Some definitions/teaching on Moral Certainty:
Address to the Tribunal of the Holy Roman Rota on Moral Certainty October 1, 1942 Pope Pius XII,
"There is an absolute certainty, in which every possible doubt about the truth of the fact and about the non-existence of the contrary is totally excluded. Such absolutely certainty, however, is not necessary in order to hand down the sentence. In many cases it is not possible for human beings to attain it; to insist on it would be tantamount to requiring something unreasonable of the judge and of the parties: it would mean burdening the administration of justice to an intolerable extent, and would even obstruct its path on an enormous scale."
Vs:
"In contrast to this supreme degree of certainty, common parlance not infrequently calls certain a knowledge which, strictly speaking, does not deserve that designation, but should be described as a greater or lesser probability, because it does not exclude every reasonable doubt and allows a warranted fear of error to exist. This probability or quasi-certainty does not offer a sufficient basis for a judicial sentence about the objective truth of the fact."
Middle road:
"Between absolute certainty and quasi-certainty or probability stands, as though between two extremes, the moral certainty that is usually at stake in the questions submitted to your forum, and to which We intend to refer principally. It is characterized, on the positive side, by the fact that it excludes all warranted or reasonable doubt and, considered thus, is essentially distinct from the abovementioned quasi-certainty; then on the negative side, it allows the absolute possibility of the contrary to exist, and thereby it differs from absolute certainty. The certainty about which We are speaking now is necessary and sufficient in order to pronounce a sentence, even if in the particular case it would be possible to obtain an absolute certainty directly or indirectly. Only in this way can there be a regular and orderly administration of justice, which proceeds without useless delays and without an excessive burden on the tribunal no less than on the parties.
Sometimes moral certainty is attained only from a quantity of circuмstantial evidence [indizi] and proofs [prove] which, taken singly, are unable to establish a true certainty, and only in combination allow no reasonable doubt to arise for a man with sound judgment. In this way one by no means passes from probability to certainty by a simple addition of probabilities; that would involve an illegitimate transition from one species to another essentially different one; eis állo génos metábasis; 4 this is, rather, the recognition that the simultaneous presence of all these individual pieces of evidence and proofs can have a sufficient foundation only on the existence of a common source or basis from which they are derived: that is, on the objective truth and reality. Certainty therefore proceeds in this case from the wise application of an absolutely sure and universally valid principle, which is to say, the principle of sufficient reason. Therefore if, in the reasoning for his sentence, the judge states that the proofs adduced when considered separately cannot be called sufficient yet when taken together and encompassed by a single glance offer the elements necessary in order to arrive at a sure, definitive judgment, it must be acknowledged that this argument as a matter of principle is just and legitimate.
At any rate, this certainty must be understood as objective certainty, that is, based on objective grounds, not as a purely subjective certainty that is based on feeling or on the merely subjective opinion of one person or another, perhaps also on personal credulity, thoughtlessness, or inexperience. Such an objectively founded moral certainty does not exist if there are reasons for the reality of the contrary which a sound, serious, and competent judgment declares to be worthy of attention, at least in some way, and which consequently mean that the contrary must be described as not only absolutely possible, but even, in some way, probable."
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“Moral certitude is that with which judgments are formed concerning human character and conduct; for the laws of human nature are not quite universal, but subject to occasional exceptions.”
- Catholic Encyclopedia (1913)
Moral certainty—and this is the type of certainty to be considered here
—is divided as follows :
a) it is said to be perfect (strict) when it excludes
prudent doubt, and imperfect (wide) when some slight reasons militate
against the truth of a decision which is founded on serious motives.
b) Moral certainty is speculative when the intellect considers the truth
of some matter in an objective manner without any direct reference
to a practical case ; it is practical when it is concerned with an act to be
done here and now.
C) Direct moral certainty is based on intrinsic principles which clearly
reveal the moral character of the act ; indirect moral certainty is derived
from what are called reflex principles, which we shall discuss later.
CHAPTER VI. VARIOUS MORAL SYSTEMS
150. DEFINITION. A moral system is a method of arriving at moral certainty
from a state of practical doubt. There are seven such systems :—
1. Riconism, or Absolute Tutiorism, maintains that the safer course
must always be followed even though the opinion in favour of liberty
is most probable. This was the opinion of Joannes Sinnichius, Doctor
of Louvain (d. 1666) and of the Jansenists. The system was condemned
by Alexander VIII who censured the following proposition on Dec. 7,
1690: “It is not lawful to follow even the most probable of probable
opinions.”
151. 2. Moderate TUTIORISM teaches that the less safe opinion which
favours liberty can be followed provided that it is most probable. This
was the system proposed by certain doctors at Louvain (Steyart, Opstraet)
and by other authors, v.g., Henry of St. Ignatius, Gerdil. Although
this system has not been condemned by the Church, nowadays it is
rightly rejected by everyone as too severe and impossible to follow in
practice.
152. 3. PROBABILIORISM asserts that one may follow the opinion that
favours liberty so long as it is clearly more probable than the opinion
in favour of the law. Before the days of Medina this system was the
one most commonly taught but today it finds few supporters owing
to its great practical difficulties.
153. 4. EQUIPROBABILISM is summed up in the following statement :
“ when there are conflicting opinions which are equally or almost equally
probable, it is lawful to follow the opinion in favour of liberty when the
doubt relates to the existence of law, but if the doubt concerns the
cessation of law, the law continues to bind.” (cf. Aertneys C.SS.R.) To
some extent this system resembles the previous system of Probabiliorism,
in so far as it maintains that it is permissible to follow the opinion in
favour of liberty when it is certainly more probable, but he must follow
the opinion in favour of the law if this is certainly more probable. The
principal exponent of this system is St. Alphonsus who was preceded
by Eusebius Amort, Rassler and others; all Redemptorists and many
others follow the same view.
154. PROBABILISM maintains that in cases of doubt relating
to the lawfulness of acts and not to their validity it is always lawful to
follow the opinion in favour of liberty if the opinion is certainly probable,
even though the opinion in favour of the law is much more probable.
There are various kinds of probability.
1) Probability is either intrinsic or extrinsic. Probability is said to be
intrinsic when it is founded on reasons taken from the nature of the matter
to prove its truth; it is extrinsic when based on the authority of learned
men. An opinion is considered to be extrinsically probable when there
are five or six noteworthy authorities in its favour or at least one out-
standing doctor like St. Thomas or St. Alphonsus.
2) An opinion may be either certainly, or doubtfully, or slightly probable,
according as the opinion rests on solid and firm arguments, or on doubtful
or slight arguments.
3) Probability is absolute when the arguments in favour of an opinion
considered by themselves, viz., independently of any opposing arguments,
appear to be valid; probability is relative if the arguments in favour
of an opinion retain their value only when compared with the arguments
supporting the contrary opinion. The first theologian to lend his support
to this theory was Bartholomew Medina, O.P., who has been followed
by an almost innumerable number of theologians down to the present day.
155. 6. LAX PROBABILISM or Laxism taught that it is lawful to follow
an opinion that is not only certainly probable—as Probabilism maintains
—but even when the opinion is doubtfully or slightly probable. This
was the teaching of Thomas Tamburinus, Caramuel, Bauny, Moya
and others. Nowadays this theory has ceased to exist and seems to
have been condemned by Innocent [X in proscribing thisthird proposition:
“ Generally, in doing anything that is supported by intrinsic or extrinsic
probability no matter how slight, provided it does not cease to be probable,
we are acting prudently.”
156. 7. COMPENSATIONISM Or THE SYSTEM OF SUFFICIENT CAUSE maintains
that one may follow a certainly probable opinionin favour of liberty while
abandoning a more probable opinion in favour of the law, but when
there is danger of sin there is required a sufficient reason (compensa-
tion) for acting in favour of liberty. If this sufficient reason is lacking,
one must follow the more probable opinion. This opinion is held
by Potton, Manier, Laloux and other more recent authors.
PRACTICAL Conctusion. Apart from Rigorism and Laxism each of
the above systems is tolerated by the Church, and in consequence the
confessor is not entitled to force his own system on the penitent or to
demand something from his penitent to which the latter is not
obliged according to the principles of one or other of the systems.
Therefore the confessor may prudently advise the safer and more
probable opinion, but he is not justified in imposing such on the penitent.
In practice let him choose those opinions which, taking everything into
consideration, promise to be the more beneficial for the spiritual welfare
of his penitent.
- Prummer:Handbook of Moral Theology
So, all NON-R&R, please refrain from answering, as it would skew the poll.
We already know YOU have moral certitude Leo is not Pope (for whatever reason).