Here on this thread, and more fully in my book, I have explained my position on opinion no. 2, so PC2 has no excuse: He is deliberately engaging in deceotion by inverting my meaning. I have explained that according to Bellarmine, a heretic is an incapable subject of the form of the papacy. Bellarmine explains the intrinsic metaphysical reason why one who is without faith is incapable of being pope; and consequently he says that a pope who would fall into heresy would straightaway cease to be pope. However, he says this cannot actually happen, because of an extrinsic reason, namely, the effect would bring about the defection of the Church. Thus, opinion no. 2 is false because both its premise (it is premised on the metaphysical impossibility of there being a heretic pope), and the effect that would result from it are impossible. Since its premise is impossible, opinion no. 1 is necessarily true. Opinion no. 1 is the true opinion in actual reality. Opinion no. 2 is not applicable in reality, although in theory as a purely abstract hypothesis, its outcome would be of strict metyphysical necessity. At the same time, its metaphysically necessary outcome would be theologically impossible, because it would provoke the defection of the Church. Thus opinion no. 2 is ncessarily false because it has no possible applicability in reality. If it were possible for a pope to be a heretic, a manifest heretic would lose office automatically; but since it is not possible for a pope to be a heretic (possible according to nature, but not possible in view of the promise made by Christ that the pontiff's faith will not fail), opinion no. 5 is valid only as a purely abstract hypothesis. Just like "PaxChristi2", "Pax Vobis" indulges in the outright deception and sophistry of John Salza and Robert Siscoe: "Neither you, nor I, nor anyone but the Cardinals can officially, formally correct, warn, or rebuke the pope." No one on earth possesses the jurisdiction to "officially" warn or correct the pope. Ecclesiastical warnings are of the nature of an act of a superior over a subject. A formal correction done as a charitable act can be done by any private person, as Ballerini explains. "But obstinacy is not obvious, because it's of the internal forum." False. Sometimes it is not obvious; sometimes it is obvious. If the obstinacy is manifest, it is perciptible to the senses and is manifested in such a manner that is seen to be obvious, such as when one refuses correction, or otherwise manifests the dolus of heresy without correction. When the obstinacy is manifest, it is public or will become public, and pertains to the external forum. If the obstinacy is occult, it is either 1) internal, 2) external but not perceived, or 3) external and perceived privately in such a manner that it will not become public. "If +Bellarmine meant that manifest heresy can be "obvious to all" then that would contradict Scripture." The proposition is absurd on its face. That which is manifest is by definition plainly obvious. If it is not obvious it is not manifest. If the obstinacy of heresy is manifested in such a manner that the dolus of heresy is obvious even without correction, then the form of heresy is already manifest entirely by itself, even without warnings (as Bordoni and de Lugo explain); and therefore is manifest even before being judged and declared by the Church. If the form of heresy is not evident, but only the matter is manifest; the heresy is materially manifest but formally occult. Once the manifest material heretic remains obstinate even after being corrected by someone (by anyone who is capable) with an explanation that would suffice to convince a reasonable man (as Fr. Charles Augustine and St. Alphonsus explain), then the formal heresy is obvious and manifest, even before any judgment or declaration is made by the Church. "Without this rebuke/warning process, obstinacy is not proved. Without obstinacy being proved, the heresy is material only, not manifest" The proposition is pure sophistry. It is a half-truth. Now A proof is sufficient evidence or a sufficient argument for the truth of a proposition. If there already exists such evidence which sufficiently manifests the obvious truth of a proposition, (such as, Bergoglio is a formal heretic), then there no need to prove by providing evidence of the truth of a proposition when the evidence of its truth is already manifestly known and obvious. To assert that it is necessary to prove the truth of that which is already manifestly evident and true is absurd on its face. " 'By the fact' that a person is proved to be OBSTINATE, then they lose their office immediately. Not before" False. By the fact of the manifestly evident obstinacy , one loses his office immediately by himself; regardless of whether it was manifestly evident per se, or if it needed to be proven to become manifest. The public act of defection from the faith into manifestly obvious formal heresy is the fact by which per se the statutory loss of office takes place according to Bellarmine and according to canon law: If the pertinacity is manifest per se, then no further evidence by way of proof is needed; and if it is occult, then by means of proof, the pertinacity becomes manifest, and by the fact of becoming manifest, the office is lost per se. It is not "by the fact" of the proving by the cardinals or by a council, but by the fact of the act of pertinacity becoming manifest, regardless of whether or not proof by an external agent was needed as a dispository act for the pertinacity to become manifest, that the office is lost ipso facto and per se.  

Are we to believe that Fr. Kramer and all the canonists and theologians he quoted have misunderstood Bellarmine's arguments on the fourth and fifth opinions; and that only now, Salza & Siscoe finally got it right?

I'm re-reading Fr. Chazal's book, "Contra Cekadam," I came across an interesting passage on page 93, in which Father mentions the debates between Fr. Kramer and John Salsa and Robert Sisco. Though he has for sympathy for Per Se (Fr. Kramer's stance), in that it rightly says that something happens before God when a Pope proffers heresy, he emphasizes that we should wait for the restoration of the juridical order of the Church to be restored before it can be resolved, and that it's not something we can resolve ourselves. Father he warns about the problem of "Anarchical refusal of the Juridical Order of the Church." Hopefully I'm properly understanding what Father is saying here.


Fr. Chazal writes:

"Anarchical refusal of the Juridical Order of the Church

"You (addressing Fr. Cekada) say emphatically that you are not arguing on a canonical standpoint; that the matter cannot be resolved canonically, but only by divine law: DULY NOTED, yet 1. This is anarchy 2. Why do you use Canonists in your argument?

"The violent debates that pits Fr. Kramer, who argues along the PER SE line, and John Salza and Robert Siscoe, who elaborate more on the QUOAD NOS line, simply confirm that a crime has distinct consequences, one before God and in itself, and secondly before men and in the life of the Church as a public and juridical society.

"Mgr. Guerard des Laurier should have adhered to the theological distinction held by his Dominican predecessors: PER SE/QUOAD NOS. Things that have happened before God may not have yet happened before men, while something happens immediately when a Pope proffers a heresy. Should a phenomenon happen per se, suapte natura, ex natura, ipso facto, by itself, from the very fact, yet we remain human, social beings, carrying on in a visible society endowed with a public life and juridical bond. That is the way we are: social beings.

"Quoad Nos

"We stand against the opposite notion which is anarchy, and anarchy breeding: an almost protestant high opinionatedness. We are Catholics, not protestants, especially because when a difference emerges amongst us, we wait patiently and charitably, until it can be resolved by an instrument established by Our Lord to prevent the fragmentation of the Church. Luther was surprised, disappointed, that after having thrown the Pope out, many popes immediately proliferated: a similar chaos reigns over the sede movement as a whole. Who can make the extensive list of sects sedevacantism has bred since the days of Fr. Saenz? (At least the sedeplenists are divided only in three: Ecclesia Dei, the neo-SSPX, and the Resistance). Without denying that our present Popes are insane, why not wait patiently for the restoration of the juridical order of the Church? Why not accept that the situation is not in our hands, begging God to return the public life of the Church to the normalcy it enjoyed for so many centuries?"

In a sense, he does, though, as the formaliter lines up with the QUOAD SE and the materialiter with the QUOAD NOS.

Not 100%, but they line up in a way.

I don't understand what your first sentence means exactly, but what I see in what Fr. Chazal is saying is that a distinction should be made between the two: Yes, something happens before God... BUT...we must wait for a proper juridical authority to resolve it, since we are only human.

We can't see the divine side of things; and as such we have to rely on (wait for) the juridical order of the Church, or we may fall into a anarchical stance. That's my take on it, which is maybe over-simplifying it, but Fr. Chazal isn't writing for theologians. He tries to keep it simple (for people like me  ;D)

St Peter was not a heretic of any sort and St Paul never thought he was a heretic.  He was guilty of sin.  Read Haydock.

I said that St Peter was not obstinate in his error.  Technically, it could be argued he was materially in error/heresy, as Fr. Cornelius a Lapide says:
.
It may be urged that in this act of Peter’s there was at least something sinful, if not actually erroneous in faith, as some have rashly asserted. By his action it may be thought that he thoughtlessly made a profession of Judaism, and so put a stumbling-block in the way of the Gentiles, and tempted them to Judaise with him. He had previously lived with the Gentiles, but he afterwards withdrew from them suddenly, went over to the Jews, and lived with them. From this the Gentiles might properly infer that Judaism was necessary to salvation, both for him and themselves, and was binding on Christians ; for though the Old Law, with its ceremonies, was not yet the cause of death, and might be preserved so as to secure for itself an honourable burial, and also to draw the Jews to the faith of Christ, yet it was dead, and in one sense death-giving, viz., to any one who should keep it on the supposition that it was binding on Christians. Although Peter, however, did not so regard it, yet his action was so imprudent as to give the Gentiles good reason for thinking that he did.
.
St Paul did not, and would not, rebuke St Peter for something trivial...not in the manner in which he rebuked him.  St Paul would not have been enlightened by the Holy Ghost to put this as part of Scripture, if we can just ignore it as some minor misunderstanding between he and St Peter.  No, St Peter's actions were a scandal (even if he did not mean them as such) and grave enough for St Paul to stop what he was doing, pack up and travel to St Peter's location, and rebuke him publically, in an attempt to stop the action and to set an example for those in St Peter's city.  St Paul was correcting an unorthodox practice.  No one has ever said that St Peter was unorthodox or a heretic, but his ACTIONS were unorthodox and heretical, in an objective and material way.
.
Haydock says that St Peter's action was a venial sin.  Such a sin was obviously against the Faith.  Can not a venial sin of Faith be considered a material heresy?  Of course.  Heresy simply means "a belief or opinion contrary to orthodox practices."  Material heresy means the person is UNKNOWINGLY or UNWILLINGLY holding a belief or opinion contrary to orthodoxy.  By extension, a materially heretical act is of the same nature.  It simply means the act is unorthodox or is scandalous to orthodoxy.  It's certainly clear that St Peter's actions were materially heretical.  This is why St Paul rebuked him; to stop the unorthodox (i.e. heretical) scandal.

Salza & Siscoe say Suárez was of the fifth opinion, not the fourth; and that Bellarmine was of the same opinion as Suárez. According to  Suárez, the Church deposes a heretic pope by rendering "juridical" judgment of the crime, and then Christ deposes the heretic from the papacy; and consequently, the pope falls from office "ipso facto". The dispository nature of the judgment logically opposes the nature of an ipso facto effect, but Suárez remained undaunted by this technicality. According to Bellarmine's exposition on the fifth opinion, the fall is ipso facto, and takes place"per se"; which logically excludes any need for a dispository judgment by an external agent. This "fifth opinion" is the historical opinion formulated already by the early Decretists in the late twelfth century, which Bellarmine lists as the fifth; and is obviously a different argument than that of the opinion of Suárez. Suárez's opinion was an entirely new argument, not one of the historical "five opinions" Bellarmine outlines; so Bellarmine does not even mention it; because it is only an unremarkable variation of the fourth opinion which incoherently combines elements of the fourth and fifth opinions. Bordoni argues against the fifth opinion, and also refutes Suárez's opinion; clearly distinguishing between the two opinions. This is all lost on the obtuse minds of Salza & Siscoe who continue to blindly assert that Suárez and Bellarmine were both of the same "fifth opinion".