• Weak global detection, assessment, and warning of pandemic risks. The international community needs a more robust, transparent detection, evaluation, and early warning system that can rapidly communicate actionable information about pandemic risks.
• Gaps in national-level preparedness. National governments should improve preparedness by developing national-level pandemic response plans built upon a coherent system of “triggers” that prompt anticipatory action, despite uncertainty and near-term costs—in other words, on a “no-regrets” basis.
• Gaps in biological research governance. The international system for governing dual-use biological research is neither prepared to meet today’s security requirements, nor is it ready for significantly expanded challenges in the future. There are risk reduction needs throughout the bioscience research and development life cycle.
• Insufficient financing of international preparedness for pandemics. Many countries around the world lack financing to make the essential national investments in pandemic preparedness.

• Bolster international systems for pandemic risk assessment, warning, and investigating outbreak origins
  
  
  • The WHO should establish a graded, transparent, international public health alert system.
  • The United Nations (UN) system should establish a new mechanism for investigating high-consequence biological events of unknown origin, which we refer to as a “Joint Assessment Mechanism.”
• Develop and institute national-level triggers for early, proactive pandemic response
  
  
  • National governments must adopt a “no-regrets” approach to pandemic response, taking anticipatory action—as opposed to reacting to mounting case counts and fatalities, which are lagging indicators.
  • To facilitate anticipatory action on a no-regrets basis, national governments should develop national-level plans that define and incorporate “triggers” for responding to high-consequence biological events.
• Establish an international entity dedicated to reducing emerging biological risks associated with rapid technology advances
  
  
  • The international community should establish an entity dedicated to reducing the risk of catastrophic events due to accidental misuse or deliberate abuse of bioscience and biotechnology.
  • To meaningfully reduce risk, the entity should support interventions throughout the bioscience and biotechnology research and development life cycle—from funding, through execution, and on to publication or commercialization.
• Develop a catalytic global health security fund to accelerate pandemic preparedness capacity building in countries around the world
  
  
  • National leaders, development banks, philanthropic donors, and the private sector should establish and resource a new financing mechanism to bolster global health security and pandemic preparedness.
  • The design and operations of the fund should be catalytic—incentivizing national governments to invest in their own preparedness over the long term.
• Establish a robust international process to tackle the challenge of supply chain resilience
  
  
  • The UN Secretary General should convene a high-level panel to develop recommendations for critical measures to bolster global supply chain resilience for medical and public health supplies.

I am not worried about this. If it is only sɛҳuąƖly transmitted, it probably won't become widespread, nor will it be able to be used as an excuse to close public places.

I should prep up also with smallpox and marburg decorations before we have more supply chain shortages.