http://sedevacantist.com/viewtopic.php?f=11&t=1401&sid=829eafa4c3a825bd57d6aeaec534c45bTHE DUBLIN REVIEW, VOL. 83, JULY, 1878
ART. IX, THE ASSENT DUE TO CERTAIN PAPAL UTTERANCES
(to read with italics and other original formatting:
http://books.google.com/books?id=JiSG2K0-Tm4C&dq=franzelin%20infallible%20security&pg=PA155#v=onepage&q=franzelin%20infallible%20security&f=false------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ART. IX.—THE ASSENT DUE TO CERTAIN PAPAL UTTERANCES.
1. Cardinal Franxelin, De Divina Traditione et De Habitudine Itationis
Humana ad Divinam Fidem. Ronue, MDCCCLXXV.
2. Dommico Berti, II Processo Originate di Galileo Galilei, pubblicato per
la Prima Volta. Roma. 1875.
3. Revue des Deux Mondes. Octobre, 1876.
4. Le P. Eugene Desjardins, Encore GaliUe. Paris. 1877.
THE author of the "Confessions of a Revolutionist" says that it is wonderful how we ever stumble on theology "in all our political questions. Donoso Cortes,* who has justly
*Essays, &c., chap. i.
been called one of the most profound thinkers of the nineteenth century, is astonished at these remarkable words, and observes on them, that there is nothing here to cause surprise but the surprise of M. Proudhon; for, he finally adds, theology, inasmuch as it is the science of God, is the ocean which contains and embraces all sciences, as God is the ocean which contains and embraces all things. The same author* ably points out how, even as the knowledge of the laws which control Governments, and of the laws which control human societies, is the possession of political and of social truth; so the knowledge of God comprises the knowledge of all these laws; and as the knowledge of God consists in knowing, by hearing and believing, what He affirms of Himself, and as theology is the science that has these affirmations for its object, it follows that "every affirmation relative to society or to Government, supposes an affirmation relative to God; or, what comes to the same, that every political and social, is necessarily converted into a theological, truth." It is, therefore, clear that a true understanding of historical facts, of those especially which involve in their importance weighty social and political questions, presupposes a true understanding of the doctrines, of the theological truths, with which they were at variance, or with which they harmonized. Principles, "unchangeable and eternal" as the first principle from which they flow, are the criteria by which men and men's acts, as they appear in public life and on the broad page of history should be judged, and then condemned or approved. By ignoring altogether the fundamental doctrinal tenets by which the Supreme Ruler means to have the world ruled, according to the dispensation which He has graciously established, or by completely losing sight, or completely making abstraction, in a most unpardonable manner, of theological teachings, writers without number have pored over the annals of the past, have written copiously of the characters, worthy and unworthy, who figure prominently on the dead record, have commented abundantly on the deeds which they did, and on the events to which they led the way; but, as the great De Maistre+ so energetically says, although they have but too well shown that they knew how to write, they have also proved that they certainly never knew how to read.
With writers of this kind we have constantly to deal. Indeed a Catholic Review, which has to cope with them, cannot but feel indebted to them for many and able contributions, of which they have not been the authors, but to which they gave occasion, and which they oftentimes strongly called forth.
* Essays, &c., chap. i. + Du Pape, livre II. chap. x
In order to meet difficulties, real or imaginary, at the outset, and to stem the evil in its source, it is invariably necessary to remind such enemies of truth and friends of falsehood, of undeniable, saving principles, which they either ignore or spurn; to show forth such principles in all their harmony, in their unity and variety, in the full noonday of their truthful lustre, and strenuously to vindicate them against direct or indirect attacks. Widely different, indeed, must necessarily be the judgments formed on men and things, according to the different or opposite standards by which they are judged, and according to the various levels from which they are contemplated; but there is only one standard by which they can ever be fairly and duly appreciated,—that of unswerving principle, only one level from which they can be so viewed as to be seen in their true colours, —that of elevated, unbending truth.
We propose, then, in the present article, to give the teaching of Catholic theology on the assent due to certain papal utterances, which are not strictly infallible, because not ex cathedra; and, in showing forth this doctrine, we intend following, as a worthy and sure guide, his Eminence Cardinal Franzelin, the prince of living theologians, who, whilst filling with ability unsurpassed the chair of dogmatic theology in the Gregorian University of Rome, enriched the treasury of the queen of sciences with works which tell how admirably he laid hold of the mind of the Church, how he was deeply imbued with the spirit of her divine tradition, and in how masterly a manner he compassed in his vast intellect the teaching of her noble fathers. The elevation of the great professor to the dignity of Cardinal is itself a manifest proof of how the Holy See appreciated his valuable services, and if, indeed, we needed it, would be a strong and more than sufficient recommendation of his authority as a Roman Catholic divine. It is now more than two years since, after following the same leader through the teaching of tradition on Papal Infallibility, we announced our intention of treating the present question. It is not too late to do so even now. Whilst we follow the path marked out by the Jesuit Cardinal, we shall compress or develop his expositions and arguments with full freedom, and shall not be afraid of digressing, and of drawing from other sources tributaries to his purpose and ours.
A sketch of the other works mentioned at the heading of this article will serve as an admirable illustration of the special point of doctrine with which we deal. The publication of the original docuмents connected with Galileo's process has called forth champions from the two hostile, ever-opposed camps: one to attack the Church's conduct in that case, and to warn her against a repetition of it; the other to justify that conduct, and to demonstrate that it was in full keeping with the Church's office and duty, that it was wise at the time, and would be wise at any time under the circuмstances that then existed. This Review has more .than once considered at length and in detail the whole case of Galileo; but a notice of the works before us will not be a disagreeable recital of what has been so often said, and will be far from irrelevant on the present subject.
Before entering on the question which occupies us, and as a preparation for its due consideration, Cardinal Franzelin lays down the principle that the Holy Apostolic See may prescribe theological opinions, or opinions bearing on theology, as to be followed, or proscribe them as to be avoided; and that, too, not solely with the intention of deciding the truth by a definitive sentence, but even without any such intention, from the need it has and the design it entertains of looking to the security of Catholic doctrine, whether absolutely, or relatively only to particular circuмstances. Now, although in declarations of this sort there is not infallible truth of the doctrine, since the supposition is that there is no intention of definitely deciding such truth, still there is infallible security, both objectively, as regards the teaching so put forth, and subjectively, inasmuch as it is safe for all to embrace it; whereas to refuse to embrace it would not be safe, and would be a violation of the law whereby Christians are bound to be submissive to the teaching authority which has been instituted by God. Nor can it at all be reasonably said that infallible truth and infallible security in doctrinal matters come to one and the same thing, that one cannot exist without the other; for it is plain, as a moment's reflection would suffice to show, that a theory or particular point of doctrine can be infallibly secure without being infallibly true. Opinions, for instance, which are only probable, in a greater or less degree, and not at all quite certain, may be, as they often are, most safe. Absolute certainty is by no means requisite for absolute safety, which a well-grounded moral certitude can frequently insure. Such is the importance of this distinction between the defining sentences of the Sovereign Pontiff speaking ex cathedra and other doctrinal decrees, enjoining, or prohibiting, which emanate from the Holy See,—a distinction to be borne in mind both as regards the speculative truth and the practical application of the pronouncements,—that they who deny it would be forced, says Cardinal Franzelin, to the absurd position of holding that all such decrees, referring in any way to doctrine, are ex cathedra definitions. Ecclesiastical history, the Holy See's usual way of acting, and the Vatican Council's careful explanation of what an ex cathedra definition really is, show how manifestly false this would be.
As we distinguish between ex cathedra definitions and other decisions of the Holy See which are not ex cathedra; as we distinguish between the infallible truth and the infallible security of doctrine; so, in the teaching authority instituted by Christ, we must distinguish between the infallible authority, which, by the aid of the Holy Ghost, infallibly defines truth, and the authority of universal ecclesiastical provision, or of doctrinal provision, which is the same authority as the other, not, however, exercising all its intensity in ultimately defining, but taking measures for the safety of the Church's teachings. The one belongs to the supreme Pontiff alone, and he cannot communicate it, so that if an infallible definition is said to be issued by any sacred Roman congregation, that manner of speaking is inexact; for, whilst a congregation is consulted, performs its duties of labour and research, and gives in the result of its own deliberations, it is only the Pontiff that defines. The authority of universal ecclesiastical provision, on the other hand, may be communicated by the Pope, in a greater or less extent, to certain congregations of Cardinals, not so as to leave it independent of, but keeping it dependent on, his own control. From this it is clear that whilst every ex cathedra definition is, no doubt, a definition of the Holy See, still every decree of the Holy See is not at all an ex cathedra definition; a decree of a pontifical congregation can never be said to be ex cathedra, in the exact and genuine sense of the word.
After these preliminaries, in which we have very closely adhered to Cardinal Franzelin's text (pp. 127-129), and which we deem of much moment, we come to our thesis itself.
It is quite false that the only authority to whose decisions intellectual assent is due is that of God revealing, or that of the Church of God or Roman Pontiff infallibly defining; for even as an assent of properly and immediately divine faith is due to the authority of God revealing; and as an assent of ecclesiastical or mediately divine faith is due to the authority of the church of God or of the Roman Pontiff defining any doctrine as true, though not as revealed;—so there is an intellectual religious assent due to the authority of universal ecclesiastical provision.
Before proceeding to fully prove this thesis, which is upheld by "the weightiest arguments," it is useful, and even necessary, to show its real nature and drift, what it does mean and imply, what it does not mean and does not imply.
The infallible ex cathedra definitions of the Holy See may have for object either truths revealed by God, and defined as such, to which so defined assent of properly and immediately divine faith must be given by all Catholics; or their object may be truths which are not revealed, but which are connected with, and have a close bearing on, those that are: as the former, when defined as revealed, must be believed by immediately divine faith; so the latter, when defined as true, must be believed as such by ecclesiastical or mediately divine faith. By a similar infallible definition, it follows, one doctrine may be condemned as heretical and opposed to the teaching of divine revelation, and another may be condemned, not as heretical or directly antagonistic to revealed truth, but as deserving of some censure, as false, as rash, as scandalous, or the like; and in all cases the doctrine is exactly what the infallible authority declares it ex cathedra to be (pp. 123, 124). Now, our thesis has not to deal with truths ultimately defined as revealed or as true, nor with error solemnly condemned as heretical, rash, or not safe; it has not to deal with ex cathedra decisions of any sort; but it has to deal with decrees or decisions emanating from the Holy See, which are not ex cathedra at all, and which, consequently, are not necessarily of themselves, and do not claim to be, infallibly true. The formal object, that is to say, the authority to which, the reason why, assent is, and should be, given, fixes the species of the act of assent itself, which is of faith immediately or mediately divine, or an intellectual religious one, according as the authority is that of God revealing, that of the Church, or her supreme head, infallibly teaching, or that of sacred authority, not solemnly defining, but looking to the interests of Catholic doctrine.
In an article of this Review on Galileo and the Roman Congregations,* it was remarked how, although the notion that firm interior assent can be due to a fallible judgment has been denounced as extravagant, still nothing is more common in everyday life, nothing deemed less extravagant, and more in conformity with good common sense. Thus, a patient, it was said, gives firm assent to the decisions of an eminent medical doctor, and resolves on following his prescriptions, although, surely, the physician is not infallible. In like manner, it was maintained, "a firm interior assent, ordinarily not accompanied by any doubt whatever, yet not so firm as to be incompatible with the co-existence of doubt," is due to the doctrine of a congregational decree. This we find to be in fullest harmony with what the Cardinal, whose steps we now follow, lays down in his statement of the question before us. So sacred, he says, is the authority, in virtue of the supreme and universal magisterium,
* July, 1871.
that, even when it is not defining ex cathedra a doctrine to be held by the universal Church, but only, without such a definition, prescribing a doctrine to be followed or not followed, obedience is due to it. Our adversaries* he continues, do not deny that this obedience is due, but they restrict it to the omission of external acts, to a respectful silence, to not teaching, writing, or expressing opinions on any doctrine forbidden in this way; and they hold that without an ex cathedra definition submission of the mind cannot be exacted to such a degree that a person should lay aside his opinions, and embrace the opposite with so firm a certitude as to declare adhesion to it on oath. We, however, he adds, maintain that in delivered judgments of this sort, even without an ex cathedra definition, an obedience is exacted, and should be tendered, which includes a submission of the mind; not, to be sure, that the doctrine put forth in such a decree should be looked on, and should be believed, as infallibly true or false, but that it should be deemed infallibly secure. Hence we argue that the intellectual religious assent of which we speak is not "so firm as to be incompatible with the coexistence of doubt," as to the truth or falsehood of a doctrine, although it is " ordinarily not accompanied by any doubt whatever "; still it is, and should be, " so firm as to be incompatible with the co-existence of doubt" as to that doctrine's infallible security, and the insecurity of its contradictory. It is true, then, that "without an ex cathedra definition, submission of the mind" to a doctrine as infallibly true or false, as of faith," cannot be exacted to such a degree, that a person should lay aside his opinions, and embrace the opposite with so firm a certitude as to declare adhesion to it on oath"; yet it is not less true that, without an ex cathedra definition, submission of the mind can be exacted, and even in this extreme degree, to a point of doctrine as infallibly secure, and to the proposition that the contradictory of some given doctrine is infallibly unsafe.
In the same article, the question as to whether this assent is due under pain of sin, whether mortal or venial, was but mentioned in passing, and was, as it formerly bad been, avoided by express design. Cardinal Franzelin, too, leaves this question to the professors of moral theology, and is satisfied with remarking on it, that, by reason of the object, and taking the matter in itself, there can be no sin, immediately or mediately, against faith; that, taking the subject into consideration, there can be no sin without deliberate obstinacy, and that the existence, of sin, as well as its gravity, depends on many circuмstances regarding the object and the subject, which he would not take up singly and go through one after the other (p. 153).
It must be observed, moreover, that there are some decrees issued by the Holy See which enjoin silence, and nothing more; as was the case, for instance, with the decision of Paul V. on the auxilia of divine grace; and there are also private letters, in which certain authors, or schools, or the like, are recommended; of neither of these does the present thesis speak, but of those replies and decrees by which a doctrine is laid down as to be followed or not to be followed, to be taught or not to be taught, to be defended or not to be defended; and we contend that this following or not following, teaching or not teaching, defending or not defending, involves submission of the mind, and leaves no room for dissimulation and hypocrisy.
We shall arrange under three headings the proofs we adduce to uphold our thesis; under the first we shall give general proofs drawn from principles fundamental in theological science; under the second shall come those which are furnished by certain docuмents issued by the Holy See; and under the third, arguments drawn from the teaching of private doctors of name and weight.
I. First of all, then, there is an intellectual religious assent due to pronouncements of the Holy See which do not bear upon them the stamp of infallibility; if the obligation of such assent is in fullest harmony with essential constituent elements of the Christian economy, with the relation between the teaching and the taught, which is the physical essence, so to say, of our religion, and if the lawfulness of refusing such assent would be altogether at variance with, and opposed to, these elements and this relation. Now, that such is the case can very easily be shown. Authority to preach the Word of God on the one hand, and the obligation of hearing and believing it when preached on the other, were the two great essentials of the Christian religion in its foundation and first propagation, and since a thing cannot last if its essentials cease to be such, they are the essentials and constituents of that same religion to the present day, and so shall they be to the end. Our able author, at the beginning of his treatise on Tradition (p. 27) says that authority, a personal authentic magisterium, apostolic preaching, on the one side, and, on the other, a corresponding subjection, obedience, and obligation of receiving from the persons invested with that power the faith which is handed down, and its explanations, are not something external to the Christian religion and economy, are not something added on to it, as it were, by chance in certain changing circuмstances, but they are an internal constituent, and an essential property of the economy instituted by Christ. We do not say, he continues, that the authentic magisterium and the corresponding duty of obedience of faith are essential a priori to any religion; but we do say, that they are essential to the Christian religion according to the very form which Christ impressed on it; for there is here no question of the metaphysical essence of religion in general, but of one of the essential elements, and of the physical essence, as it were, of the Christian religion instituted in this special form by Christ the Incarnate Word. Is it not then in fullest harmony with the unchangeable relation between the authority which has power to bind, and those subject to it, that the persons invested with the authority should meet with a religious submission to their dictates, even when they do not speak in all the fulness of their power, with anathema to crush the unbelieving? And would not lawfulness to refuse the submission called for be altogether at variance with, and opposed to, this essential element of the Christian economy? Surely nobody would say that the duty of filial respect and obedience would be fulfilled by a child who would obey only when the parent would give a rigid command and say: "If you do not obey, I shall disinherit you." Nor would anybody assert that a citizen in any society, in any condition, under any law, is bound to do only what is commanded, and to avoid only what is forbidden under pain of the severest penalties. Filial duty and social duty require much more from the child and from the citizen; and much more right has the more sacred authority set up over the Christian family and vast society of the Church to exact submission ex animo, on the part of its subjects, to the teachings which it inculcates, even when it does not prescribe them with the utmost solemnity. Nothing could be more conformable to the relation between the parent and child, and between the ruling and ruled in the State, than alacrity and heartiness in doing things which are recommended, though not strictly enjoined; and very much opposed to it would be bargaining and measuring the reach of unavoidable subjection; so, too, and a fortiori, nothing more in keeping with the mutual relations between the Church authentically teaching and her children who are taught, than freely to offer the assent we speak of to the decisions which are infallibly safe, if not infallibly true; and entirely injurious and antagonistic to that relation would be the refusal of this assent, the denial that it is due. Therefore we argue the truth of the doctrine we have laid down, because of its harmony and close connection with a doctrine which is beyond all question, as the groundwork of Catholic teaching.
II. Our second argument flows from that just given, and is, it would seem, nothing more than a further development of it. It is drawn from the mind and understanding of the Church, both teaching and taught, which constitutes between the authentic teachers and those instructed by them another relation, which may be fairly regarded as an effect, or as the natural outcome of that which we have just noticed. The Church of God is infallible in its teaching, in its universal preaching, and in its universal belief. A definition ex cathedra is indeed a criterion of infallible truth; but it is not the only one (p. 117). The Apostles, the first heralds of the Gospel and preachers of the Kingdom of Heaven, were all endowed with the extraordinary charisma of infallibility; all who would believe them and would be baptized should be saved, all who would not believe them should be condemned. The successors of the Apostles, taken singly and individually, are not infallible; but the head of that Apostolic succession and of the whole Church is infallible, and so are all the other pastors, collectively, together with him. Now, it is clear, and this seems to us a most powerful argument for the doctrine we lay down, that if the faithful are not bound to give any internal, intellectual, religious assent to any doctrinal utterances that are not strictly infallible, they are free to disregard and slight, and even condemn, at least internally, the ordinary teaching of their pastors — a doctrine the admission of which would be simply monstrous, and would mean the complete overthrow of the order established by the Good Shepherd between the pastors and their flocks, for in the latter it would substitute for the duty of learning the power of teaching and the right of criticising. On this special point the very wording of the thesis, to which the principle here put forward comes as a scholium, is deserving of minute consideration. The thesis is, that the conscience and profession of faith in the whole body of the faithful are always preserved free from error by the Spirit of truth through the authentic magisterium of the Apostolic succession. Therefore, although the duty of learning, and not the power of authentically teaching, belongs both to individuals from among the people and to entire peoples; still the "Catholic mind " of the whole Christian people, and their common belief in a dogma,, ought to be looked upon as one of the criteria of divine tradition (p. 103).
This statement involves two theological truths which arc correlative to one another. The members of the Apostolic succession, the pastors of the people, alone have the right and power of teaching authentically in the Church of God; whilst the duty of learning, the obligation of being taught, is incuмbent on all the other children of that Church. This statement involves, moreover, two other theological truths which are also correlative to one another. The authentic magisterium is the cause, partially, ministerially and outwardly (p. 104), of the
VOL. xxxi. NO. LXI. [New Series.']
infallibility of the Church's universal belief; and this latter, consequently, is, in a corresponding manner, the effect of the former. From these truths we argue that this duty of learning, this obligation of being taught, brings with it the obligation and the duty of entering into and of embracing the "Catholic mind "; and, in like manner, we say, that this second obligation brings with it the duty of giving the assent of which we speak to the decisions which, as we hold, demand and have a right to demand it.
The doctrine of Catholic theology on the duty incuмbent on Catholics of cleaving to the " Catholic mind," of entering into the sentiment of the universal Mother Church, is of the most plain and emphatic kind. The earliest Fathers of the Church, those who, from their nearness to the Apostolic times, are looked on as almost Apostles, lay the greatest stress on it. S.Clement of Rome,* S. Ignatius, f the martyr bishop of Antioch, S. Polycarp,J and Hegisippus, a little later on, unite in asserting that Christ our Lord gave orders to His Apostles to ordain bishops to be their successors in the ministry through a series that should never die out; that union with the bishops, who are to be followed as Christ Himself, is necessary for the avoiding of heresy and the preserving of the true doctrine; and that this is the means by which the tradition received from the beginning is to be held to the end. S. Ignatius of Antioch especially, whose epistles are monumental and of greatest authority in the Church, is solicitous, above all else, about the harmony of consent and of union between flocks and their bishops, as the great means of preserving the one sound doctrine of faith and of remaining true to the divinely-instituted power which governs the Church. His words are so telling, and so much to our present purpose, that we deem it well worth while quoting a few of them:—"I have warned you first of all," he says, "to be unanimous in the mind of God; for Jesus Christ, our inseparable life, is the mind of the Father, as the bishops, who are constituted as such all over the earth, are in the mind of Jesus Christ; whence it behoveth you to be unanimously of the mind and opinions of your bishops. For whomsoever the father of the household seudeth to govern his family, we should receive as him who sendeth him." The bishops, taken individually, are not infallible; they issue no ex cathedra definitions; but they are the links which bind the more remote members to their head; they are authentic teachers in the Church, authentic witnesses of the Church's teaching and belief,
* Clem. Rom. Ep. I. ad Cor. n. 42. +Ad Eph. n. 3-6. +Ep. n. 13.
authentic exponents of her mind; therefore, even in doubtful matters, the presumption is always in their favour; therefore, it behoveth their flocks, it is the duty of their flocks, to be of their mind, that so they may be of the mind of the great Mother Church.
As, then, the congregations of Cardinals, who, under the immediate control and close supervision of the sovereign Pontiff, superintend the teaching of the entire Church, and issue doctrinal decisions with the stamp of the sacred, though not absolutely infallible, authority with which they are invested, are exponents of the Church's mind and witnesses to her tradition, exponents of, and witnesses to, the untarnished Roman tradition in particular, no less, but even more closely, than bishops; and as the faithful are bound to be of the mind of the latter, because of their relations to the Church and to them, so, surely, and a fortiori, are they bound to be of the mind of the former, which they cannot be unless they receive their decisions with religious, mental assent and with docility of will. The ecclesiastical preaching, the rule of understanding, the rule of apostolic truth, and corresponding to them, the conscience of faith, the Catholic understanding, the ecclesiastical mind and feeling, the faith written in the heart, the unwritten wisdom (p. 96)—all this, forcibly taught and expounded by the Church through her fathers and doctors, means all we say, or, if it does not mean that, it is devoid of meaning altogether.
III. Furthermore the sacred authority of a Pontifical congregation which issues congregational decrees is a motive amply sufficient to exact intellectual submission of a religious character; and, consequently, because it is so sufficient a motive, this submission is due to its pronouncements. This third argument follows naturally from those already advanced. The authority of which we treat is, with the sole exception of that which is absolutely infallible, the greatest on earth as regards the matters which come under its supervision and are compassed in its wide-extended sphere; and if, in these matters and within that sphere, it is unable to make those under it enter into its views by mental subjection, and has no right to exact such subjection, assuredly there is no superiority, no eminence in any profession, that can claim weight on the convictions of the inferior and ignorant. "Since the peculiar source of argument and the peculiar and principal reason for which assent is given in theological doctrine is not the intrinsic perception of the truth, but the authority which proposes it, the sacred authority of universal doctrinal provision is, in virtue of its office, a most sufficient motive for which a pious will can and should command the mind to surrender itself to it by a religious or theological consent" (p. 131). This ever living authority not only is a witness of the Church's tradition, of her teaching in all times back to the earliest ages, but is, moreover, invested in a body of men eminent for their abilities and learning, who make it the business of their lives to study and fathom the doctrines which have been handed down to them, and which they have to preserve undefined at the fountainhead, under the living shadow of the hoary rock. It would be more than absurd to say that any Catholic could reasonably and without breach of duty oppose his private judgment or opinion to the judgment of such a body, and should not submit with heart, and soul, and mind to its official utterances. These utterances are not infallibly true, no doubt, though the strong presumption is that they really are true, but they are always infallibly safe; whereas the judgment of the individual cannot pretend to either infallible truth or infallible safety. Which, then, should preponderate? We repeat that this sacred authority is an amply sufficient motive to claim assent, not hypocritical, but genuine and intellectual, from its subjects; and, therefore, this assent on their part is due to its authoritative decisions.
A fresh proof of a general sort, and one that would admit of considerable development, is furnished by the fact that it may happen, and does happen, that doubt may exist in the mind of Catholics, even of the highly educated, as to whether some particular docuмent coming forth from the Holy See is or is not ex cathedra. In the case of such uncertainty no Catholic could venture to think that he is free to accept or not accept, to submit to or not submit to, the doctrine embodied in the declaration of which the authority is questioned. The only safe course would evidently be to subject the intellect as well as the will to all which is taught in this way. Whence it follows that mental subordination should be given to doctrinal pronouncements the absolute infallibility of which is not quite certain. The nature of the assent itself will, of course, be in accordance with the motive for which it is offered.
We now proceed from these general proofs to those which are supplied by particular docuмents issued by the Holy See. We shall see how the Holy See has over and over again exacted intellectual subjection to declarations sent forth from it which were not ex cathedra; and as it would be simply preposterous to suppose that the Holy See has been repeatedly officially doing and claiming what it could not do and had no right to claim—absurd to think that it has been repeatedly going beyond the limits of its power; the one logical and natural conclusion to be drawn from the pronouncements which we are going to consider is, that the assent so often claimed was rightfully claimed and is always due.
I. We shall first call attention to the reply sent by the sacred Roman Congregation of the Inquisition to the question whether seven propositions of Professor Ubaghs relative to ontologism could or could not be safely taught. The demand was an tuto tradi possent? After taking the votes of the consultors, and after maturely weighing each of the propositions, the most eminent members of that congregation returned an answer in the negative, which bears date the 18th September, 1861. "Surely no theologian would say that this declaration of the Sacred Congregation was an ex cathedra definition" (p. 137); nor could any theologian maintain that by this decision silence, and nothing more, was enjoined; for by that decision the doctrine of the seven propositions was declared unsafe. Evidently, then, it would have been but mockery to ask this doctrinal pronouncement, and but mockery for the Sacred Congregation to give it, if it did not carry with it the obligation on the part of Catholics of believing that the teaching in question really was what it was thus declared to be. Wherefore, says our most eminent author, by this reply— "The Sacred Congregation has judged that the doctrine here laid down cannot be safely taught,"—any Catholic theologian will look on the simply and strictly theological question as solved, and will deem all arguments brought forward in opposition as done away with; although assuredly he can find in this response no answer to the philosophical question, why and for what intrinsic reason is the teaching unsafe? The Sacred Congregation meant that the propositions should be believed to be unsafe; as is clear from another docuмent that speaks of a doctrine which should be heartily condemned and rejected, and which, it is said, was plainly like that of the seven propositions. We conclude our argument from this reply; it was not an excathedra definition, still it called for interior submission to what it officially affirmed.
II. We next come to a letter, bearing date the 2nd March, 1866, sent by Cardinal Patrizi, in the name of the Sacred Congregations of the Inquisition and of the Index, to his Eminence the Cardinal Archbishop of Mechlin. The letter refers to the teachings of the same Louvain Professor, and from it we translate this extract:—" The Cardinals have undertaken to examine other teachings contained in more recent editions of the same author's works; and they have clearly seen inculcated in these books teachings like some of the seven propositions which your Eminence will find on an enclosed leaf, and which the supreme Congregation of the Holy Office declared unsafe on the18th of September, 1861; and they have seen too that there are other opinions in the same books which-are put forward without sufficient caution. This is especially the case with regard to the opinion called Traducianism, and with regard to what is said on the principle of life in man, which should by all means be corrected. The most eminent Cardinals, therefore, have come to this decision: that in the books on philosophy already published by G. C. TJbaghs there are found teachings and opinions which cannot be taught without danger. His Holiness Pius IX. has approved and confirmed this decision by his Supreme Authority."
It has been objected that this letter, or the judgment contained in it, is an ex cathedra definition; and for our purpose it is necessary to establish beyond doubt that it is not such, before we construct our argument upon it. This congregational sentence, it is said, is an ex cathedra definition, because the Sovereign Pontiff confirmed it by his supreme authority, and because Cardinal Patrizi is found later on to say that by it the Louvain question was defined. We answer, that in order that any sentence should be an ex cathedra definition it should be issued by the Sovereign Pontiff himself, and in his own name, since, as has been already laid down, he cannot communicate his infallible authority to any dignitary under heaven; this sentence was issued by Cardinal Patrizi in the name of the Congregations of the Inquisition and of the Index, not by the Pope in his own name. The substance of the docuмent is to be found in the words:—" The most eminent Cardinals, therefore, have come to this decision: that in the books on philosophy already published by Q. C. Ubaghs, there are found teachings and opinions which cannot be taught without danger." An ex cathedra definition is never couched in such terms, but is formulated in a widely different manner. If theologians say, as for instance Cardenas, and Lacroix, and Zaccaria, and Bouix do, that doctrinal decrees of the Sacred Congregations, when specially approved by the Pope, arc ex cathedra definitions, this doctrine, in order to be reconciled with that of the Vatican Council, must be understood in its only true sense to mean that, in such a case, such decrees should be so specially approved by the Pope, as to be made by him his own, in such sense that he himself would be the author of any decree so promulgated, and the Congregations' part in it would be nothing more than that of having been consulted. As to what is said, that the Pontiff confirmed the letter by his supreme authority, it must be borne in mind that his authority may be termed supreme cither in the intensity of its exercise, or in its substance—sive intensione exercitii sive in sua substantia,—as the distinction has it; in the former sense, not in the latter, does it imply infallibility, and it is evidently in the latter sense, not in the former, that it is here applied. But, it is urged, Cardinal Patrizi expressly said that the Louvain question was defined by this decree. Yes, to be sure, but he does not say by a definition ex Cathedra. The Cardinal evidently means that the question which had been for years under consideration was at length brought to a close and put an end to by the authority of universal doctrinal provision. The professors most concerned in the matter were perfectly right in believing and saying that this was no ex cathedra definition, although they were very wrong in asserting that it was a disciplinary decision, and not a doctrinal one.
Having shown that Cardinal Patrizi's official letter was not an ex cathedra definition, it remains for us to prove that intellectual submission was due to the substance of it. The doctrines and opinions of the professor are declared unsafe; and are therefore to be thought so, and not to be taught. It is true that some thought that by this utterance silence was enjoined, and nothing more, nothing about the doctrine itself. Soon, however, they were made see their great mistake; for, in August of the same year, Cardinal Patrizi wrote on the subject, in the Holy Father's name, to the Belgian bishops, these words, which are of the utmost weight, for our end :— "It is the duty of Catholics, and much more so of Ecclesiastics, to submit themselves fully, perfectly, and absolutely to the decrees of the Holy See, and to do away with all contentions which would be incompatible with the sincerity of their assent." These are almost the very words of our thesis, and, consequently, proceeding from such a source, prove and confirm it admirably. Furthermore, the professors in question were ordered to sign a formula then given, and "all did sign it with most praiseworthy obedience, in December of the same year." The formula, a very important and imperative one, was as follows:—" In compliance with your orders, I hasten to offer you this written testimony of my filial obedience, and I most humbly entreat you to lay it at the feet of our Most Holy Father, Pope Pius IX. / fully, perfectly, and absolutely submit myself to the decisions of the Apostolic See, issued the 2nd of March and 30th of August of this year, and / agree with them in my convictions. Therefore, / heartily condemn and reject any opposite doctrine." No one who looks carefully and candidly into the matter will come to regard these decisions as ex cathedra definitions; and, nevertheless, it is as clear as the light of day, that full, perfect, and absolute submission was due to them,—a submission of the intellect, no doubt, as the language implies, and as the terms "ex animo acquiesce,” and “ex corde reprobo," expressly state. The learned Louvain professors understood the decisions in their true sense, and, in a most praiseworthy manner, did their duty, by subjecting their strong intellects to them.
III. For our next argument in support of our theological principle, we shall refer to three docuмents, which are much of a similar nature. The Bishop of Strasburg, in accordance with the wishes of Gregory XVI., requested M. Bautain, of Strasburg seminary, to subscribe, and, by so doing, attest his assent, to certain propositions drawn up for him, and M. Bautain did so in 1840. The Sacred Congregation of the Index, with the approval of Pius IX., exacted a similar act of submission, by signature likewise, from the learned Bonnetty, in 1855. Neither of these formally undersigned docuмents is an ex cathedra utterance, or has ever been thought to be one; still,it is certain, and the full account of each case leaves no room for doubt on the matter, that intellectual submission, and not merely respectful silence, was claimed by, and was due to, both one and the other. It would be nothing short of revolting to Catholic feeling to suppose that Messrs. Bautain and Bonnetty, whilst signing their names as they were required, were not bound in conscience to submit their minds to the doctrine to which they subscribed. If they were not, the action of venerable authority in their regard would be nothing more than a glaring encouragement of intolerable hypocrisy, which it is too absurd even to imagine.
The third docuмent which we here notice is a letter which Pius IX. addressed in June, 1857, to Cardinal Geissel, Archbishop of Cologne, concerning a decree of the Sacred Congregation of the Index, which proscribed the works of Antony Giinther. The decree referred to, like so many others, was not an ex cathedra definition, even though issued at the express command and with the confirmation of the Sovereign Pontiff. Still, the letter of Pius IX. asserts that the decree was quite sufficient to oblige all Catholics to believe, not only that the doctrine put forward in these works could not be defended and upheld, but that it could not be considered in itself as being at all a true and tenable doctrine. The language of Pius IX. expresses the very conclusion which we wish to draw, and renders further comment superfluous.
IV. We now come to consider the well-known Munich Brief, a docuмent so telling and conclusive on our subject, that it was the only argument in support of this doctrine that Cardinal Franzelin thought it necessary to bring forward in the first edition of his work on "Tradition." In it we find the following passage:—" We give deserved praise to the men of this Congress, because, rejecting the false distinction between philosophy and the philosopher, of which we have spoken in another letter, they know and have declared that all Catholics in their works are bound in conscience to obey the dogmatical decrees of the Infallible Catholic Church. And whilst we thus praise them for professing a truth which necessarily arises from the obligation of Catholic faith, we wish to believe that they did not intend to limit that obligation, which is altogether binding on Catholic teachers and writers, within the sphere of those matters only which are proposed by the Church's infallible judgment, as dogmata of faith to be believed by all. And we are persuaded likewise that they did not mean to declare that the perfect adhesion towards revealed truths, which they have acknowledged as altogether necessary for achieving true progress in the sciences, and for refuting error, can be obtained, if faith and obedience be given only to the dogmata expressly defined by the Church. For, even if there were question of that subjection which is to be yielded by an act of divine faith, that should not be confined to matters defined by express decrees of (Ecuмenical Councils, or of the Roman Pontiffs and of this Apostolic See, but should also be extended to all that is taught as divinely revealed by the ordinary magisterium of the whole Church spread throughout the world, and which, therefore, is held by the universal and common consent of theologians as belonging to the faith. But since there is question of that subjection whereby all Catholics are bound in conscience, who apply themselves to the speculative sciences, in order that by their writings they may produce fresh benefits for the Church; the men of this Congress should, therefore, acknowledge that it is not enough for educated Catholics to receive and venerate the forementioned dogmata, but that it is also necessary that they submit themselves both to the doctrinal decisions which are issued by the Pontifical congregations and to those points of doctrine which are held by the common and constant consent of Catholics as theological truths and conclusions, so certain that, although the opinions opposed to these same points of doctrine cannot be called heretical, still they deserve some other theological censure."*
It has been asserted that in this Brief there is no question at all about any congregational decisions, except those which are strictly infallible, as being ex cathedra definitions; and although the language of the docuмent on this point is very
* We may refer our readers to a comment on this part of the Munich Brief which appeared in our number for July, 1871, pp. 148-152. That comment issues substantially in the same conclusions with those maintained in the text.
clear indeed, and easily understood, still we must notice the statements which have been made to uphold the strange assertion. The Sovereign Pontiff, it has been said, speaks first of all of revealed dogmata, and when he mentions decisions emanating from Pontifical congregations, he means ex cathedra definitions, to which every Catholic is bound to tender absolute assent,—to the first class of truths under pain of incurring the censure of heresy, to the second class under pain of incurring some censure of a less formidable character. It has been alleged that this is still further shown from the fact that these judgments of Pontifical congregations are mentioned in connection with "those points of doctrine which are held by the common and constant consent of Catholics as theological truths and conclusions, so certain that although the opinions opposed to these same points of doctrine cannot be called heretical, still they deserve some other theological censure "; and on these points it is acknowledged that Suarez and others declare the consenting Church to be infallible. Nay, it is even objected, that what we deem the one clear and natural sense of the letter of Pius IX. to the Archbishop of Munich cannot be the genuine one, because theologians teach that mental assent can be exacted only by an infallible definition; and Cardinal Gotti, in particular, it is said, denies our principle, since he teaches that although congregational decrees should be looked on as of importance, and exact external obedience; still, taken in themselves as issued by the Congregation, they do not furnish the theologian with a firm and reliable proof of the doctrine which they inculcate.
We shall speak of the teaching of theologians, and of Cardinal Gotti in particular, with reference to our subject, in due course; -and here we shall be satisfied with doing away with the other futile objections brought against the substance of the Brief.
We answer first of all, in a general manner, by asking at the outset with Cardinal Pranzelin, Who could ever believe that "decisions which are issued by Pontifical Congregations" should comprise none of those issued by the congregations themselves, and-Sra/y those that are issued by the Sovereign Pontiff, teaching «x cathedra? No doubt congregational decisions are often termed decisions of the Holy See, because it is from the Holy See that the congregations hold their jurisdiction and teaching authority, as its organs and members exercised for universal pastoral and doctrinal provision. No doubt, the decrees too are often called Pontifical, inasmuch as the Pope ratifies and confirms them by his supreme authority. But it is a thing unheardof, and it is altogether at variance with the style of the Curia, that an ex cathedra definition should be designated as a decision issued by a Pontifical congregation.
Not only is this statement stripped of any force by being out of keeping with the custom and language of the Curia; a full consideration and clear understanding of the Brief itself and of its tenour makes it quite untenable. The Brief lays down three distinct classes of decisions that come forth from the Holy See, as we have done, and specifies, as we have done, though not in quite the same language, the nature of the assent due to each respectively. First of all, we see pointed out "the dogmatical decrees of the Infallible Catholic Church," the truths " which are proposed by the Church's infallible judgment as dogmata of faith to be believed by all," "the dogmata expressly defined by the Church." To all such decrees as these "faith and obedience" are due, faith properly and immediately divine to revealed truths, defined as such, and faith mediately divine to other truths, not revealed, but connected with others that are revealed, which are likewise defined by the Church's infallible authority. The members of the Munich Congress acknowledged "that all Catholics are bound in conscience to obey the dogmatical decrees of the Infallible Catholic Church." The Sovereign Pontiff praises them for this declaration ; but supposes that they did not intend to limit the obligation of Catholics to the sphere of such decrees, and expressly asserts that it would not be enough. "For even if there were question of the subjection which is to be yielded by an act of divine faith, that should not be confined to matters defined by express decrees, .... but should be extended to all that is taught as divinely-revealed by the ordinary magisterium of the whole Church." But the present question is not about "the subjection which is to be yielded by an act of divine faith," whether immediately or mediately divine, to the pronountfements to which such an act is due. The real question at issue concerns " that subjection whereby all Catholics are bound in conscience, who apply themselves to the speculative sciences"; and Pius IX. answers the question admirably in this way:—" The men of this Congress should, therefore, acknowledge that it is not enough for educated Catholics to receive and venerate the forementioned dogmata, but that it is also necessary that they submit themselves both to the doctrinal decisions which are issued by the Pontifical Congregations, and to those points of doctrine which are held by the common and constant consent of Catholics as theological truths and conclusions." The " theological truths and conclusions" here spoken of are not truths and conclusions defined as such by the infallible authority, but truths and conclusions which are held as such "by the common and constant consent of Catholics," and which are "so certain, that although the opinions opposed to these points of doctrine cannot be called heretical, still they deservesome other theological censure." Religious assent, consequently, and inn assent of divine faith, is due to these truths and conclusions; and therefore, instead of inferring that the doctrinal decisions mentioned in connection with them are ex cathedra definitions, the logical and truth-seeking mind should naturally be led to a different inference.
We deem it then unquestionable that there is a marked distinction made in the Brief between the congregational decrees of which we speak, and utterances which are ex cathedra, bearing with them the formal sanction of infallible authority; and this being once laid down, it is matter of small difficulty to show how the Brief expressly teaches that intellectual assent is due to these doctrinal decisions. The Sovereign Pontiff teaches that perfect adhesion towards revealed truths cannot be obtained if faith and obedience be given only to the dogmata expressly defined by the Church. Faith and obedience are also due to all that is taught as divinely revealed by the ordinary magisterium of the whole Church; and, to ensure that perfect adhesion to revealed truths, Catholics are bound in conscience to submit themselves to the decisions of Pontifical Congregations, and to other undefined theological truths and conclusions. The end for which the submission is declared necessary, viz., to ensure perfect adhesion to revealed truths, proves that, if the necessary means are to be in keeping with, and in proportion, to the end, the submission to congregational decisions so requisite must be intellectual, since the perfect adhesion to revealed truths, since the act of divine faith, is an intellectual act. Furthermore, the same submission is said to be required for these decisions as for the theological truths and conclusions mentioned in connection with them; and since it is beyond doubt that mental submission should be tendered in the one case, it follows that the assent to be given in the other should be mental likewise. Our adversary says that the Brief does require intellectual subjection to the pronouncements of which it speaks; but as he takes them to be ex cathedra declarations, he should naturally claim for them an intellectual subjection which would involve an act of mediately divine faith, not merely the religious submission of mind which, as is openly stated, all Catholics are bound in conscience to offer to decrees of Sacred Congregations, which are not ex cathedra definitions.
These important docuмents, taken singly or taken collectively, seem to us to establish the doctrine embodied in our thesis in the most decisive manner. It remains for us to consider a third class of arguments drawn from the doctrine of theologians on our subject. To this task we shall apply ourselves in a future article, as space does not permit us to give in the present, as we expressly intended at the outset, the full treatment of this division of the subject, and of the portion which is to come after it. However we shall continue it with interest in the coming number. First, we shall show, as if by a negative proof, that the doctrine of some theologians, such as Suarez, Bellarmine, and Gotti, which has been said to be opposed to our teaching, is fully in harmony with it, and even something more. Then we shall adduce arguments of a really positive character, by showing how the doctrine of our thesis has been held by theologians in general, and especially by Zaccaria, Gregory XVI., and Benedict XIV., who may justly be regarded on the matter as organs of the entire Teaching Church.
Wed Feb 20, 2013 8:22 pm
Profile
Joe Cupertino
Joined: Mon Aug 13, 2012 8:25 pm
Posts: 80
New post Re: Assent Due to Certain Papal Utterances - Dublin Review,
This is part II from The Dublin Review, 1878
(to read with italics and other original formatting:
http://books.google.com/books?id=nf4IAQAAIAAJ&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false)
.......................................................................................................
ART. IX.—THE ASSENT DUE TO CERTAIN PAPAL UTTERANCES.
1. Cardinal Franzelin, De Divina Traditione et De Habitudine Rationis
Humance ad Divinam Fidem. KomEe, MDCCCLXXV.
2. Dmnenieo Berti, II Processo Originate di Galileo Galilei, pubblicato per
la Prima Volta. Eoma. 1875.
3. Revue dei Deux Mondes. Oetobre, 1876.
. Le P. Eugene Desjardins, Encore Galilee. Paris. 1877.
IN the July issue of this Review we laid down, as plainly and as clearly as the subject-matter allowed, the doctrine which we go on to defend in the present article, and, having then adduced arguments from a two-fold source to uphold our important thesis, we shall now, without further preface, resume the subject where we left off, by proceeding at once to the third class of proofs already marked out. "First, we shall show, as if by a negative proof, that the doctrine of some theologians, such as Suarez, Bellarmine, and Gotti, which has been said to be opposed to our teaching, is for the most part fully in harmony with it, and even something more. Then we shall adduce arguments of a really positive character, by showing how the doctrine of our thesis has been held by theologians in general, and especially by Zaccaria, Gregory XVI., and Benedict XIV., who may justly be regarded on the matter as organs of the entire teaching Church.''*
I. The teaching of Suarez has been brought forward as in direct opposition to what we maintain in the thesis under our consideration, and, as Suarez is a host in himself, it is of much importance indeed for us to see whether he stands on our side or is leagued with our adversary. On what grounds has it been alleged that Suarez is opposed to our doctrine on this head, and that, consequently, what he teaches is opposed to the interpretation of the substance of the Munich Brief, which we deem the only obvious, natural, and truthful one? Because he holds that the consent of Catholics in matters of doctrine is an infallible criterion of truth! Whence it has been argued'
* The DUBLIN REVIEW, July, 1878, p. 173.
that intellectual submission is, indeed, due " to those points of doctrine which are held by the common and constant consent of Catholics as theological truths and conclusions," for the plain and simple reason that such submission should be tendered to an infallible authority, which exists in the present case. In like manner it has been contended, if mental consent is to be given “ to the doctrinal decisions which are issued by the Pontifical Congregations," it is only when and because these decisions are decrees which emanate from that authority which rules supreme, and is unquestionably infallible. The bold conclusion is that this, nothing else and no more, was what Suarez meant and what Suarez taught.*
By referring to the great doctor's works, even to that portion of them which is adduced as unfriendly to our purpose,+ we can readily gather what was his meaning, and what his express teaching, nor do we find the least reason for dreading lest our cause may suffer from the research. Concerning the authority of the consent of Catholics in matters of doctrine, or, what is the same, concerning the Church's passive infallibility, her infallibility in believing, — Suarez teaches, first of all, that the Church cannot sin against faith, cannot fall away from the true faith, by heresy. He lays down, in the second place, that in those matters which the Church believes as being certainly of faith she cannot be led astray by any ignorance. Thirdly, what is altogether to our purpose, and fully answers our end,—that in those points of doctrine which the Church does not indeed believe as certainly of faith, but which, nevertheless, hold such a place in her convictions that any opposite opinion would be accounted deserving of some censure —that even in these the presumption is, and it must be held, that the Church is not wrong, although there is no real certainty that in these points she is infallible.t This is what the great theologian who is said to be against us says, and of his very words this is as faithful a translation as we can offer. "I say, in the third place, that although it is not certain that those things which the Church believes as pious and probable are true, still, if the entire Church consents in anything of this sort, it must be held that in this she does not err, not only that she commits no practical, but even that she commits no speculative, error. The reason of the first part of the assertion—
* Card. Franz., De. Div. Trad., p. 141.
+ Suarez, De Fide Disp. v., sect. 6, n. 8.
t It is plain on the very surface that Suarez is not speaking of cases in which the Supreme Pontiff has defined that certain tenets are erroneous or otherwise censurable.
why it is not certain that matters so believed as pious and probable are true—is because it is not agreed on as of certainty that the Church is ruled by the Holy Ghost in all these things, since they do not belong to the faith, and are not necessary for salvation. The reason of the second part of the assertion,— viz., why it must be held that even in these the Church does not err,—is because the entire Church, even when considered only as a human society, in which there are very many wise men, has the greatest authority that exists except the divine. If, therefore, the whole Church judges—by its belief—that anything is probable, it evidently is so, and in this way the danger of practical error is at once done away with, whilst it becomes most likely that it is even true in reality, especially as it is likely that the Holy Ghost gives particular aid and light to the doctors of the Church. If this is admitted with regard to truths of the natural order, as we have said,* how much more should it be believed with reference to the matter of which we now treat? But it must be borne in mind that there are degrees in these things, as can be gathered from what we have to say,+ for although some of them are not so certain that opinions contrary to them would be heretical, still they are sometimes very closely connected with principles of faith, and then opinions contrary to them are erroneous. Sometimes they are sustained by the great consent of the fathers, and then the opposite teaching is rash.
After this quotation it must indeed seem rather astonishing that Suarez should have been put forward as teaching something at variance with what we defend; for surely there is nothing here that is out of keeping with our thesis, nothing that is not completely in harmony with it, and a good deal too which seems to b
Topic: Public Heretics and Loss of Office in the Catholic Church (Read 1560 times)