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TyrannicideHelp support New Advent and get the full contents of this website as an instant download. Includes the Catholic Encyclopedia, Church Fathers, Summa, Bible and more — all for only $19.99...Tyrannicide literally is the killing of a tyrant, and usually is taken to mean the killing of a tyrant by a private person for the common good. There are two classes of tyrants whose circuмstances are widely apart — tyrants by usurpation and tyrants by oppression. A tyrant by usurpation (
tyrannus in titula) is one who unjustly displaces or attempts to displace the legitimate supreme ruler, and he can be considered in the act of usurpation or in subsequent peaceful possession of the supreme power. A tyrant by oppression (
tyrannus in regimine) is a supreme ruler who uses his power arbitrarily and oppressively.
Tyrant by usurpationWhile actually attacking the powers that be, a tyrant by usurpation is a traitor acting against the common weal, and, like any other criminal, may be
put to death by legitimate authority. If possible, the legitimate authority must use the ordinary forms of
law in condemning the tyrant to death, but if this is not possible, it can proceed informally and grant
individuals a mandate to inflict the
capital punishment.
St. Thomas (In II Sent., d. XLIV, Q. ii, a. 2),
Suarez (Def. fidei, VI, iv, 7), and the majority of authorized
theologians say that private
individuals have a tacit mandate from legitimate authority to
kill the usurper when no other means of ridding the community of the tyrant are available. Some, however, e.g.
Crolly (De justitia, III, 207), hold that an express mandate is needed before a private
person can take on himself the office of executioner of the usurping tyrant. All authorities hold that a private
individual as such, without an express or tacit mandate from authority, may not lawfully
kill an usurper unless he is actually his
unjust aggressor. Moreover, it sometimes happens that an usurper is accorded the
rights of a belligerent, and then a private
individual, who is a non-combatant, is excluded by
international law from the category of those to whom authority is given to
kill the tyrant (
Crolly, loc. cit.).
If an usurper has already established his rule and peacefully reigns, until the prescriptive period has run its course the legitimate ruler can lawfully expel him by force if he is able to do so, and can punish him with
death for his offence. If, however, it is out of the legitimate ruler's power to re-establish his own authority, there is nothing for it but to acquiesce in the actual state of affairs and to refrain from merging the community in the miseries of useless
warfare. In these circuмstances, subjects are bound to obey the just
laws of the realm, and can lawfully take an
oath of obedience to the
de facto ruler, if the
oath is not of such a nature as to acknowledge the legitimacy of the usurper's authority (cf.
Brief of
Pius VIII, 29 Sept., 1830). This teaching is altogether different from the view of those who put forward the
doctrine of accomplished facts, as it has come to be called, and who maintain that the actual peaceful possessor of the ruling authority is also legitimate ruler. This is nothing more or less than the glorification of successful
robbery.
Tyrant by oppressionLooking on a tyrant by oppression as a public enemy, many authorities claimed for his subjects the right of
putting him to death in defence of the common good. Amongst these were
John of Salisbury in the twelfth century (Polycraticus III, 15; IV, 1; VIII, 17), and
John Parvus (Jehan Petit) in the fifteenth century. The
Council of Constance (1415) condemned as contrary to
faith and
morals the following proposition:
"Any vassal or subject can lawfully and meritoriously kill, and ought to kill, any tyrant. He may even, for this purpose, avail himself of ambushes, and wily expressions of affection or of adulation, notwithstanding any oath or pact imposed upon him by the tyrant, and without waiting for the sentence or order of any judge." (Session XV)
Subsequently a few
Catholics defended, with many limitations and safeguards, the right of subjects to kill a tyrannical ruler. Foremost amongst these was the
Spanish Jesuit Mariana. In his book, "De rege et regis institutione" (Toledo, 1599), he held that people ought to bear with a tyrant as long as possible, and to take action only when his oppression surpassed all bounds. They ought to come together and give him a warning; this being of no avail they ought to declare him a public enemy and
put him to death. If no public judgment could be given, and if the people were unanimous, any subject might, if possible, kill him by open, but not by secret means. The book was dedicated to Philip III of
Spain and was written at the request of his tutor Garcias de Loaysa, who afterwards became
Bishop of Toledo. It was published at Toledo in the printing-office of Pedro Rodrigo, printer to the king, with the
approbation of Pedro de Oñ,
Provincial of the
Mercedarians of
Madrid, and with the permission of Stephen Hojeda, visitor of the
Society of Jesus in the Province of Toledo (
see JUAN MARIANA). Most unfairly the
Jesuit Order has been blamed for the teaching of
Mariana. As a matter of fact,
Mariana stated that his teaching on tyrannicide was his personal opinion, and immediately on the publication of the book the
Jesuit General Aquaviva ordered that it be corrected. He also on 6 July, 1610, forbade any member of the order to teach publicly or privately that it is lawful to attempt the life of a tyrant.
Though
Catholic doctrine condemns tyrannicide as opposed to the
natural law, formerly great
theologians of the
Church like
St. Thomas (II-II, Q. xlii, a.2),
Suarez (Def. fidei, VI, iv, 15), and
Bañez, O.P. (De justitia et jure, Q. lxiv, a. 3), permitted rebellion against oppressive rulers when the tyranny had become extreme and when no other means of safety were available. This merely carried to its
logical conclusion the
doctrine of the
Middle Ages that the supreme ruling authority comes from
God through the people for the public good. As the people immediately give sovereignty to the ruler, so the people can deprive him of his sovereignty when he has used his power oppressively. Many authorities, e.g.
Suarez (Def. fiedei, VI, iv, 18), held that the State, but not private
persons, could, if
necessary, condemn the tyrant to
death. In recent times
Catholic authors, for the most part, deny that subjects have the
right to rebel against and depose an
unjust ruler, except in the case when the ruler was appointed under the condition that he would lose his power if he abused it. In
proof of this teaching they appeal to the Syllabus of
Pius IX, in which this proposition is condemned: "It is lawful to refuse obedience to legitimate princes, and even to rebel" (prop. 63). While denying the right of rebellion in the strict sense whose direct object is the deposition of the tyrannical ruler, many
Catholic writers, such as
Crolly, Cathrein, de Bie,
Zigliara, admit the right of subjects not only to adopt an attitude of passive resistance against
unjust laws but also in extreme cases to assume a state of active defensive resistance against the actual aggression of a legitimate, but oppressive ruler.
Many of the Reformers were more or less in favour of tyrannicide. Luther held that the whole community could condemn the tyrant to death (Sämmtliche Werke", LXII, Frankfort-on-the-Main and Erlangen, 1854, 201, 206).
Melanchthon said that the killing of a tyrant is the most agreeable offering that man can make to
God (Corp. Ref., III, Halle, 1836, 1076). The
Calvinist writer styled Junius Brutus held that individual subjects have no
right to kill a legitimate tyrant, but that resistance must be authorized by a representative council of the people (Vindiciae contra Tyrannos, p. 45).
John Knox affirmed that it was the
duty of the nobility, judges, rulers, and people of
England to condemn
Queen Mary to
death (Appellation).
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