So, it seems supplied jurisdiction is not needed because the power to consecrate is one of the powers of Orders.
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The guiding principle is, "We distinguish but we do not separate." The words, "distinctly separate," do not follow this principle.
For example, this quote from Miaskiewicz implies you can have jurisdictional power without Orders as well as Orders without jurisdictional power. This introduces confusion instead of clarity!
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Therefore, it would seem this quote from Miaskiewicz contains a mistake. Where it has "distinctly separate" it ought to have "distinguished." If those words are replaced, it would say:
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It's not a mistake, to be sure.
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Teleologically, orders and jurisdiction are meant to converge. Ontologically, they do not. A man may indeed have orders without any jurisdiction, and a man may indeed have jurisdiction without orders. To the latter idea (having jurisdiction without orders, which is probably the "weirder" sounding idea), one might think of Pope Pius II, who when elected pope was not even a priest, and was
never a priest (he died within a month, before he could secure orders). Or of St. Ambrose, who likewise had no orders at all when he was elected bishop. Such men received jurisdiction from the office completely even before they received holy orders.
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Besides that, if the two could not be separated, then large swaths of canon law which deal with
how men with orders get jurisdiction would be entirely superfluous. The idea of jurisdiction being supplied at all is a non-sequitur if orders can't be separated from it. As a matter of course, men who receive orders don't have jurisdiction until someone gives it to them.
Topic: What is the source of sedevacantist bishops' jurisdiction? (Read 10457 times)