him guilty to say that he is a murderer and treat him like one. In fact, to deny moral certainty and instead opt for some far-fetched explanation like his doppelganger being responsible for the crime would be an injustice against prudence.
To which you replied:
Would this not be a rash judgement also, as explained above? It could have been in self defense; and in many cases, it was; but another person saw it and thought otherwise. So no...there is no "realiz[ation] that moral certainty gives us license to act, and informs our intellect on what judgements to make." God forbid. That would be anarchy; that is why there are courts of justice, to state if there is guilt, or if there is no guilt.
God's authority alone passes that judgment through His Church; not from Her children; especially in regards to a Pope. This is where sedevacantists fall into error. They see the effects; but rash judge on ALL of the other areas with presumption and assumption to draw and formulate the "opinions" they pick out of from law; void of the higher Moral Law. Opinions found in the text of Law is only a means and a tool; it is not an end in itself. As such, to judge rashly is a private interpretation that, for justice sake, should not be acted on until the Holiness of the Church courts and declares such with Her Wisdom and just judgements.
What you are proposing is not true. Consider the following from
McHugh and Callan, which would be confirmed in any other theology manual that deals with the conscience:
643. Kinds of Certitude.--Judgments may be certain in a greater or less
degree.
(a) They are metaphysically certain, when error is absolutely
impossible, the opposite of what is held by the mind being a
contradiction in terms which omnipotence itself could not make true.
Example: The judgments that the same, identical act cannot be both good
and bad, that good is to be done and evil to be avoided, that God is to
be honored, are metaphysically certain, since they result immediately
from the very concepts of being, of goodness, and of God.
(b) Judgments are physically certain, when error is impossible
according to the laws of nature, the opposite of what is held by the
mind being unrealizable except through intervention of another cause.
Example: The judgments that he who takes poison will destroy life, that
he who applies fire to a house will destroy property, are physically
certain. because natural agencies, like poison and fire, act infallibly
when applied to suitable matters and under suitable conditions and left
to their course, unless they are overruled by superior power.
(c) Judgments are morally certain, when error is impossible according
to what is customary among mankind, the opposite of what is held by the
mind being so unlikely that it would be imprudent to be moved by it.
Examples: One is morally certain that what a reputedly truthful and
competent person relates to one is true. A person is morally certain
that a conclusion he has drawn about his duty in a particular instance
is correct, if he believes that he has overlooked no means of reaching
the truth. Testimony and inference, since they come from free and
fallible agencies, may lead into error; but, when they appear to have
the requisite qualities indicative of truth, they are for the most part
reliable and in practical life have to be considered as such.
...
644. As to the certainty that is required in the judgment of
conscience, the following points must be noted:
(a) Metaphysical certainty is not required, since conscience does not
deal with primary propositions, but with deductions about particular
acts. The first moral principles, which are the object of synderesis,
and at least some of the general conclusions, which are the object of
moral science, are metaphysically certain (see above 145, 300), as they
are based on necessary relations; but the particular conclusions, which
are the object of conscience, are concerned with the contingent and the
individual.
(b) Physical certainty is not required for the judgment of conscience,
since conscience is not concerned with the activities of natural
agents, but with the activities of moral agents that act with freedom
and responsibility.
(c) Moral certitude, therefore, is sufficient for the conclusions drawn
by conscience. That a higher kind of certitude is not necessary should
not surprise us, for it would be unreasonable to expect that the same
degree of assent be given to judgments that are concerned with
particular and contingent cases as to those that are concerned with
universal and necessary principles.
...
646. Moral certitude in the wide sense is sufficient for a safe
conscience, even in matters of great importance, since it is frequently
the only kind of certitude one can have, and he who would strive to be
free from every slight and baseless suspicion would be soon involved in
a maze of scruples and perplexities.
A judgement which is based on observable facts and is exempt from probable and/or positive doubt (also called "reasonable doubt") is a judgement made with moral certainty, and moral certainty is all that is required to make a judgement.
....
The idea that an apparent fact cannot inform our judgement and allow us to act with safety is borne of scruples and gnosticism. As I mentioned prior, Christ instructed us to be wary of false prophets. This requires us to make judgements based on facts (evidence). We have all already done this regarding the New Mass and the Novus Ordo teachings. Is it so unruly to suggest that the same can be done regarding the men who have spread them? It is certain that it is unruly to claim that any such judgements are "rash" or "presumptuous" provided that they are made with moral certainty.
Are you morally certain that he IS the pope? Because all you have proposed are negative doubts, i.e., "what ifs." We are not to act against positive or probable doubts. A doubtful pope is no pope, just as a doubtful sacrament is no sacrament.
May God bless you, too.
Topic: "Recognize and Resist" or Sedevacantism? (Read 22392 times)