Cursus Theologicus of John of St. Thomas
Tome 6. Questions 1-7 on Faith. Disputation 8.
~ Article 2 ~
When a pope has been legitimately elected, is it de fide, either per se primo or per se secundo, that this particular person—for instance, Innocent X—is the pope?
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Efficient Cause
(Second Objection)
[Principal Argument/objection] We cannot know with the certainty of faith that these particular electors have a valid intention of electing, nor that they are true and legitimate cardinals, nor that they observed the form of ɛƖɛctıon required by law, such as the requirement that the pope be elected by a two-thirds majority of the cardinals, as well as the other conditions without which the ɛƖɛctıon is null. The faith does not teach us whether these conditions were met; for, when the ɛƖɛctıon of the pope is first made public, there is no guarantee, no way by which the truths of the faith are made known to us, no revelation or tradition that could make the Church certain, when she accepts the man as pope, that all the conditions were met that are required for a valid ɛƖɛctıon; but she relies on the trustworthiness of the electors themselves who are promulgating the ɛƖɛctıon; therefore, the Church never attains to the certitude of faith regarding the man chosen, that he was legitimately elected. (…)
This is because it is not necessary, whenever something of itself pertains to the faith, that all the propositions having a necessary connection with that truth of faith should also be de fide; on the contrary, this is precisely what a theological conclusion is; for theological conclusions are concerned with whatever things have a necessary connection, or logical implication, with de fide truths. For example, from the truth of faith, “Christ is a man,” proceeds the theological conclusion, “Christ is capable of laughter,” because the capacity to laugh is necessarily connected to being a man.
Likewise, because it is de fide that this man in particular, accepted by the Church as canonically elected, is the pope, the theological conclusion is drawn that there were genuine electors, and a real intention of electing, as well as the other requisites, without which the de fide truth could not stand. Therefore, we have the certainty of faith, by a revelation implicitly contained in the Creed and in the promise made to Peter, and made more explicit in the definition of Martin V, and applied and declared in act (in exercitio) by the acceptance of the Church, that this man in particular, canonically elected according to the acceptance of the Church, is pope. The certainty of faith touches this alone; and whatever is prerequisite to, or else follows upon, the fact of the ɛƖɛctıon, is inferred as a theological conclusion drawn from the proposition that is de fide, and is believed mediately. (…)The Church accepts the ɛƖɛctıon and the elect as a matter of faith, because as she receives him as the infallible rule of faith, and as the supreme head to whom she is united—for the unity of the Church depends upon her union with him.
To the objection that there must be someone to propose this truth to the Church as de fide, I respond that the ɛƖɛctıon and the one elected are proposed by the cardinals, not in their own person, but in the person of the Church and by her power—for she it is who committed to them the power of electing the pope and of declaring him to have been elected. Wherefore they, in this respect and for this task, are the Church herself representatively. Thus the cardinals, or whoever else are electors legitimately designated by the Church (that is, by the pope), represent the Church in all that concerns the ɛƖɛctıon of her head, the successor of Peter. Just as the pope gathers the bishops together in a Council, and yet its confirmation and the ultimate sentence in matters of faith depend upon him, so the congregation of cardinals elects the pope, and declares that he has been elected, and yet it is the Church, whose ministers they are, that by its acceptance ultimately confirms as a truth of faith the fact that this man is truly the highest rule of faith and the supreme pontiff. Wherefore, if the cardinals elect him in a questionable manner, the Church can correct their ɛƖɛctıon, as the Council of Constance determined in its 41st session. Hence, the proposition is rendered de fide, as already has been explained, by the acceptance of the Church, and that alone, even before the pope himself defines anything. It is not any acceptance at all of the Church, but the acceptance of the Church in a matter pertaining to the faith, since the pope is accepted as a determinate rule of faith.
Reply to another objection. It was argued above, that none of the conditions necessary for the ɛƖɛctıon are externally visible, but that everything takes place in the company of the electors, on whose testimony the Church accepts the pope. To this I reply that it is not necessary that all those conditions, and the ɛƖɛctıon itself, and the intention of the electors be visible, but only that it be possible for a moral certainty to be had of their [the conditions] accomplishment. This moral certainty comes of seeing the electors gathered together for the act of electing, and peacefully proposing the man who has been elected, and declaring him such. As long as no reasonable doubt presents itself, this [i.e., the peaceful ɛƖɛctıon] already suffices for the Church universally to accept him, and, by this acceptance, to render the truth de fide.
[Note: the “peaceful” aspect of the P&UA, refers to the ɛƖɛctıon; the “universal acceptance” refers to the Church’s acceptance of the man as Pope; the former can render the latter unnecessary for the proposition to be de fide; the latter can supply for a defect in the former].
For it is not necessary, in order for something to be de fide, that all the conditions prerequisite to it be visible. It suffices initially to have a moral certitude of these conditions, which afterwards acquire the certitude of a theological conclusion. (…) prior to the ɛƖɛctıon, we can have only a moral certitude that all the conditions strictly necessary for a legitimate ɛƖɛctıon are being met. Once the ɛƖɛctıon is accepted, however, it becomes a theological conclusion that all the conditionswere met, since they have a necessary connection with, and are of their very nature prerequisite to, this truth of faith. (…) Hence, it is not merely a pious belief, but a theological conclusion (as we have stated), that God will not permit one to be elected and peacefully accepted by the Church who in fact does not meet the conditions required; this would be contrary to the special providence that God exercises over the Church and the assistance that she receives from the Holy Ghost. [This was echoed by what Cardinal Billot wrote
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