No doubt, anyone who reads this thread who is not a long-time consumer of Cathinfo will likely be alarmed and confused at the state of this thread. As a PSA, let me summarize the two arguments that are being pitted against each other. My goal is to clarify and defuse, since things have so immediately descended into strawmen and ad hominens. I am not offering my own argument in its most developed sense so much as I am simply summarizing two competing arguments to the benefit of the reader, I hope:
.
Ladislaus's basic position is that periodic continence is always wrong in practice because it necessarily includes a formal motive of "not intending to conceive" while still pursuing the marital act. This motive, he argues, (and has argued for some time) is contrary to the teachings of Pope Pius XI who taught that in order for marital relations to be lawful, the secondary ends of the act (the allaying of concupiscence, spousal bonding, etc.) must be subordinated to the primary end (procreation). He maintains that the encyclical
Casti Connubii establishes
two distinct principles, the one which condemns contraception, the other which condemns the use of periodic continence. Here is the paragraph on which he bases that view:
.
[Sterile relations are intrinsically lawful because] in matrimony as well as in the use of the matrimonial rights there are also secondary ends, such as mutual aid, the cultivating of mutual love, and the quieting of concupiscence which husband and wife are not forbidden to consider so long as they are subordinated to the primary end and so long as the intrinsic nature of the act is preserved. (§59, Pieran Press Translation)
.
So, sterile relations are lawful so long as the intrinsic nature of the act is preserved (i.e., so long as contraception is not used)
and so long as the ends are properly ordered (i.e., so long as your motive of intending to have children is mentally prioritized over your motive to gain any of the other rewards of marriage). One can see how the text implies a distinction between these two things. Periodic continence does not include a disruption of the intrinsic nature of the act but, by definition, it does mean subordinating the primary end to the secondary ends because when one uses periodic continence one withdraws the intention to procreate. Ergo, it is condemned.
.
My position is different in a subtle but highly significant way. My position is that in order for marital relations to be lawful the intrinsic nature of the act must be preserved,
and that if it is preserved, then the ends are duly ordered. I believe that although the quote Ladislaus uses to support his position does seem to read the way he reads it, it is an inferior translation and it does-- objectively, manifestly, and matter-of-factly-- differ from the preconciliar translation, as we shall see in a minute.
.
I do not believe that
Castii Connubii, in the relevant section, has anything at all to say about motives, intentions, etc.-- it is concerned completely and entirely with the nature of the act itself rather than with the nature of the
and the motives for acting. My position is based in what I believe to be the true meaning of
Casti Connubii based on:
.
1) It's Latin original
2) It's pre-conciliar Denzinger translation
3) The lengthy explanations of it from its drafter, Fr. Arthur Vermeersch.
.
Here is the translation I am using-- it is the preconciliar, Denzinger translation (by DeFarrari). Notice how it differs in a subtle but significant way from what Ladislaus is relying on:
.
[Sterile relations are intrinsically lawful because] in matrimony itself, as in the practice of the conjugal right, secondary ends are also considered, such as mutual aid, the cultivation of mutual love, and the quieting of concupiscence, which spouses are by no means forbidden to attempt, provided the intrinsic nature of that act is preserved, and so its due ordering is towards its primary end. (Casti Connubii §59, Denzinger/Defarrari translation §2241)
.
There is only
one principle being elucidated here: Pius XI says that such relations are lawful because
so long as the intrinsic nature of the act is preserved,
then the ends of the act
are duly ordered toward the primary end. It's basically a conditional:
if the act is preserved,
then the ends are duly ordered. I would maintain this is a more accurate reading anyways, since the theological context is a discussion of intrinsic ends (i.e., those which pertain to the nature of acts) rather than extrinsic ones (which pertain to the
reasons or
motives for which one acts). I think that without the help of an inferior translation, one would never
naturally read this paragraph to be describing motivations, intentions, etc.
.
For context, the Latin that is being translated is
"...dummodo salva semper sit intrinseca illius actus natura ideoque eius ad primarium finem debita ordinatio." (AAS 22, 539). .I would maintain that the Latin does not imply the kind of distinction that might be read in the translation on which Ladislaus is basing his argument. As usual, the traditional translation is the more faithful one. That is my position. But, not being a particularly capable Latinist, I suppose it is possible that I am wrong (although that would also mean the traditional Denzinger translation is wrong, and that we had to wait about sixty years to get an accurate one). However, the man who ghost-wrote Casti Connubii, Pius XI's chief moral theologian Fr. Arthur Vermeersch, understands it in exactly the same way:.As long as the act takes place normally it remains objectively directed toward its primary end, which is generation; and since, according to the maxim that the purpose of the law is not within the matter of the law (finis legis non cadit sub legem), there is no obligation, while observing the law, to intend the end for which it was promulgated, it follows that the act is not necessarily vitiated by deliberately choosing a certain time with the intention of avoiding conception. (What is Marriage? A Catechism arranged According to the Encyclical Casti Connubii, 1932, p. 44, emphasis added)
.
I am satisfied that the combination of the original translation and text, combined with the expert explanations of the man who was closest to the drafting of the docuмent in question, are sufficient evidence to support my position: periodic continence is intrinsically lawful on account of the fact that, since it preserves the intrinsic nature of the marital act, it maintains the due ordering of secondary to primary ends.
If I am wrong, I am not "obviously" wrong, nor can the broad polemic that Ladislaus has initiated against me-- describing me as a public sinner who promotes public sin, etc.-- be maintained without throwing far greater men than I under the bus of public sin, stupidity, malice, etc.
.
The furthest Ladislaus has gotten in responding to my argument that
Casti Connubii doesn't say what he thinks it does is by accusing my position of regarding intentions as irrelevant to morality. For one, I've explicitly admitted on numerous occasions that intentions absolutely do factor into whether an act is moral, and I have explicitly warned against the use of PC for insufficient motives, and offered my own opinion that doing so would likely constitute a grave sin against marriage. So it just isn't accurate to say that my position requires one to jettison the role that motives play in human morality. But there is a second and more important problem. And that is this:
the whole point of dispute is whether or not a withdrawal of the intention to conceive constitutes the undue ordering of ends in the first place. Ladislaus says that it does, and the current status of the question is that I have argued it
doesn't because the encyclical treats the ends as duly ordered so long as the nature of the act is preserved. So in accusing me of ignoring motives, Ladislaus simply begs the question. The exchange between us has been so incommensurate that
if I get a reply, it will likely be an isolated quote (maybe the last sentence even, where I claim he begs the question) followed by a Lutheran-style-polemic that twists my position into a strawman and then makes an
ad absurdum reduction from it. But this really is the state of the question: does
Casti Connubii tell us what Ladislaus says it does? I say it doesn't, and I've given my reasons. Now, Ladislaus is of course "free" to continue maintaining his position, but he is
not free to insist that it is based on Pius XI's teaching. He can keep making the same argument based on his own intrinsic reasoning (which is really all that he's been doing this whole time anyways), but he can't claim support that it's a position supported-- never mind
obviously or
in black and white, as he likes to say-- by
Casti Connubii. He's free to make a different argument too, of course. Though one would hope-- given the emotional currency he has tied up in the present argument-- that he would first acknowledge the present state of the question so that we could have a moment of intellectual catharsis.
#s3gt_translate_tooltip_mini { display: none !important; }