Catholic Info
Traditional Catholic Faith => Crisis in the Church => Topic started by: SkidRowCatholic on January 11, 2026, 08:17:45 PM
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pur5qxs7PkY
So, this sermon is a bit long, but interesting. It seems +Roy is up for giving Bro-Bug a run for his $$$.
It centers on a "solution" to the crisis.
Within he calls the concept of 3 people electing a Pope in a garage "ridiculous".
What he is advocating for is an, "imperfect council of the Church made up of all the faithful" (I suspect he means represented by their clergy).
And that it is the duty of the clergy, "to provide the Church with a true Pope".
He is just asking for prayers now.
I know he has met with CMRI before and they have a mutually friendly relationship...
And that a priest of the CMRI spoke in a conference about how the clergy holding an imperfect council could be a "solution".
I think the SSPV would be against it
I am not sure which way the RCI/IMBC would go...
But, I am also curious how Resistance individuals view his thoughts - not the validity/invalidity of his orders - but his actual arguments he is making within the sermon itself.
I suppose if you are a dogmatic R&R - to listen to this sermon would be considered heresy, schism, or both.
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Just a hair away from what is know as "Conclavism". I consider it to be the craziest side of the Traditionalist spectrum. A sure path to madness.
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Could devout Catholics be blamed for electing a ruler to uphold Tradition with authority, given the circuмstances of this crisis?
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Could devout Catholics be blamed for electing a ruler to uphold Tradition with authority, given the circuмstances of this crisis?
In the same vein, could devout Catholics ever be blamed for doubting the validity of such an election?
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I really wish that Trad bishops would stop using croziers, as if they had jurisdiction. Stop it. I know they like their cool-looking clerical garb, but they need to stop it. Use faldstools. They're just emergency dispensers of Sacraments.
As for electing a Pope, many other have tried before him, and they always fail, since they will never obtain any kind of universal consensus on the matter. Imperfect Councils, without there being a Pope, are only as good as they represent the universality of the Church. You have far too many Trads, the SSPX types, as well as the Motarians ... who refuse to admit that the See is vacant, and even beyond them the sedprivationists believe that such elections are impeded.
So what you have left is a group of Totalist Sedevacantists, who represent perhaps 5-10% of Traditional Catholics ... and that's why any such efforts are doomed out of the gate. Does Bishop Roy fancy himself the first to come up with this idea ... that he in his brilliance will somehow succeed when many others have failed?
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In the same vein, could devout Catholics ever be blamed for doubting the validity of such an election?
Yes, even though I myself am a "Totalist" sedevacantist, in the sense that I believe that the Siri Theory holds the key and even though sedeprivationism is superior in principle to Totalistm, because Siri had obstructed the ability of the Conciliar papal claimants to have even a material claim on the office ... in other words, where I believe that Traditional Catholics could in fact convene and elect a True Pope ... if Bishop Roy, the St. Getrudites, and CMRI got together and elected a Pope, I'd consider there to be 5% chance that such an election would be legitimate, since it could never achieve universal acceptance among Catholics. In other words, I'm a Totalist (de facto) and I MYSELF WOULD NOT ACCEPT such an election. So there's that too, where even of that 5% of Traditional Catholics who are convinced Totalists, a significant percentage of them would have serious doubts about such an election, wondering if Shuckhardt, Bawden, Dominguez, Pulvermacher, von Pentz, and now Hildebrand (aka Bugnolo) ... didn't have only slightly weaker claims to the papacy. Dominguez actually even had stigmata, could see even though he physically lost both his eyes in a card accident, and would levitate while offering Mass.
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You mean like this?
(https://i.imgur.com/O84KoYO.jpeg)
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You mean like this?
I never heard of that guy. Is he the current successor of Dominguez or something?
In any case, if you look here, the Totalists are even infighting, where they descend from the same basic line.
https://www.sgg.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Letter-2023.pdf
Here you have +McGuire, who himself was consecrated by +da Silva, denouncing the consecrations of +Roy and +Altamira ... by the same bishop who consecrated him. :facepalm:
I guess that +McGuire considers himself the arbiter of who would be a suitable bishop and who would not, and denounces them because they had not been first submitted to his own impeccable judgment for consideration.
What a train-wreck these guys are ! I've heard from people who knew Fr. McGuire for many years and who felt that he was decidedly unqualified to be a bishop, and I'll just leave it at that.
If you look at +McGuire's denunciation, he fancies himself the head of some "international apostolate of St. Getrude the Great". What the heck even is that? So now they have some kind of international mission, for their little po'dunk chapel? He insists that he should be consulted regarding all such consecrations. Then, he points out that +Dolan took many years before consecrating anyone else and only "under extreme circuмstances". Sounds a lot like SSPX denouncing +Williamson's consecrations. Who decides what "extreme circuмstances" are? +McGuire?
I disagree that there need be "extreme circuмstances". It suffices that the faithful need some Sacraments that can typically only be provided by bishops, and if we understand that these bishops are merely emergency dispensers of said Sacraments, and lack jurisdiciton, his "concern" is misplaced. It's only if you pretend that you have some quasi-jurisdiction, such as when you head up the "inernational apostolate of St. Gertrude the Great" that you would have serious problems with this.
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Why is it that so many of today's Trad bishops and priests remind me so very much of the little boy who play priest, where they dress up and act the part, but just come across as a bunch of pretenders who project a sense of self-importance? I see very little of that humble and genuine zeal for the salvation of souls, but just them jockeying among one another to see who can make his little pond bigger than the other guy's little pond, so that he could pretend to be the bigger fish in the pond.
Apart from among The Nine, I sensed so little of this among the early generations of Traditional clergy, where the priests I knew, and Bishop Williamson .. did not project this attitude, but where they simply cared about the souls entrusted to their care and wished only to do the will of God.
Among the Resistance today, I sense no such attitude from Bishops Faure and Thomas Aquinas and Zendejas, but it's very much evident in Ballini, Morgan, and Stobnicki.
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Why is it that so many of today's Trad bishops and priests remind me so very much of the little boy who play priest, where they dress up and act the part, but just come across as a bunch of pretenders who project a sense of self-importance? I see very little of that humble and genuine zeal for the salvation of souls, but just them jockeying among one another to see who can make his little pond bigger than the other guy's little pond, so that he could pretend to be the bigger fish in the pond.
Apart from among The Nine, I sensed so little of this among the early generations of Traditional clergy, where the priests I knew, and Bishop Williamson .. did not project this attitude, but where they simply cared about the souls entrusted to their care and wished only to do the will of God.
Among the Resistance today, I sense no such attitude from Bishops Faure and Thomas Aquinas and Zendejas, but it's very much evident in Ballini, Morgan, and Stobnicki.
Explain how you see this with stobnicki or Morgan? Because they are relatively young??
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There may be some 10,000 Sedevacantists throughout the world, with the most important centers in the United States, Mexico, France, Italy, Germany, and the Czech Republic. The small Japanese group Seibo no Mikuni, founded in 1970 by Yukio Nemoto (1925-1988), remains largely isolated because of its peculiar millennial beliefs. Most of them believe that forming a central organization would be tantamount to establishing a schismatic alternative to the Roman Catholic Church. They prefer to remain a network of small groups and see themselves as the only surviving remnant of the one true post-Second Vatican Council Catholic Church. One of their main problems is how to respond to the issue of the future of Catholic authority. By definition, they regard the pope as essential for the church’s very survival and infallibility, but, at the same time, they maintain that there is no (legitimate) pope in Rome at present. A large majority of Sedevacantists dismiss as non-canonical, and even ridiculous, the very idea that they could convene a conclave and elect a pope of their own; they prefer to wait for a solution to come directly, and perhaps unpredictably, from God, whose ways, they say, are after all not human ways. A few Sedevacantists, on the other hand, are “conclavist”—that is, they believe a conclave should be called (composed of all, or at least most, Sedevacantist bishops) and a new pope duly elected. Conclavists realize nonetheless that, should a conclave be organized, the majority of the Sedevacantist bishops would refuse to attend it, and that some groups (such as the Italian Association of St. Mary Salus Populi Romani, headquartered in Turin, Italy) regard a conclave as certainly desirable but, at least for the time being, impracticable. Attempts have been made to organize a conclave, however: in 1994, for example, some 20 Sedevacantist bishops from 12 different countries met in Assisi, Italy, and elected as pope a South African priest (and former student at Lefebvre’s seminary), Victor Von Pentz (b. 1953), under the name of Linus II. He currently resides in the United Kingdom and maintains but a limited following. Some conclavists have, on the other hand, joined other alternative popes (“antipopes,” according to Roman Catholic theology), who, even before the full development of the Sedevacantist network, had claimed that their role was based both on the alleged heresies of the Second Vatican Council and on mystical visions calling them to the pontificate without the need of any conclave or election. One of the earliest “pretenders” was a French priest, Michel-Auguste-Marie Collin (1905-1974), who claimed to have been called by heaven itself to become Pope Clemens XV during the Second Vatican Council, in 1963. Collin established an alternative Vatican in Clémery, Lorraine, where he also founded a Renewed Church of Christ, known outside France as the Church of the Magnificat. After Collin’s death in 1974, his church nearly collapsed entirely, and it is now reduced to a small remnant of what it once was. One of Collin’s followers, however, the Québec priest Gaston Tremblay (b. 1928), had already ceased to recognize the French claimant in 1968 and had proclaimed himself Pope Gregory XVII. His movement is called the Apostles of Infinite Love.
Tremblay’s main competitor was Clemente Domínguez y Gómez (1946-2005), one of the seers in the alleged Marian apparitions of Palmar de Troya, Spain (1968-1976), and later a “Thuc bishop,” consecrated by the Vietnamese archbishop on January 11, 1976. In 1978, Domínguez (in the meantime blinded in a car accident in May 1976) revealed that he had been mystically designated by Jesus Christ as the new pope in a 1976 vision, and his followers confirmed his election as Pope Gregory XVII (the same name adopted by Tremblay in Québec). His Catholic, Apostolic, and Palmarian Church (named after the town of Palmar de Troya) is probably the single largest organization bowing to the authority of an “alternative” pope, with more than 1,000 followers in Spain and several hundreds more internationally. In the 1990s, however, Domínguez was accused of sɛҳuąƖ immorality with several nuns of the order he had established in the meantime; in 1997 he admitted his sins and asked for his community’s forgiveness. Most followers remained loyal to Domínguez and, after his death in 2005, to his handpicked successor, former lawyer and “Thuc bishop” Manuel Alonso Corral, who became Pope Peter II. Others, however, have both doubted the sincerity of Domínguez in his apology and questioned his decision to appoint a successor rather than leave this choice to a conclave including the many cardinals he had in the meantime appointed from among his bishops. At the end of 2000, 17 bishops with a couple of hundred followers left the Palmarian Church and formed a splinter movement known as The Tribe. Other claimants to the role of pope have included Father Gino Frediani (1913-1984), the parish priest of Gavinana (province of Pistoia, Italy), who in 1973 claimed to have been mystically consecrated by Jesus Christ and several Old Testament prophets as Pope Emmanuel I. He gathered several hundred followers; after his death, a hundred have remained active in his New Church of the Holy Heart of Jesus under the leadership of his successor, Father Sergio Melani (who, however, makes no claim to being the new pope). A couple of dozen rival “antipopes” operate in several countries, but none of them have more than a handful of followers. Among them are Father Lucian Pulvermacher (b. 1918), who in 1998 proclaimed himself the new pope under the name Pius XIII (http://www.truecatholic.us); and David Allen Bawden (b. 1959), living in the Kansas countryside, once a seminarian with the Society of Saint Pius X (where he had never been ordained to the priesthood), who on July 16, 1990, was elected by a group of six laypeople (including three women) as Pope Michael.
A special position is nonetheless maintained by William Kamm (b. 1950), a German-born Catholic lay preacher living in Australia and known as “Little Pebble.” It is claimed that the Virgin Mary has revealed to Kamm that the post-Second Vatican Council popes, including John Paul II and Benedict XVI, are indeed legitimate (contrary to the Sedevacantist thesis). On the other hand, heaven has designated Kamm as a future pope under the name Peter II. Kamm gathered more than 1,000 followers in several countries, some of them living communally and most of them members of a religious order known as the Order of Saint Charbel (named after the popular Catholic Lebanese saint Charbel Maklouf [1828-1898]). The Australian Catholic bishops, despite his protests, have repeatedly branded Kamm’s organization as schismatic and not a legitimate part of the Catholic Church. Their position seemed vindicated when in 2005 and 2007 Kamm was sentenced to two jail terms for sɛҳuąƖ relations with two minor girls. Kamm did not deny the relations, but claimed that the Virgin Mary in an apparition had authorized him to take as many as 84 “mystical wives.” Kamm is now in jail and will not be eligible for parole before 2013. Many followers have left the Order of Saint Charbel and only a handful remain loyal to Kamm.
https://isidore.co/misc/Res%20pro%20Deo/Sede/Sedevacantism%20and%20Antipopes.pdf (https://isidore.co/misc/Res pro Deo/Sede/Sedevacantism and Antipopes.pdf)
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So, the one comment I have to make about the long excerpt from above is that I absolutely call BS on Von Pentz's Assisi conclave.
There were no "20 bishops from 12 different countries" that met at Assisi to elect Von Pentz.
I knew the guy at Winona, when he was a seminarian there. He was constantly spinning nonsense, tall tales, aka, BS, in an almost pathological manner ... making Ambrose Moran look like the paragon of honesty by comparison, and it came as no surprise to anyone when he had been shown the door. He then allgedly went on to be ordained a priest in the Eastern Rite, but I would certainly not wager my soul on that ever having happened, and, to be honest, if I had to wager $100 one way or the other, I'd put it down on the his having made that up. He told everyone at Winona that he had been ordained a deacon in the Eastern Rite, but the seminary never allowed him to function as such, undoubtedly because he had zero evidence for this claim.
There were only 2 bishops TOPS who MAY have shown up, and that would have been Korab and Lopez-Gaston, the latter being the very strange invididual who had been consecrated by the alleged "Bishop" Roux ... whom most believe to have lied about having been consecrated by +Thuc. Korab was also "consecrated" by Lopez-Gaston, the same bishop, BTW, who ordained Coomaraswamy. I think that there are positive doubts about +?Roux, and in fact there's an abundance of evidence that he made the whole thing up and wasn't a bishop at all.
In any case, they later made up some mythology about Von Pentz having been consecrated by Bishop Arrigo Pintonello. Now, the reason they had chosen Pintonello was because the man had been almost legendary in SV circles, since he was the only bishop who actively refused to sign any of the Vatican II docuмents. There were some who didn't sign because they didn't show up, but everyone signed them in the end, even Archbishop Lefebvre, after Motini basically ordered them to. But +Pintonello refused. Others had sought him out for episcopal consecration before, but +Pintonello had not obliged them, so I doubt that he'd swoop in to consecrate a half-crazy Von Pentz.
As far as I'm concerned, it's just as likely that Von Pentz sat down with a drinking buddy and concocted the entire thing and no conclave ever took place.
Of course, adding to the drama, they spun this story about how Von Pentz had been elected on 9 straight ballots, refusing each time, until on the 10th ballot the vote had been unnaimous, at which point he "reluctantly" accepted. Yeah, right. Von Pentz wouldn't have refused it for even a nanosecond. So 20 bishops showed up just to elect this relatively-unknown (and unverifiable) Eastern Rite "priest" as Pope ... rather than one of those 20 bishops?
Evidently Linus II either abdicated or else did not get enough revenue from Linus's Pence to even support himself as a priest ... or he just finally gave up on the scam and returned to secular life.
https://www.linkedin.com/in/victor-von-pentz-b9932ba4
If it were possible, I'd say that Von Pentz is far less reliable and trustworthy than even Ambrose (aka William Moran), since I do believe +Moran had scammed himself into receiving episcopal consecration from some Orthodox group.
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Note, however, that Dominguez (whom I believe to have had preternatural abilities in cooperation with dark forces) took on the name "Gregory XVII". Archbishop Lefebvre also thought that movement was diabolical. If it was diabolical, vs. just a human fabrication ... that might lend further support to Cardinal Siri having been elected Gregory XVII, where the devil would be mocking and/or discrediting (or perhaps both) the election of Cardinal Siri.
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The biggest issue with this talk of conclave is that it never seems to include any non-sede valid bishops. At the very least SSPX + Resistance + Eastern Rites would need to be included to have any shred of legitimacy. This is ignoring the fact that only Eastern Rite bishops could maybe qualify as electors because they have jurisdiction whereas everyone else does not.
As a sede, the biggest problem amongst sedes is the fact that many see themselves as the only true Catholics. They do not recognize the reality that Catholics includes the SSPX, Resistance, Eastern Rites, and much more among the Novus Ordo than sedes and many trads would like to admit.
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The biggest issue with this talk of conclave is that it never seems to include any non-sede valid bishops. At the very least SSPX + Resistance + Eastern Rites would need to be included to have any shred of legitimacy. This is ignoring the fact that only Eastern Rite bishops could maybe qualify as electors because they have jurisdiction whereas everyone else does not.
As a sede, the biggest problem amongst sedes is the fact that many see themselves as the only true Catholics. They do not recognize the reality that Catholics includes the SSPX, Resistance, Eastern Rites, and much more among the Novus Ordo than sedes and many trads would like to admit.
Bishop Roy is not opposed to the SSPX and Resistance being represented in an eventual imperfect council. It has happened in the past that people professing to be Catholic met in general councils without agreeing about everything. If there is such a meeting, he does not necessarily expect that a valid election will happen immediately. He wants traditional bishops to meet and discuss the issues and he is aware of the practical challenges.
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https://www.sgg.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Letter-2023.pdf
He did this so subtly (almost to a point of suspicion) almost not one person who goes there knew about that..
lol
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Thank you SRC for posting this video of Bishop Roy. He seems to have wisdom beyond his years. At time 32:30 into the video he states: "There are problems in your family, problems in our country, problems in the Church, problems in our parishes. This our main problem, we don't have the voice of Peter."
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Introibo says,
"The most probable way of restoring the papacy is an "imperfect General Council." Some pre-Vatican II theologians pondered such a Council in the absence of cardinals. Indeed, theologian Van Noort pondered it as late as 1956 (See Dogmatic Theology 2: 276).
Theologian Cajetan wrote: "...by exception and by supplementary manner this power [electing a pope], corresponds to the Church and to the Council, either by absence of Cardinal Electors, or because they are doubtful, or the election itself is uncertain, as it happened at the time of the schism." (See De Comparatione Auctoritatis Papae et Concilii)
Theologian Billot wrote: "When it would be necessary to proceed with the election, if it is impossible to follow the regulations of papal law, as was the case during the Great Western Schism, one can accept, without difficulty, that the power of election could be transferred to a...Council...Because natural law prescribes that, in such cases, the power of a superior is passed to the immediate inferior because this is absolutely necessary for the survival of the society and to avoid the tribulations of extreme need." (See De Ecclesia Christi)."
https://introiboadaltaredei2.blogspot.com/ (https://introiboadaltaredei2.blogspot.com/)
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Introibo says,
"The most probable way of restoring the papacy is an "imperfect General Council." Some pre-Vatican II theologians pondered such a Council in the absence of cardinals. Indeed, theologian Van Noort pondered it as late as 1956 (See Dogmatic Theology 2: 276).
Theologian Cajetan wrote: "...by exception and by supplementary manner this power [electing a pope], corresponds to the Church and to the Council, either by absence of Cardinal Electors, or because they are doubtful, or the election itself is uncertain, as it happened at the time of the schism." (See De Comparatione Auctoritatis Papae et Concilii)
Theologian Billot wrote: "When it would be necessary to proceed with the election, if it is impossible to follow the regulations of papal law, as was the case during the Great Western Schism, one can accept, without difficulty, that the power of election could be transferred to a...Council...Because natural law prescribes that, in such cases, the power of a superior is passed to the immediate inferior because this is absolutely necessary for the survival of the society and to avoid the tribulations of extreme need." (See De Ecclesia Christi)."
https://introiboadaltaredei2.blogspot.com/ (https://introiboadaltaredei2.blogspot.com/)
Introibo has used Cardinal Billot to say precisely the opposite of what Billot said in the section Introibo quotes from him. Here is the full section quoted from Billot:
(https://ia801601.us.archive.org/5/items/tractatusdeeccle01bill/tractatusdeeccle01bill.pdf):
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"§ 1. That the legitimate election of the Pontiff now depends de facto on pontifical law alone is demonstrated by an easy and obvious argument: because the law regulating the election was enacted by the Supreme Pontiffs. Therefore, until it is abrogated by the Pontiff himself, it remains in force, and there is no power in the Church, even when the see is vacant, by which it can be changed.
'For the Pope instituted to whom the election pertains, and he changes and limits the act of election in such a way that it would be null if done in the opposite manner. That the Church or Council, apart from the Pope, does not have this authority is clear from this: that the whole Church cannot authoritatively change a law made by the Pope--for example, [to decree] that the election does not pertain to true and indubitable Cardinals, or that one elected by less than two-thirds of the Cardinals is Pope. But conversely, the Pope could establish this... because it belongs to the same authority to remove [a law] as to authoritatively establish it in matters of positive law.' [Cajetan]
And therefore, if for example the see had happened to become vacant during the Vatican Council, the legitimate election would not have pertained to the Fathers of the Council, but only to the customary electors, as Pius IX had also expressly provided by special bull.
The only question, therefore, can be about the possible: namely, whether the assignment of the conditions of election could have pertained to some authority other than the pontifical. On this matter, no doubt is raised concerning the authority of an ecuмenical council, which is in no way distinguished from pontifical power, since it belongs to the nature of ecuмenical decrees that they have confirmation from the Pontiff. Hence doubt arises only concerning some other, inferior authority. But the conclusion must be negative, because since the primacy was given to Peter alone for himself and his successors, it pertains to him alone--that is, to the Supreme Pontiff alone--to determine the mode of transmission of hereditary power, and consequently also of the election through which this same transmission is accomplished. Moreover, every law concerning the order of the universal Church transcends the limits fixed by the nature of things to a power that is not supreme. But the election of the supreme pastor undoubtedly pertains to the order of the universal Church. Therefore, by the nature of things, it is reserved to the determination of him to whom the care of the whole community has been entrusted by Christ.
And these conclusions hold without controversy for the ordinary and regular state. But the question is raised: what would be the law if perchance an extraordinary case should occur in which it would be necessary to proceed to the election of a Pontiff, yet it would no longer be possible to observe the conditions which the antecedent pontifical law had determined--as many think occurred at the time of the Great Schism in the election of Martin V?
Now, supposing once that such circuмstances have occurred, it must be admitted without difficulty that the power of election would devolve to a general council. For it is from natural law itself that in such cases the attribution of the power of a superior comes by way of devolution to the power next following, precisely insofar as is required so that society may be preserved and escape the straits of extreme necessity.
'In the case of ambiguity, however (because it is not known whether someone is a true Cardinal..., the Pope being dead or uncertain, as seems to have occurred at the time of the Great Schism begun under Urban VI), it must be asserted that in the Church of God there exists a power to apply the papacy to a person, the due requirements being observed. And then by way of devolution this power seems to come to the universal Church, as though the electors determined by the Pope did not exist.' [Cajetan]
These things, I say, are understood without difficulty, the contingency of the case being admitted. But whether the case has ever in fact occurred is an entirely different question. Indeed, that the election of Martin V was made not from the proper authority of the Council of Constance, but from faculties expressly granted by the legitimate Pontiff Gregory XII before he renounced the papacy, is now held as nearly certain among the learned--so that Cardinal Franzelin rightly and justly says:
'There is reason why we should admire with humble praise the providence of Christ the King, Spouse, and Head of the Church, by which He resolved those immense troubles brought about and sustained by the greed and ignorance of men, with all laws preserved; demonstrating most clearly that the indefectibility of the rock on which He Himself built His Church, so that the gates of hell shall not prevail against it, rests not on human effort, but on divine fidelity in promises and omnipotence in governance.' [Franzelin]
And this indeed concerns the election of the person of the Pontiff. But now it is asked whether it is possible for a person duly elected and once raised to the pontificate ever to cease from the pontificate, and to what extent affirmatively, by what manner this can occur."
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So, Introibo cited Billot as supporting an "imperfect Council" theory. Billot actually argues the opposite. This is the key quote from Billot from the above text:
"Hence doubt arises only concerning some other, inferior authority. But the conclusion must be negative, because since the primacy was given to Peter alone for himself and his successors, it pertains to him alone--that is, to the Supreme Pontiff alone--to determine the mode of transmission of hereditary power, and consequently also of the election through which this same transmission is accomplished."
In that key quote, Billot expressly and directly contradicts the idea of an imperfect Council being able to elect a Pope. Only a body authorized by the Pope himself can elect a Pope.
Billot's logic is airtight:
1. The primacy was given to Peter alone (soli Petro datus sit primatus)
2. For himself and his successors (pro ipso et successoribus eius)
3. Therefore it pertains to him alone (ad illum solum)--that is, to the Supreme Pontiff alone--to determine the mode of transmission of hereditary power
4. And consequently also of the election through which this transmission is accomplished
The conclusion is explicit: no inferior authority can determine the conditions of papal election. The only body that can confer electoral competence is one authorized by the Pope himself.
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Introibo has used Cardinal Billot to say precisely the opposite of what Billot said in the section Introibo quotes from him. Here is the full section quoted from Billot:
(https://ia801601.us.archive.org/5/items/tractatusdeeccle01bill/tractatusdeeccle01bill.pdf):
The conclusion is explicit: no inferior authority can determine the conditions of papal election. The only body that can confer electoral competence is one authorized by the Pope himself.
How is this?
"The first school—Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Suarez, Billuart, and Van Noort—holds that if papal election becomes physically impossible according to existing pontifical law (for example, if all cardinals are dead, doubtful, or unknowable), then natural law supplies what positive law cannot. In such a case, the universa Ecclesia must act to preserve the succession, and the practical mode of that action would be an imperfect council, not by juridical right but by devolution of power in a state of extreme necessity. This position treats the imperfect council not as a legislator or elector by title, but as the instrument through which the Church’s natural‑law right to self‑preservation is exercised when the constituted order has collapsed.
The second school—Billot, Franzelin, Salaverri, and Journet—denies that any inferior authority can ever acquire competence to elect a pope, even in extraordinary circuмstances, because the determination of electors belongs exclusively to the Roman Pontiff as an act of the primacy itself. While conceding the abstract possibility of natural‑law supply, they argue that Christ’s providence prevents the Church from ever entering a juridical vacuum requiring such recourse, as shown by the resolution of the Western Schism through papal authorization, not conciliar self‑assertion. For this school, an “imperfect council” is neither a legitimate elector nor a necessary hypothesis, but a construct incompatible with the divinely established structure of papal succession."
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Before the institution of the College of Cardinals, the election of the Roman Pontiff belonged to the clergy of Rome with the assent of the faithful, a fact universally acknowledged by historians and theologians. This historical reality is precisely what theologians such as Cajetan, Suarez, John of St. Thomas, and Billuart appeal to when they argue that, in a total collapse of the juridical order—where the papal law cannot be followed because electors are non‑existent, unknown, or doubtful in the strict sense—the Church retains, by natural law, the ability to supply a pope through the universal Church acting in extremis. In this framework, the clergy and laity of Rome (or the broader Church) do not act by right or juridical authority, but as the subject of devolution when the constituted order is physically impossible to use.
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ APOSTOLIC & SUB‑APOSTOLIC ERA │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Election by Roman clergy
+ consent/acclamation of laity
(primitive, organic structure)
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ EARLY PATRISTIC PERIOD │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Roman presbyterate + deacons
become structured electoral body
(laity still involved)
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ LATE PATRISTIC / EARLY MEDIEVAL │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Imperial confirmation customary
(Byzantine emperors approve elections)
— clergy still elect the pope —
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ CAROLINGIAN → PRE‑REFORM PERIOD │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Roman nobility + secular rulers
exert increasing influence
(instability prompts reform)
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ REFORM ERA (1059) │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
*In Nomine Domini* (Nicholas II)
Cardinal‑bishops designated primary electors
(birth of the College of Cardinals)
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ HIGH MIDDLE AGES (12th–13th c.) │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
All cardinals become electors
Two‑thirds rule established
(fully juridicalized system)
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ GREAT WESTERN SCHISM (1378–1417) │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Multiple claimants → doubtful electors
(foundation for later “imperfect council”
natural‑law theories)
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ COUNCIL OF CONSTANCE │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Election of Martin V
with authorization of Gregory XII
(used by Billot/Franzelin to show
Christ preserves juridical order)
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ EARLY MODERN THEOLOGICAL DEBATE │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Two schools emerge:
1. Natural‑law devolution (Cajetan, Suarez)
2. Providential preservation (Billot, Franzelin)
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ MODERN PERIOD (19th–20th c.) │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Cardinalate stabilized as exclusive electors
Primitive election seen as non‑repeatable
except in purely hypothetical collapse
The automatic‑loss school (Bellarmine, Wernz–Vidal) holds that a pope who becomes a manifest heretic loses office ipso facto by divine law, but that the Church must recognize the fact before acting. However, this school does not require a judicial sentence—only a public fact. If such public recognition is absent or impossible, the juridical continuity of the Church is not destroyed; rather, the electoral subject remains intact (the cardinals), because their authority derives from the last unquestionably true pope. Thus, even without a juridical declaration, the Church retains a functioning electoral body unless the cardinals themselves become physically non‑existent, unknowable, or doubtful in the strict sense.
The natural‑law devolution school (Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Suarez) teaches that if the constituted electors become physically impossible to identify or utilize—whether through extinction, doubt, or total breakdown—then the Church reverts, by natural law, to the historically prior subject capable of preserving succession (Roman clergy → universal Church). This mechanism does not require public juridical recognition, because it is not a juridical act but a state‑of‑nature supply for the survival of the society. The providential‑preservation school (Billot, Franzelin, Journet) adds that Christ ordinarily prevents the Church from reaching such extremity, but does not deny the theoretical possibility. Thus, the unified synthesis is this: If there is no public juridical recognition and the constituted electors remain identifiable, they alone retain competence; but if they become physically unknowable or doubtful, natural law supplies a fallback subject, even without juridical declaration, because the Church cannot be left unable to elect a pope.
Major:
Whatever is necessary for the indefectible continuation of the apostolic primacy must exist in the Church either by positive law (constituted electors) or by natural law (historically rooted subjects capable of supplying the election), even when no public juridical recognition is available.
Minor:
If the constituted electors (the College of Cardinals) remain physically identifiable, they retain competence even without public juridical recognition; but if they become physically non‑existent, unknowable, or doubtful in the strict sense, natural law supplies a historically rooted fallback subject (Roman clergy → universal Church), which can act without juridical declaration because the act is one of survival, not jurisdiction.
Conclusion:
Therefore, even without public juridical recognition, the Church always retains a determinate subject capable of electing the Roman Pontiff—ordinarily the College of Cardinals by positive law, and in extraordinary physical collapse the historically rooted subjects by natural law—so that the apostolic primacy cannot fail.
-
How is this?
"The first school—Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Suarez, Billuart, and Van Noort—holds that if papal election becomes physically impossible according to existing pontifical law (for example, if all cardinals are dead, doubtful, or unknowable), then natural law supplies what positive law cannot. In such a case, the universa Ecclesia must act to preserve the succession, and the practical mode of that action would be an imperfect council, not by juridical right but by devolution of power in a state of extreme necessity. This position treats the imperfect council not as a legislator or elector by title, but as the instrument through which the Church’s natural‑law right to self‑preservation is exercised when the constituted order has collapsed.
The second school—Billot, Franzelin, Salaverri, and Journet—denies that any inferior authority can ever acquire competence to elect a pope, even in extraordinary circuмstances, because the determination of electors belongs exclusively to the Roman Pontiff as an act of the primacy itself. While conceding the abstract possibility of natural‑law supply, they argue that Christ’s providence prevents the Church from ever entering a juridical vacuum requiring such recourse, as shown by the resolution of the Western Schism through papal authorization, not conciliar self‑assertion. For this school, an “imperfect council” is neither a legitimate elector nor a necessary hypothesis, but a construct incompatible with the divinely established structure of papal succession."
Please provide your sources about your "two schools" thesis. This will require showing quotes from each theologian (Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Suarez, Billuart, and Van Noort) proving that they are proposing what is essentially a "functionalist" interpretation of papal election law, the "end justifies the means," a consequentialist proposition condemned by the Church.
Natural Law falls under what Aquinas called the Four Precepts of Law: 1) an ordinance of reason, 2) promulgated, 3) by legitimate ruler 4) for the common good of the society. All of the theologians you mentioned would have been well aware of these foundational principles of Catholic Jurisprudence.
But the suggestion that those particular theologians would accept functionalist theories and equate them with "natural law" sounds like an amateur has snuck in some snake oil into the equation.
Also, the "universa Ecclesia" is referenced in the Billot quote. Billot explains what happened at the Council of Constance with Martin V, as authorized by the Pope himself. It was not an act of "conciliarism" as some suggested. Read the Billot quote carefully, and you will see that there are not actually two schools. There are actually modern interpreters of these theologians who oversimplify situation described by this theologians.
Billot is using Cajetan himself to argue Billot point, thereby showing that Cajetan agrees with him on his point.
-
Before the institution of the College of Cardinals, the election of the Roman Pontiff belonged to the clergy of Rome with the assent of the faithful, a fact universally acknowledged by historians and theologians. This historical reality is precisely what theologians such as Cajetan, Suarez, John of St. Thomas, and Billuart appeal to when they argue that, in a total collapse of the juridical order—where the papal law cannot be followed because electors are non‑existent, unknown, or doubtful in the strict sense—the Church retains, by natural law, the ability to supply a pope through the universal Church acting in extremis. In this framework, the clergy and laity of Rome (or the broader Church) do not act by right or juridical authority, but as the subject of devolution when the constituted order is physically impossible to use.
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ APOSTOLIC & SUB‑APOSTOLIC ERA │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Election by Roman clergy
+ consent/acclamation of laity
(primitive, organic structure)
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ EARLY PATRISTIC PERIOD │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Roman presbyterate + deacons
become structured electoral body
(laity still involved)
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ LATE PATRISTIC / EARLY MEDIEVAL │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Imperial confirmation customary
(Byzantine emperors approve elections)
— clergy still elect the pope —
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ CAROLINGIAN → PRE‑REFORM PERIOD │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Roman nobility + secular rulers
exert increasing influence
(instability prompts reform)
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ REFORM ERA (1059) │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
*In Nomine Domini* (Nicholas II)
Cardinal‑bishops designated primary electors
(birth of the College of Cardinals)
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ HIGH MIDDLE AGES (12th–13th c.) │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
All cardinals become electors
Two‑thirds rule established
(fully juridicalized system)
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ GREAT WESTERN SCHISM (1378–1417) │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Multiple claimants → doubtful electors
(foundation for later “imperfect council”
natural‑law theories)
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ COUNCIL OF CONSTANCE │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Election of Martin V
with authorization of Gregory XII
(used by Billot/Franzelin to show
Christ preserves juridical order)
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ EARLY MODERN THEOLOGICAL DEBATE │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Two schools emerge:
1. Natural‑law devolution (Cajetan, Suarez)
2. Providential preservation (Billot, Franzelin)
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ MODERN PERIOD (19th–20th c.) │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
Cardinalate stabilized as exclusive electors
Primitive election seen as non‑repeatable
except in purely hypothetical collapse
The automatic‑loss school (Bellarmine, Wernz–Vidal) holds that a pope who becomes a manifest heretic loses office ipso facto by divine law, but that the Church must recognize the fact before acting. However, this school does not require a judicial sentence—only a public fact. If such public recognition is absent or impossible, the juridical continuity of the Church is not destroyed; rather, the electoral subject remains intact (the cardinals), because their authority derives from the last unquestionably true pope. Thus, even without a juridical declaration, the Church retains a functioning electoral body unless the cardinals themselves become physically non‑existent, unknowable, or doubtful in the strict sense.
The natural‑law devolution school (Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Suarez) teaches that if the constituted electors become physically impossible to identify or utilize—whether through extinction, doubt, or total breakdown—then the Church reverts, by natural law, to the historically prior subject capable of preserving succession (Roman clergy → universal Church). This mechanism does not require public juridical recognition, because it is not a juridical act but a state‑of‑nature supply for the survival of the society. The providential‑preservation school (Billot, Franzelin, Journet) adds that Christ ordinarily prevents the Church from reaching such extremity, but does not deny the theoretical possibility. Thus, the unified synthesis is this: If there is no public juridical recognition and the constituted electors remain identifiable, they alone retain competence; but if they become physically unknowable or doubtful, natural law supplies a fallback subject, even without juridical declaration, because the Church cannot be left unable to elect a pope.
Major:
Whatever is necessary for the indefectible continuation of the apostolic primacy must exist in the Church either by positive law (constituted electors) or by natural law (historically rooted subjects capable of supplying the election), even when no public juridical recognition is available.
Minor:
If the constituted electors (the College of Cardinals) remain physically identifiable, they retain competence even without public juridical recognition; but if they become physically non‑existent, unknowable, or doubtful in the strict sense, natural law supplies a historically rooted fallback subject (Roman clergy → universal Church), which can act without juridical declaration because the act is one of survival, not jurisdiction.
Conclusion:
Therefore, even without public juridical recognition, the Church always retains a determinate subject capable of electing the Roman Pontiff—ordinarily the College of Cardinals by positive law, and in extraordinary physical collapse the historically rooted subjects by natural law—so that the apostolic primacy cannot fail.
None of that history matters. What governs is the papal election law promulgated by the last true Pope.
The papal election law has gotten tighter and tighter over the centuries as the Church dealt with deficiencies of the laws used in prior ages. To follow the logic suggested in the diagram is to put antiquarianism above the promulgated law of the supreme legislator, the Pope.
That method is untenable. Again, your major premise reflects a form of sophistic legal functionalism, something always rejected by the Church.
-
Please provide your sources about your "two schools" thesis. This will require showing quotes from each theologian (Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Suarez, Billuart, and Van Noort) proving that they are proposing what is essentially a "functionalist" interpretation of papal election law, the "end justifies the means," a consequentialist proposition condemned by the Church.
Thank you for your feedback for this exercise.
We are dealing with something that none of the theologians envisioned in its entirety, so I am pushing it to the max (but there could be many things I am missing).
How is this?
I am recasting the theologians as a synthesis so, please don't take this to mean I am presenting this as "their" original thesis, I am just trying to integrate their various approaches.
In earlier centuries, Catholic kings sometimes intervened directly against heretical or treasonous bishops, even removing them from office or barring them from public ministry, and Rome did not treat these actions as usurpations of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The theologians explain that such interventions were legitimate not because kings possessed spiritual authority, but because they acted as public custodians of temporal order in situations where the Church herself was unable to act. Suarez notes that in emergencies “the community may act when the ordinary judge cannot” (De Fide, disp. 10), and Cajetan teaches that “when the competent judge is impeded, the Church acts through those who can” (De Comparatione, ch. 13). These kings acted publicly, not privately; they acted in the name of the whole community, not in their own name; and they acted on public facts, not private suspicions. Their actions were tolerated because the bishop’s heresy created immediate civil and ecclesial danger, the local Church was unable to intervene, the pope was distant or incapacitated, and the king acted to preserve public order until the Church could regularize the situation. Rome’s later acceptance of these actions—by not overturning them—shows that public facts can substitute for juridical acts when the competent judge is absent. John of St. Thomas articulates the principle clearly: “In the absence of the pope and cardinals, the power devolves to the Church herself” (Cursus Theologicus, De Auctoritate Summi Pontificis).
If one man, acting as public authority, may act in the name of the whole community in a vacuum, then the community itself may act corporately when the entire hierarchy is incapacitated. This is the foundation of the doctrine of the imperfect council, which Cajetan describes as the Church acting “through those members who remain” when the head cannot function. Suarez likewise affirms that if the ordinary electors fail, “the power returns to the universal Church or the Roman clergy, as was done in the beginning.” Billot concedes that natural law “supplies a subject” when the constituted subject is lost. Journet adds that the Church’s visibility can “revert to the primitive form” when the ordinary structures fail. Thus the same principle that justified a king acting on behalf of his people in an emergency also justifies a people who rule themselves (democratically) acting as one in an imperfect council: both are cases of public authority acting on public facts in the absence of the competent judge, and both preserve the Church’s visibility when the ordinary organs of governance are unusable.
Governing Principle
Throughout Christian history, Catholic kings occasionally intervened to restrain, depose, or replace bishops whose public heresy or treason created immediate danger to the realm and whose removal was necessary for the preservation of public order. The theologians explain that such royal interventions were legitimate not because kings possessed ecclesiastical jurisdiction, but because they acted as public authorities in a vacuum at moments when the Church’s own juridical organs were unable to function. The local clergy were powerless, the pope was distant or impeded, and the danger was urgent; therefore the king, as custodian of temporal peace, acted in the name of the whole community on the basis of public facts that required immediate response. Rome’s later acceptance of these actions—by not overturning them—demonstrates the principle that when the competent judge cannot act, public facts may substitute for juridical acts, provided the action is taken by a public authority for the sake of preserving the Church’s visibility and order. From this historical and theological foundation emerges the broader natural‑law principle: the same logic that permitted a king to act for the moral body he governs in an emergency necessarily permits a moral body that governs itself to assemble and act as one when the entire hierarchy is incapacitated, compromised, or juridically unusable. This is the precise theological foundation of the imperfect council.
Cajetan
Cajetan’s system aligns directly with the governing principle because he holds that when the constituted organ of the Church is unable to act, the subject Church retains the ability to act for its own preservation. His statement that “when the competent judge is impeded, the Church acts through those who can” (De Comparatione, ch. 13) mirrors the principle that public authority may act in a vacuum on public facts. Cajetan’s doctrine of the imperfect council is simply the ecclesial application of the same logic that justified kings acting for the community: when the hierarchy is juridically unusable, the Church may assemble and act as one through those members who remain capable of acting.
John of St. Thomas
John of St. Thomas explicitly teaches that if the College of Cardinals becomes unusable, the power of electing the pope “returns to the Roman clergy, as in the primitive Church” (Cursus Theologicus, De Auctoritate Summi Pontificis, disp. 2, a. 2). This reflects the governing principle’s core insight that public facts may substitute for juridical acts when the competent judge cannot act. His doctrine of the imperfect council—capable of judging the fact of papal heresy—rests on the same natural‑law foundation. He writes that the Church must retain the ability to act corporately because “the Church cannot be left without remedy when the head is in doubt.” Thus, when the hierarchy is incapacitated, the Church may assemble and act as one to preserve visibility and order.
Suarez
Suarez’s doctrine of devolution is a direct theological expression of the governing principle. He teaches that “if the ordinary electors fail, the power devolves upon the universal Church or the Roman clergy, as was done in the beginning” (De Fide, disp. 10, sect. 6). This is simply the ecclesial form of the idea that public authority may act in a vacuum. Suarez’s system presupposes that the Church, as a moral body, retains the ability to act as one when the constituted organ is unusable. His entire framework is a systematic application of the principle that public facts can substitute for juridical acts when the competent judge is absent.
Billot
Billot is cautious, but even he concedes the principle in theory. He admits that “if the constituted subject of election were lost, natural law would supply another subject, as in the primitive Church” (De Ecclesia, thesis 29). This is nothing other than the governing principle expressed in scholastic form: when the hierarchy is juridically unusable, the Church as a moral body retains the ability to assemble and act as one. Billot’s hesitation is practical, not theoretical; the principle itself is fully acknowledged.
Journet
Journet’s distinction between the essence of visibility and the mode of visibility provides the ecclesiological framework for the governing principle. He teaches that the Church can “revert to the primitive form” when the ordinary structures fail (L’Église du Verbe Incarné, vol. 1). This presupposes that public facts may substitute for juridical acts when the competent judge cannot act. For Journet, the imperfect council is simply the Church’s visibility preserved in its minimal juridical form—the Church acting as one when the hierarchy is incapacitated.
Final Synthesis
In light of the governing principle—that the same logic which permitted a king to act for the moral body he governs in an emergency necessarily permits a moral body that governs itself to assemble and act as one when the entire hierarchy is incapacitated, compromised, or juridically unusable—the convergence of the classical theologians becomes unmistakable. Cajetan’s insistence that “the Church acts through those who can” expresses the same natural‑law mechanism by which a public authority may act in a vacuum on public facts. John of St. Thomas extends this by teaching that the power of election devolves to the Roman clergy, and that an imperfect council may judge the fact of papal heresy, precisely because the Church must retain the ability to act corporately when the ordinary organ is unusable. Suarez systematizes this principle in his doctrine of devolution, arguing that if the ordinary electors fail, the power returns to the Church herself, which is simply the ecclesial form of the community acting as one when no single authority remains capable of acting for it. Even Billot, though practically cautious, concedes that natural law “supplies another subject” if the constituted subject is lost, thereby acknowledging the same foundational principle in theory. Journet completes the synthesis by showing that the Church’s visibility is indefectible even when its canonical form collapses, because the Church can revert to the primitive mode of governance—bishops and clergy acting corporately—when the ordinary structures fail. Thus, across all five theologians, the same conclusion emerges: when the hierarchy is juridically unusable, the Church retains the natural‑law capacity to assemble and act as one through an imperfect council, just as a king once acted for the community when the Church’s organs were unable to intervene.
your major premise reflects a form of sophistic legal functionalism, something always rejected by the Church.
Can you provide me with magisterial sources condemning or is it just "rejected" by the theologians?
The method I’m using is not a form of legal functionalism—sophistic or otherwise—but an attempt to articulate the governing principle in continuity with the Church’s own theological and juridical tradition. Functionalism reduces law to procedure or utility; my premise, by contrast, is grounded in the substantive moral and ecclesiological commitments that the Church herself affirms.
If you still believe the approach is untenable, I would welcome clarification on which specific aspect departs from that tradition.
-
Thank you for your feedback for this exercise.
We are dealing with something that none of the theologians envisioned in its entirety, so I am pushing it to the max (but there could be many things I am missing).
How is this?
I am recasting the theologians as a synthesis so, please don't take this to mean I am presenting this as "their" original thesis, I am just trying to integrate their various approaches.
In earlier centuries, Catholic kings sometimes intervened directly against heretical or treasonous bishops, even removing them from office or barring them from public ministry, and Rome did not treat these actions as usurpations of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The theologians explain that such interventions were legitimate not because kings possessed spiritual authority, but because they acted as public custodians of temporal order in situations where the Church herself was unable to act. Suarez notes that in emergencies “the community may act when the ordinary judge cannot” (De Fide, disp. 10), and Cajetan teaches that “when the competent judge is impeded, the Church acts through those who can” (De Comparatione, ch. 13). These kings acted publicly, not privately; they acted in the name of the whole community, not in their own name; and they acted on public facts, not private suspicions. Their actions were tolerated because the bishop’s heresy created immediate civil and ecclesial danger, the local Church was unable to intervene, the pope was distant or incapacitated, and the king acted to preserve public order until the Church could regularize the situation. Rome’s later acceptance of these actions—by not overturning them—shows that public facts can substitute for juridical acts when the competent judge is absent. John of St. Thomas articulates the principle clearly: “In the absence of the pope and cardinals, the power devolves to the Church herself” (Cursus Theologicus, De Auctoritate Summi Pontificis).
If one man, acting as public authority, may act in the name of the whole community in a vacuum, then the community itself may act corporately when the entire hierarchy is incapacitated. This is the foundation of the doctrine of the imperfect council, which Cajetan describes as the Church acting “through those members who remain” when the head cannot function. Suarez likewise affirms that if the ordinary electors fail, “the power returns to the universal Church or the Roman clergy, as was done in the beginning.” Billot concedes that natural law “supplies a subject” when the constituted subject is lost. Journet adds that the Church’s visibility can “revert to the primitive form” when the ordinary structures fail. Thus the same principle that justified a king acting on behalf of his people in an emergency also justifies a people who rule themselves (democratically) acting as one in an imperfect council: both are cases of public authority acting on public facts in the absence of the competent judge, and both preserve the Church’s visibility when the ordinary organs of governance are unusable.
Governing Principle
Throughout Christian history, Catholic kings occasionally intervened to restrain, depose, or replace bishops whose public heresy or treason created immediate danger to the realm and whose removal was necessary for the preservation of public order. The theologians explain that such royal interventions were legitimate not because kings possessed ecclesiastical jurisdiction, but because they acted as public authorities in a vacuum at moments when the Church’s own juridical organs were unable to function. The local clergy were powerless, the pope was distant or impeded, and the danger was urgent; therefore the king, as custodian of temporal peace, acted in the name of the whole community on the basis of public facts that required immediate response. Rome’s later acceptance of these actions—by not overturning them—demonstrates the principle that when the competent judge cannot act, public facts may substitute for juridical acts, provided the action is taken by a public authority for the sake of preserving the Church’s visibility and order. From this historical and theological foundation emerges the broader natural‑law principle: the same logic that permitted a king to act for the moral body he governs in an emergency necessarily permits a moral body that governs itself to assemble and act as one when the entire hierarchy is incapacitated, compromised, or juridically unusable. This is the precise theological foundation of the imperfect council.
Cajetan
Cajetan’s system aligns directly with the governing principle because he holds that when the constituted organ of the Church is unable to act, the subject Church retains the ability to act for its own preservation. His statement that “when the competent judge is impeded, the Church acts through those who can” (De Comparatione, ch. 13) mirrors the principle that public authority may act in a vacuum on public facts. Cajetan’s doctrine of the imperfect council is simply the ecclesial application of the same logic that justified kings acting for the community: when the hierarchy is juridically unusable, the Church may assemble and act as one through those members who remain capable of acting.
John of St. Thomas
John of St. Thomas explicitly teaches that if the College of Cardinals becomes unusable, the power of electing the pope “returns to the Roman clergy, as in the primitive Church” (Cursus Theologicus, De Auctoritate Summi Pontificis, disp. 2, a. 2). This reflects the governing principle’s core insight that public facts may substitute for juridical acts when the competent judge cannot act. His doctrine of the imperfect council—capable of judging the fact of papal heresy—rests on the same natural‑law foundation. He writes that the Church must retain the ability to act corporately because “the Church cannot be left without remedy when the head is in doubt.” Thus, when the hierarchy is incapacitated, the Church may assemble and act as one to preserve visibility and order.
Suarez
Suarez’s doctrine of devolution is a direct theological expression of the governing principle. He teaches that “if the ordinary electors fail, the power devolves upon the universal Church or the Roman clergy, as was done in the beginning” (De Fide, disp. 10, sect. 6). This is simply the ecclesial form of the idea that public authority may act in a vacuum. Suarez’s system presupposes that the Church, as a moral body, retains the ability to act as one when the constituted organ is unusable. His entire framework is a systematic application of the principle that public facts can substitute for juridical acts when the competent judge is absent.
Billot
Billot is cautious, but even he concedes the principle in theory. He admits that “if the constituted subject of election were lost, natural law would supply another subject, as in the primitive Church” (De Ecclesia, thesis 29). This is nothing other than the governing principle expressed in scholastic form: when the hierarchy is juridically unusable, the Church as a moral body retains the ability to assemble and act as one. Billot’s hesitation is practical, not theoretical; the principle itself is fully acknowledged.
Journet
Journet’s distinction between the essence of visibility and the mode of visibility provides the ecclesiological framework for the governing principle. He teaches that the Church can “revert to the primitive form” when the ordinary structures fail (L’Église du Verbe Incarné, vol. 1). This presupposes that public facts may substitute for juridical acts when the competent judge cannot act. For Journet, the imperfect council is simply the Church’s visibility preserved in its minimal juridical form—the Church acting as one when the hierarchy is incapacitated.
Final Synthesis
In light of the governing principle—that the same logic which permitted a king to act for the moral body he governs in an emergency necessarily permits a moral body that governs itself to assemble and act as one when the entire hierarchy is incapacitated, compromised, or juridically unusable—the convergence of the classical theologians becomes unmistakable. Cajetan’s insistence that “the Church acts through those who can” expresses the same natural‑law mechanism by which a public authority may act in a vacuum on public facts. John of St. Thomas extends this by teaching that the power of election devolves to the Roman clergy, and that an imperfect council may judge the fact of papal heresy, precisely because the Church must retain the ability to act corporately when the ordinary organ is unusable. Suarez systematizes this principle in his doctrine of devolution, arguing that if the ordinary electors fail, the power returns to the Church herself, which is simply the ecclesial form of the community acting as one when no single authority remains capable of acting for it. Even Billot, though practically cautious, concedes that natural law “supplies another subject” if the constituted subject is lost, thereby acknowledging the same foundational principle in theory. Journet completes the synthesis by showing that the Church’s visibility is indefectible even when its canonical form collapses, because the Church can revert to the primitive mode of governance—bishops and clergy acting corporately—when the ordinary structures fail. Thus, across all five theologians, the same conclusion emerges: when the hierarchy is juridically unusable, the Church retains the natural‑law capacity to assemble and act as one through an imperfect council, just as a king once acted for the community when the Church’s organs were unable to intervene.
Can you provide me with magisterial sources condemning or is it just "rejected" by the theologians?
The method I’m using is not a form of legal functionalism—sophistic or otherwise—but an attempt to articulate the governing principle in continuity with the Church’s own theological and juridical tradition. Functionalism reduces law to procedure or utility; my premise, by contrast, is grounded in the substantive moral and ecclesiological commitments that the Church herself affirms.
If you still believe the approach is untenable, I would welcome clarification on which specific aspect departs from that tradition.
Your AI is using quotes from those theologians out of context.
For example, Cajetan is also quoted in the Billot section that I quoted. If Cajetan meant for his proposition that you quoted, "when the competent judge is impeded, the Church acts through those who can,” to apply to a Papal election, then Cajetan contradicted himself. The truth is that Cajetan was not contradicting himself. The AI you are using is taking a quote from one context in Cajetan and trying to apply it to another context that you are interested in. You cannot trust the AI's to understand how the Church jurisprudence works. They will usually import functionalist premises into their logic and apply it to the Catholic theologians. The only way to break that habit is to dig into the actual text and understand the context that surrounds the quote they pull. You can train the AI not to do that, but it takes a lot of work.
So back to the Cajetan quote, of course the Church can "act" in certain limited ways when the Pope (or College of Cardinals) is not present or doubtful. During an interregnum, the Church does not shut down. The sacramental life of the Church continues. However, that does not mean that those in charge can do things that only the Pope is allowed to do during his lifetime, like appoint Cardinals, appoint bishops, declare dogmas, change disciplinary laws, etc.
And defining who the competent subject for papal election is one of those things that only the Pope himself can decide or allow. The Billot quote explains that. Even in the case where specific papal election laws cannot be followed because of impossibilty, the "general council" that acts in the place of the Cardinals must still be a "council" called/approved by the Pope himself. It cannot be a random group of Catholics who decide they are acting as the Universal Church. Why? First, it conflicts with the precepts of the law itself. Second, because it would cause chaos, not orderly succession. Different factions would convoke their own councils and elect their own Popes. Only a "council" instantiated by the Pope can share in the Pope's authority through a devolution of that papal authority. That is the only way that follows as an "ordinance of right reason" and "is for the common good of the society."
So your AI summaries are abstracting out generic ideas from these theologians and applying them to categories that they cannot apply to according to the theologians own statements elsewhere.
Face it. If you are a 1958 totalist Sede, you have no hope for a Pope except by a divine miracle. Stop trying to twist the Church's law and theology into pretzels. Watch and pray. Or, if you are adamant (and correctly so) that a theory of the crisis must have a lawful solution to the conclave situation, then move on from the intellectual dead end of totalist Sedeism.
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Your AI is using quotes from those theologians out of context.
I noticed that. But to be fair, I am attempting a synthesis of their positions as stated above.
I am happy to argue it as no one else wants to - yet - not because I believe it is "the solution", but simply as an exercise.
It cannot be a random group of Catholics who decide they are acting as the Universal Church. Why? First, it conflicts with the precepts of the law itself. Second, because it would cause chaos, not orderly succession. Different factions would convoke their own councils and elect their own Popes. Only a "council" instantiated by the Pope can share in the Pope's authority through a devolution of that papal authority. That is the only way that follows as an "ordinance of right reason" and "is for the common good of the society."
Here is what we get:
"Classical authors who allow any form of devolutio or an “imperfect council” do so as a narrow, juridical remedy: it is admissible only on clear public facts, when ordinary judges are truly impeded, and only through a public, legitimate subject acting ministerially (not as a new source of ordinary papal jurisdiction), with strict limits and prompt canonical regularization thereafter. Cajetan frames the affirmative position as remedial and expressly denies that such action makes the Church superior to the pope; John of St. Thomas introduces the debate as two technical opinions and insists the Church must not be left “without remedy” while preserving juridical form; Suarez sets the two alternatives (devolution vs. declaratory recognition) and repeatedly stresses limits so as not to imply papal subordination; Bellarmine’s “recognition” line treats manifest heresy as a fact to be declared rather than a license for coercive deposition by the Church; Billot concedes a theoretical “supply of subject” in extremis but immediately qualifies it as exceptional, public, remedial, and subject to later confirmation; Billuart and the manualists summarize the two schools precisely to show the technical, constrained character of the debate. Read in context, these authors supply the very safeguards you demand — publicity, legitimate public subject, necessity, ministerial competence, and subsequent regularization — and so their doctrine is a conservative juridical mechanism for preserving order, not a doctrinal endorsement of factional councils or consequentialist “ends justify the means” law‑making. Thomistic principles both forbid random, factional assemblies from claiming to act as the Universal Church and at the same time allow a narrowly circuмscribed remedial mechanism — but only under the strict conditions that preserve the four marks of law: ordinance of reason, legitimate author, promulgation, and the common good."
So your AI summaries are abstracting out generic ideas from these theologians and applying them to categories that they cannot apply to according to the theologians own statements elsewhere.
Each offers his own "piece of the puzzle" so I realize it may seem like that, but that is the purpose of the exercise - to see if the "governing principle" holds within that framework.
Face it. If you are a 1958 totalist Sede, you have no hope for a Pope except by a divine miracle. Stop trying to twist the Church's law and theology into pretzels. Watch and pray. Or, if you are adamant (and correctly so) that a theory of the crisis must have a lawful solution to the conclave situation, then move on from the intellectual dead end of totalist Sedeism.
I am willing to argue for the sake of the subject matter, NOT because "I need it to be true", or it is what I endorse or advocate for.
I suppose most people won't touch it with a ten foot pole (and hey, maybe for good reason).
But I don't mind playing "devil's advocate" in this either.
We all have more to learn, no one understands it all. I agree that A.I. isn't an excuse for reading the actual texts, the "solution" hasn't presented itself yet for all to recognize, so the exercises continue...
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I noticed that. But to be fair, I am attempting a synthesis of their positions as stated above.
I am happy to argue it as no one else wants to - yet - not because I believe it is "the solution", but simply as an exercise.
Here is what we get:
"Classical authors who allow any form of devolutio or an “imperfect council” do so as a narrow, juridical remedy: it is admissible only on clear public facts, when ordinary judges are truly impeded, and only through a public, legitimate subject acting ministerially (not as a new source of ordinary papal jurisdiction), with strict limits and prompt canonical regularization thereafter. Cajetan frames the affirmative position as remedial and expressly denies that such action makes the Church superior to the pope; John of St. Thomas introduces the debate as two technical opinions and insists the Church must not be left “without remedy” while preserving juridical form; Suarez sets the two alternatives (devolution vs. declaratory recognition) and repeatedly stresses limits so as not to imply papal subordination; Bellarmine’s “recognition” line treats manifest heresy as a fact to be declared rather than a license for coercive deposition by the Church; Billot concedes a theoretical “supply of subject” in extremis but immediately qualifies it as exceptional, public, remedial, and subject to later confirmation; Billuart and the manualists summarize the two schools precisely to show the technical, constrained character of the debate. Read in context, these authors supply the very safeguards you demand — publicity, legitimate public subject, necessity, ministerial competence, and subsequent regularization — and so their doctrine is a conservative juridical mechanism for preserving order, not a doctrinal endorsement of factional councils or consequentialist “ends justify the means” law‑making. Thomistic principles both forbid random, factional assemblies from claiming to act as the Universal Church and at the same time allow a narrowly circuмscribed remedial mechanism — but only under the strict conditions that preserve the four marks of law: ordinance of reason, legitimate author, promulgation, and the common good."
Each offers his own "piece of the puzzle" so I realize it may seem like that, but that is the purpose of the exercise - to see if the "governing principle" holds within that framework.
I am willing to argue for the sake of the subject matter, NOT because "I need it to be true", or it is what I endorse or advocate for.
I suppose most people won't touch it with a ten foot pole (and hey, maybe for good reason).
But I don't mind playing "devil's advocate" in this either.
We all have more to learn, no one understands it all. I agree that A.I. isn't an excuse for reading the actual texts, the "solution" hasn't presented itself yet for all to recognize, so the exercises continue...
In a normal situation where it is possible for the normal electing subject (i.e., the College of Cardinals) to be instantiated by the papal election law, that papal election law must be followed in those parts of the law that would be invalidating if not followed. There are many procedural rules in the papal election law that are there to ensure a good orderly process. But not following a merely procedural rule in the papal election law would not invalidate the election. It would merely make the election irregular or illicit.
In an extraordinary situation where it is impossible for the electing subject (i.e., the College of Cardinals) to be instantiated because of some defect in the College (as in the period leading up to Constance), and the papal election law could not be followed because the electing subject was doubtful, the Pope, acting as the principle of unity for the universal Church can approve of a general Council to solve the problem. That is what Billot says happened at Constance.
The key is that the Pope has to be involved in that process. Otherwise there will be chaos. The Pope is recognized as the only divinely-authorized person on earth who decide how his successor is elected. Again, this is Billot's point.
This absolutely excludes a meeting that some random yahoo and his faction calls "a council." That not what any of those real Catholic theologians is referring to when they say the word "council." Rather, the only "council" that can do the work of electing a Pope is one approved by the Pope himself.
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On strict application of papal election law in ordinary cases: The manuals do hold that the pope’s positive law fixes the ordinary electing subject and that norms attached to validity must be observed; but Cajetan and his school treat this as ordinary law, not an absolute metaphysical bar that forecloses every other possibility in true collapse.
On the blanket claim that procedural breaches are never nullifying: Classical canonists distinguish constitutive from merely procedural norms; whether a procedural rule nullifies depends on the legislator’s intention and the nature of the norm, a point emphasized repeatedly in the Thomist tradition and in manualist treatments of election law.
On the impossibility of instantiating the College: John of St. Thomas explicitly contemplates the hypothesis that the constituted electors may become physically unusable or doubtful, and he teaches that in such a case the power of election can revert to the Roman clergy or the universal Church as the historically prior subject.
On the necessity of papal authorization for any council in extremis: Historical and manualist readings of Constance stress that Gregory XII’s authorization preserved juridical continuity in that concrete case, but the commentators do not make papal authorization an absolute metaphysical requirement in a scenario where no certain pope exists to authorize anything.
On reading Constance as proof that only papally‑approved councils can act: Journet and other theologians use Constance as an example of providential preservation with papal cooperation; they do not deny the theoretical natural‑law fallback in a total collapse, and they caution that Constance’s legitimacy rested on Gregory XII’s participation, not on a general rule that would render the Church impotent if no pope existed.
On the claim that papal involvement is always required to avoid chaos: Journet argues that papal involvement secures juridical unity in ordinary and many extraordinary cases, but he also recognizes that visibility and juridical life are not strictly identical to later canonical forms; the manuals therefore allow only tightly constrained emergency measures when the head and constituted organs are truly unusable.
On the assertion that only the pope is divinely authorized to decide the mode of his succession: Pre‑Vatican II authors uniformly affirm papal primacy in ordinary legislation; yet several (Cajetan, Suarez, John of St. Thomas) distinguish between ordinary papal determination and the natural‑law roots of ecclesial survival, so that the pope’s legislative role is not a logical impossibility in cases where no certain pope exists.
On Billot’s supposed absolute insistence on papal involvement: Billot insists that Constance must be read with Gregory XII’s authorization to avoid conciliarist errors, but he explicitly concedes the theoretical possibility that, if the constituted subject were truly lost, natural law would supply another subject as in the primitive Church; his caution is historical and prudential, not an absolute metaphysical bar.
On excluding every non‑papally convoked assembly as illegitimate: The classical manuals reject factional self‑convocation and conciliarism; yet they also teach that an imperfect council (the Church acting through those who remain) is a theoretical, strictly limited remedy in extremis—not a license for private factions, but not a categorical denial of any non‑papal corporate action when the papal office and constituted electors are genuinely absent or unknowable.
On the proper synthesis: The safe, pre‑Vatican II synthesis is this: (a) follow papal election law in ordinary cases and respect constitutive norms; (b) reject factional self‑convocation and conciliar supremacy; (c) nevertheless acknowledge the classical‑manualist teaching that, in a true and total collapse of the constituted electors and of any certain pope, natural law supplies a narrowly defined, exceptional fallback (rooted historically in the Roman clergy or universal Church) to preserve the primacy—a theoretical safeguard, not a routine procedure.
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On strict application of papal election law in ordinary cases: The manuals do hold that the pope’s positive law fixes the ordinary electing subject and that norms attached to validity must be observed; but Cajetan and his school treat this as ordinary law, not an absolute metaphysical bar that forecloses every other possibility in true collapse.
On the blanket claim that procedural breaches are never nullifying: Classical canonists distinguish constitutive from merely procedural norms; whether a procedural rule nullifies depends on the legislator’s intention and the nature of the norm, a point emphasized repeatedly in the Thomist tradition and in manualist treatments of election law.
On the impossibility of instantiating the College: John of St. Thomas explicitly contemplates the hypothesis that the constituted electors may become physically unusable or doubtful, and he teaches that in such a case the power of election can revert to the Roman clergy or the universal Church as the historically prior subject.
On the necessity of papal authorization for any council in extremis: Historical and manualist readings of Constance stress that Gregory XII’s authorization preserved juridical continuity in that concrete case, but the commentators do not make papal authorization an absolute metaphysical requirement in a scenario where no certain pope exists to authorize anything.
On reading Constance as proof that only papally‑approved councils can act: Journet and other theologians use Constance as an example of providential preservation with papal cooperation; they do not deny the theoretical natural‑law fallback in a total collapse, and they caution that Constance’s legitimacy rested on Gregory XII’s participation, not on a general rule that would render the Church impotent if no pope existed.
On the claim that papal involvement is always required to avoid chaos: Journet argues that papal involvement secures juridical unity in ordinary and many extraordinary cases, but he also recognizes that visibility and juridical life are not strictly identical to later canonical forms; the manuals therefore allow only tightly constrained emergency measures when the head and constituted organs are truly unusable.
On the assertion that only the pope is divinely authorized to decide the mode of his succession: Pre‑Vatican II authors uniformly affirm papal primacy in ordinary legislation; yet several (Cajetan, Suarez, John of St. Thomas) distinguish between ordinary papal determination and the natural‑law roots of ecclesial survival, so that the pope’s legislative role is not a logical impossibility in cases where no certain pope exists.
On Billot’s supposed absolute insistence on papal involvement: Billot insists that Constance must be read with Gregory XII’s authorization to avoid conciliarist errors, but he explicitly concedes the theoretical possibility that, if the constituted subject were truly lost, natural law would supply another subject as in the primitive Church; his caution is historical and prudential, not an absolute metaphysical bar.
On excluding every non‑papally convoked assembly as illegitimate: The classical manuals reject factional self‑convocation and conciliarism; yet they also teach that an imperfect council (the Church acting through those who remain) is a theoretical, strictly limited remedy in extremis—not a license for private factions, but not a categorical denial of any non‑papal corporate action when the papal office and constituted electors are genuinely absent or unknowable.
On the proper synthesis: The safe, pre‑Vatican II synthesis is this: (a) follow papal election law in ordinary cases and respect constitutive norms; (b) reject factional self‑convocation and conciliar supremacy; (c) nevertheless acknowledge the classical‑manualist teaching that, in a true and total collapse of the constituted electors and of any certain pope, natural law supplies a narrowly defined, exceptional fallback (rooted historically in the Roman clergy or universal Church) to preserve the primacy—a theoretical safeguard, not a routine procedure.
For option C:
1. Roman clergy = Cardinal bishops following the papal election law in regard to constitutive norms. These are a subset of the College of Cardinals anyway. So if the entire college was doubtful but the Roman clergy were not doubtful, then that smaller group could make sense as a competent subject. But an ecuмenical council would be more secure.
2. Universal Church = Ecuмenical Council with approval of last living Pope. This is the Council of Constance solution. This solution already worked. This would be the preferred solution because it would include the maximum number of validly-ordained bishops and would therefore calm consciences.
With those definitions in mind. I agree with the concluding synthesis. Option B is definitely a no-go.
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Bishop Sanborn had talked about this issue. He said that such a claimant to the papacy would not be a successor of Saint Peter and thus not a true pope, in the current circuмstances I believe he meant. Now, granted, if one holds the Thesis and yet there would be no more cardinals or clergy of Rome left, then an election would in theory have to devolve to the universal Church as Fr. Cekada listed in the possibilities of electing a new pope, as was pointed out by SkidRowCatholic earlier.
There is a lot more to this, of course, being a complex matter as I noticed in the thread, and I would have to learn even more about it. Fr. Despósito in his Little Catechism on the Thesis speaks of the various kinds of titles for election to an office. Although undesirable, the Thesis argues that the Novus Ordo popes are popes-elect and hold at least a colored title.
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For option C:
1. Roman clergy = Cardinal bishops following the papal election law in regard to constitutive norms. These are a subset of the College of Cardinals anyway. So if the entire college was doubtful but the Roman clergy were not doubtful, then that smaller group could make sense as a competent subject. But an ecuмenical council would be more secure.
2. Universal Church = Ecuмenical Council with approval of last living Pope. This is the Council of Constance solution. This solution already worked. This would be the preferred solution because it would include the maximum number of validly-ordained bishops and would therefore calm consciences.
Two clarifications are needed to keep Option C aligned with the actual teaching.
1. Roman clergy as fallback subject
Your instinct is correct that the Roman clergy represent the historically prior subject of papal election. But identifying them with cardinal bishops is not quite accurate.
- Roman clergy as historically prior electors: In the classical manuals, “Roman clergy” refers to the presbyters and deacons of the Roman Church—the original electing body before the later development of the College of Cardinals.
- Cardinal bishops as later juridical development: Cardinal bishops are not simply a subset of the Roman clergy; they are a later, papally‑constituted organ.
- Fallback logic in total collapse: If the College became doubtful or unusable, the manuals argue that the Church could revert to the historically prior subject—not because they are a subset of the College, but because they are the root from which the College historically developed.
So the Roman clergy option is not “the cardinal bishops who remain valid,” but rather the primitive electing subject supplied by natural law when the constituted subject cannot be instantiated.
2. Universal Church as fallback subject
Your second point—equating the “universal Church” with an ecuмenical council approved by the last living pope—needs refinement.
- Constance as a providential, not normative, model: Constance worked because Gregory XII was alive and could authorize it.
- Natural‑law fallback does not require papal approval: In the hypothetical scenario contemplated by Cajetan, Suárez, and John of St. Thomas, there is no certain pope—and therefore no one who can authorize a council.
- Universal Church acting in extremis: The manuals teach that in a true collapse, the universal Church (represented by an imperfect council) could act precisely because no pope exists to authorize anything.
Thus, the “universal Church” option is not “Constance repeated,” but the theoretical natural‑law remedy that would apply only if no Gregory XII existed to regularize the process.
Trad clergy as fallback subject
Even if every bishop with ordinary jurisdiction has been lost, impeded, or rendered doubtful, the Church does not lose the ability to act. Ordinary jurisdiction can be blocked, but episcopal character remains, and with it the Church’s natural‑law right to preserve her visible head. The manuals taken together strongly imply that in a total collapse of constituted authority, the Church’s capacity to act does not depend on the continued existence of diocesan governance but on the continued existence of publicly consecrated bishops who remain part of the hierarchical order. Their sacramental character is indelible, and their public identity as members of the episcopate is sufficient to prevent the Church from falling into juridical paralysis.
These bishops, even without ordinary jurisdiction, still constitute a public and corporate subject. They are not private individuals acting on their own initiative but the remaining visible hierarchy of the Church. Because they retain the power of order and a public ecclesial identity, they are capable of acting corporately in extremis. This is precisely why the classical tradition distinguishes the power of order from the power of jurisdiction: when jurisdiction is impeded, the Church can still act through the power of order to preserve what is essential to her constitution.
In such a situation, these bishops can assemble by natural law into what the manuals call an imperfect council. This gathering is not a juridically convoked ecuмenical council, since no pope exists to authorize it, but a natural‑law assembly of the remaining hierarchy whose competence is strictly limited to one act: designating or electing the man who can restore the papacy. The imperfect council does not claim supreme authority, does not legislate, and does not govern the Church. Its sole purpose is to restore the head so that ordinary jurisdiction can be reconstituted.
This mechanism does not collapse into conciliarism because the imperfect council exists only to re‑establish the papal office, not to replace it. The bishops do not claim superiority over the pope or over the papal office; they simply act as the last remaining public organ of the Church when all constituted authority has failed. The moment a pope is restored, the imperfect council ceases to have any competence. In this way, the Church preserves visibility, apostolic succession, and the capacity to designate her head even in the most extreme imaginable collapse.
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Two clarifications are needed to keep Option C aligned with the actual teaching.
1. Roman clergy as fallback subject
Your instinct is correct that the Roman clergy represent the historically prior subject of papal election. But identifying them with cardinal bishops is not quite accurate.
- Roman clergy as historically prior electors: In the classical manuals, “Roman clergy” refers to the presbyters and deacons of the Roman Church—the original electing body before the later development of the College of Cardinals.
- Cardinal bishops as later juridical development: Cardinal bishops are not simply a subset of the Roman clergy; they are a later, papally‑constituted organ.
- Fallback logic in total collapse: If the College became doubtful or unusable, the manuals argue that the Church could revert to the historically prior subject—not because they are a subset of the College, but because they are the root from which the College historically developed.
So the Roman clergy option is not “the cardinal bishops who remain valid,” but rather the primitive electing subject supplied by natural law when the constituted subject cannot be instantiated.
2. Universal Church as fallback subject
Your second point—equating the “universal Church” with an ecuмenical council approved by the last living pope—needs refinement.
- Constance as a providential, not normative, model: Constance worked because Gregory XII was alive and could authorize it.
- Natural‑law fallback does not require papal approval: In the hypothetical scenario contemplated by Cajetan, Suárez, and John of St. Thomas, there is no certain pope—and therefore no one who can authorize a council.
- Universal Church acting in extremis: The manuals teach that in a true collapse, the universal Church (represented by an imperfect council) could act precisely because no pope exists to authorize anything.
Thus, the “universal Church” option is not “Constance repeated,” but the theoretical natural‑law remedy that would apply only if no Gregory XII existed to regularize the process.
Trad clergy as fallback subject
Even if every bishop with ordinary jurisdiction has been lost, impeded, or rendered doubtful, the Church does not lose the ability to act. Ordinary jurisdiction can be blocked, but episcopal character remains, and with it the Church’s natural‑law right to preserve her visible head. The manuals taken together strongly imply that in a total collapse of constituted authority, the Church’s capacity to act does not depend on the continued existence of diocesan governance but on the continued existence of publicly consecrated bishops who remain part of the hierarchical order. Their sacramental character is indelible, and their public identity as members of the episcopate is sufficient to prevent the Church from falling into juridical paralysis.
These bishops, even without ordinary jurisdiction, still constitute a public and corporate subject. They are not private individuals acting on their own initiative but the remaining visible hierarchy of the Church. Because they retain the power of order and a public ecclesial identity, they are capable of acting corporately in extremis. This is precisely why the classical tradition distinguishes the power of order from the power of jurisdiction: when jurisdiction is impeded, the Church can still act through the power of order to preserve what is essential to her constitution.
In such a situation, these bishops can assemble by natural law into what the manuals call an imperfect council. This gathering is not a juridically convoked ecuмenical council, since no pope exists to authorize it, but a natural‑law assembly of the remaining hierarchy whose competence is strictly limited to one act: designating or electing the man who can restore the papacy. The imperfect council does not claim supreme authority, does not legislate, and does not govern the Church. Its sole purpose is to restore the head so that ordinary jurisdiction can be reconstituted.
This mechanism does not collapse into conciliarism because the imperfect council exists only to re‑establish the papal office, not to replace it. The bishops do not claim superiority over the pope or over the papal office; they simply act as the last remaining public organ of the Church when all constituted authority has failed. The moment a pope is restored, the imperfect council ceases to have any competence. In this way, the Church preserves visibility, apostolic succession, and the capacity to designate her head even in the most extreme imaginable collapse.
The Church itself has never authorized those options. You can see the state of the Church's thinking in Billot's discussion. The Ecuмenical Council with Pope participation is viable. All other things are hypothetical, illegal and practically unworkable.
1. Roman clergy option with your re-definition: this should be thrown out right away. Priests and deacons of the diocese of Rome, even if they could theoretically get together and meet, have no power to bind the universal Church. So it is best just to put this historically-assumed option away. It is ridiculous to think deacons, who are more numerous, could decide who the Pope is.
2. Universal Church as ecuмenical council with Pope participation: this is the only viable answer. This is not so much a natural law fallback as it is an accepted fallback based on "the power of order" in constituting the College of Bishops and the living Pope as the head of that body. The Pope cannot be a Pope without the episcopal consecration. His election must be followed by episcopal consecration if he not already a bishop. When he convokes, presides, and approves of the Council, he is not doing so with juridical force. His authority is "moral authority" as the head of the College. The proof of this is that by convocation, he invites. He cannot compel participation. He presides by acclamation, not because he punishes others who might usurp. He approves but the other bishops are free to reject the findings of the Council approved by the Pope and therefore become heretics. As the head of the College of Bishops, his activities are collegial not juridical in nature. So he could have resigned his office (and not yet been replaced) and still be head of the College of Bishops. He retains the last See in his title of emeritus Bishop of Rome.
3. The trad clergy option: With that title you have just identified it as a faction. In that respect, it would be incompatible with natural law because it is incompatible with the Four Precepts of Law: specifically, it would not be reasonable for a faction to choose a Pope for the Universal Church. It would be lack the subject who was care for the whole community. It would lack the ability to promulate because it is not the legitimate ruler. It is not consistent with the common good because it would cause dissension. So do not call it natural law option. It is neither natural nor legal. It is usurpation disguised as epekeia. It is pure fantasy, a second reality.
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(https://i.imgur.com/71cB19y.png)
(https://i.imgur.com/58bQVXb.png)
(https://i.imgur.com/354i7or.png)
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This should be put here as well for those interested: https://ttu-files.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/The_Election_of_the_Pope.pdf (https://ttu-files.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/The_Election_of_the_Pope.pdf)
Within he states:
Bishops without jurisdiction cannot elect the Pope
We have seen that in abnormal circuмstances the election of the Pope - according to the thought of the theologians who have dealt with the question - falls to the imperfect General Council, in other words to the Bishops and prelates who enjoy, in the Church itself, jurisdiction. The Pope is, in fact, Bishop of the universal Church: it is therefore normal that exceptionally it is the prelates of the universal Church governing, like him and below him, a portion of the flock who elect him. We have also seen that by the very nature of things, and as a consequence of what has been said, are excluded from the number of electors per accidens of the Pope, titular Bishops, Bishops consecrated with the Roman mandate but deprived of jurisdiction in the Church. A fortiori are excluded from the number of electors - precisely because they are excluded from the General Council - Bishops consecrated without a Roman mandate under the exceptional conditions of the current (formal) vacancy of the Apostolic See. These Bishops were indeed consecrated validly and even, in our opinion - at least in certain cases - lawfully; but nevertheless they are - in the most absolute way - deprived of jurisdiction by the fact that the Bishop receives jurisdiction from God only through the intermediary of the Pope, an intermediary excluded in our case (14). Being deprived of jurisdiction, they do not belong to the hierarchy of the Church according to jurisdiction, for which they are not ex officio members of the Council and are therefore not entitled to validly elect the Pope, not even in cases extraordinary. This point of doctrine, already established in itself, is confirmed by the practical impossibility of electing a reliable and undoubted Pope by following this path. Who will be able to establish with certainty, among the many Bishops who have been and will still be consecrated in this way, those who have the right to participate in the election and those who do not? Who has the right to convene the Conclave and who does not? Who can be considered as legitimately consecrated and who not? In the absence of criteria of discernment (the Roman mandate, the residential seat) there are no limits per se to these consecrations neither on the part of who can authorize them (the Pope) nor with regard to the portion of territory to be governed (the diocese). The number of voters can therefore grow disproportionately without any guarantee of their catholicity, as has happened in practice.
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And in another place it was claimed,
"The anonymous author accepts Pivarunas’ proof that the Holy See is vacant but shows that “universal Church” in Cajetan means an imperfect general council of bishops holding ordinary jurisdiction. Because strict (total) sedevacantism concedes no such bishops today, only the Cassiciacuм (material-formal) thesis can preserve apostolic succession and a future election."
https://www.truecatholicfaith.com/articles/p/2asy6yaysnrh7dbgvxe9zp7iyq25wy (https://www.truecatholicfaith.com/articles/p/2asy6yaysnrh7dbgvxe9zp7iyq25wy)
And here is the formed response based on the exercise so far:
Rebuttal: Bishops without Jurisdiction and Devolution in Extremis
- Thesis and summary.
In a true catastrophic collapse of the Church’s ordinary juridical organs, the classical manualist tradition permits a remedial corporate response: validly consecrated bishops who lack ordinary jurisdiction are not ipso facto excluded from participating in an emergency assembly or election when the Church supplies the necessary juridical capacity under strict, public safeguards. This position preserves apostolic succession and visible continuity without adopting metaphysical alternatives (e.g., Cassiciacuм) as the only solution. - Sacramental character distinct from juridical power.
The ontological fact of episcopal consecration is distinct from the grant of jurisdiction. St. Thomas and the manualist tradition teach that orders confer an indelible character even when juridical faculties are absent; therefore a bishop’s sacramental capacity remains a real basis for corporate action when positive juridical structures fail. - The remedial principle in the scholastic tradition.
Cajetan’s and Suarez’s formulations of devolution express a remedial principle: when the competent judge is impeded, the Church acts by those who can (paraphrase of Cajetan) and, if ordinary electors fail, the power devolves to the universal Church or the Roman clergy (Suarez, paraphrase). Read together, these teachings authorize the Church to supply juridical competence corporately in extremis rather than to leave apostolic primacy without remedy. - Imperfect council as a form, not a fixed juridical body.
The imperfect council is a remedial form the Church may assume; it is not identical to a canonical ecuмenical council composed only of bishops who already possess ordinary jurisdiction. John of St. Thomas and other manualists envisage the Church acting through those who remain publicly able to act, which can include sacramentally valid bishops whose jurisdictional defects are temporarily supplied by the Church’s corporate will. - Why jurisdictional exclusion cannot be absolute.
To insist that no bishop without a Roman mandate may ever participate would create a logical dead end in scenarios where no ordinary electors survive or can be used. Classical theologians avoid that dead end by allowing natural‑law supply: positive law governs ordinarily, but natural law and the Church’s corporate life provide extraordinary remedies to preserve visible succession. - Distinguishing physical impossibility from moral defect.
The proper, objective trigger for devolution is physical impossibility—death, capture, permanent disappearance, or total communications blockade. Moral defects such as manifest heresy are a different category; they can produce practical impossibility only when they have objectively and universally destroyed the Church’s ability to identify and rely on electors. - When widespread manifest heresy becomes a practical trigger.
Manifest heresy qualifies as a devolution trigger only when all of the following obtain simultaneously: (a) Universality — the heresy is publicly notorious across the entire electoral subject; (b) Indeterminacy — no elector can be credibly certified as orthodox or trustworthy; (c) Incapacity to adjudicate — no independent tribunal can judge the fact without circularity; and (d) Irreversibility for the foreseeable future — communications or canonical processes cannot restore reliable identification within a reasonable canonical interval. Only such a compound factual state converts moral defect into practical impossibility. - Evidentiary standards and Bellarmine’s caution.
The manualist insistence on public notoriety is decisive here: Bellarmine’s technical teaching that a manifest heretic loses office ipso facto presupposes public notoriety, not private accusation. Therefore any claim that heresy has produced practical impossibility must be certified by public facts meeting a high evidentiary bar. - Who convokes and who may convene.
When ordinary convocation is impossible, surviving public ecclesial authorities—senior metropolitans, the most public bishops remaining, or a multi‑regional committee—may lawfully convene an imperfect council. This follows the scholastic pattern that the Church acts through those who remain able to act publicly for the good of the whole. - Eligibility to vote: sacramental validity plus public attestation.
Eligibility should be limited to bishops who are validly consecrated and whose consecration can be publicly attested. Residential jurisdiction is prudentially preferred but not an absolute ontological disqualification if corroboration exists. Public certification, docuмentary proof, and regional representation are the operative criteria. - Procedural safeguards to prevent proliferation and factionalism.
To answer the critic’s practical worries, impose strict safeguards: (a) multi‑regional corroboration (recommendation: attestations from at least three distinct ecclesial regions); (b) docuмentary proof of consecration and public acts; (c) public notarization and contemporaneous minutes; (d) oaths of fidelity by conveners and electors; and (e) a canonical waiting period (e.g., 30 days) for contestation. Suarez’s prudential cautions and Billot’s insistence on public proof justify these measures. - Avoiding circularity in adjudication.
Determinations that remove or exclude electors cannot be self‑authenticating. Claims of manifest heresy or jurisdictional illegitimacy must be adjudicated by a public corporate act under the evidentiary rules above, not by unilateral partisan declarations. This preserves the distinction between public facts and private accusations. - Why Cassiciacuм is not the only viable route.
The Cassiciacuм (material‑formal) thesis is a metaphysical solution that preserves a material pope deprived of formal authority; it is one possible response but not the only theologically defensible route. The classical devolution doctrine supplies a corporate juridical remedy that preserves succession without adopting Cassiciacuм’s metaphysical distinctions. - Practical model (concise procedural summary).
The operative sequence in extremis should be: (1) certify impossibility publicly with multi‑regional attestations; (2) convene representative bishops under oath; (3) admit only sacramentally valid bishops with public proof; (4) deliberate and, if necessary, elect following ancient Roman‑clergy principles adapted to the circuмstances; (5) record and publish minutes with civil or ecclesial notarization; (6) seek later canonical regularization if ordinary organs reappear. - Conclusion and theological balance.
The classical authorities—Cajetan, Suarez, John of St. Thomas, Bellarmine, Billot, and Journet—converge on a balanced solution: the Church’s visibility and apostolic succession are indefectible, but the historical mode of juridical visibility is not. In true extremis the Church may act corporately to supply what positive law cannot, provided that the remedial action is constrained by high evidentiary standards, public procedures, and prudential safeguards designed to preserve catholicity and prevent opportunism. This preserves both doctrinal integrity and practical continuity without making metaphysical constructs the only available remedy.
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Combine the Cassiciacuм metaphysical hypothesis with the Governing Principle procedural model so the Church preserves metaphysical continuity where present while restoring visible, juridical authority through a public imperfect council when ordinary organs are unusable. The synthesis treats Cassiciacuм as an optional theological backstop and the imperfect council as the primary, verifiable mechanism for restoring formal governance.
Core principles
- Sacramental vs juridical: episcopal consecration (ontological) is distinct from jurisdiction (juridical); remedial supply can address juridical defects without denying sacramental reality.
- Objective triggers: devolution is triggered primarily by physical impossibility (death, capture, total communications blockade); manifest heresy becomes a trigger only when it produces universal, insurmountable doubt about elector identity.
- Publicity and evidence: every extraordinary act must rest on public facts, multi‑regional corroboration, notarized records, and a waiting period to prevent partisan claims.
Integration models
- Backstop model: treat Cassiciacuм as a metaphysical continuity claim—if a credible materially‑present claimant exists, the council formalizes or recognizes his authority.
- Recognition/formalization model: the council’s public act is decisive; Cassiciacuм language may be used interpretively but is not required as the legal basis.
- Elective/repair model: if no credible material claimant exists, the council proceeds to elect under strict safeguards, creating both material and formal status by public canonical act.
- Hybrid model: prefer a conditional approach—recognize and formalize a credible material claimant when demonstrable; otherwise elect under the Governing Principle.
Procedural framework for an imperfect council
- Convocation: convene by surviving public ecclesial authorities or a multi‑regional committee when ordinary convocation is impossible.
- Eligibility: admit only validly consecrated bishops with public attestations; residential jurisdiction is preferred but not absolute if corroboration exists.
- Evidence and timing: require attestations from at least three distinct regions, docuмentary proof, notarized minutes, oath‑taking, and a canonical waiting period (recommended 30 days).
- Publication and provisionality: publish all acts and state explicitly that decisions are provisional and subject to later canonical regularization.
Handling a materially‑present claimant impeded by heresy
- First step — correction: prioritize public correction and rehabilitation; summon the person, offer a clear opportunity for recantation, and docuмent any reconciliation.
- Second step — juridical declaration: if heresy is public, notorious, and obstinate, treat the person as having lost any legitimate claim ipso facto once the high evidentiary bar is met, and proceed to formalize another candidate or elect.
- Third step — provisional action: if neither correction nor clean juridical declaration is possible, treat the claimant as functionally impeded and act provisionally to restore governance while preserving a path for later review.
Recommendation and safeguards
Adopt the hybrid conditional model: use Cassiciacuм only when a materially‑present claimant is publicly credible; otherwise rely on the imperfect council under the Governing Principle with strict evidentiary and procedural safeguards. This preserves doctrinal integrity, restores practical continuity, minimizes metaphysical controversy, and protects the Church from factionalism and opportunism.
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This should be interesting:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f5qSqQ93VFM (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f5qSqQ93VFM)
To Stephen's credit, he has interviewed quite a range of persons in a short amount of time from all across the "trad-o-sphere" and he often asks thoughtful questions.
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This should be put here as well for those interested: https://ttu-files.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/The_Election_of_the_Pope.pdf (https://ttu-files.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/The_Election_of_the_Pope.pdf)
Within he states:
Bishops without jurisdiction cannot elect the Pope
We have seen that in abnormal circuмstances the election of the Pope - according to the thought of the theologians who have dealt with the question - falls to the imperfect General Council, in other words to the Bishops and prelates who enjoy, in the Church itself, jurisdiction. The Pope is, in fact, Bishop of the universal Church: it is therefore normal that exceptionally it is the prelates of the universal Church governing, like him and below him, a portion of the flock who elect him. We have also seen that by the very nature of things, and as a consequence of what has been said, are excluded from the number of electors per accidens of the Pope, titular Bishops, Bishops consecrated with the Roman mandate but deprived of jurisdiction in the Church. A fortiori are excluded from the number of electors - precisely because they are excluded from the General Council - Bishops consecrated without a Roman mandate under the exceptional conditions of the current (formal) vacancy of the Apostolic See. These Bishops were indeed consecrated validly and even, in our opinion - at least in certain cases - lawfully; but nevertheless they are - in the most absolute way - deprived of jurisdiction by the fact that the Bishop receives jurisdiction from God only through the intermediary of the Pope, an intermediary excluded in our case (14). Being deprived of jurisdiction, they do not belong to the hierarchy of the Church according to jurisdiction, for which they are not ex officio members of the Council and are therefore not entitled to validly elect the Pope, not even in cases extraordinary. This point of doctrine, already established in itself, is confirmed by the practical impossibility of electing a reliable and undoubted Pope by following this path. Who will be able to establish with certainty, among the many Bishops who have been and will still be consecrated in this way, those who have the right to participate in the election and those who do not? Who has the right to convene the Conclave and who does not? Who can be considered as legitimately consecrated and who not? In the absence of criteria of discernment (the Roman mandate, the residential seat) there are no limits per se to these consecrations neither on the part of who can authorize them (the Pope) nor with regard to the portion of territory to be governed (the diocese). The number of voters can therefore grow disproportionately without any guarantee of their catholicity, as has happened in practice.
- - END QUOTE - -
And in another place it was claimed,
"The anonymous author accepts Pivarunas’ proof that the Holy See is vacant but shows that “universal Church” in Cajetan means an imperfect general council of bishops holding ordinary jurisdiction. Because strict (total) sedevacantism concedes no such bishops today, only the Cassiciacuм (material-formal) thesis can preserve apostolic succession and a future election."
https://www.truecatholicfaith.com/articles/p/2asy6yaysnrh7dbgvxe9zp7iyq25wy (https://www.truecatholicfaith.com/articles/p/2asy6yaysnrh7dbgvxe9zp7iyq25wy)
And here is the formed response based on the exercise so far:
Rebuttal: Bishops without Jurisdiction and Devolution in Extremis
- Thesis and summary.
In a true catastrophic collapse of the Church’s ordinary juridical organs, the classical manualist tradition permits a remedial corporate response: validly consecrated bishops who lack ordinary jurisdiction are not ipso facto excluded from participating in an emergency assembly or election when the Church supplies the necessary juridical capacity under strict, public safeguards. This position preserves apostolic succession and visible continuity without adopting metaphysical alternatives (e.g., Cassiciacuм) as the only solution. - Sacramental character distinct from juridical power.
The ontological fact of episcopal consecration is distinct from the grant of jurisdiction. St. Thomas and the manualist tradition teach that orders confer an indelible character even when juridical faculties are absent; therefore a bishop’s sacramental capacity remains a real basis for corporate action when positive juridical structures fail. - The remedial principle in the scholastic tradition.
Cajetan’s and Suarez’s formulations of devolution express a remedial principle: when the competent judge is impeded, the Church acts by those who can (paraphrase of Cajetan) and, if ordinary electors fail, the power devolves to the universal Church or the Roman clergy (Suarez, paraphrase). Read together, these teachings authorize the Church to supply juridical competence corporately in extremis rather than to leave apostolic primacy without remedy. - Imperfect council as a form, not a fixed juridical body.
The imperfect council is a remedial form the Church may assume; it is not identical to a canonical ecuмenical council composed only of bishops who already possess ordinary jurisdiction. John of St. Thomas and other manualists envisage the Church acting through those who remain publicly able to act, which can include sacramentally valid bishops whose jurisdictional defects are temporarily supplied by the Church’s corporate will. - Why jurisdictional exclusion cannot be absolute.
To insist that no bishop without a Roman mandate may ever participate would create a logical dead end in scenarios where no ordinary electors survive or can be used. Classical theologians avoid that dead end by allowing natural‑law supply: positive law governs ordinarily, but natural law and the Church’s corporate life provide extraordinary remedies to preserve visible succession. - Distinguishing physical impossibility from moral defect.
The proper, objective trigger for devolution is physical impossibility—death, capture, permanent disappearance, or total communications blockade. Moral defects such as manifest heresy are a different category; they can produce practical impossibility only when they have objectively and universally destroyed the Church’s ability to identify and rely on electors. - When widespread manifest heresy becomes a practical trigger.
Manifest heresy qualifies as a devolution trigger only when all of the following obtain simultaneously: (a) Universality — the heresy is publicly notorious across the entire electoral subject; (b) Indeterminacy — no elector can be credibly certified as orthodox or trustworthy; (c) Incapacity to adjudicate — no independent tribunal can judge the fact without circularity; and (d) Irreversibility for the foreseeable future — communications or canonical processes cannot restore reliable identification within a reasonable canonical interval. Only such a compound factual state converts moral defect into practical impossibility. - Evidentiary standards and Bellarmine’s caution.
The manualist insistence on public notoriety is decisive here: Bellarmine’s technical teaching that a manifest heretic loses office ipso facto presupposes public notoriety, not private accusation. Therefore any claim that heresy has produced practical impossibility must be certified by public facts meeting a high evidentiary bar. - Who convokes and who may convene.
When ordinary convocation is impossible, surviving public ecclesial authorities—senior metropolitans, the most public bishops remaining, or a multi‑regional committee—may lawfully convene an imperfect council. This follows the scholastic pattern that the Church acts through those who remain able to act publicly for the good of the whole. - Eligibility to vote: sacramental validity plus public attestation.
Eligibility should be limited to bishops who are validly consecrated and whose consecration can be publicly attested. Residential jurisdiction is prudentially preferred but not an absolute ontological disqualification if corroboration exists. Public certification, docuмentary proof, and regional representation are the operative criteria. - Procedural safeguards to prevent proliferation and factionalism.
To answer the critic’s practical worries, impose strict safeguards: (a) multi‑regional corroboration (recommendation: attestations from at least three distinct ecclesial regions); (b) docuмentary proof of consecration and public acts; (c) public notarization and contemporaneous minutes; (d) oaths of fidelity by conveners and electors; and (e) a canonical waiting period (e.g., 30 days) for contestation. Suarez’s prudential cautions and Billot’s insistence on public proof justify these measures. - Avoiding circularity in adjudication.
Determinations that remove or exclude electors cannot be self‑authenticating. Claims of manifest heresy or jurisdictional illegitimacy must be adjudicated by a public corporate act under the evidentiary rules above, not by unilateral partisan declarations. This preserves the distinction between public facts and private accusations. - Why Cassiciacuм is not the only viable route.
The Cassiciacuм (material‑formal) thesis is a metaphysical solution that preserves a material pope deprived of formal authority; it is one possible response but not the only theologically defensible route. The classical devolution doctrine supplies a corporate juridical remedy that preserves succession without adopting Cassiciacuм’s metaphysical distinctions. - Practical model (concise procedural summary).
The operative sequence in extremis should be: (1) certify impossibility publicly with multi‑regional attestations; (2) convene representative bishops under oath; (3) admit only sacramentally valid bishops with public proof; (4) deliberate and, if necessary, elect following ancient Roman‑clergy principles adapted to the circuмstances; (5) record and publish minutes with civil or ecclesial notarization; (6) seek later canonical regularization if ordinary organs reappear. - Conclusion and theological balance.
The classical authorities—Cajetan, Suarez, John of St. Thomas, Bellarmine, Billot, and Journet—converge on a balanced solution: the Church’s visibility and apostolic succession are indefectible, but the historical mode of juridical visibility is not. In true extremis the Church may act corporately to supply what positive law cannot, provided that the remedial action is constrained by high evidentiary standards, public procedures, and prudential safeguards designed to preserve catholicity and prevent opportunism. This preserves both doctrinal integrity and practical continuity without making metaphysical constructs the only available remedy.
Fr. Ricossa's argument is logically unsound.
His major premise is empirically falsified by the very historical precedent, the Council of Constance, that Fr. Ricossa accepts to establish the possibility of extraordinary papal election.
At Constance bishops participated who "jurisdiction" derived from each of the three papal claimants. But at most one of these claimants was the legitimate Pope. The bishops whose jurisdiction derived from the other two held no legitimate jurisdiction by Fr. Ricossa's own criterion. Yet they participated. And the result (Martin V) is universally recognized as valid.
Therefore, the major premise is false. Legitimate jurisdiction derived from a legitimate Pope is not the criterion for participation in an extraordinary Council convened to elect a Pope.
A logically valid argument with a false premise is unsound. Fr. Ricossa's argument is logically valid (the conclusion follows from the premises), but it is unsound because the major premise is contradicted by the historical facts of Constance—the very precedent he relies upon.
Fr. Ricossa cannot simultaneously: invoke Constance as the precedent for extraordinary papal election AND
- maintain that only bishops with legitimate jurisdiction can participate
The facts of Constance disprove the jurisdictional criterion. If Constance is the model, then the criterion must be something other than jurisdiction—most plausibly, valid episcopal consecration.
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Fr. Ricossa's argument is logically unsound.
The facts of Constance disprove the jurisdictional criterion. If Constance is the model, then the criterion must be something other than jurisdiction—most plausibly, valid episcopal consecration.
So what about a synthesis of the two positions?
Also,
What do you think about +Roy saying (paraphrase), "The Church has never waited around for direct Divine intervention to secure a pope."?
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+Sanborn states, "Now there is talk about some bishops getting together and electing a pope which is most absurd and ridiculous."
But the reason he gives for this statement is that the man elected would be living, "many miles for Rome" and the "Pope has to be the bishop of Rome."
I do not think he gave a good answer.
Even Van Noort says that (paraphrase), "if Rome was destroyed, the Pope would still be the Bishop of Rome, even if he decided to setup the Holy See in Texas or New York, etc."
@57:00
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tSBBkgkKILg (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tSBBkgkKILg)
And at the same time that +Sanborn was live saying that, Stephen Kokx was airing the interview with +Roy (where he gives more of his opinion on this).
Relevant part starts @31:00
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f5qSqQ93VFM (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f5qSqQ93VFM)
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So what about a synthesis of the two positions?
Also,
What do you think about +Roy saying (paraphrase), "The Church has never waited around for direct Divine intervention to secure a pope."?
If I understand what you mean by the "synthesis," the answer is to look at the arguments used by the Totalist Sedes to undermine the Thesis Sedes. And then look at the reply of the Thesis Sedes to the Totalist Sedes.
A synthesis is not actually possible. One side ignores the valid evidence used by the other side against its position. The evidence each side uses against the other is incontrovertible. Those evidentiary claims are grounded in the first principles of Catholic jurisprudence and the canon law derived from those first principles. By denying those first principles, one negates the foundations of the law itself. Eventually they resort to "epikeia" or "salus animarum."
The totalist proposes a "council" of trad bishops (conclavism) as the solution. Insanity. The Thesis people know that is not consistent with Catholic teaching and provide evidence. The totalist ignores that evidence and says the Thesis ignore the fact that a Pope without formal jurisdiction cannot appoint Cardinals (through material/formal principle misapplication in the juridical context). The Thesis Sede ignores that evidence an adds another layer of sophistry to work around it.
Both are undoubtedly correct in their criticism of the other. To believe these criticisms can just be hand-waved (by either side) is irrational.
The only solution for Sedes would be to look at something like what Billot allows. But that requires a true Pope to be involved in either making the papal election law that the Cardinals follow OR participating in some way with the "ecuмenical council." Sedes have excluded the possibility of both by claiming all Popes since 1958/1963 are heretics and do not have jurisdiction over the Church.
Again, they would be better off just saying, "Hey we don't understand how all of this is going to work out. We just know we can't follow teachings that seem to us to be heretical. We will pray for enlightenment, but until that happens, we stick to the traditional teachings and practices." That would be the humble position to take.
The problem with these faithful traditional Catholics is not their insight that something is wrong in the NuChurch and their solution to the immediate problem of keeping the faith in a time of Crisis. The real problem is that they fancy themselves theologians and develop an ideology called "Sedevacantism," but contradict their own basic propositions on how their "theological" opinions can solve the Crisis.
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Does anyone really think all the traditional Catholic groups could ever agree on or submit to a “pope” chosen by……who?
Remember how well the “Pope Michael” thing worked out!