Introibo says,

"The most probable way of restoring the papacy is an "imperfect General Council." Some pre-Vatican II theologians pondered such a Council in the absence of cardinals. Indeed, theologian Van Noort pondered it as late as 1956 (See Dogmatic Theology 2: 276).

Theologian Cajetan wrote: "...by exception and by supplementary manner this power [electing a pope], corresponds to the Church and to the Council, either by absence of Cardinal Electors, or because they are doubtful, or the election itself is uncertain, as it happened at the time of the schism."  (See De Comparatione Auctoritatis Papae et Concilii)

Theologian Billot wrote: "When it would be necessary to  proceed with the election, if it is impossible to follow the regulations of papal law, as was the case during the Great Western Schism, one can accept, without difficulty, that the power of election could be transferred to a...Council...Because natural law prescribes that, in such cases, the power of a superior is passed to the immediate inferior because this is absolutely necessary for the survival of the society and to avoid the tribulations of extreme need." (See De Ecclesia Christi)."


https://introiboadaltaredei2.blogspot.com/

Before the institution of the College of Cardinals, the election of the Roman Pontiff belonged to the clergy of Rome with the assent of the faithful, a fact universally acknowledged by historians and theologians. This historical reality is precisely what theologians such as Cajetan, Suarez, John of St. Thomas, and Billuart appeal to when they argue that, in a total collapse of the juridical order—where the papal law cannot be followed because electors are non‑existent, unknown, or doubtful in the strict sense—the Church retains, by natural law, the ability to supply a pope through the universal Church acting in extremis. In this framework, the clergy and laity of Rome (or the broader Church) do not act by right or juridical authority, but as the subject of devolution when the constituted order is physically impossible to use.

                ┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐

                │        APOSTOLIC & SUB‑APOSTOLIC ERA    │
                └──────────────────────────────────────────┘
                              │
                              ▼
                Election by Roman clergy
                + consent/acclamation of laity
                (primitive, organic structure)

                              │
                              ▼
                ┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
                │        EARLY PATRISTIC PERIOD            │
                └──────────────────────────────────────────┘
                              │
                              ▼
                Roman presbyterate + deacons
                become structured electoral body
                (laity still involved)

                              │
                              ▼
                ┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
                │    LATE PATRISTIC / EARLY MEDIEVAL      │
                └──────────────────────────────────────────┘
                              │
                              ▼
                Imperial confirmation customary
                (Byzantine emperors approve elections)
                — clergy still elect the pope —

                              │
                              ▼
                ┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
                │  CAROLINGIAN → PRE‑REFORM PERIOD        │
                └──────────────────────────────────────────┘
                              │
                              ▼
                Roman nobility + secular rulers
                exert increasing influence
                (instability prompts reform)

                              │
                              ▼
                ┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
                │        REFORM ERA (1059)                │
                └──────────────────────────────────────────┘
                              │
                              ▼
                *In Nomine Domini* (Nicholas II)
                Cardinal‑bishops designated primary electors
                (birth of the College of Cardinals)

                              │
                              ▼
                ┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
                │      HIGH MIDDLE AGES (12th–13th c.)    │
                └──────────────────────────────────────────┘
                              │
                              ▼
                All cardinals become electors
                Two‑thirds rule established
                (fully juridicalized system)

                              │
                              ▼
                ┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
                │  GREAT WESTERN SCHISM (1378–1417)      │
                └──────────────────────────────────────────┘
                              │
                              ▼
                Multiple claimants → doubtful electors
                (foundation for later “imperfect council”
                natural‑law theories)

                              │
                              ▼
                ┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
                │      COUNCIL OF CONSTANCE              │
                └──────────────────────────────────────────┘
                              │
                              ▼
                Election of Martin V
                with authorization of Gregory XII
                (used by Billot/Franzelin to show
                Christ preserves juridical order)

                              │
                              ▼
                ┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
                │    EARLY MODERN THEOLOGICAL DEBATE      │
                └──────────────────────────────────────────┘
                              │
                              ▼
                Two schools emerge:
                1. Natural‑law devolution (Cajetan, Suarez)
                2. Providential preservation (Billot, Franzelin)

                              │
                              ▼
                ┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
                │        MODERN PERIOD (19th–20th c.)      │
                └──────────────────────────────────────────┘
                              │
                              ▼
                Cardinalate stabilized as exclusive electors
                Primitive election seen as non‑repeatable
                except in purely hypothetical collapse


The automatic‑loss school (Bellarmine, Wernz–Vidal) holds that a pope who becomes a manifest heretic loses office ipso facto by divine law, but that the Church must recognize the fact before acting. However, this school does not require a judicial sentence—only a public fact. If such public recognition is absent or impossible, the juridical continuity of the Church is not destroyed; rather, the electoral subject remains intact (the cardinals), because their authority derives from the last unquestionably true pope. Thus, even without a juridical declaration, the Church retains a functioning electoral body unless the cardinals themselves become physically non‑existent, unknowable, or doubtful in the strict sense.

The natural‑law devolution school (Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Suarez) teaches that if the constituted electors become physically impossible to identify or utilize—whether through extinction, doubt, or total breakdown—then the Church reverts, by natural law, to the historically prior subject capable of preserving succession (Roman clergy → universal Church). This mechanism does not require public juridical recognition, because it is not a juridical act but a state‑of‑nature supply for the survival of the society. The providential‑preservation school (Billot, Franzelin, Journet) adds that Christ ordinarily prevents the Church from reaching such extremity, but does not deny the theoretical possibility. Thus, the unified synthesis is this: If there is no public juridical recognition and the constituted electors remain identifiable, they alone retain competence; but if they become physically unknowable or doubtful, natural law supplies a fallback subject, even without juridical declaration, because the Church cannot be left unable to elect a pope.

Major: 
Whatever is necessary for the indefectible continuation of the apostolic primacy must exist in the Church either by positive law (constituted electors) or by natural law (historically rooted subjects capable of supplying the election), even when no public juridical recognition is available.

Minor: 
If the constituted electors (the College of Cardinals) remain physically identifiable, they retain competence even without public juridical recognition; but if they become physically non‑existent, unknowable, or doubtful in the strict sense, natural law supplies a historically rooted fallback subject (Roman clergy → universal Church), which can act without juridical declaration because the act is one of survival, not jurisdiction.

Conclusion: 
Therefore, even without public juridical recognition, the Church always retains a determinate subject capable of electing the Roman Pontiff—ordinarily the College of Cardinals by positive law, and in extraordinary physical collapse the historically rooted subjects by natural law—so that the apostolic primacy cannot fail.

Thank you for your feedback for this exercise.

We are dealing with something that none of the theologians envisioned in its entirety, so I am pushing it to the max (but there could be many things I am missing).

How is this?

I am recasting the theologians as a synthesis so, please don't take this to mean I am presenting this as "their" original thesis, I am just trying to integrate their various approaches.

In earlier centuries, Catholic kings sometimes intervened directly against heretical or treasonous bishops, even removing them from office or barring them from public ministry, and Rome did not treat these actions as usurpations of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The theologians explain that such interventions were legitimate not because kings possessed spiritual authority, but because they acted as public custodians of temporal order in situations where the Church herself was unable to act. Suarez notes that in emergencies “the community may act when the ordinary judge cannot” (De Fide, disp. 10), and Cajetan teaches that “when the competent judge is impeded, the Church acts through those who can” (De Comparatione, ch. 13). These kings acted publicly, not privately; they acted in the name of the whole community, not in their own name; and they acted on public facts, not private suspicions. Their actions were tolerated because the bishop’s heresy created immediate civil and ecclesial danger, the local Church was unable to intervene, the pope was distant or incapacitated, and the king acted to preserve public order until the Church could regularize the situation. Rome’s later acceptance of these actions—by not overturning them—shows that public facts can substitute for juridical acts when the competent judge is absent. John of St. Thomas articulates the principle clearly: “In the absence of the pope and cardinals, the power devolves to the Church herself” (Cursus Theologicus, De Auctoritate Summi Pontificis).

If one man, acting as public authority, may act in the name of the whole community in a vacuum, then the community itself may act corporately when the entire hierarchy is incapacitated. This is the foundation of the doctrine of the imperfect council, which Cajetan describes as the Church acting “through those members who remain” when the head cannot function. Suarez likewise affirms that if the ordinary electors fail, “the power returns to the universal Church or the Roman clergy, as was done in the beginning.” Billot concedes that natural law “supplies a subject” when the constituted subject is lost. Journet adds that the Church’s visibility can “revert to the primitive form” when the ordinary structures fail. Thus the same principle that justified a king acting on behalf of his people in an emergency also justifies a people who rule themselves (democratically) acting as one in an imperfect council: both are cases of public authority acting on public facts in the absence of the competent judge, and both preserve the Church’s visibility when the ordinary organs of governance are unusable.


Governing Principle
Throughout Christian history, Catholic kings occasionally intervened to restrain, depose, or replace bishops whose public heresy or treason created immediate danger to the realm and whose removal was necessary for the preservation of public order. The theologians explain that such royal interventions were legitimate not because kings possessed ecclesiastical jurisdiction, but because they acted as public authorities in a vacuum at moments when the Church’s own juridical organs were unable to function. The local clergy were powerless, the pope was distant or impeded, and the danger was urgent; therefore the king, as custodian of temporal peace, acted in the name of the whole community on the basis of public facts that required immediate response. Rome’s later acceptance of these actions—by not overturning them—demonstrates the principle that when the competent judge cannot act, public facts may substitute for juridical acts, provided the action is taken by a public authority for the sake of preserving the Church’s visibility and order. From this historical and theological foundation emerges the broader natural‑law principle: the same logic that permitted a king to act for the moral body he governs in an emergency necessarily permits a moral body that governs itself to assemble and act as one when the entire hierarchy is incapacitated, compromised, or juridically unusable. This is the precise theological foundation of the imperfect council.

Cajetan
Cajetan’s system aligns directly with the governing principle because he holds that when the constituted organ of the Church is unable to act, the subject Church retains the ability to act for its own preservation. His statement that “when the competent judge is impeded, the Church acts through those who can” (De Comparatione, ch. 13) mirrors the principle that public authority may act in a vacuum on public facts. Cajetan’s doctrine of the imperfect council is simply the ecclesial application of the same logic that justified kings acting for the community: when the hierarchy is juridically unusable, the Church may assemble and act as one through those members who remain capable of acting.

John of St. Thomas
John of St. Thomas explicitly teaches that if the College of Cardinals becomes unusable, the power of electing the pope “returns to the Roman clergy, as in the primitive Church” (Cursus Theologicus, De Auctoritate Summi Pontificis, disp. 2, a. 2). This reflects the governing principle’s core insight that public facts may substitute for juridical acts when the competent judge cannot act. His doctrine of the imperfect council—capable of judging the fact of papal heresy—rests on the same natural‑law foundation. He writes that the Church must retain the ability to act corporately because “the Church cannot be left without remedy when the head is in doubt.” Thus, when the hierarchy is incapacitated, the Church may assemble and act as one to preserve visibility and order.

Suarez
Suarez’s doctrine of devolution is a direct theological expression of the governing principle. He teaches that “if the ordinary electors fail, the power devolves upon the universal Church or the Roman clergy, as was done in the beginning” (De Fide, disp. 10, sect. 6). This is simply the ecclesial form of the idea that public authority may act in a vacuum. Suarez’s system presupposes that the Church, as a moral body, retains the ability to act as one when the constituted organ is unusable. His entire framework is a systematic application of the principle that public facts can substitute for juridical acts when the competent judge is absent.

Billot
Billot is cautious, but even he concedes the principle in theory. He admits that “if the constituted subject of election were lost, natural law would supply another subject, as in the primitive Church” (De Ecclesia, thesis 29). This is nothing other than the governing principle expressed in scholastic form: when the hierarchy is juridically unusable, the Church as a moral body retains the ability to assemble and act as one. Billot’s hesitation is practical, not theoretical; the principle itself is fully acknowledged.

Journet
Journet’s distinction between the essence of visibility and the mode of visibility provides the ecclesiological framework for the governing principle. He teaches that the Church can “revert to the primitive form” when the ordinary structures fail (L’Église du Verbe Incarné, vol. 1). This presupposes that public facts may substitute for juridical acts when the competent judge cannot act. For Journet, the imperfect council is simply the Church’s visibility preserved in its minimal juridical form—the Church acting as one when the hierarchy is incapacitated.

Final Synthesis
In light of the governing principle—that the same logic which permitted a king to act for the moral body he governs in an emergency necessarily permits a moral body that governs itself to assemble and act as one when the entire hierarchy is incapacitated, compromised, or juridically unusable—the convergence of the classical theologians becomes unmistakable. Cajetan’s insistence that “the Church acts through those who can” expresses the same natural‑law mechanism by which a public authority may act in a vacuum on public facts. John of St. Thomas extends this by teaching that the power of election devolves to the Roman clergy, and that an imperfect council may judge the fact of papal heresy, precisely because the Church must retain the ability to act corporately when the ordinary organ is unusable. Suarez systematizes this principle in his doctrine of devolution, arguing that if the ordinary electors fail, the power returns to the Church herself, which is simply the ecclesial form of the community acting as one when no single authority remains capable of acting for it. Even Billot, though practically cautious, concedes that natural law “supplies another subject” if the constituted subject is lost, thereby acknowledging the same foundational principle in theory. Journet completes the synthesis by showing that the Church’s visibility is indefectible even when its canonical form collapses, because the Church can revert to the primitive mode of governance—bishops and clergy acting corporately—when the ordinary structures fail. Thus, across all five theologians, the same conclusion emerges: when the hierarchy is juridically unusable, the Church retains the natural‑law capacity to assemble and act as one through an imperfect council, just as a king once acted for the community when the Church’s organs were unable to intervene.

Can you provide me with magisterial sources condemning or is it just "rejected" by the theologians?

The method I’m using is not a form of legal functionalism—sophistic or otherwise—but an attempt to articulate the governing principle in continuity with the Church’s own theological and juridical tradition. Functionalism reduces law to procedure or utility; my premise, by contrast, is grounded in the substantive moral and ecclesiological commitments that the Church herself affirms.

If you still believe the approach is untenable, I would welcome clarification on which specific aspect departs from that tradition.

I noticed that. But to be fair, I am attempting a synthesis of their positions as stated above.

I am happy to argue it as no one else wants to - yet - not because I believe it is "the solution", but simply as an exercise.
Here is what we get:

"Classical authors who allow any form of devolutio or an “imperfect council” do so as a narrow, juridical remedy: it is admissible only on clear public facts, when ordinary judges are truly impeded, and only through a public, legitimate subject acting ministerially (not as a new source of ordinary papal jurisdiction), with strict limits and prompt canonical regularization thereafter. Cajetan frames the affirmative position as remedial and expressly denies that such action makes the Church superior to the pope; John of St. Thomas introduces the debate as two technical opinions and insists the Church must not be left “without remedy” while preserving juridical form; Suarez sets the two alternatives (devolution vs. declaratory recognition) and repeatedly stresses limits so as not to imply papal subordination; Bellarmine’s “recognition” line treats manifest heresy as a fact to be declared rather than a license for coercive deposition by the Church; Billot concedes a theoretical “supply of subject” in extremis but immediately qualifies it as exceptional, public, remedial, and subject to later confirmation; Billuart and the manualists summarize the two schools precisely to show the technical, constrained character of the debate. Read in context, these authors supply the very safeguards you demand — publicity, legitimate public subject, necessity, ministerial competence, and subsequent regularization — and so their doctrine is a conservative juridical mechanism for preserving order, not a doctrinal endorsement of factional councils or consequentialist “ends justify the means” law‑making. Thomistic principles both forbid random, factional assemblies from claiming to act as the Universal Church and at the same time allow a narrowly circuмscribed remedial mechanism — but only under the strict conditions that preserve the four marks of law: ordinance of reason, legitimate author, promulgation, and the common good."
Each offers his own "piece of the puzzle" so I realize it may seem like that, but that is the purpose of the exercise - to see if the "governing principle" holds within that framework.

I am willing to argue for the sake of the subject matter, NOT because "I need it to be true", or it is what I endorse or advocate for.

I suppose most people won't touch it with a ten foot pole (and hey, maybe for good reason).

But I don't mind playing "devil's advocate" in this either.

We all have more to learn, no one understands it all. I agree that A.I. isn't an excuse for reading the actual texts, the "solution" hasn't presented itself yet for all to recognize, so the exercises continue...

On strict application of papal election law in ordinary cases: The manuals do hold that the pope’s positive law fixes the ordinary electing subject and that norms attached to validity must be observed; but Cajetan and his school treat this as ordinary law, not an absolute metaphysical bar that forecloses every other possibility in true collapse.

On the blanket claim that procedural breaches are never nullifying: Classical canonists distinguish constitutive from merely procedural norms; whether a procedural rule nullifies depends on the legislator’s intention and the nature of the norm, a point emphasized repeatedly in the Thomist tradition and in manualist treatments of election law.

On the impossibility of instantiating the College: John of St. Thomas explicitly contemplates the hypothesis that the constituted electors may become physically unusable or doubtful, and he teaches that in such a case the power of election can revert to the Roman clergy or the universal Church as the historically prior subject.

On the necessity of papal authorization for any council in extremis: Historical and manualist readings of Constance stress that Gregory XII’s authorization preserved juridical continuity in that concrete case, but the commentators do not make papal authorization an absolute metaphysical requirement in a scenario where no certain pope exists to authorize anything.

On reading Constance as proof that only papally‑approved councils can act: Journet and other theologians use Constance as an example of providential preservation with papal cooperation; they do not deny the theoretical natural‑law fallback in a total collapse, and they caution that Constance’s legitimacy rested on Gregory XII’s participation, not on a general rule that would render the Church impotent if no pope existed.

On the claim that papal involvement is always required to avoid chaos: Journet argues that papal involvement secures juridical unity in ordinary and many extraordinary cases, but he also recognizes that visibility and juridical life are not strictly identical to later canonical forms; the manuals therefore allow only tightly constrained emergency measures when the head and constituted organs are truly unusable.

On the assertion that only the pope is divinely authorized to decide the mode of his succession: Pre‑Vatican II authors uniformly affirm papal primacy in ordinary legislation; yet several (Cajetan, Suarez, John of St. Thomas) distinguish between ordinary papal determination and the natural‑law roots of ecclesial survival, so that the pope’s legislative role is not a logical impossibility in cases where no certain pope exists.

On Billot’s supposed absolute insistence on papal involvement: Billot insists that Constance must be read with Gregory XII’s authorization to avoid conciliarist errors, but he explicitly concedes the theoretical possibility that, if the constituted subject were truly lost, natural law would supply another subject as in the primitive Church; his caution is historical and prudential, not an absolute metaphysical bar.

On excluding every non‑papally convoked assembly as illegitimate: The classical manuals reject factional self‑convocation and conciliarism; yet they also teach that an imperfect council (the Church acting through those who remain) is a theoretical, strictly limited remedy in extremis—not a license for private factions, but not a categorical denial of any non‑papal corporate action when the papal office and constituted electors are genuinely absent or unknowable.

On the proper synthesis: The safe, pre‑Vatican II synthesis is this: (a) follow papal election law in ordinary cases and respect constitutive norms; (b) reject factional self‑convocation and conciliar supremacy; (c) nevertheless acknowledge the classical‑manualist teaching that, in a true and total collapse of the constituted electors and of any certain pope, natural law supplies a narrowly defined, exceptional fallback (rooted historically in the Roman clergy or universal Church) to preserve the primacy—a theoretical safeguard, not a routine procedure.