Author Topic: Sede bishop begins to "work" towards electing a true Roman Pontiff... (Read 3767 times)

Everlast22 · « **Reply #15 on:** January 13, 2026, 11:40:05 AM »

Quote from: Ladislaus on January 11, 2026, 10:19:54 PM

https://www.sgg.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Letter-2023.pdf

He did this so subtly (almost to a point of suspicion) almost not one person who goes there knew about that..

lol

JonandDebbie · « **Reply #16 on:** **Yesterday** at 01:27:45 AM »

Thank you SRC for posting this video of Bishop Roy. He seems to have wisdom beyond his years. At time 32:30 into the video he states: "There are problems in your family, problems in our country, problems in the Church, problems in our parishes. This our main problem, we don't have the voice of Peter."

SkidRowCatholic · « **Reply #17 on:** **Yesterday** at 05:07:45 PM »

Introibo says,

"The most probable way of restoring the papacy is an "imperfect General Council." Some pre-Vatican II theologians pondered such a Council in the absence of cardinals. Indeed, theologian Van Noort pondered it as late as 1956 (See Dogmatic Theology 2: 276).

Theologian Cajetan wrote: "...by exception and by supplementary manner this power [electing a pope], corresponds to the Church and to the Council, either by absence of Cardinal Electors, or because they are doubtful, or the election itself is uncertain, as it happened at the time of the schism." (See De Comparatione Auctoritatis Papae et Concilii)

Theologian Billot wrote: "When it would be necessary to proceed with the election, if it is impossible to follow the regulations of papal law, as was the case during the Great Western Schism, one can accept, without difficulty, that the power of election could be transferred to a...Council...Because natural law prescribes that, in such cases, the power of a superior is passed to the immediate inferior because this is absolutely necessary for the survival of the society and to avoid the tribulations of extreme need." (See De Ecclesia Christi)."

https://introiboadaltaredei2.blogspot.com/

Angelus · « **Reply #18 on:** **Today** at 12:40:33 PM »

Quote from: SkidRowCatholic on Yesterday at 05:07:45 PM

Introibo says,

"The most probable way of restoring the papacy is an "imperfect General Council." Some pre-Vatican II theologians pondered such a Council in the absence of cardinals. Indeed, theologian Van Noort pondered it as late as 1956 (See Dogmatic Theology 2: 276).

Theologian Cajetan wrote: "...by exception and by supplementary manner this power [electing a pope], corresponds to the Church and to the Council, either by absence of Cardinal Electors, or because they are doubtful, or the election itself is uncertain, as it happened at the time of the schism." (See De Comparatione Auctoritatis Papae et Concilii)

Theologian Billot wrote: "When it would be necessary to proceed with the election, if it is impossible to follow the regulations of papal law, as was the case during the Great Western Schism, one can accept, without difficulty, that the power of election could be transferred to a...Council...Because natural law prescribes that, in such cases, the power of a superior is passed to the immediate inferior because this is absolutely necessary for the survival of the society and to avoid the tribulations of extreme need." (See De Ecclesia Christi)."

https://introiboadaltaredei2.blogspot.com/

Introibo has used Cardinal Billot to say precisely the opposite of what Billot said in the section Introibo quotes from him. Here is the full section quoted from Billot:

(https://ia801601.us.archive.org/5/items/tractatusdeeccle01bill/tractatusdeeccle01bill.pdf):

---

"§ 1. That the legitimate election of the Pontiff now depends de facto on pontifical law alone is demonstrated by an easy and obvious argument: because the law regulating the election was enacted by the Supreme Pontiffs. Therefore, until it is abrogated by the Pontiff himself, it remains in force, and there is no power in the Church, even when the see is vacant, by which it can be changed.

'For the Pope instituted to whom the election pertains, and he changes and limits the act of election in such a way that it would be null if done in the opposite manner. That the Church or Council, apart from the Pope, does not have this authority is clear from this: that the whole Church cannot authoritatively change a law made by the Pope--for example, [to decree] that the election does not pertain to true and indubitable Cardinals, or that one elected by less than two-thirds of the Cardinals is Pope. But conversely, the Pope could establish this... because it belongs to the same authority to remove [a law] as to authoritatively establish it in matters of positive law.' [Cajetan]

And therefore, if for example the see had happened to become vacant during the Vatican Council, the legitimate election would not have pertained to the Fathers of the Council, but only to the customary electors, as Pius IX had also expressly provided by special bull.

The only question, therefore, can be about the possible: namely, whether the assignment of the conditions of election could have pertained to some authority other than the pontifical. On this matter, no doubt is raised concerning the authority of an ecuмenical council, which is in no way distinguished from pontifical power, since it belongs to the nature of ecuмenical decrees that they have confirmation from the Pontiff. Hence doubt arises only concerning some other, inferior authority. But the conclusion must be negative, because since the primacy was given to Peter alone for himself and his successors, it pertains to him alone--that is, to the Supreme Pontiff alone--to determine the mode of transmission of hereditary power, and consequently also of the election through which this same transmission is accomplished. Moreover, every law concerning the order of the universal Church transcends the limits fixed by the nature of things to a power that is not supreme. But the election of the supreme pastor undoubtedly pertains to the order of the universal Church. Therefore, by the nature of things, it is reserved to the determination of him to whom the care of the whole community has been entrusted by Christ.

And these conclusions hold without controversy for the ordinary and regular state. But the question is raised: what would be the law if perchance an extraordinary case should occur in which it would be necessary to proceed to the election of a Pontiff, yet it would no longer be possible to observe the conditions which the antecedent pontifical law had determined--as many think occurred at the time of the Great Schism in the election of Martin V?

Now, supposing once that such circuмstances have occurred, it must be admitted without difficulty that the power of election would devolve to a general council. For it is from natural law itself that in such cases the attribution of the power of a superior comes by way of devolution to the power next following, precisely insofar as is required so that society may be preserved and escape the straits of extreme necessity.

'In the case of ambiguity, however (because it is not known whether someone is a true Cardinal..., the Pope being dead or uncertain, as seems to have occurred at the time of the Great Schism begun under Urban VI), it must be asserted that in the Church of God there exists a power to apply the papacy to a person, the due requirements being observed. And then by way of devolution this power seems to come to the universal Church, as though the electors determined by the Pope did not exist.' [Cajetan]

These things, I say, are understood without difficulty, the contingency of the case being admitted. But whether the case has ever in fact occurred is an entirely different question. Indeed, that the election of Martin V was made not from the proper authority of the Council of Constance, but from faculties expressly granted by the legitimate Pontiff Gregory XII before he renounced the papacy, is now held as nearly certain among the learned--so that Cardinal Franzelin rightly and justly says:

'There is reason why we should admire with humble praise the providence of Christ the King, Spouse, and Head of the Church, by which He resolved those immense troubles brought about and sustained by the greed and ignorance of men, with all laws preserved; demonstrating most clearly that the indefectibility of the rock on which He Himself built His Church, so that the gates of hell shall not prevail against it, rests not on human effort, but on divine fidelity in promises and omnipotence in governance.' [Franzelin]

And this indeed concerns the election of the person of the Pontiff. But now it is asked whether it is possible for a person duly elected and once raised to the pontificate ever to cease from the pontificate, and to what extent affirmatively, by what manner this can occur."
---

So, Introibo cited Billot as supporting an "imperfect Council" theory. Billot actually argues the opposite. This is the key quote from Billot from the above text:

"Hence doubt arises only concerning some other, inferior authority. But the conclusion must be negative, because since the primacy was given to Peter alone for himself and his successors, it pertains to him alone--that is, to the Supreme Pontiff alone--to determine the mode of transmission of hereditary power, and consequently also of the election through which this same transmission is accomplished."

In that key quote, Billot expressly and directly contradicts the idea of an imperfect Council being able to elect a Pope. Only a body authorized by the Pope himself can elect a Pope.

Billot's logic is airtight:

1. The primacy was given to Peter alone (soli Petro datus sit primatus)
2. For himself and his successors (pro ipso et successoribus eius)
3. Therefore it pertains to him alone (ad illum solum)--that is, to the Supreme Pontiff alone--to determine the mode of transmission of hereditary power
4. And consequently also of the election through which this transmission is accomplished

The conclusion is explicit: no inferior authority can determine the conditions of papal election. The only body that can confer electoral competence is one authorized by the Pope himself.

SkidRowCatholic · « **Reply #19 on:** **Today** at 01:11:56 PM »

Quote from: Angelus on Today at 12:40:33 PM

Introibo has used Cardinal Billot to say precisely the opposite of what Billot said in the section Introibo quotes from him. Here is the full section quoted from Billot:

(https://ia801601.us.archive.org/5/items/tractatusdeeccle01bill/tractatusdeeccle01bill.pdf):

The conclusion is explicit: no inferior authority can determine the conditions of papal election. The only body that can confer electoral competence is one authorized by the Pope himself.

How is this?

"The first school—Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Suarez, Billuart, and Van Noort—holds that if papal election becomes physically impossible according to existing pontifical law (for example, if all cardinals are dead, doubtful, or unknowable), then natural law supplies what positive law cannot. In such a case, the universa Ecclesia must act to preserve the succession, and the practical mode of that action would be an imperfect council, not by juridical right but by devolution of power in a state of extreme necessity. This position treats the imperfect council not as a legislator or elector by title, but as the instrument through which the Church’s natural‑law right to self‑preservation is exercised when the constituted order has collapsed.

The second school—Billot, Franzelin, Salaverri, and Journet—denies that any inferior authority can ever acquire competence to elect a pope, even in extraordinary circuмstances, because the determination of electors belongs exclusively to the Roman Pontiff as an act of the primacy itself. While conceding the abstract possibility of natural‑law supply, they argue that Christ’s providence prevents the Church from ever entering a juridical vacuum requiring such recourse, as shown by the resolution of the Western Schism through papal authorization, not conciliar self‑assertion. For this school, an “imperfect council” is neither a legitimate elector nor a necessary hypothesis, but a construct incompatible with the divinely established structure of papal succession."

SkidRowCatholic · « **Reply #20 on:** **Today** at 02:18:25 PM »

Before the institution of the College of Cardinals, the election of the Roman Pontiff belonged to the clergy of Rome with the assent of the faithful, a fact universally acknowledged by historians and theologians. This historical reality is precisely what theologians such as Cajetan, Suarez, John of St. Thomas, and Billuart appeal to when they argue that, in a total collapse of the juridical order—where the papal law cannot be followed because electors are non‑existent, unknown, or doubtful in the strict sense—the Church retains, by natural law, the ability to supply a pope through the universal Church acting in extremis. In this framework, the clergy and laity of Rome (or the broader Church) do not act by right or juridical authority, but as the subject of devolution when the constituted order is physically impossible to use.

┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐

│ APOSTOLIC & SUB‑APOSTOLIC ERA │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Election by Roman clergy
+ consent/acclamation of laity
(primitive, organic structure)

│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ EARLY PATRISTIC PERIOD │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Roman presbyterate + deacons
become structured electoral body
(laity still involved)

│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ LATE PATRISTIC / EARLY MEDIEVAL │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Imperial confirmation customary
(Byzantine emperors approve elections)
— clergy still elect the pope —

│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ CAROLINGIAN → PRE‑REFORM PERIOD │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Roman nobility + secular rulers
exert increasing influence
(instability prompts reform)

│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ REFORM ERA (1059) │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
*In Nomine Domini* (Nicholas II)
Cardinal‑bishops designated primary electors
(birth of the College of Cardinals)

│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ HIGH MIDDLE AGES (12th–13th c.) │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
All cardinals become electors
Two‑thirds rule established
(fully juridicalized system)

│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ GREAT WESTERN SCHISM (1378–1417) │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Multiple claimants → doubtful electors
(foundation for later “imperfect council”
natural‑law theories)

│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ COUNCIL OF CONSTANCE │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Election of Martin V
with authorization of Gregory XII
(used by Billot/Franzelin to show
Christ preserves juridical order)

│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ EARLY MODERN THEOLOGICAL DEBATE │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Two schools emerge:
1. Natural‑law devolution (Cajetan, Suarez)
2. Providential preservation (Billot, Franzelin)

│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ MODERN PERIOD (19th–20th c.) │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Cardinalate stabilized as exclusive electors
Primitive election seen as non‑repeatable
except in purely hypothetical collapse

The automatic‑loss school (Bellarmine, Wernz–Vidal) holds that a pope who becomes a manifest heretic loses office ipso facto by divine law, but that the Church must recognize the fact before acting. However, this school does not require a judicial sentence—only a public fact. If such public recognition is absent or impossible, the juridical continuity of the Church is not destroyed; rather, the electoral subject remains intact (the cardinals), because their authority derives from the last unquestionably true pope. Thus, even without a juridical declaration, the Church retains a functioning electoral body unless the cardinals themselves become physically non‑existent, unknowable, or doubtful in the strict sense.

The natural‑law devolution school (Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Suarez) teaches that if the constituted electors become physically impossible to identify or utilize—whether through extinction, doubt, or total breakdown—then the Church reverts, by natural law, to the historically prior subject capable of preserving succession (Roman clergy → universal Church). This mechanism does not require public juridical recognition, because it is not a juridical act but a state‑of‑nature supply for the survival of the society. The providential‑preservation school (Billot, Franzelin, Journet) adds that Christ ordinarily prevents the Church from reaching such extremity, but does not deny the theoretical possibility. Thus, the unified synthesis is this: If there is no public juridical recognition and the constituted electors remain identifiable, they alone retain competence; but if they become physically unknowable or doubtful, natural law supplies a fallback subject, even without juridical declaration, because the Church cannot be left unable to elect a pope.

Major:
Whatever is necessary for the indefectible continuation of the apostolic primacy must exist in the Church either by positive law (constituted electors) or by natural law (historically rooted subjects capable of supplying the election), even when no public juridical recognition is available.

Minor:
If the constituted electors (the College of Cardinals) remain physically identifiable, they retain competence even without public juridical recognition; but if they become physically non‑existent, unknowable, or doubtful in the strict sense, natural law supplies a historically rooted fallback subject (Roman clergy → universal Church), which can act without juridical declaration because the act is one of survival, not jurisdiction.

Conclusion:
Therefore, even without public juridical recognition, the Church always retains a determinate subject capable of electing the Roman Pontiff—ordinarily the College of Cardinals by positive law, and in extraordinary physical collapse the historically rooted subjects by natural law—so that the apostolic primacy cannot fail.

Angelus · « **Reply #21 on:** **Today** at 03:33:37 PM »

Quote from: SkidRowCatholic on Today at 01:11:56 PM

How is this?

"The first school—Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Suarez, Billuart, and Van Noort—holds that if papal election becomes physically impossible according to existing pontifical law (for example, if all cardinals are dead, doubtful, or unknowable), then natural law supplies what positive law cannot. In such a case, the universa Ecclesia must act to preserve the succession, and the practical mode of that action would be an imperfect council, not by juridical right but by devolution of power in a state of extreme necessity. This position treats the imperfect council not as a legislator or elector by title, but as the instrument through which the Church’s natural‑law right to self‑preservation is exercised when the constituted order has collapsed.

The second school—Billot, Franzelin, Salaverri, and Journet—denies that any inferior authority can ever acquire competence to elect a pope, even in extraordinary circuмstances, because the determination of electors belongs exclusively to the Roman Pontiff as an act of the primacy itself. While conceding the abstract possibility of natural‑law supply, they argue that Christ’s providence prevents the Church from ever entering a juridical vacuum requiring such recourse, as shown by the resolution of the Western Schism through papal authorization, not conciliar self‑assertion. For this school, an “imperfect council” is neither a legitimate elector nor a necessary hypothesis, but a construct incompatible with the divinely established structure of papal succession."

Please provide your sources about your "two schools" thesis. This will require showing quotes from each theologian (Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Suarez, Billuart, and Van Noort) proving that they are proposing what is essentially a "functionalist" interpretation of papal election law, the "end justifies the means," a consequentialist proposition condemned by the Church.

Natural Law falls under what Aquinas called the Four Precepts of Law: 1) an ordinance of reason, 2) promulgated, 3) by legitimate ruler 4) for the common good of the society. All of the theologians you mentioned would have been well aware of these foundational principles of Catholic Jurisprudence.

But the suggestion that those particular theologians would accept functionalist theories and equate them with "natural law" sounds like an amateur has snuck in some snake oil into the equation.

Also, the "universa Ecclesia" is referenced in the Billot quote. Billot explains what happened at the Council of Constance with Martin V, as authorized by the Pope himself. It was not an act of "conciliarism" as some suggested. Read the Billot quote carefully, and you will see that there are not actually two schools. There are actually modern interpreters of these theologians who oversimplify situation described by this theologians.

Billot is using Cajetan himself to argue Billot point, thereby showing that Cajetan agrees with him on his point.

Angelus · « **Reply #22 on:** **Today** at 04:10:16 PM »

Quote from: SkidRowCatholic on Today at 02:18:25 PM

Before the institution of the College of Cardinals, the election of the Roman Pontiff belonged to the clergy of Rome with the assent of the faithful, a fact universally acknowledged by historians and theologians. This historical reality is precisely what theologians such as Cajetan, Suarez, John of St. Thomas, and Billuart appeal to when they argue that, in a total collapse of the juridical order—where the papal law cannot be followed because electors are non‑existent, unknown, or doubtful in the strict sense—the Church retains, by natural law, the ability to supply a pope through the universal Church acting in extremis. In this framework, the clergy and laity of Rome (or the broader Church) do not act by right or juridical authority, but as the subject of devolution when the constituted order is physically impossible to use.

┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐

│ APOSTOLIC & SUB‑APOSTOLIC ERA │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Election by Roman clergy
+ consent/acclamation of laity
(primitive, organic structure)

│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ EARLY PATRISTIC PERIOD │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Roman presbyterate + deacons
become structured electoral body
(laity still involved)

│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ LATE PATRISTIC / EARLY MEDIEVAL │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Imperial confirmation customary
(Byzantine emperors approve elections)
— clergy still elect the pope —

│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ CAROLINGIAN → PRE‑REFORM PERIOD │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Roman nobility + secular rulers
exert increasing influence
(instability prompts reform)

│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ REFORM ERA (1059) │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
*In Nomine Domini* (Nicholas II)
Cardinal‑bishops designated primary electors
(birth of the College of Cardinals)

│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ HIGH MIDDLE AGES (12th–13th c.) │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
All cardinals become electors
Two‑thirds rule established
(fully juridicalized system)

│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ GREAT WESTERN SCHISM (1378–1417) │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Multiple claimants → doubtful electors
(foundation for later “imperfect council”
natural‑law theories)

│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ COUNCIL OF CONSTANCE │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Election of Martin V
with authorization of Gregory XII
(used by Billot/Franzelin to show
Christ preserves juridical order)

│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ EARLY MODERN THEOLOGICAL DEBATE │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Two schools emerge:
1. Natural‑law devolution (Cajetan, Suarez)
2. Providential preservation (Billot, Franzelin)

│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ MODERN PERIOD (19th–20th c.) │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Cardinalate stabilized as exclusive electors
Primitive election seen as non‑repeatable
except in purely hypothetical collapse

The automatic‑loss school (Bellarmine, Wernz–Vidal) holds that a pope who becomes a manifest heretic loses office ipso facto by divine law, but that the Church must recognize the fact before acting. However, this school does not require a judicial sentence—only a public fact. If such public recognition is absent or impossible, the juridical continuity of the Church is not destroyed; rather, the electoral subject remains intact (the cardinals), because their authority derives from the last unquestionably true pope. Thus, even without a juridical declaration, the Church retains a functioning electoral body unless the cardinals themselves become physically non‑existent, unknowable, or doubtful in the strict sense.

The natural‑law devolution school (Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Suarez) teaches that if the constituted electors become physically impossible to identify or utilize—whether through extinction, doubt, or total breakdown—then the Church reverts, by natural law, to the historically prior subject capable of preserving succession (Roman clergy → universal Church). This mechanism does not require public juridical recognition, because it is not a juridical act but a state‑of‑nature supply for the survival of the society. The providential‑preservation school (Billot, Franzelin, Journet) adds that Christ ordinarily prevents the Church from reaching such extremity, but does not deny the theoretical possibility. Thus, the unified synthesis is this: If there is no public juridical recognition and the constituted electors remain identifiable, they alone retain competence; but if they become physically unknowable or doubtful, natural law supplies a fallback subject, even without juridical declaration, because the Church cannot be left unable to elect a pope.

Major:
Whatever is necessary for the indefectible continuation of the apostolic primacy must exist in the Church either by positive law (constituted electors) or by natural law (historically rooted subjects capable of supplying the election), even when no public juridical recognition is available.

Minor:
If the constituted electors (the College of Cardinals) remain physically identifiable, they retain competence even without public juridical recognition; but if they become physically non‑existent, unknowable, or doubtful in the strict sense, natural law supplies a historically rooted fallback subject (Roman clergy → universal Church), which can act without juridical declaration because the act is one of survival, not jurisdiction.

Conclusion:
Therefore, even without public juridical recognition, the Church always retains a determinate subject capable of electing the Roman Pontiff—ordinarily the College of Cardinals by positive law, and in extraordinary physical collapse the historically rooted subjects by natural law—so that the apostolic primacy cannot fail.

None of that history matters. What governs is the papal election law promulgated by the last true Pope.

The papal election law has gotten tighter and tighter over the centuries as the Church dealt with deficiencies of the laws used in prior ages. To follow the logic suggested in the diagram is to put antiquarianism above the promulgated law of the supreme legislator, the Pope.

That method is untenable. Again, your major premise reflects a form of sophistic legal functionalism, something always rejected by the Church.

SkidRowCatholic · « **Reply #23 on:** **Today** at 04:17:45 PM »

Quote from: Angelus on Today at 03:33:37 PM

Please provide your sources about your "two schools" thesis. This will require showing quotes from each theologian (Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Suarez, Billuart, and Van Noort) proving that they are proposing what is essentially a "functionalist" interpretation of papal election law, the "end justifies the means," a consequentialist proposition condemned by the Church.

Thank you for your feedback for this exercise.

We are dealing with something that none of the theologians envisioned in its entirety, so I am pushing it to the max (but there could be many things I am missing).

How is this?

I am recasting the theologians as a synthesis so, please don't take this to mean I am presenting this as "their" original thesis, I am just trying to integrate their various approaches.

In earlier centuries, Catholic kings sometimes intervened directly against heretical or treasonous bishops, even removing them from office or barring them from public ministry, and Rome did not treat these actions as usurpations of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The theologians explain that such interventions were legitimate not because kings possessed spiritual authority, but because they acted as public custodians of temporal order in situations where the Church herself was unable to act. Suarez notes that in emergencies “the community may act when the ordinary judge cannot” (De Fide, disp. 10), and Cajetan teaches that “when the competent judge is impeded, the Church acts through those who can” (De Comparatione, ch. 13). These kings acted publicly, not privately; they acted in the name of the whole community, not in their own name; and they acted on public facts, not private suspicions. Their actions were tolerated because the bishop’s heresy created immediate civil and ecclesial danger, the local Church was unable to intervene, the pope was distant or incapacitated, and the king acted to preserve public order until the Church could regularize the situation. Rome’s later acceptance of these actions—by not overturning them—shows that public facts can substitute for juridical acts when the competent judge is absent. John of St. Thomas articulates the principle clearly: “In the absence of the pope and cardinals, the power devolves to the Church herself” (Cursus Theologicus, De Auctoritate Summi Pontificis).

If one man, acting as public authority, may act in the name of the whole community in a vacuum, then the community itself may act corporately when the entire hierarchy is incapacitated. This is the foundation of the doctrine of the imperfect council, which Cajetan describes as the Church acting “through those members who remain” when the head cannot function. Suarez likewise affirms that if the ordinary electors fail, “the power returns to the universal Church or the Roman clergy, as was done in the beginning.” Billot concedes that natural law “supplies a subject” when the constituted subject is lost. Journet adds that the Church’s visibility can “revert to the primitive form” when the ordinary structures fail. Thus the same principle that justified a king acting on behalf of his people in an emergency also justifies a people who rule themselves (democratically) acting as one in an imperfect council: both are cases of public authority acting on public facts in the absence of the competent judge, and both preserve the Church’s visibility when the ordinary organs of governance are unusable.

Governing Principle
Throughout Christian history, Catholic kings occasionally intervened to restrain, depose, or replace bishops whose public heresy or treason created immediate danger to the realm and whose removal was necessary for the preservation of public order. The theologians explain that such royal interventions were legitimate not because kings possessed ecclesiastical jurisdiction, but because they acted as public authorities in a vacuum at moments when the Church’s own juridical organs were unable to function. The local clergy were powerless, the pope was distant or impeded, and the danger was urgent; therefore the king, as custodian of temporal peace, acted in the name of the whole community on the basis of public facts that required immediate response. Rome’s later acceptance of these actions—by not overturning them—demonstrates the principle that when the competent judge cannot act, public facts may substitute for juridical acts, provided the action is taken by a public authority for the sake of preserving the Church’s visibility and order. From this historical and theological foundation emerges the broader natural‑law principle: the same logic that permitted a king to act for the moral body he governs in an emergency necessarily permits a moral body that governs itself to assemble and act as one when the entire hierarchy is incapacitated, compromised, or juridically unusable. This is the precise theological foundation of the imperfect council.

Cajetan
Cajetan’s system aligns directly with the governing principle because he holds that when the constituted organ of the Church is unable to act, the subject Church retains the ability to act for its own preservation. His statement that “when the competent judge is impeded, the Church acts through those who can” (De Comparatione, ch. 13) mirrors the principle that public authority may act in a vacuum on public facts. Cajetan’s doctrine of the imperfect council is simply the ecclesial application of the same logic that justified kings acting for the community: when the hierarchy is juridically unusable, the Church may assemble and act as one through those members who remain capable of acting.

John of St. Thomas
John of St. Thomas explicitly teaches that if the College of Cardinals becomes unusable, the power of electing the pope “returns to the Roman clergy, as in the primitive Church” (Cursus Theologicus, De Auctoritate Summi Pontificis, disp. 2, a. 2). This reflects the governing principle’s core insight that public facts may substitute for juridical acts when the competent judge cannot act. His doctrine of the imperfect council—capable of judging the fact of papal heresy—rests on the same natural‑law foundation. He writes that the Church must retain the ability to act corporately because “the Church cannot be left without remedy when the head is in doubt.” Thus, when the hierarchy is incapacitated, the Church may assemble and act as one to preserve visibility and order.

Suarez
Suarez’s doctrine of devolution is a direct theological expression of the governing principle. He teaches that “if the ordinary electors fail, the power devolves upon the universal Church or the Roman clergy, as was done in the beginning” (De Fide, disp. 10, sect. 6). This is simply the ecclesial form of the idea that public authority may act in a vacuum. Suarez’s system presupposes that the Church, as a moral body, retains the ability to act as one when the constituted organ is unusable. His entire framework is a systematic application of the principle that public facts can substitute for juridical acts when the competent judge is absent.

Billot
Billot is cautious, but even he concedes the principle in theory. He admits that “if the constituted subject of election were lost, natural law would supply another subject, as in the primitive Church” (De Ecclesia, thesis 29). This is nothing other than the governing principle expressed in scholastic form: when the hierarchy is juridically unusable, the Church as a moral body retains the ability to assemble and act as one. Billot’s hesitation is practical, not theoretical; the principle itself is fully acknowledged.

Journet
Journet’s distinction between the essence of visibility and the mode of visibility provides the ecclesiological framework for the governing principle. He teaches that the Church can “revert to the primitive form” when the ordinary structures fail (L’Église du Verbe Incarné, vol. 1). This presupposes that public facts may substitute for juridical acts when the competent judge cannot act. For Journet, the imperfect council is simply the Church’s visibility preserved in its minimal juridical form—the Church acting as one when the hierarchy is incapacitated.

Final Synthesis
In light of the governing principle—that the same logic which permitted a king to act for the moral body he governs in an emergency necessarily permits a moral body that governs itself to assemble and act as one when the entire hierarchy is incapacitated, compromised, or juridically unusable—the convergence of the classical theologians becomes unmistakable. Cajetan’s insistence that “the Church acts through those who can” expresses the same natural‑law mechanism by which a public authority may act in a vacuum on public facts. John of St. Thomas extends this by teaching that the power of election devolves to the Roman clergy, and that an imperfect council may judge the fact of papal heresy, precisely because the Church must retain the ability to act corporately when the ordinary organ is unusable. Suarez systematizes this principle in his doctrine of devolution, arguing that if the ordinary electors fail, the power returns to the Church herself, which is simply the ecclesial form of the community acting as one when no single authority remains capable of acting for it. Even Billot, though practically cautious, concedes that natural law “supplies another subject” if the constituted subject is lost, thereby acknowledging the same foundational principle in theory. Journet completes the synthesis by showing that the Church’s visibility is indefectible even when its canonical form collapses, because the Church can revert to the primitive mode of governance—bishops and clergy acting corporately—when the ordinary structures fail. Thus, across all five theologians, the same conclusion emerges: when the hierarchy is juridically unusable, the Church retains the natural‑law capacity to assemble and act as one through an imperfect council, just as a king once acted for the community when the Church’s organs were unable to intervene.

Quote from: Angelus on Today at 04:10:16 PM

your major premise reflects a form of sophistic legal functionalism, something always rejected by the Church.

Can you provide me with magisterial sources condemning or is it just "rejected" by the theologians?

The method I’m using is not a form of legal functionalism—sophistic or otherwise—but an attempt to articulate the governing principle in continuity with the Church’s own theological and juridical tradition. Functionalism reduces law to procedure or utility; my premise, by contrast, is grounded in the substantive moral and ecclesiological commitments that the Church herself affirms.

If you still believe the approach is untenable, I would welcome clarification on which specific aspect departs from that tradition.

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