The use of the three-hour fast is, so far as I and my own understanding are concerned, licit; that said, it should be with the understanding much is profited in observing the greater fast, which was neither abrogated nor proscribed in Christus Dominus.  The precepts of canon law concerning the changes to the rubrics of Holy Week are outlined above; under them, it is perfectly licit to abandon them, and indeed should be imperative because of the harm done to the notion of liturgical stability.

Under the canon law precepts of stability (the law was not intended to be perpetually binding with the allowance of abrogation by another pontiff at a later date) and cessation through harm to discipline (the changes were introduced as the first creeping vines of modernism to that would eventually choke the Holy Sacrifice out of the conciliar structure), the holy week rubrics are no longer in force.

You say it might have been a bad decision.  Maybe.  At first I was thinking that all disciplinary decisions are in themselves good, because if they come from a true Pope, they come from God.  But it might be better to say they are ALLOWED by God, and that some are better than others.  Someone correct me if I'm wrong.  My reasoning is that Cardinal Merry del Val disagreed with Pope St. Pius X lowering the age of first communion.  He even said "You're wrong on this one."  Well, Cardinal Merry del Val and Pius X were a team, so clearly questioning a discipline in itself isn't against the faith.

Assertion 3: The Church's infallibility extends to the general discipline of the Church. This proposition is theologically certain.

By the term “general discipline of the Church” are meant those ecclesiastical laws passed for the universal Church for the direction of Christian worship and Christian living. Note the italicized words: ecclesiastical laws, passed for the universal Church.

The imposing of commands belongs not directly to the teaching office but to the ruling office; disciplinary laws are only indirectly an object of infallibility, i.e., only by reason of the doctrinal decision implicit in them. When the Church's rulers sanction a law, they implicitly make a twofold judgment:

1. “This law squares with the Church's doctrine of faith and morals”; that is, it imposes nothing that is at odds with sound belief and good morals. (15) This amounts to a doctrinal decree.

2. “This law, considering all the circuмstances, is most opportune.” This is a decree of practical judgment.

Although it would he rash to cast aspersions on the timeliness of a law, especially at the very moment when the Church imposes or expressly reaffirms it, still the Church does not claim to he infallible in issuing a decree of practical judgment. For the Church's rulers were never promised the highest degree of prudence for the conduct of affairs. But the Church is infallible in issuing a doctrinal decree as intimated above — and to such an extent that it can never sanction a universal law which would be at odds with faith or morality or would be by its very nature conducive to the injury of souls.

The Church's infallibility in disciplinary matters, when understood in this way, harmonizes beautifully with the mutability of even universal laws. For a law, even though it be thoroughly consonant with revealed truth, can, given a change in circuмstances, become less timely or even useless, so that prudence may dictate its abrogation or modification.

Although it would be rash to cast aspersions on the timeliness of a law, especially at the very moment when the Church imposes or expressly reaffirms it, still the Church does not claim to he infallible in issuing a decree of practical judgment. For the Church's rulers were never promised the highest degree of prudence for the conduct of affairs.

But the Church is infallible in issuing a doctrinal decree as intimated above — and to such an extent that it can never sanction a universal law which would be at odds with faith or morality or would be by its very nature conducive to the injury of souls.

Yet we have had no pontiff since Pius XII or John XXIII, depending on how you look at it.  So who is the Pontiff that abrogated the Bugnini/ Pius XII Holy Week rubrics?  I'm getting a little scared here...

Yes or no -- do you follow someone who calls himself a Pope?

Thanks, SJB.  Are you contradicting me or agreeing with me?  I think what you posted fits with what I was suggesting.

The point is that when an ecclesiastical law is defined as being transitory it is neither requisite, nor perhaps even laudable, to maintain it if doing so harms the discipline or the faithful's understanding of it.

Quote from: SJB

Quote from: JohnGrey

The point is that when an ecclesiastical law is defined as being transitory it is neither requisite, nor perhaps even laudable, to maintain it if doing so harms the discipline or the faithful's understanding of it.

Who defined it as transitory? Did Pius XII?

Naturally.  Pius XII didn't just allow the CLR work without any guidelines or prospectus.  A very lengthy docuмent called the Memoria sulla riforma liturgica was prepared and approved by Pius XII before Bugnini and his cohorts were to begin work on formulating and implementing the actual changes; I incidentally have one of approximately 30 copies ever released outside the Holy See.  In it, it makes clear that the reform of the liturgy would occur in stages, with abrogation of the previous phase when the new one was implemented.  It also instructed that at the end of the reform, a Code of Liturgical Law would be produced that would then formalize the stability of the reform.

The changes to the rubrics of the Breviarium and the Rites of Holy Week were actually one a part of the first phase, and the only ones implemented by Pius XII before his death.  The fact that he promulgated no new breviary or liturgical books, in fact commanded that no changes should be made to existing Breviaries and Missals despite the changes makes it obvious that they were considered experimental and of limited duration.