The fallacious Salza/Siscoe argument that external heresy is in its nature an ecclesiastical crime, is that since, according to Canon Law the external act of heresy conforms to the specifications required for an act to qualify as a crime, external heresy is therefore, in its nature a crime. The nonsensical fallacy of their thinking is exposed in the consideration that what pertains to the definition of a crime, does not intrinsically pertain to the nature of exernal heresy (whether considered formally in its specific nature as heresy or materially in its generic nature as an external act); and therefore, the external act of heresy is not in its nature a crime. Heresy in its nature is directly and per se opposed to faith, but it is not in its nature intrinsically opposed to ecclesiastical law, since the penal sanction added to it in ecclesiastical law is an accidental circuмstance extrinsic to its nature. Salza & Siscoe fallaciously argue that since external heresy falls within the parameters of the definition of a crime in canon law (i.e. an external violation of a law or precept, etc.), external heresy is consequently by definition a crime, and therefore it is in its intrinsic nature a crime. The false conclusion is based on an elementary error of logic: External heresy is indeed a crime because it falls within the parameters of the canonical definition of a delict; but that only accidently qualifies external heresy as a crime, because the specifications of the nature of a crime which fall within the canonical definition of a crime do not fall within the canonical or theological definition of heresy. Being a crime is an accidental quality of external heresy due to the circuмstance that external heresy is a delict according to ecclesiastical law; but that quality does not pertain per se to the essential nature of external heresy, because its being an external violation of a penal law does not pertain to the definition of external heresy as it is defined in canon law and moral theology. Furthermore, to be a crime, the external act must be morally imputable; and hence, the merely material and therefore inculpable external act of heresy is not a crime; and therefore, it follows necessarily that the act of external heresy is manifestly not in its nature a crime. Additionally (as is explained below), to be a crime, it does not suffice that it violate a precept of divine law, but it must also violate an ecclesiastical law or precept; and therefore, without a law or precept of ecclesiastical law, or at least a divine law to which is added a penal censure, the external act is not a delict, nor is it punishable in the external forum by the Church. Thus, it is patent, that the external act of heresy per se, is not in its nature a crime.
be an “externa et moraliter imputabilis legis violatio cui addita sit sanctio canonica saltem indeterminata”. A morally imputable violation of divine law, whether internal or external, is by definition, and therefore in its very nature a sin , but not a crime. It is thus, patently clear that by leaving out the important material in the cited section of Fr. Augustine’s work, Salza & Siscoe deliberately intend to deceive their readers into thinking that Fr. Augustine says exactly the opposite of what he actually says. When one reads the text of Fr. Augustine’s commentary on canon 2195 in its proper context, the fraudulent verbal sleight off hand becomes obvious: On page 10 – 11: «A crime, in ecclesiastical law, is an external and morally imputable transgression of a law to which is attached a canonical sanction, at least in general. Delictum is taken from the word delinquere (de and linquere, to forsake, to leave, to omit) and means an offense in the general sense. However, by common usage the term is restricted to a public offense or crime against the juridical order or law. Therefore it is called a transgression of the law, whether divine or human, i.e., merely ecclesiastical. It is the law, either eternal or positive, that governs order, the relation of man to God and of man to man, and any defection from that order constitutes a frustration of the designs of Providence. » «2. But the transgression which the ecclesiastical law considers is not merely the guilty mind (mens rea), but the act, – i.e., an outward manifestation of a vicious intention, or a breach of the law as externally apprehensible . . . It is essential to the notion of delictum that it be an external act, either of speech or deed, although it is not necessary to be provable. » After the paragraph on externality, Fr. Augustine then elaborates on the legal element on page 12, 13 and 14: «4. But what does the addition “cui addita sit sanctio canonica saltem indeterminata” mean? The transgression is accompanied by penal sanction, at least in general terms. This means that there is neither crime nor punishment without a penal law.4 [“Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege poenali,” was the adage of the School; Eichmann, l. c., p. 27.] It is therefore, as stated above, the law which is infringed and which punishes. […] Take, for instance, the reading of forbidden books, which is not punished generally (can. 1395) but only in particular cases (can. 2318); hunting by clergymen (can.138), etc. Yet these forbidden actions cannot be called crimes in the sense of ecclesiastical law.” […] The sanctio canonica indeterminata signifies a penalty to be meted out according to the good pleasure of the judge or superior (can. 2217, § I, n. I). It follows that, although no special penalty is provided for the transgression of a law, yet if that law embodies the provision that the punishment of the transgressor is left to the prudent judgment of the Ordinary, this is sufficient to mark the transgression as a crime, provided that the other necessary marks are not wanting. » Thus, one of the great authorities on Canon Law explains those marks and elements necessary for a sin to be considered a cime in ecclesiastical law; and all of those marks and elements together do not pertain to the intrinsic nature of any external sin. The commentary of the Salamanca Canon Law Faculty explains on page 783, the definition of a crime in essentially the same sense as Fr. Augustine, but expounding on the necessary elements that constitute a delict in ecclesiastical law more concisely and with greater precision: «2195 Tres son los elementos constitutivos del delito por derecho ecelesiástico: a) violación externa de una ley; b) que la violación sea moralmente imputable, y c) que la ley lleve aneja una sanción canonica, por lo menos indeterminada. A estos tres elementos suelen los autores llamarles, respectivamente, elemento objetivo, elemento subjetivo y elemento legal. A dicha terminología nos atendremos, por ser la más común. » Those three elements necessary for a sin to be constituted as a crime in ecclesiastical law are 1) the external violation of a law (the objective element), 2) moral imputability of the violation (the subjective element), 3) a penal sanction connected to the law (legal element). The objective element is comprised of a) an external violation, b) of a law, c) that damages the juridico-social order of the Church . The canon uses the word ‘law’ in the broad sense of an obligatory norm of objective law, which includes in its scope a law properly so-called, or a simple jurisdictional precept or admonition. The law must be ecclesiastical, it does not suffice for a crime that a law merely natural or divine be transgressed, however grave it might be. In order for a natural or divine law to be of ecclesiastical character, it would suffice that the Church sanction it with a canonical penalty. Also pertaining essentially to the nature of a crime, is the legal element, as Fr. Augustine explained (in the portion of the text that Salza & Siscoe left out when quoting it), and summed up with the words, “This means that there is neither crime nor punishment without a penal law.” The catedráticos of the Canon Law faculty of Salamanca elaborate even more fully on this point, and what is most essential is that, «[P]or derecho eclesiástico, lo mismo que ocurre en la legislación de los Estados, la violación no constituye delito, aunque pueda ser pecado externo, si no hay una norma legal objetiva – en sentido lato, según hemos expuesto – que amenace previamente con una pena. De no ser asi, se daría lugar a inumerables arbitrariedades, lo que cedería en ultimo lugar en detrimento mayor y trastorno del orden social. » In this passage, the Salamanca canonists explain why it is that the legal element necessarily pertains essentially to the nature of a crime – and that is because it is necessary for a penalty to be connected to the violation of a law, for the violation to constitute a crime; because it is essential to the preservation of the social order which necessarily requires it. Hence, the mere omission of any mention of the legal element in the characterization of a crime in the 1983 Code (which falls short of a proper definition), cannot imply that the absence of inclusion of the legal element in the canons of the 1983 Code alters the essential definition of a crime; firstly because the legal element pertains intrinsically to the nature of a crime, which lies outside of the power of a legislator to eliminate; and secondly [as the Canon Law faculty of Navarre explain in the passage cited below] because one of the general principles applied in the 1983 revision of the Code of Canon Law was the elimination of all the definitions that were given in the 1917 Code, since they pertain to canonical doctrine rather than legislation; and thus remain applicable for the interpretation of the canons of the 1983 Code. Salza & Siscoe fail to make the most elementary distinctions when they say in Part II of their Formal Reply:
The only distinction that can be made when considering the nature of heresy is between: (1) the sin of heresy that is completely concealed in the heart and has never been externalized at all, and (2) the crime of heresy that has been externalized, even if no one was around to hear it (i.e., external, occult heresy). Cajetan explains that the reason the two are distinct, according to their nature, is because the sin of heresy that remains entirely hidden in the heart can only be judged by God, according to 1 Kings 16:7 - “man seeth the things that appear, but God beholdeth the heart,” whereas the crime of heresy that has been externalized (the external act renders it a crime by its nature) is subject to the judgment of men - even if, due to the circuмstances (e.g., no one around to hear it) it cannot be judged. In other words, the former is not divulged at all (hidden by its nature); the latter is divulged (external by its nature), even if no one heard it. The former is judgeable only by God; the latter can be judged by men. Heresy that has not been externalized at all is a sin, but not a crime; heresy that has been externalized (even if no one was around to hear it), is both a sin and a crime. Hence, the crime of heresy is more restrictive in its meaning than is the sin of heresy; and the external act is what makes it a crime, by its nature. The first distinction they fail to make is between the internal sin and the external sin; and the second is the distinction between the external sin and the crime. The second I have already sufficiently explained above; so it will suffice here to point out firstly, that an act that in its nature is only a crime against divine law, but does not in any manner violate an ecclesiastical law, does not fall under the jurisdiction of the Church in the external forum as a crime; and therefore, is not subject to the public penal judgment of the Church. Secondly, although every crime is an external sin, every exernal sin is not a crime in the sense of an ecclesiastical delict that is subject to the public penal judgment of the Church. Thirdly, the Salza/Siscoe self-contradictory notion of an “externalized internal sin”, is a failed oxymoron, based on the non sequitur that since the formal component of sin is internal; therefore sin is internal, even if it is committed with an external act. This grave error against Catholic moral doctrine fails to recognize that sin is in its essential nature a composite act consisting of two constituent components: matter and form. The form alone is not the sin, but the composite of the form and the matter together constitute the essence of a sin, which specifies its nature. All sins are actions – thoughts, words or deeds; actions which are either internal or external. The matter of the sin is the action itself which transgresses the law of God, as St. Alphonsus (quoted below) explains; and if that action is external, then the sin is an external sin. The classic definition of sin is that of St. Augustine (Contra Faustum XXII 27): «Dictum, factum vel concupitum contra legem æternam». The form, consists in the intention of the will to knowingly commit an act of transgression against the divine law, and is the principle from which the sinful action is brought into being. Internal sin is an action which terminates within the mind in such a manner that there does not proceed from the act of the will an action which is perceptible to the senses. External sin is a transgression of the law of God which begins in the will, as do all sins, and terminates in the external commission of words or deeds that are perceptible to the senses. The form of a sin is only a constitutive component of the sin, but not the sin itself; because the sinful action itself is the matter of the transgression which specifies the nature of the sin. Form without matter is a mere abstraction – a principle without any specific determination of any transgression of divine law; and therefore, there is no sin without both matter and form. Hence, if the action is internal, the sin is internal; but if the action is external, then the sin is an external sin. On the basis of their bizarre doctrine that the sin of heresy is internal, and is of a different specific nature than the external sin, i.e. the crime of heresy; and that only the crime of heresy, but not the act of public heresy considered formally as a sin, separates one from the body of the Church; Salza & Siscoe, heretically interpret the words of Mystici Corporis to mean that only the canonical ecclesiastical crime of notorious heresy (i.e. according to their own uncanonical definition of “notorious heresy”) separates one from membership in the Church by its own nature by severing the juridical bond of membership in the Church, without a public judgment of the Church. From this point of departure, they eventually arrive at the conclusion that for anything less than canonically notorious heresy (according to their own definition of the term), the juridical bond that unites one to the Church is not actually severed until a judgment of the crime is pronounced. In their Formal Reply, they begin by quoting their own book: True or False Pope?, explaining that it is, «the public offense (the crime) of heresy, which, of its nature, severs a person from the Body of the Church with no further censure attached to the offense. (…) Jerome is referring to the nature of the crime [of heresy], which severs one from the body of the Church with no additional censure attached to it. In this sense, the crime of heresy differs in its nature from other crimes, such as physically striking the Pope or procuring an abortion, which are crimes that only sever a person from the Church by virtue of the additional censure attached to the act. » They continue by arguing that only the crime of notorious heresy separates one from the body of the Church: «The Crime of Notorious Heresy: What separates a Catholic from external union with the Body of the Church is not the nature of the sin of heresy (again, as Kramer argues above), but rather the nature of the external act (crime[4]) [[4]The external act of heresy is, by its nature, a crime.] of notorious heresy. » «This is confirmed by Cardinal Billot, who said “only notorious heretics are excluded from the body of the Church.” (De Ecclesia, Thesis II). The reason notorious heresy, of its nature, separates a Catholic from the Body of the Church is because it severs the juridical bond[5] [[5] See Mystici Corporis Christi, No. 70.] The legal separation from the Church has nothing to do with the nature of the sin of heresy, and everything to do with the nature of the public act (crime) of notorious heresy. This is confirmed from the fact that Bellarmine, Cajetan and John of St. Thomas unanimously teach that a notoriously heretical Pope can be deposed, or declared deposed, even if, per accidens, he is not subjectively guilty of the sin. » In the quoted paragraph, Salza & Siscoe have just provided the premises for their own refutation. Firstly, as mentioned above, material heresy, if not qualified by schism, which places one outside the Church, does not separate one from the Church, nor does it effect the loss of office ex natura hæresis, because merely material heresy does not formally oppose the faith of the Church, and therefore does not sever the juridical bond. Salza & Siscoe say, “Bellarmine, Cajetan and John of St. Thomas unanimously teach that a notoriously heretical Pope can be deposed, or declared deposed, even if, per accidens, he is not subjectively guilty of the sin”; but they do not provide any direct quotation or reference to back up this claim; so, from the information provided, it is not possible to determine exactly what these authors really wrote nor determine what was their meaning. In Part III of this work I quote Bellarmine in lib. iv cap. ii of De Romano Pontifice, where he says that all authors, Catholic and non-Catholic are in agreement that a pope can be materially in heresy due to ignorance. So, no matter how notoriously known the materially heretical opinion of a pope may be; he is not properly a heretic, and therefore not a “notorious heretic” as the Church understands that term, unless he visibly separates himself from the Church; thus qualifying his material heresy by a visible act of schism. Secondly, according to the definition of ‘crime’ in canon 2195 § 1, and what is prescribed concerning imputability and dolus of crime in cann. 2199 and 2200; heresy cannot be considered a crime notorious by fact, nor is it even a crime at all if there is no moral imputability, which only exists when there is subjective guilt: If one is not subjectively guilty of the sin, then there is no crime; because, there is lacking in the act the grave moral imputability, which depends directly on the dolus, (i.e. «deliberata voluntas violandi legem») or culpability that are intrinsic to the nature of a crime, as defined in the canons; and without which the material act would not fulfil the conditions necessary for the act to be qualified as, and actually be constituted as a crime. Nevertheless, one who formally defects from the Catholic faith or communion with the Church, expressly rejecting the authority of the Church inculpably, separates himself from visible union with the Church and severs the juridical bond without committing the crime of heresy, schism, or apostasy; since there is no crime without grave moral imputability. Furthermore, mere material heresy on one or several points of doctrine, no matter how publicly or notoriously known, does not separate a Catholic from the Church, nor effect the loss of office; because an officeholder who is only materially in heresy has not defected from the faith by rejecting its formal cause, nor has he intended to leave the Church; nevertheless, given that the external violation of the law has occurred, the dolus of crime, which is defined as the deliberate intention to violate the law (Can. 2200. §1), is presumed in the 1917 Code until the contrary is proven (2200. §2): « Posita externa legis violatione, dolus in foro externo præsumitur, donec contrarium probetur. » In the 1983 Code it is presumed unless it appears otherwise. ( nisi aliud appareat — Can. 1321 § 1) Yet, heresy schismatically qualified as a public act of formal defection from the Church (as opposed to simple heresy), committed by one who happens to not be subjectively guilty of sin but who wilfully departs from the Church, although not having committed an actual crime, is nevertheless visibly and juridically separated from the body of the Church, by the very nature of the defection; and therefore loses office ipso jure (can. 194; 188. 4° in the 1917 Code), apart from any consideration of penal legislation, or the lack of dolus or culpa which would need to be present to make the act a grave and morally imputable crime. Thus, it can be seen that Salza & Siscoe contradict themselves again when they assert, «heresy includes everything from the internal sin alone, to the public crime of notorious heresy - and only the latter [i.e. the crime] automatically severs a person from external union with the Church “without a declaration.” » So, the premise, “the fact that Bellarmine, Cajetan and John of St. Thomas unanimously teach that a notoriously heretical Pope can be deposed, or declared deposed, even if, per accidens, he is not subjectively guilty of the sin,” does not prove or confirm that “the legal separation from the Church has nothing to do with the nature of the sin of heresy, and everything to do with the nature of the public act (crime) of notorious heresy;” – but what it does prove, is that the juridical bond that unites one to the Church as an actual member is sundered ipso jure as a direct result of the fact of the severing of the visible external bond, which is accomplished per se by the act of public defection; regardless of whether or not that act be also a sin or a crime. The public sin of manifest formal heresy, by its very nature as a visible rejection of the formal cause of faith, and not because it is a crime in ecclesiastical law, but because it per se severs the visible external bond of faith that formerly united the heretic to the Church as a visible member, suapte natura dissolves the juridical bond, and separates the heretic from the body of the Church in such a manner that heretics (as Mystici Corporis teaches) “miserably separate themselves” from the body of the Church by that very sin; and not “by legitimate authority” for having committeed a crime. This is precisely what Pius XII taught in Mystici Corporis, and not that the “offense”, (considered only under its formal aspect as a crime in ecclesiastical law), separates one suapte natura from the body of the Church; as Salza & Siscoe heretically assert against the clear and perpetual teaching of the universal and ordinary magisterium of the Church.
The latter quoted statement of Salza & Siscoe is also plainly false, because not only an act of notorious heresy, but even public heresy separates one from the Church, and as a direct consequence, results in an ipso jure loss of office: In its Prot. N. 10279/2006 (Actus Formalis Defecionis ab Ecclesia Catholica) approved by the Supreme Pontiff, Benedict XVI, the Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts. on 13 March 2006, clarified the Church’s position on formal defection from the Church, explaining, «The concept therein presented is new to canonical legislation and is distinct from the other – rather “virtual” (that is, deduced from behaviors) – forms of “notoriously” or “publicly” abandoning the faith (cfr. can. 171, § 1, 4°; 194, § 1, 2°; 316, § 1; 694, § 1, 1°; 1071, § 1, 4° and § 2). In the latter circuмstances, those who have been baptized or received into the Catholic Church continue to be bound by merely ecclesiastical laws (cfr. can. 11). » The docuмent distinguishes between « forms of “notoriously” or “publicly” abandoning the faith», both of which constitute a defection from the Church, and effect the ipso jure loss of office. This proves that it is not only canonically notorious heretics who are outside the Church, as Salza & Siscoe claim, (quoting Billot, who uses the word according to its common meaning, synonymous with “public”: “only notorious heretics are excluded from the body of the Church.”); but also public heretics. Furthermore, whoever publicly defects from the Catholic faith, apart from any consideration of penal law, crime, or the imputability of the act, loses office ipso jure according to the prescription of Canon 194, § 1, 2°. The ipso jure loss of office takes place “by the action of the law itself”, and as Canon 188. 4° prescribed, “automatically” (ipso facto) and “without any declaration” (sine ulla declaratione), and from “whatsoever offices” (quælibet officia), because the loss of office ultimately does not result from any human law, but from the nature of heresy; as Bellarmine explains in the earlier cited passage: “Nam Patres illi cuм dicunt hæreticos amittere jurisdictionem, non allegant ulla jura humana, quæ etiam forte tunc nulla extabant de hac re: sed argumentantur ex natura hæresis.” Salza & Siscoe continue: «It should be further noted – and this is also a critical point - that notorious heresy does not sever a person from the Church because it is listed as a crime (delict) in canon law, or because of the censure of excommunication that the Church attaches to the crime . . . Rather, notorious heresy separates a person from the Church due to the nature of the public act itself, which severs a juridical bond (i.e., “profession of the faith”). Notorious heresy would sever a person from the Church even if it were not listed as a crime in canon law.” » First of all, if it were not listed as a crime in canon law, then heresy would not be an ecclesiastical delict, and would therefore not be judicable and punishable in the external forum by the Church. Furthermore, as I explained above, it is in the nature of notorious heresy, (as the word ‘notorious’ is commonly understood as interchangeable with ‘public’), as being intrinsically an act of public defection (i.e. as a fact), and not because it is a crime (i.e. a penal offense or delict), that it severs the juridical bond ipso jure apart from any penal laws. Since Salza & Siscoe profess that the external act of heresy is in its nature a crime; according to them, the crime of notorious heresy severs the juridical bond and thus separates heretic from the body of the Church without a declaration – but if the crime is not public and notorious, then, according to Salza & Siscoe, the juridical bond is not severed automatically, but only by a penal sentence pronounced by Church authority: «Now, in the case of a Catholic who is guilty of the sin of heresy and has even externalized his heresy, yet who is not deemed to be a notorious heretic by fact, he would still incur the censure of excommunication ipso facto (since the censure is even incurred by external occult heretics) but, in such a case, it would require a “pronounced judgment of the Church” (rendering him notorious by law), before he would be legally severed from the Body of the Church. The ipso facto excommunication he incurred (in the internal forum) would not, per se, have the juridical effect (in the external forum) of legally separating him from the visible society of the Church since, as Pope Benedict IV said, “a sentence declaratory of the offence is always necessary in the external forum, since in this tribunal no one is presumed to be excommunicated unless convicted of a crime that entails such a penalty.” » The Salza/Siscoe conclusion is a non sequitur, because in the cited passage, Benedict XIV does not state or imply that a declaratory sentence of a penal offense is necessary for the juridical bond with the Church to be severed; but only that no one is to be presumed to have incurred the penalty of excommunication without a declaratory sentence of the crime. For the public crime of heresy, the juridical bond is not severed by the penalty of excommunication, but is severed suapte natura by the act of public heresy. Thus it is that Salza and Siscoe have fallen into heresy for their clearly heretical opinion that holds that a manifest formal heretic who is guilty of the public sin of heresy, but is not guilty of the crime of heresy canonically notorious by fact (as they understand it), remains a member of the Church until he is juridically judged to be a heretic, unless 1) he has left the Church by an explicit act of formal defection, or 2) has explicitly rejected the magisterium as the rule of faith, 3) has expressly admitted that his opinion is heretical. Those guilty of heresy, as heretics are defined in Canon 1325 § 2, if the sin is public (Canon 2197. 1°), have publicly defected from the Catholic faith, and are therefore by the very nature of that act of defection, separated from the body of the Church, apart from the latæ sententiæ excommunication prescribed in the canon. Such a defection provokes the ipso jure removal from ecclesiastical office (Canon 194, § 1, 2°). The proposition, «The ipso facto excommunication he incurred (in the internal forum) would not, per se, have the juridical effect (in the external forum) of legally separating him from the visible society of the Church since, as Pope Benedict IV said, “a sentence declaratory of the offence is always necessary in the external forum, since in this tribunal no one is presumed to be excommunicated unless convicted of a crime that entails such a penalty,» is fallacious in so far as it presumes 1) on the basis of the previous sentence, that the “externalized” public sin of heresy, incurs an ipso facto excommunication “in the internal forum”, because “sin is internal” – and “the Church does not judge internals”. In fact, the public sin of heresy is an external sin, and because it publicly violates an ecclesiastical law, its excommunication pertains to the external forum. However, notwithstanding the fact of the crime of external heresy and the penalty incurred by it, 2) the public sin of heresy, as an act of public defection from the Catholic faith, by its very nature severs the juridical bond of union with the Church apart from any penal censure or any human law, as has been amply demonstrated above, and therefore, as Bellarmine explained in the above quoted passage, “heretics are outside the Church, even before excommunication, and deprived of all jurisdiction, for they are condemned by their own judgment, as the Apostle teaches to Titus; that is, they are cut from the body of the Church without excommunication, as Jerome expresses it.” For this reason, the public sin of manifest formal heresy of itself severs the juridical bond, and thus suapte natura produces the effect of separating the heretic from the visible society of the Church ipso jure, notwithstanding the merely penal requirement mentioned by Benedict XIV, (“a sentence declaratory of the offence is always necessary in the external forum, since in this tribunal no one is presumed to be excommunicated unless convicted of a crime that entails such a penalty”), which is merely necessary to confirm the penalty of excommunication, but not to effect the severing of the juridical bond – because heresy already directly and per se separates one from the Church without any excommunication, i.e. by its very nature; and not “by legitimate authority”, i.e. by excommunication, as Pius XII teaches in Mystici Corporis. It is this last consideration which exposes the absurdity of the Salza/Siscoe thesis which would reason against reason, arguing that since external heresy is in its nature a crime, therefore a public judgment of the Church would be necessary for the juridical bond to be severed, and for the heretic to lose office. However, even if we grant solely for the sake of argument that the external act of heresy is in its nature a crime; it remains that the very act of manifestly formal heresy suapte natura, as an act of severing the bonds of communion, directly and per se severs the heretic visibly from the body of the Church entirely by itself, and therefore directly and per se severs the juridical bond ipso jure and causes the loss of office; and therefore necessarily it does so without any judgment of Church authority. An action which actually accomplishes the severing of the bonds of communion directly and per se, is manifestly not merely dispositive in nature, disposing the heretic to be severed upon judgment by the Church, since the act itself by its own nature accomplishes that severing entirely by itself.
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