God wills that man be a being capable of choosing. Man has what is called a “dominating indifference,” which is potential before acting and actual when a choice is made. Every “free” choice a man makes could be other: there is always a pro or con to every choice a man makes: if I overeat I get the additional pleasure overeating provides, but I gain excessive weight and may suffer health consequences, etc.
There are several more distinctions that help clarify the point under consideration.
To begin with,
good is the object of the will, and
truth is the object of the intellect. The two operations of the will are to desire and to chose; the to operations of the intellect are to consider and to judge.
The Practical Good: Now, within man there is a sensitive appetite (the desires of the flesh), and an intellectual appetite (the judgements of reason). Our free will stands midway between the two and has the ability to choose either. For example, our lower nature
desires to eat the cherry pie, while our intellect
judges that we should eat the vegetables. In the end, we
chose (second act of the will) one or the other. This is the battle between the lower nature and higher nature - the flesh and the spirit - that St. Paul speaks of in Romans, chapter 8.
This act of the will pertains directly to choosing a practical
good (I should
do this, and not do that) not to a speculative good, that is, to a truth (I should
believe this, and not believe that).
Antecedent and Consequent Actual Grace: Another distinction is between antecedent actual grace and consequent actual grace. Antecedent grace enlightens the mind to the truth and moves the will to choose the good. If the person chooses in accord with the antecedent grace, consequent actual grace is given to help the person carry out the good.
The Speculative Good, or Truth: Now, just as some acts pertain directly to the practical
good (I should do this and not that), others pertain directly to the the speculative good, or to the
truth (I should believe this and not that). The intellect and will, and the two forms of actual grace, are both involved in this act as well. Let's use an example to illustrate the point
A Moslem hears the Gospel peached. He is given an antecedent actual grace which 1) provides his mind with the light to "see" the truth and 2) moves his will to believe it (belief involves a
choice of the will).
Yet, at the same time, the Moslem thinks to himself, if I accept this truth, I will have to convert to Catholicism, and if I do that, I will be disowned by my family and possibly be put to death. He is left with three possibilities:
1) He can embrace the truth in spite of the consequences, at which point he will be given consequent actual grace to help him carry it out.
2) He can accept the truth interiorly without revealing it publicly ("if he will not confess Me before men, neither will I confess him before My Father"; "he who loves father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me").
3) Or, since the will remains free, he can refuse to
believe the truth.
God never forces the will to choose the good or to believe the truth, but he gives everyone the antecedent actual grace needed to make the right choice.
Thus, even if the good action or choice made by the elect is necessarily caused by God in the sense that it could not be other, it remains a free action because the alternative choice or action is a real possibility that is apparent to the man acting: if God causes me to pray the Rosary on a Sunday afternoon I am aware that I could be watching a football game (and I am also attracted to that option), an alternative act or choice, which is a real possibility or choice;
God would only cause it in the sense of giving the antecedent actual grace that moved the person's will to desire to say the Rosary. But the will nevertheless remains free to cooperate or not. If his desire to watch the football game is greater than his desire to say the Rosary, you can bet that he will choose to say the Rosary after the game, or chose to not say it at all.
But a man’s praying or watching football, even if the action were determined by God, would still be a contingent action because it could be other, as is clear in the nature of the case of their being alternatives that are real and possible.
If God forced the person's will to choose to say the Rosary, and forced him to carry it out, neither the choice nor the act would be free, nor would either be meritorious. God moves us to do what is good and to choose what is true, but he doesn't force either of necessity.
Topic: God's salvific will to save "all men" and the death of unbaptized infants (Read 313202 times)