"As regards the
doctrinal value of Decrees of the Holy Office it should be observed that canonists distinguish two kinds of
approbation of an act of an inferior by a superior: first,
approbation in common form (
in forma communi), as it is sometimes called, which does not take from the act its nature and quality as an act of the inferior. Thus, for example, the decrees of a provincial council, although approved by the Congregation of the Council or by the
Holy See, always remain provincial
conciliar decrees. Secondly, specific
approbation (
in forma specifica), which takes from the act approved its character of an act of the inferior and makes it the act of the superior who approves it. This
approbation is understood when, for example, the
pope approves a
Decree of the Holy Office
ex certa scientia, motu proprio, or
plenitudine suâ potestatis. Even when specifically approved by the
pope, decrees of the Holy Office are not
infallible. They call for a
true assent, internal and sincere, but they do not impose an absolute assent, like the dogmatic definitions given by the
pope as
infallible teacher of the Faith. The reason is that, although an act of this congregation, when approved by the
pope specifically, becomes an act of the
sovereign pontiff, that act is not necessarily clothed with the
infallible authority inherent in the
Holy See, since the
pope is free to make the act of an inferior his own without applying his pontifical prerogative to its performance. Similarly, when he acts of his own volition, he may teach ex cathedra or he may teach in a less decisive and solemn way. Examples of specific
approbation of the Decrees of the Holy Office which yet lack the force of ex cathedra definitions are given by Choupin ("Valeur des décisions doctrinales et disciplinaires du Saint-Siège", Paris, 1907, ch. ix, sect. 9). The disciplinary Decrees of the Holy Office have the same force as those of the other congregations, that is, they are binding upon all the faithful if they be formally universal; and they are binding only upon the parties interested if they be merely personal, e.g., judicial sentences, which are law for the parties in the case. If, however, they be personal and at the same time equivalently universal, canonists are not fully agreed as to their force. For a discussion of this point see Choupin, op. cit., ch. iv, sect. 33, and the authors cited by him."
via "newadvent.org"