I'm still confused though. The Catholic Encyclopedia says that the proposition that anyone is predestined to be damned has been condemned. This would surely include Tornpage's resolution of the issue(that God wishes to save all men only in that He created the means by which all men can be saved, and doesn't wish for the salvation of every individual, and therefore not offering salvific grace to all of them). But I can't actually find any condemnation of such. Trent merely condemns the proposition that everyone who isn't predestined for salvation is damned, which would still allow for the unbaptised infant being offered no way to save itself.(https://www.cathinfo.com/baptism-of-desire-and-feeneyism/the-absurdities-of-the-feeneyite-heresy/msg732904/#msg732904)
I'm not sure about anything here, to be honest. What's your own resolution of the issue?
The Absurdities of The Feeneyite Heresy - page 18 - The Feeneyism Ghetto - Catholic Info (cathinfo.com) (https://www.cathinfo.com/baptism-of-desire-and-feeneyism/the-absurdities-of-the-feeneyite-heresy/msg732904/#msg732904)
[3] (http://drbo.org/cgi-bin/d?b=drb&bk=61&ch=2&l=3-#x) For this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour, [4] (http://drbo.org/cgi-bin/d?b=drb&bk=61&ch=2&l=4-#x) Who will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth.(http://drbo.org/chapter/61002.htm)
Douay-Rheims Bible, 1 Timothy Chapter 2 (drbo.org) (http://drbo.org/chapter/61002.htm)
Chap. 3. Omnipotent God wishes all men without exception to be saved (1 Tim. 2:4) although not all will be saved. However, that certain ones are saved, is the gift of the one who saves; that certain ones perish, however, is the deserved punishment of those who perish.
THE DEATH of an unbaptized infant presents Catholic theologians with a poignant problem. The dawn star of Christian culture had hardly risen when men first raised the question, and it has continued to echo through the centuries. There are reasons enough for the persistent reappearance of the difficulty. The fate of an unbaptized child is closely tied to several highly volatile questions: original sin, the necessity of baptism, the salvific will of God. Each of these issues is a vital nerve in the body of Catholic doctrine, and each can be studied with clinical precision in the person of an unbaptized child. The question, then, is not pure pedantry; and if it seems a discouraging one, we have the admonition of St. Gregory of Nyssa: "I venture to assert that it is not right to omit the examination which is within the range of our ability, or to leave the question here raised without making any inquiries or having any ideas about it."
(LIMBO: A THEOLOGICAL EVALUATION by GEORGE J. DYER, 1958)
Article 6. Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?
Objection 1. It seems that the will (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15624a.htm) of God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) is not always fulfilled. For the Apostle (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11567b.htm) says (1 Timothy 2:4 (https://www.newadvent.org/bible/1ti002.htm#verse4)): "God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) will have all men (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09580c.htm) to be saved, and to come to the knowledge (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08673a.htm) of the truth (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15073a.htm)." But this does not happen. Therefore the will (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15624a.htm) of God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) is not always fulfilled.
. . .
Reply to Objection 1. The words of the Apostle (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11567b.htm), "God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) will have all men (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09580c.htm) to be saved," etc. can be understood in three ways.
First, by a restricted application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/02084a.htm) says (De praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) wills all men (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09580c.htm) to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09580c.htm) whom He does not wish saved, but because there is no man (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09580c.htm) saved whose salvation (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/13407a.htm) He does not will."
Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every class of individuals (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07762a.htm), not to every individual (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07762a.htm) of each class; in which case they mean that God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) wills some men of every class and condition (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/04211a.htm) to be saved, males and females, Jews (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08386a.htm) and Gentiles (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06422a.htm), great and small, but not all of every condition (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/04211a.htm).
Thirdly, according to Damascene (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08459b.htm) (De Fide Orth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm); not of the consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent, but to the things willed.
To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06636b.htm), is willed by God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm). A thing taken in its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may be good (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06636b.htm) or evil (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05649a.htm), and yet when some additional circuмstances are taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06636b.htm); and that a man should be killed is evil (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05649a.htm), absolutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or dangerous to society, to kill him is a good (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06636b.htm); that he live is an evil (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05649a.htm). Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills all men (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09580c.htm) to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) antecedently wills all men (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09580c.htm) to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08571c.htm) exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15624a.htm) is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in themselves they exist (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05543b.htm) under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circuмstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) simply wills takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place.
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: The will of God (Prima Pars, Q. 19) (newadvent.org) (https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1019.htm#article6)
(https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1023.htm#article5)
Objection 3. Further, "There is no injustice (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08010c.htm) in God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm)" (Romans 9:14 (https://www.newadvent.org/bible/rom009.htm#verse14)). Now it would seem unjust (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08010c.htm) that unequal things be given to equals. But all men (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09580c.htm) are equal as regards both nature (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10715a.htm) and original sin (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11312a.htm); and inequality in them arises from the merits (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10202b.htm) or demerits of their actions. Therefore God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) does not prepare unequal things for men by predestinating (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12378a.htm) and reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10202b.htm) and demerits.
Reply to Objection 3.The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was said above (Question 22, Article 2). Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying (Romans 9:22-23): "What if God, willing to show His wrath [that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to make His power known, endured [that is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory" and (2 Timothy 2:20): "But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto honor, but some unto dishonor." Yet why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine will. Whence Augustine says (Tract. xxvi. in Joan.): "Why He draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err." Thus too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity of species in things of nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form, and that under another, depends upon the simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part of the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that place. Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted as a debt, and not gratuitously. In things which are given gratuitously, a person can give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he deprives nobody of his due), without any infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house said: "Take what is thine, and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?" (Matthew 20:14-15).
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: Predestination (Prima Pars, Q. 23) (newadvent.org) (https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1023.htm#article5)
Ch 3. Children who die without Baptism
Here it only remains for us to answer the objection which is drawn from children being lost when they die before Baptism, and before they come to the use of reason. If God wills all to be saved, it is objected, how is it that these children perish without any fault of their own, since God gives them no assistance to attain eternal salvation? There are two answers to this objection, the latter more correct than the former, I will state them briefly.
First, it is answered that God, by antecedent will, wishes all to be saved, and therefore has granted universal means for the salvation of all; but these means at times fail of their effect, either by reason of the unwillingness of some persons to avail themselves of them, or because others are unable to make use of them, on account of secondary causes [such as the death of children], whose course God is not bound to change, after having disposed the whole according to the just judgment of His general Providence; all this is collected from what St. Thomas says: Jesus Christ offered His merits for all men, and instituted Baptism for all; but the application of this means of salvation, so far as relates to children who die before the use of reason, is not prevented by the direct will of God, but by a merely permissive will; because as He is the general provider of all things, He is not bound to disturb the general order, to provide for the particular order.
The second answer is, that to perish is not the same as not to be blessed: since eternal happiness is a gift entirely gratuitous; and therefore the want of it is not a punishment. The opinion, therefore, of St. Thomas-----is very just, that children who die in infancy have neither the pain of sense nor the pain of loss; not the pain of sense, he says, "because pain of sense corresponds to conversion to creatures; and in Original Sin there is not conversion to creatures" [as the fault is not our own], "and therefore pain of sense is not due to Original Sin;" because Original Sin does not imply an act. [De Mal. q. 5, a. 2]
Objectors oppose to this the teaching of St. Augustine, who in some places shows that his opinion was that children are condemned even to the pain of sense. But in another place he declares that he was very much confused about this point. These are his words: When I come to the punishment of infants, I find myself [believe me] in great straits; nor can I at all find anything to say." [Epist. 166, E. B.] And in another place he writes, that it may be said that such children receive neither reward nor punishment: "Nor need we fear that it is impossible there should be a middle sentence between reward and punishment; since their life was midway between sin and good works." [De Lib. Ar. 1, 3, c. 23] This was directly affirmed by St. Gregory nαzιanzen: "Children will be sentenced by the just judge neither to the glory of Heaven nor to punishment." St. Gregory of Nyssa was of the same opinion: "The premature death of children shows that they who have thus ceased to live will not be in pain and unhappiness."
And as far as relates to the pain of loss, although these children are excluded from glory, nevertheless St. Thomas, [In 2 Sent. d. 33, q. 2, a. 2] who had reflected most deeply on this point, teaches that no one feels pain for the want of that good of which he is not capable; so that as no man grieves that he cannot fly, or no private person that he is not emperor, so these children feel no pain at being deprived of the glory of which they were never capable; since they could never pretend to it either by the principles of nature, or by their own merits.
St. Thomas adds, in another place, [De Mal. q. 5, a. 3] a further reason, which is, that the supernatural knowledge of glory comes only by means of actual faith, which transcends all natural knowledge; so that children can never feel pain for the privation of that glory, of which they never had a supernatural knowledge.
He further says, in the former passage, that such children will not only not grieve for the loss of eternal happiness, but will, moreover, have pleasure in their natural gifts; and will even in some way enjoy God, so far as is implied in natural knowledge, and in natural love: "Rather will they rejoice in this, that they will participate much in the Divine goodness, and in natural perfections." And he immediately adds, that although they will be separated from God, as regards the union of glory, nevertheless 'they will be united with Him by participation of natural gifts; and so will even be able to rejoice in Him with a natural knowledge and love." [In 2 Sent. d. 33, q. 2, a. 2]
http://www.catholictreasury.info/books/prayer/pr18.php#bk3
Good topic, Decem!
I think it's about providence, not predestination. Like St. Alphonsus says (Reply #3). I think, his first answer is key, although he deems the latter "more correct".
Assuming, I'm not in the state of grace. Even if God wills that I repent my sins, he may allow that I die right now before even having a chance to do so.
How?
He knows by providence in advance whether I will or I won't repent. I case I won't, there is no reason to wait and give me a chance.
Same thing with unbaptized children who die before the age of reason. God knows in advance that in case they'd live on, they'd later reject Him, anyway.
An aside: This puts me on the same foot with unbaptized children. With respect to the question, I am not privileged, just because I'm baptized. The unbaptized at least is in limbo. If I'm cut off, because God knows in advance that I won't make it to heaven anyway, then I'll go to hell, below limbo. And if I live to be 90 or 110, still the same result.
In another of his works, St. Thomas states the case still more clearly: "It cannot be said that certainty of foreknowledge is the only thing superadded to providence by predestination; this is tantamount to saying that God ordains the one predestined to salvation as He does anyone else, but that in the case of the one predestined He knows that he will not fail to be saved. In such a case, to be sure, there would be no difference between the one predestined and the one not predestined as regards the order of cause to effect, but only as regards the foreknowledge of the event. Thus foreknowledge would be the cause of predestination, and predestination would not be because of the choice of the one predestinating, which is contrary to the authority of the Scripture and the sayings of the saints. Hence in addition to the certainty of foreknowledge, there is infallible certainty in this order of predestination as regards the effect. Yet the proximate cause of salvation, namely, the free will, is not necessarily but contingently directed to this end." 9
Garrigou-Lagrange, Rev. Fr. Reginald. Predestination: The Meaning of Predestination in Scripture and the Church (p. 215). TAN Books. Kindle Edition.
The election of the saved being a gratuitous act of God's predestination being a truth of Scripture and the Church's teaching, there is no ground for valid objection to God's conjoined free and gratuitous determination of the how or manner He does it.
But let me comment: if one understands predestination - God's willing and providing - being the infallible cause of - the salvation of His chosen elect, and understands the truism that God determines the means and the ends of everything He "simply" wills (St. Thomas, above), then the difficulties or problems of the "fairness" of God saving only those who are joined to the Catholic Church disappears: if He wills infallibly the salvation of all who are saved (and He does), it is obvious that He would also at the same time determine the how or the way He does it (i.e., do it in the manner He selected or wishes) - via faith in Christ, the Church, or baptism, etc.
One could no more object to His choice of how He saves than one can object to His choice of who is saved. The truth of one being established (God's choice of who is to be saved), their are no logical or legitimate grounds to justify an objection to the how, since both come down to His free determination and choice.
There is simply no distinction between the who and the how of election that legitimatizes an objection to the one rather than the other.
You are on a different footing than an unbaptized child; we'll get to that.
It is true that God foresees the malice and wicked acts of the damned, though He does not cause them. It is different, however, with regard to the predestined elect: God does not simply save them because He foresees their faith or repentance, etc., but is actually and infallibly the cause of it (the elect will be saved not merely because God foresees them exercising faith and making the right choices, but He ensures that they - as opposed to others He merely permits to remain in their sin and disbelief - will and do).
In his great book, Predestination, Father Garrigou-Lagrange quotes St. Thomas: [...]
Decem, you said
You didn't give any further explanation. At least not explicitly.
I agree. But on the other hand, the death of unbaptized infants does not concern the elect and their predestination.
Thomas says "foreknowledge would be the cause of predestination, and predestination would not be because of the choice of the one predestinating" (which can't be the case) if one would say "that certainty of foreknowledge is the only thing superadded to providence by predestination; this is tantamount to saying that God ordains the one predestined to salvation as He does anyone else, but that in the case of the one predestined He knows that he will not fail to be saved."
Now, I argued not about the "predestined to salvation", but about "anyone else". I talked about "unbaptized children who die before the age of reason", who are not "predestined to salvation", but rather classified in the class "anyone else".
You didn't give any further explanation. At least not explicitly.
Yes, indeed. And that's St. Alphonsus' second answer (quoted in your Reply #3), which he deems more correct than his first one. I think, it should answer every and all questions of those who don't understand how Our Lord can "refuse" the beatific vision to unbaptized children who die before the age of reason. As a matter of fact, Our Lord doesn't refuse the beatific vision, in the same way the holiest of the Saints doesn't earn it.
Typically, this doesn't convince contemporaries, though, who think in terms of "human rights" and who don't think of fallen man in terms of "enemy of God". An unbaptized man is an enemy of God, ever since original sin (see Council of Trent, cuм hoc tempore, on justification). Many people imagine a father, who would be considered unjust, if he'd elect his first three sons to inherit all property, and let the rest go disinherited. They factor out the question of original sin, they factor out that the topic is about criminal children, who lost their rights as children, in the first place.
There was a comment on CI, about abortion. The commentator thought that (beside crying to heaven) it's a particularly evil crime, because the aborted child "will be denied the Beatific Vision for eternity". As if a man could cross the plans of God, who ensures that all who are called and chosen will make it to heaven.
I agree. But I don't have much hope that many people will be convinced by learning that not having been baptized before death implies neither having been chosen nor been elect.
John 6:34, 44 and 46
V. 37, 44, and 66. No one can come to me, unless the Father draw him.[1] These verses are commonly expounded of God's elect; who are not only called, but saved, by a particular mercy and providence of God. God is said to draw them to himself by special and effectual graces, yet without any force or necessity, without prejudice to the liberty of their free-will. A man, says S. Aug. is said to be drawn by his pleasures, and by what he loves. Wi.
Haydock, George. Catholic Commentary on the New Testament . Veritatis Splendor Publications. Kindle Edition.
Romans 8: 29-30
Ver. 29. For whom he foreknew, he also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of his Son, in suffering with Christ, in following his doctrine, in imitating his life. This foreknowledge of God, according to S. Augustin,[6] is not merely a foreseeing of what men will do by the assistance and graces of God's ordinary providence, much less a foreseeing of what they will do by their own natural strength, as the Pelagian heretics pretended: but is a foreknowledge including an act of the divine will, and of his love towards his elect servants; (as to know in the Scriptures, when applied to God, is many times the same as to approve and love) God therefore hath foreseen or predestinated, or decreed that these elect, by the help of his special graces, and by the co-operation of their free-will, should be conformable to the image of his Son, that so his Son, even as man, might be the first-born, the chief, and the head of all that shall be saved. Wi. — God hath preordained that all his elect shall be conformable to the image of his Son. We must not here offer to dive into the secrets of God's eternal election: only firmly believe that all our good, in time and eternity, flows originally from God's free goodness; and all our evil from man's free will. Ch. Ver. 30. And whom he predestinated, them he also called to the true faith and to his service, without any deserts in them, nay, when all mankind were guilty of eternal death, by original sin. — And whom he called, them he also justified, by faith, by hope, by a love of him, and a true penance. — And whom he justified, them he also glorified. That is, hath decreed to glorify. Yet not all who have been justified, but only his elect, who are under his special protection, and to whom he grants a perseverance in his grace to the end: so that the call to faith, their sanctification, their final perseverance, and glorification in heaven, are the effects of their free election and predestination. Wi.
Haydock, George. Catholic Commentary on the New Testament . Veritatis Splendor Publications. Kindle Edition.
Romans 9:10. &c
Not yet born. By this example of these twins, and the preference of the younger to the elder, the drift of the apostle is, to shew that God, in his election, mercy, and grace, is not tied to any particular nation, as the Jews imagined, nor to any prerogative of birth, or any foregoing merits. For as, antecedently, to his grace, he sees no merit in any, but finds all involved in sin, in the common mass of condemnation; and all children of wrath; there is no one whom he might not justly leave in that mass; so that whomsoever he delivers from it, he delivers in his mercy: and whomsoever he leaves in it, he leaves in his justice. As when, of two equally criminal, the king is pleased out of pure mercy to pardon one, whilst he suffers justice to take place in the execution of the other. Ch. — Nor had done any good or evil. God was pleased to prefer, and promise his blessings to the younger of them, Jacob, declaring that the elder shall serve the younger; that is, that the seed of the elder should be subject to that of the younger, as it happened afterwards to the Idumeans. And the prophet, Malachy, said of them, I have loved Jacob, but hated Esau, and turned his mountains into a desert, &c. — That the purpose of God, his will, and his decree, (see the foregoing ch. v. 28.) might stand according to election, might be, not according to any works they had done, or that he foresaw they would do, but merely according to his mercy. And though the preference which God gave to Jacob was literally true, as to temporal benefits; yet S. Aug. observes in divers places, that Jacob was a figure of the elect or predestinate, and Esau of the reprobate; and that as Jacob and his posterity was more favoured, purely by the mercy of God, without any merits on their side; so are God's elect, whom he has called, and to whom, according to his eternal purpose, he decreed to give eternal glory, and special graces to bring them thither. Wi.
Haydock, George. Catholic Commentary on the New Testament . Veritatis Splendor Publications. Kindle Edition.
Romans 9:14
Ver. 14. What shall we say, then? Is there injustice with God, when he bestows special favours and benefits on some, and not on others? He answers, by no means. And he justifies almighty God's conduct, v. 22. In the mean time, it is certain that there is no injustice in not giving what another has no right to: and besides all men having sinned, deserved punishment. If then, he shews mercy to some, it is an effect of his goodness and liberality only which they do not deserve. If he leaves others in their sins, they are only punished according to their deserts. His mercy shines upon his elect; and his divine justice is displayed against the wicked and the reprobate, but only according to what they have deserved. Wi.
Haydock, George. Catholic Commentary on the New Testament . Veritatis Splendor Publications. Kindle Edition.
Romans 9:15-16
Ver. 15-16. I will have mercy, &c. Then it is not of him that willeth, &c. By these words he again teaches that God's call and predestination of those whom he has decreed to save, is not upon account of any works or merits in men, but only to be attributed to the mercy and goodness of God. See S. Thom. of Aquin on this chap. lect. iii. See S. Aug. Encher. c. xcviii. Epis. 194. in the new Ed. Ep. 105. ad Sixtum de lib. Arbit. c. xxv. &c. Wi.
Haydock, George. Catholic Commentary on the New Testament . Veritatis Splendor Publications. Kindle Edition.
Romans 9:22-23
Ver. 22-23. And if God, &c. He now gives the reason why God might, without any injustice, have mercy on some, and not on others; grant particular graces and favours to his elect, and not equally to all; because all mankind was become liable to damnation by original sin: the clay that all are made of, is a sinful clay; and as S. Aug. says, was become a lump and mass of damnation. Every one had sinned in Adam. Now, if out of this sinful lump and multitude God, to shew the richness of his glory, and superabundant mercy, hath chosen some as vessels of election, whom he hath decreed to save, and by special graces and favours to make partakers of his heavenly kingdom; and to shew his justice and hatred of sin, hath left others as vessels of his wrath and justice, to be lost in their sins, which for a time he bears patiently with, when they deserved present punishment, who can say that he hath done unjustly? Wi.
Haydock, George. Catholic Commentary on the New Testament . Veritatis Splendor Publications. Kindle Edition.
1 Cor. 4:7
Ver. 7. For who distinguisheth, or hath distinguished thee from another? He speaks particularly to those proud, vain preachers: if thou hast greater talents than another man, who hath given them to thee, or to any one, but God, who is the giver, and the author of every gift and perfection? This is not only true of the gift of preaching, but of all gifts and graces; so that S. Aug. makes use of it in several places against the Pelagians, to shew that it is by grace only, that one man is preferred before another, and not by, or for his own merits. Wi.
Haydock, George. Catholic Commentary on the New Testament . Veritatis Splendor Publications. Kindle Edition.
1 Timothy 2:4
Ver. 4. All men to be saved. They contradict this, and other places of the Scripture, as well as the tradition and doctrine of the Catholic Church, who teach that God willeth only the salvation of the predestinated, of the elect, and as they say, of the first-begotten only: and that he died only for them, and not for all mankind. But if it is the will of God that all and every one be saved, and no one resists, or can frustrate the will of the Almighty, whence comes it that every one is not saved? To understand and reconcile divers places in the holy Scriptures, we must needs distinguish in God a will that is absolute and effectual, accompanied with special graces and assistances, and with the gift of final perseverance, by which, through his pure mercy, he decreed to save the elect, without any prejudice to their free will and liberty; and a will, which by the order of Providence, is conditional, and this not a metaphorical and improper will only, but a true and proper will, by which he hath prepared and offered graces and means to all men, whereby they may work their salvation; and if they are not saved, it is by their own fault, by their not corresponding with the graces offered, it is because they resist the Holy Ghost. Acts vii. 51. If in this we meet with difficulties, which we cannot comprehend, the words of S. Paul, (Rom. ix. 20.) O man, who art thou, who repliest against God? may be sufficient to make us work our salvation with fear and trembling. Wi.
Haydock, George. Catholic Commentary on the New Testament . Veritatis Splendor Publications. Kindle Edition.
John 10:28
Ver. 28. They shall not perish for ever: and no man shall snatch them out of my hand. He speaks of his elect, of those whom he called by a special Providence and mercy, whom he blessed with more than ordinary graces, and with the gift of final perseverance to the end in his grace. Wi.
Haydock, George. Catholic Commentary on the New Testament . Veritatis Splendor Publications. Kindle Edition.
Acts 14:48
Ver. 48. As many as were pre-ordained to eternal life,[3] by the free election, and special mercies, and providence of God. Wi. — Some understand this as if it meant, predisposed by their docility, to receive the word of life. But the Fathers unanimously understand it literally of predestination, which is defined by S. Thomas, serm. i. qu. 23. a. 1. "The disposition of God, by which he prepares, what he will himself perform, according to his infallible foreknowledge." In other words, it is the manner in which God conducts a reasonable creature to its proper destiny, which is eternal life. In this mystery of the Catholic faith, which cannot be clearly explained to human understanding, because it is a mystery, there are nevertheless several points, which we know for certain. 1st. Though it is certain, that this decree of the Almighty is infallible, and must have its effect, yet it is far removed from the blasphemy of Calvinists, who pretend that it destroys free-will, and therefore removes all motives of exertion to good works. 2d. For it is a point of Catholic faith, that this foreknowledge of the Almighty no ways interferes with man's liberty, but leaves him still a perfectly free agent, and therefore responsible for his actions. 3d. It is likewise decreed by the Council of Trent, that no one can certainly know that he is of the number of the predestined, without a special revelation to that effect. These are the most essential points, which it concerns us to know of this doctrine. As to the consequences which may be drawn from these positions, it were better for us to submit our understandings to the obedience of faith, than entangle ourselves in a maze of abstruse errors, far removed from our comprehension. Would that this sober line of conduct were pursued by many moderns, who at present talk and write so much on this subject, and to such little purpose. How excellently well does the great genius of the Latin Church, S. Augustin, say: Melius est dubitare de occultis, quam litigare de occultis! How much wiser and better is it to confess our ignorance on mysteries, than idly to dispute on mysteries! l. viii. de Gen. ad litt. c. 5.
Haydock, George. Catholic Commentary on the New Testament . Veritatis Splendor Publications. Kindle Edition.
This sermon by Bishop Sanborn is a great starting point for a study of the subject of Predestination:
http://traditionalcatholicsermons.org/BishopSanbornSermonArchive/BpSan_Predestination_01-31-99_1533.mp3
This is the one I had in mind, though both are excellent:
http://traditionalcatholicsermons.org/BishopSanbornSermonArchive/BpSan_Predestination_02-12-95_1277.mp3
[...] Catholic Dogma of predestination [...] while God desires the salvation of all men, and gives all men the sufficient grace to save their souls so that everyone has a chance, nevertheless by a resolved decision, he orders some people to everlasting glory [...] while others he permits to fall down through their own fault
[God predestines some] by willing for them the necessary graces to accomplish that end.
I feel that one should not spend too much time thinking about this. It's easy for our puny brains to misunderstand this mystery and can lead to various issues. I believe it was St. Francis des Sales who was tempted to despair over it for some time. It's highly disputed regarding how this works, and we'll likely never solve the question. Even the Church refused to rule on it definitively. Especially scrupulous types should avoid this subject entirely.
Exodus 33:18-19
And he said: shew me thy glory. [19] (http://www.drbo.org/cgi-bin/d?b=drb&bk=2&ch=33&l=19-#x) He answered: I will shew thee all good, and I will proclaim in the name of the Lord before thee: and I will have mercy on whom I will, and I will be merciful to whom it shall please me.
Very good, indeed. The most important aspects explained lucidly and succinctly, using good examples.
At the beginning there is an error, but it's effectively corrected later on:
True is: God gives the sufficient grace to save their souls to all just (not to all men). Correction:
Marion,
Your distinction about sufficient grace gets to the reason why unbaptized infants are mentioned in the topic of this thread: what "sufficient grace" did an infant who died in say Mexico in the 10th century get - beyond the Lord's institution in the general order of the sacrament of baptism, which is available to all men without distinction in the general order (see St. Alphonsus above)?
Am I getting near your point?
DR
Absit enim, ut praedestinatus ad vitam sine Sacramento Mediatoris finire permittatur hanc vitam.augustinus.it (https://www.augustinus.it/latino/contro_giuliano/index2.htm) (see menu: Liber Quintus)
God forbid anyone saying that someone predestined to life should end this life without the Sacrament of the Mediator.
Canon 4: [...] original sin [...] has need of being expiated by the laver of regeneration for the obtaining life everlasting [...]papalencyclicals.net (https://www.papalencyclicals.net/councils/trent/fifth-session.htm)
The issue identified in the subject of this thread was broached by Forlorn in a current thread on baptism of desire. In his last post in that thread, Forlorn wrote:I am no expert on this.
(https://www.cathinfo.com/baptism-of-desire-and-feeneyism/the-absurdities-of-the-feeneyite-heresy/msg732904/#msg732904)
In that post, Forlorn refers to a discussion I pointed him to in another Catholic forum, here:
1 Timothy 2:4 (forumotion.com) (https://catholicforum.forumotion.com/t467-1-timothy-24)
I told Forlorn I'd move the discussion here, and I will begin it with a citation in Denzinger (Deferarri translation, 1954) to the central passage of Scripture with regard to God's will to save "all men," 1 Timothy 2:4, which states:
(http://drbo.org/chapter/61002.htm)
The passage is cited in Denzinger 318, where the Council of Quiersy states:
The only other time the verse is referenced in Denzinger is by the First Vatican Council Council at 1794, where it is cited with reference to the Church's divine mission (see my remarks below), the part of the verse there cited being God's desire that "all men" "come to the knowledge of the truth."
The first thing I want to note regarding 1 Timothy 2:4 is the link between God's desire to save "all men" and His desire that the same group "come to the knowledge of the truth." As the second citation to the verse by the First Vatican Council indicates, the divine mission of the Church to "all men" - which we know is Scripturally framed as Jєω and Gentile, male, female, etc. (see Galatians 3:26-29 etc.) - is being addressed here.
The question which Forlorn raised implicates whether God's desire to save "all men" is broader than merely an indication that His salvation is universal and open to "all men" without racial or any other distinction via the Church - i.e., does it encompass every single soul that has been generated in the womb or thereafter born which dies before baptism, the "only remedy" to men not capable of what Pius XII referred to as the "act of love" that requires rational choice and mature, informed and responsible will (as to the only remedy, see Denzinger 712 (Florence), 791 (Trent))?
The second point I want to make is as to the the language of the Council of Quiersy cited above. Note that the Council, after citing 1 Tim. 2:4, states "that certain ones perish, however, is the deserved punishment of those who perish" (emphasis added).
As Ladislaus pointed out in his response to Forlorn in the above-referenced thread, infants who die without baptism do not "perish" and suffer the damnation and torment of the damned who "deserve" it (Quiersy), but go to Limbo. I believe that is why the doctrine of Limbo, while not defined as de fide dogma, is essential to the truth and consistency of our Catholic faith.
Of course, this prescinds from the point raised by Forlorn, since those infants, while not damned, are indeed not "saved" in heaven.
I will continue with a discussion of St. Thomas's reflections on the meaning of 1 Tim 2:4's reference to God's desire to save "all men" in the Summa Theologica, First Part, Question 19, Article 6.
Of course I open this up for comment and the reflections of others who have studied the Scriptures and the Church's teaching on this issue.
DR
I am no expert on this.Terrible. In My Catholic Faith the same kind of baptism is mentioned as a theory; called Baptism by Illumination. Now we have a fourth baptism!
An old priest I knew who was ordained long before Vat II, discussed this topic with me. He was a trained theologian. Also my uncle, ordained before vat II, had a doctorate in theology and was ordained in Rome, discussed It also.
They believed Limbo was shut when the gates of heaven were opened and is no longer in use.
As for babies who die before they are baptized, they explained that where they go after death depends upon the intent of the parents. If the parents would have baptized the child had they had the chance, then the baby goes to heaven. If the parents would not have baptized the baby, then the child ends up in purgatory.
Terrible. In My Catholic Faith the same kind of baptism is mentioned as a theory; called Baptism by Illumination. Now we have a fourth baptism!Well, it was referred to me as baptism of desire, the desire of the parent. Whatever the parent would have done had the baby lived...
The notion of predestination (https://www.catholic.org/encyclopedia/view.php?id=9593) comprises two essential elements: God's infallible foreknowledge ( prœscientia ), and His immutable decree (https://www.catholic.org/encyclopedia/view.php?id=3710) ( decretum ) of eternal happiness. The theologian who, following in the footsteps of the Pelagians, would limit the Divine activity to the eternal foreknowledge and exclude the Divine will, would at once fall into Deism, which asserts that God, having created all things, leaves man (https://www.catholic.org/encyclopedia/view.php?id=7463) and the universe (https://www.catholic.org/encyclopedia/view.php?id=11816) to their fate (https://www.catholic.org/encyclopedia/view.php?id=4584) and refrains from all active interference. Though the purely natural gifts (https://www.catholic.org/shopping/?category=10) of God, as descent from pious parents, good (https://www.catholic.org/encyclopedia/view.php?id=5257) education, and the providential guidance of man's external career, may also be called effects of predestination, still, strictly speaking, the term implies only those blessings which lie in the supernatural (https://www.catholic.org/encyclopedia/view.php?id=11159) sphere, as sanctifying grace, all actual graces, and among them in particular those which carry with them final perseverance and a happy death. Since in reality only those reach heaven (https://www.catholic.org/encyclopedia/view.php?id=5593) who die in the state of justification (https://www.catholic.org/encyclopedia/view.php?id=6551) or sanctifying grace (https://www.catholic.org/encyclopedia/view.php?id=5305) , all these and only these are numbered among the predestined, strictly so called. From this it follows that we must reckon among them also all children (https://www.catholic.org/shopping/?category=28) who die in baptismal grace, as well as those adults who, after a life (https://www.catholic.org/encyclopedia/view.php?id=7101) stained with sin, are converted on their death-beds. The same is true of the numerous predestined who, though outside the pale of the true Church of Christ, yet depart from this life (https://www.catholic.org/encyclopedia/view.php?id=7101) in the state of grace (https://www.catholic.org/encyclopedia/view.php?id=5305) as catechumens, Protestants in good (https://www.catholic.org/encyclopedia/view.php?id=5257) faith, schismatics, Jєωs, Mahommedans, and pagans. Those fortunate Catholics who at the close of a long life (https://www.catholic.org/encyclopedia/view.php?id=7101) are still clothed in their baptismal innocence, or who after many relapses into mortal sin (https://www.catholic.org/encyclopedia/view.php?id=10849) persevere till the end, are not indeed predestined more firmly, but are more signally favoured than the last-named categories of persons.
Predestination - Encyclopedia Volume - Catholic Encyclopedia - Catholic Online (https://www.catholic.org/encyclopedia/view.php?id=9593)
The notion of predestination (https://www.catholic.org/encyclopedia/view.php?id=9593) comprises two essential elements: God's infallible foreknowledge ( prœscientia ), and His immutable decree (https://www.catholic.org/encyclopedia/view.php?id=3710) ( decretum ) of eternal happiness . . .
Though the purely natural gifts (https://www.catholic.org/shopping/?category=10) of God, as descent from pious parents, good (https://www.catholic.org/encyclopedia/view.php?id=5257) education, and the providential guidance of man's external career, may also be called effects of predestination, still, strictly speaking, the term implies only those blessings which lie in the supernatural (https://www.catholic.org/encyclopedia/view.php?id=11159) sphere, as sanctifying grace, all actual graces, and among them in particular those which carry with them final perseverance and a happy death.
St. Augustine, A Treatise on the Predestination of the Saints, Book IIChapter 18.—But Why Should One Be Punished More Than Another?
“But if,” it is said, “it was necessary that, although all were not condemned, He should still show what was due to all, and so He should commend His grace more freely to the vessels of mercy; why in the same case will He punish me more than another, or deliver him more than me?” I say not this. If you ask wherefore; because I confess that I can find no answer to make. And if you further ask why is this, it is because in this matter, even as His anger is righteous and as His mercy is great, so His judgments are unsearchable.
Augustine, Saint. The Complete Works of St. Augustine: Cross-linked to the Bible and with in-line footnotes (p. 9452). Kindle Edition.
Pope Innocent III (Denzinger 410)
But through the sacrament of baptism the guilt of one made red by the blood of Christ is remitted, and to the kingdom of heaven one also arrives, whose gate the blood of Christ has mercifully opened for His faithful. For God forbid that all children of whom daily so great a multitude die, would perish, but that also for these the merciful God who wishes no one to perish has procured some remedy unto salvation. . . . As to what opponents say, (namely), that faith or love or other virtues are not infused in children, inasmuch as they do not consent, is absolutely not granted by most. . . . some asserting that by the power of baptism guilt indeed is remitted to little ones but grace is not conferred; and some indeed saying both that sin is forgiven and that virtues are infused in them as they hold virtues as a possession not as a function, until they arrive at adult age. . . . We say that a distinction must be made, that sin is twofold: namely, original and actual: original, which is contracted without consent; and actual which is committed with consent. Original, therefore, which is committed without consent, is remitted without consent through the power of the sacrament; but actual, which is contracted with consent, is not mitigated in the slightest without consent. . . . The punishment of original sin is deprivation of the vision of God, but the punishment of actual sin is the torments of everlasting hell. . . .
https://sensusfidelium.us/the-sources-of-catholic-dogma-the-denzinger/innocent-iii-1198-1216-the-effect-of-baptism-and-the-character/ (https://sensusfidelium.us/the-sources-of-catholic-dogma-the-denzinger/innocent-iii-1198-1216-the-effect-of-baptism-and-the-character/)
Those who insist that God's choice is determined in some way by man (man's faith, man's action) place the "mystery" of salvation in the wrong place:
This call is necessary, because our heart would not turn itself to God, unless God himself drew us to him: no one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him (John 6:44); turn us to thyself, O Lord, that we may be turned (Lam 5:21). Furthermore, this call is efficacious in the predestined, because they assent to the call: everyone who has heard and learned from the Father comes to me (John 6:45).https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~Rom.C8.L6.n707
And the free choice of God of how a man is saved - by being baptized and persevering in the Catholic faith - is no more "unjust" than His free determination of which man to save.
Hope, faith, and love are (first) infused when a man receives the sacrament of baptism. Man is not able to have the (supernatural) faith and do God pleasing deeds, without sanctifying grace. So I agree, God doesn't predestine based on these. But, what about man's freely willed decision to cooperate with grace? What about the voto mentioned by the Council of Trent. God foreknows the will, the voto.
There is no merit involved, since all merit comes from the blood of Christ, and is communicated (Trent) to the candidates.
I can't understand, why predestination should be that mysterious. God has revealed who will be saved:
We know that to them that love God, all things work together unto good (Rom 8:28)
For whom he foreknew, he also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of his Son (Rom 8:29)
he who endures to the end will be saved (Matt 24:13)
St. Thomas Aquinas avoids to consider the role of the of the free will, although he mentions it without further consideration:
https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~Rom.C8.L6.n707
Thomas mentions the way in which "God's choice is determined in some way by man" (DecemRationis). God would prefer to predestine all men, since he wills to do so. But he is limited by man, since the predestined have to freely assent to the call (excepting exceptions). God cannot predestine someone who doesn't want to assent (or who later backs down).
I don't understand why St. Thomas doesn't infer that God's foreknowledge of this assent of the predestined is key to solve the "mystery" of predestination.
Your point ...
... is not concerned. Since even a less mysterious predestination doesn't invalidate it.
Article 8. Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?
Objection 1. It seems that the will (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15624a.htm) of God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) imposes necessity (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm) on the things willed. For Augustine (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/02084a.htm) says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved, except whom God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm) be."
Objection 2. Further, every cause (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03459a.htm) that cannot be hindered, produces its effect necessarily (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm), because, as the Philosopher (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/01713a.htm) says (Phys. ii, 84) "Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder it." But the will (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15624a.htm) of God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) cannot be hindered. For the Apostle (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11567b.htm) says (Romans 9:19 (https://www.newadvent.org/bible/rom009.htm#verse19)): "Who resisteth His will (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15624a.htm)?" Therefore the will (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15624a.htm) of God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) imposes necessity (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm) on the things willed.
Objection 3. Further, whatever is necessary (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm) by its antecedent cause (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03459a.htm) is necessary (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm) absolutely; it is thus necessary (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm) that animals should die, being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/04470a.htm) by God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) are related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03459a.htm), whereby they have necessity (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm). For the conditional statement is true (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15073a.htm) that if God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) wills a thing, it comes to pass; and every true (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15073a.htm) conditional statement is necessary (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm). It follows therefore that all that God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) wills is necessary (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm) absolutely.
On the contrary, All good (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06636b.htm) things that exist (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05543b.htm) God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) wills to be. If therefore His will (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15624a.htm) imposes necessity (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm) on things willed, it follows that all good (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06636b.htm) happens of necessity (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm); and thus there is an end of free will (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06259a.htm), counsel, and all other such things.
I answer that, The divine will imposes necessity (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm) on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to intermediate causes (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03459a.htm), holding that what God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) produces by necessary (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm) causes (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03459a.htm) is necessary (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm); and what He produces by contingent causes (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03459a.htm) contingent (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/04331a.htm). This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons.
First, because the effect of a first cause (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03459a.htm) is contingent on account of the secondary cause (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03459a.htm), from the fact that the effect of the first cause (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03459a.htm) is hindered by deficiency in the second cause (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03459a.htm), as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03459a.htm) can hinder God's (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) will from producing its effect.
Secondly, because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm) is to be referred only to secondary causes (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03459a.htm), this must be independent of the divine intention (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08069b.htm) and will; which is inadmissible. It is better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03459a.htm) is efficacious to act, the effect follows upon the cause (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03459a.htm), not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/01096c.htm) points, that belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine will (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15624a.htm) is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, which God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) wills some things to be done necessarily (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm), some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15183a.htm). Therefore to some effects He has attached necessary (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm) causes (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03459a.htm), that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03459a.htm), from which arise contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03459a.htm) are contingent that the effects willed by God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) happen contingently, but because God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) prepared contingent causes (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03459a.htm) for them, it being His will (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15624a.htm) that they should happen contingently.
Reply to Objection 1. By the words of Augustine (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/02084a.htm) we must understand a necessity (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm) in things willed by God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) that is not absolute, but conditional. For the conditional statement that if God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) wills a thing it must necessarily (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm) be, is necessarily (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm) true (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15073a.htm).
Reply to Objection 2. From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm) or contingently according to His will (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15624a.htm).
Reply to Objection 3. Consequents have necessity (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm) from their antecedents according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the divine will have that kind of necessity (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm) that God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) wills them to have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute necessities.
https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1019.htm#article8
Article 4. Whether the will is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God?
Objection 1. It would seem that the will (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15624a.htm) is moved of necessity (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm) by God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm). For every agent that cannot be resisted moves of necessity (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm). But God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) cannot be resisted, because His power is infinite (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08004a.htm); wherefore it is written (Romans 9:19 (https://www.newadvent.org/bible/rom009.htm#verse19)): "Who resisteth His will (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15624a.htm)?" Therefore God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) moves the will (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15624a.htm) of necessity (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm).
Objection 2. Further, the will (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15624a.htm) is moved of necessity (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm) to whatever it wills naturally (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10715a.htm), as stated above (Article 2, Reply to Objection 3 (https://www.newadvent.org/summa/2010.htm#article2)). But "whatever God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) does in a thing is natural (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10715a.htm) to it," as Augustine (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/02084a.htm) says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3). Therefore the will (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15624a.htm) wills of necessity (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm) everything to which God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) moves it.
Objection 3. Further, a thing is possible, if nothing impossible follows from its being supposed. But something impossible follows from the supposition that the will (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15624a.htm) does not will that to which God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) moves it: because in that case God's (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) operation would be ineffectual. Therefore it is not possible for the will (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15624a.htm) not to will that to which God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) moves it. Therefore it wills it of necessity (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm).
On the contrary, It is written (Sirach 15:14 (https://www.newadvent.org/bible/sir015.htm#verse14)): "God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) made man (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09580c.htm) from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel." Therefore He does not of necessity (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm) move man's (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09580c.htm) will.
I answer that, As Dionysius (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05013a.htm) says (Div. Nom. iv) "it belongs to Divine providence (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12510a.htm), not to destroy but to preserve the nature (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10715a.htm) of things." Wherefore it moves all things in accordance with their conditions (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/04211a.htm); so that from necessary (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm) causes (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03459a.htm) through the Divine motion, effects follow of necessity (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm); but from contingent causes (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03459a.htm), effects follow contingently. Since, therefore, the will (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15624a.htm) is an active principle, not determinate to one thing, but having an indifferent relation to many things, God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) so moves it, that He does not determine it of necessity (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm) to one thing, but its movement remains contingent and not necessary (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm), except in those things to which it is moved naturally (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10715a.htm).
Reply to Objection 1. The Divine will extends not only to the doing of something by the thing which He moves, but also to its being done in a way which is fitting to the nature (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10715a.htm) of that thing. And therefore it would be more repugnant to the Divine motion, for the will (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15624a.htm) to be moved of necessity (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm), which is not fitting to its nature (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10715a.htm); than for it to be moved freely, which is becoming to its nature (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10715a.htm).
Reply to Objection 2. That is natural (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10715a.htm) to a thing, which God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) so works in it that it may be natural (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10715a.htm) to it: for thus is something becoming to a thing, according as God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) wishes it to be becoming. Now He does not wish that whatever He works in things should be natural (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10715a.htm) to them, for instance, that the dead should rise again. But this He does wish to be natural (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10715a.htm) to each thing—that it be subject to the Divine power.
Reply to Objection 3. If God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) moves the will (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15624a.htm) to anything, it is incompatible with this supposition, that the will (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15624a.htm) be not moved thereto. But it is not impossible simply. Consequently it does not follow that the will (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15624a.htm) is moved by God (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608a.htm) necessarily (https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10733a.htm).
https://www.newadvent.org/summa/2010.htm
In virtue of the fundamental principle that the faculties, habits, and acts are specified by their object, in the definition of free will we must consider its specifying object, and say with the Thomists that liberty is the dominating indifference of the will with regard to good proposed to it by the reason as not in every respect good. The essence of liberty consists in the dominating indifference of the will with regard to every object proposed by the reason as at the moment good in one aspect, and not good in another, according to the formula of St. Thomas: "If the will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it will not tend to this of necessity."16 There is then indifference in willing or not willing this object, a potential indifference in the faculty and an actual indifference in the free act which is not necessarily inclined toward it. Even when, in fact, the will actually wills this object, when it is already determined to will this, it is still inclined freely toward this with a dominating indifference that is no longer potential but actual. In like manner, the divine liberty that is already determined maintains us in existence. Liberty therefore arises from the infinite disproportion prevailing between the will that is specified by universal good, and a particular good which is good in one aspect, not good or insufficient in another. The Thomists also say in opposition to Suarez, that not even by His absolute power can God move our will of necessity to will a certain object, the indifference of judgment remaining as it is, so long as we judge the object to be good in one aspect and not so in another. The reason is that it implies a contradiction for the will to will of necessity the object proposed to it by the intellect as indifferent or as absolutely out of proportion to its scope.17
Garrigou-Lagrange, Rev. Fr. Reginald. Predestination: The Meaning of Predestination in Scripture and the Church (p. 321). TAN Books. Kindle Edition.
God wills that man be a being capable of choosing. Man has what is called a “dominating indifference,” which is potential before acting and actual when a choice is made. Every “free” choice a man makes could be other: there is always a pro or con to every choice a man makes: if I overeat I get the additional pleasure overeating provides, but I gain excessive weight and may suffer health consequences, etc.
Thus, even if the good action or choice made by the elect is necessarily caused by God in the sense that it could not be other, it remains a free action because the alternative choice or action is a real possibility that is apparent to the man acting: if God causes me to pray the Rosary on a Sunday afternoon I am aware that I could be watching a football game (and I am also attracted to that option), an alternative act or choice, which is a real possibility or choice;
But a man’s praying or watching football, even if the action were determined by God, would still be a contingent action because it could be other, as is clear in the nature of the case of their being alternatives that are real and possible.
There are several more distinctions that help clarify the point under consideration.
To begin with, good is the object of the will, and truth is the object of the intellect. The two operations of the will are to desire and to chose; the to operations of the intellect are to consider and to judge.
The Practical Good: Now, within man there is a sensitive appetite (the desires of the flesh), and an intellectual appetite (the judgements of reason). Our free will stands midway between the two and has the ability to choose either. For example, our lower nature desires to eat the cherry pie, while our intellect judges that we should eat the vegetables. In the end, we chose (second act of the will) one or the other. This is the battle between the lower nature and higher nature - the flesh and the spirit - that St. Paul speaks of in Romans, chapter 8.
This act of the will pertains directly to choosing a practical good (I should do this, and not do that) not to a speculative good, that is, to a truth (I should believe this, and not believe that).
Antecedent and Consequent Actual Grace: Another distinction is between antecedent actual grace and consequent actual grace. Antecedent grace enlightens the mind to the truth and moves the will to choose the good. If the person chooses in accord with the antecedent grace, consequent actual grace is given to help the person carry out the good.
The Speculative Good, or Truth: Now, just as some acts pertain directly to the practical good (I should do this and not that), others pertain directly to the the speculative good, or to the truth (I should believe this and not that). The intellect and will, and the two forms of actual grace, are both involved in this act as well. Let's use an example to illustrate the point
A Moslem hears the Gospel peached. He is given an antecedent actual grace which 1) provides his mind with the light to "see" the truth and 2) moves his will to believe it (belief involves a choice of the will).
Yet, at the same time, the Moslem thinks to himself, if I accept this truth, I will have to convert to Catholicism, and if I do that, I will be disowned by my family and possibly be put to death. He is left with three possibilities:
1) He can embrace the truth in spite of the consequences, at which point he will be given consequent actual grace to help him carry it out.
2) He can accept the truth interiorly without revealing it publicly ("if he will not confess Me before men, neither will I confess him before My Father"; "he who loves father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me").
3) Or, since the will remains free, he can refuse to believe the truth.
God never forces the will to choose the good or to believe the truth, but he gives everyone the antecedent actual grace needed to make the right choice.
God would only cause it in the sense of giving the antecedent actual grace that moved the person's will to desire to say the Rosary. But the will nevertheless remains free to cooperate or not. If his desire to watch the football game is greater than his desire to say the Rosary, you can bet that he will choose to say the Rosary after the game, or chose to not say it at all.
If God forced the person's will to choose to say the Rosary, and forced him to carry it out, neither the choice nor the act would be free, nor would either be meritorious. God moves us to do what is good and to choose what is true, but he doesn't force either of necessity.
If God forced the person's will to choose to say the Rosary, and forced him to carry it out, neither the choice nor the act would be free, nor would either be meritorious. God moves us to do what is good and to choose what is true, but he doesn't force either of necessity.
By a truly efficacious grace is meant one that will be (is) infallibly followed by the act to which it tends, e.g. contrition. If you receive such a grace, even before your will consents to it, that grace is infallibly “sure of success;” it will infallibly procure your consent, produce that act – of contrition.
Garrigou-Lagrange, Rev. Fr. Reginald. Predestination: The Meaning of Predestination in Scripture and the Church (p. 321). TAN Books. Kindle Edition.
On https://libgen.is/ (current alias domains are libgen.rs, libgen.is, libgen.st) I found a collection of works of Garrigou-Lagrange, more than 7000 pages, including "Predestination".
Type "Garrigou-Lagrange" (without quotes).
Select "Search in Fields ... Author(s)"
Search!
The list of results has one entry: "Reverend Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange Collection"
https://libgen.is/search.php?req=Garrigou-Lagrange&lg_topic=libgen&open=0&view=simple&res=25&phrase=1&column=title
Click on one of the Mirrors [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] (at the right side of the entry) for the download-page.
To download, click the GET-Link, on top of the page.
It's an ePub-File of ~7MB.
I used https://www.freeconvert.com/epub-to-pdf, to create a searchable ~36MB PDF.
On https://libgen.is/ (current alias domains are libgen.rs, libgen.is, libgen.st) I found a collection of works of Garrigou-Lagrange, more than 7000 pages, including "Predestination".
Type "Garrigou-Lagrange" (without quotes).
Select "Search in Fields ... Author(s)"
Search!
The list of results has one entry: "Reverend Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange Collection"
https://libgen.is/search.php?req=Garrigou-Lagrange&lg_topic=libgen&open=0&view=simple&res=25&phrase=1&column=title
Click on one of the Mirrors [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] (at the right side of the entry) for the download-page.
To download, click the GET-Link, on top of the page.
It's an ePub-File of ~7MB.
I used https://www.freeconvert.com/epub-to-pdf, to create a searchable ~36MB PDF.
There are several more distinctions that help clarify the point under consideration.
To begin with, good is the object of the will, and truth is the object of the intellect. The two operations of the will are to desire and to chose; the to operations of the intellect are to consider and to judge.
The Practical Good: Now, within man there is a sensitive appetite (the desires of the flesh), and an intellectual appetite (the judgements of reason). Our free will stands midway between the two and has the ability to choose either. For example, our lower nature desires to eat the cherry pie, while our intellect judges that we should eat the vegetables. In the end, we chose (second act of the will) one or the other. This is the battle between the lower nature and higher nature - the flesh and the spirit - that St. Paul speaks of in Romans, chapter 8.
This act of the will pertains directly to choosing a practical good (I should do this, and not do that) not to a speculative good, that is, to a truth (I should believe this, and not believe that).
Antecedent and Consequent Actual Grace: Another distinction is between antecedent actual grace and consequent actual grace. Antecedent grace enlightens the mind to the truth and moves the will to choose the good. If the person chooses in accord with the antecedent grace, consequent actual grace is given to help the person carry out the good.
The Speculative Good, or Truth: Now, just as some acts pertain directly to the practical good (I should do this and not that), others pertain directly to the the speculative good, or to the truth (I should believe this and not that). The intellect and will, and the two forms of actual grace, are both involved in this act as well. Let's use an example to illustrate the point
A Moslem hears the Gospel peached. He is given an antecedent actual grace which 1) provides his mind with the light to "see" the truth and 2) moves his will to believe it (belief involves a choice of the will).
Yet, at the same time, the Moslem thinks to himself, if I accept this truth, I will have to convert to Catholicism, and if I do that, I will be disowned by my family and possibly be put to death. He is left with three possibilities:
1) He can embrace the truth in spite of the consequences, at which point he will be given consequent actual grace to help him carry it out.
2) He can accept the truth interiorly without revealing it publicly ("if he will not confess Me before men, neither will I confess him before My Father"; "he who loves father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me").
3) Or, since the will remains free, he can refuse to believe the truth.
God never forces the will to choose the good or to believe the truth, but he gives everyone the antecedent actual grace needed to make the right choice.
God would only cause it in the sense of giving the antecedent actual grace that moved the person's will to desire to say the Rosary. But the will nevertheless remains free to cooperate or not. If his desire to watch the football game is greater than his desire to say the Rosary, you can bet that he will choose to say the Rosary after the game, or chose to not say it at all.
If God forced the person's will to choose to say the Rosary, and forced him to carry it out, neither the choice nor the act would be free, nor would either be meritorious. God moves us to do what is good and to choose what is true, but he doesn't force either of necessity.
St. Augustine, A Treatise on the Predestination of the Saints, Book IIChapter 21 - Instances of the Unsearchable Judgments of God.
Therefore, of two infants, equally bound by original sin, why the one is taken and the other left; and of two wicked men of already mature years, why this one should be so called as to follow Him that calleth, while that one is either not called at all, or is not called in such a manner,—the judgments of God are unsearchable. But of two pious men, why to the one should be given perseverance unto the end, and to the other it should not be given, God’s judgments are even more unsearchable. Yet to believers it ought to be a most certain fact that the former is of the predestinated, the latter is not. “For if they had been of us,” says one of the predestinated, who had drunk this secret from the breast of the Lord, “certainly they would have continued with us.”( 1 John ii. 19 . ) What, I ask, is the meaning of, “They were not of us; for if they had been of us, they would certainly have continued with us”? Were not both created by God—both born of Adam—both made from the earth, and given from Him who said, “I have created all breath,”( Isa. lvii. 16 [see LXX.] ) souls of one and the same nature? Lastly, had not both been called, and followed Him that called them? and had not both become, from wicked men, justified men, and both been renewed by the laver of regeneration? But if he were to hear this who beyond all doubt knew what he was saying, he might answer and say: These things are true. In respect of all these things, they were of us. Nevertheless, in respect of a certain other distinction, they were not of us, for if they had been of us, they certainly would have continued with us. What then is this distinction? God’s books lie open, let us not turn away our view; the divine Scripture cries aloud, let us give it a hearing. They were not of them, because they had not been “called according to the purpose;” they had not been chosen in Christ before the foundation of the world; they had not gained a lot in Him; they had not been predestinated according to His purpose who worketh all things. For if they had been this, they would have been of them, and without doubt they would have continued with them.
Augustine, Saint. The Complete Works of St. Augustine: Cross-linked to the Bible and with in-line footnotes (pp. 9456-9457). Kindle Edition.
But, what about man's freely willed decision to cooperate with grace? What about the voto mentioned by the Council of Trent. God foreknows the will, the voto.
. . .
God would prefer to predestine all men, since he wills to do so. But he is limited by man, since the predestined have to freely assent to the call (excepting exceptions). God cannot predestine someone who doesn't want to assent (or who later backs down).
I don't understand why St. Thomas doesn't infer that God's foreknowledge of this assent of the predestined is key to solve the "mystery" of predestination.
St. Augustine, A Treatise on the Predestination of the Saints, Book IIChapter 23.—Why for the People of Tyre and Sidon, Who Would Have Believed, the Miracles Were Not Done Which Were Done in Other Places Which Did Not Believe.
. . . But can we say that even the Tyrians and Sidonians would have refused to believe such mighty works done among them, or would not have believed them if they had been done, when the Lord Himself bears witness to them that they would have repented with great humility if those signs of divine power had been done among them? And yet in the day of judgment they will be punished; although with a less punishment than those cities which would not believe the mighty works done in them. For the Lord goes on to say, “Nevertheless, I say unto you, it shall be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon in the day of judgment than for you.”( Matt. xi. 22 . ) Therefore the former shall be punished with greater severity, the latter with less; but yet they shall be punished. Again, if the dead are judged even in respect of deeds which they would have done if they had lived, assuredly since these would have been believers if the gospel had been preached to them with so great miracles, they certainly ought not to be punished; but they will be punished. It is therefore false that the dead are judged in respect also of those things which they would have done if the gospel had reached them when they were alive. And if this is false, there is no ground for saying, concerning infants who perish because they die without baptism, that this happens in their case deservedly, because God foreknew that if they should live and the gospel should be preached to them, they would hear it with unbelief. It remains, therefore, that they are kept bound by original sin alone, and for this alone they go into condemnation; and we see that in others in the same case this is not remitted, except by the gratuitous grace of God in regeneration; and that, by His secret yet righteous judgment—because there is no unrighteousness with God—that some, who even after baptism will perish by evil living, are yet kept in this life until they perish, who would not have perished if bodily death had forestalled their lapse into sin, and so come to their help. Because no dead man is judged by the good or evil things which he would have done if he had not died, otherwise the Tyrians and Sidonians would not have suffered the penalties according to what they did; but rather according to those things that they would have done, if those evangelical mighty works had been done in them, they would have obtained salvation by great repentance, and by the faith of Christ.
Augustine, Saint. The Complete Works of St. Augustine: Cross-linked to the Bible and with in-line footnotes (pp. 9460-9461). Kindle Edition.
Mind you, I'm not saying you're wrong, or St. Augustine necessarily right. I'm offering it for your consideration.
Finally, the Thomists retort by saying that it is the scientia media which destroys liberty; for it supposes that God previous to any divine decree sees infallibly what a particular man freely would choose if placed in certain circuмstances.
[...]
We saw that St. Thomas had already formulated it as clearly as possible, when he said: “It seems that the will is moved of necessity by God. For every agent that cannot be resisted moves of necessity. But God cannot be resisted, because His power is infinite; wherefore it is written: Who resisteth His will? (Rom. 9: 19.) Therefore God moves the will of necessity.” We know that St. Thomas replied to this by saying: “The divine will extends not only to the doing of something by the thing which He moves, but also to its being done in a way which is fitting to the nature of that thing. And therefore it would be more repugnant to the divine motion, for the will to be moved of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature, than for it to be moved freely, which is becoming to its nature.” From this reply, what remains of the major of this objection: Every agent that cannot be resisted, moves of necessity? St. Thomas distinguishes as follows: If this agent causes the movement, without causing the being to move freely, I deny the major; if it causes the being to move and to move freely, then I concede the major. Thus man under the influence of efficacious grace remains free, although he never resists it; for it causes in him and with him even that he act freely; it actualizes his liberty in the order of good, and if he no longer is in a state of potential or passive indifference, he still has an actual and active indifference, a dominating indifference with regard to the particular good which he chooses. This good is incapable of invincibly attracting him like the vision of God face to face. He is inclined freely toward this good, God actualizing this free movement; and since its free mode still is being, it is included in the adequate object of divine omnipotence. Such is manifestly the doctrine of St. Thomas. The texts just quoted clearly prove this to be the case.
Thanks a lot, Decem! Given your comments, especially Reply #30, and Garrigou Lagrange's Predestination (first two and a half pages of Part III, Chapter VIII THE DIVINE MOTION AND THE FREEDOM OF OUR SALUTARY ACTS), I've come to understand the point of the Thomists/Augustinians.
Whether the predestined are chosen by God? [*"Eligantur."]Objection 1: It seems that the predestined are not chosen by God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1) that as the corporeal sun sends his rays upon all without selection, so does God His goodness. But the goodness of God is communicated to some in an especial manner through a participation of grace and glory. Therefore God without any selection communicates His grace and glory; and this belongs to predestination.
Objection 2: Further, election is of things that exist. But predestination from all eternity is also of things which do not exist. Therefore, some are predestined without election.
Objection 3: Further, election implies some discrimination. Now God "wills all men to be saved" (1 Tim. 2:4). Therefore, predestination which ordains men towards eternal salvation, is without election.
On the contrary, It is said (Eph. 1:4): "He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world."
I answer that, Predestination presupposes election in the order of reason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that predestination, as stated above (A[1]), is a part of providence. Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering of some things towards an end; as was proved above (Q[22], A[2]). But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end already exists. Whence the predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that God wills their salvation; and to this belong both election and love:---love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of eternal salvation; since to love is to wish well to anyone, as stated above (Q[20], AA[2],3):---election, inasmuch as He wills this good to some in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as stated above (A[3]). Election and love, however, are differently ordered in God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not cause good, but we are incited to love by the good which already exists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election in us precedes love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination. Whence all the predestinate are objects of election and love.
Reply to Objection 1: If the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered, God communicates His goodness without election; inasmuch as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness, as we said above (Q[6], A[4]). But if we consider the communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it without election; since He gives certain goods to some men, which He does not give to others. Thus in the conferring of grace and glory election is implied.
Reply to Objection 2: When the will of the person choosing is incited to make a choice by the good already pre-existing in the object chosen, the choice must needs be of those things which already exist, as happens in our choice. In God it is otherwise; as was said above (Q[20], A[2]). Thus, as Augustine says (De Verb. Ap. Serm. 11): "Those are chosen by God, who do not exist; yet He does not err in His choice."
Reply to Objection 3: God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will, which is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His consequent will, which is to will simply.
Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica - Enhanced Version . Christian Classics Ethereal Library. Kindle Edition.
St. Augustine, A Treatise on the Predestination of the Saints, Book IIChapter 33.—God Gives Both Initiatory and Persevering Grace According to His Own Will.
From all which it is shown with sufficient clearness that the grace of God, which both begins a man’s faith and which enables it to persevere unto the end, is not given according to our merits, but is given according to His own most secret and at the same time most righteous, wise, and beneficent will; since those whom He predestinated, them He also called,( Rom viii. 30 . ) with that calling of which it is said, “The gifts and calling of God are without repentance.”( Rom. xi. 29 . ) To which calling there is no man that can be said by men with any certainty of affirmation to belong, until he has departed from this world; but in this life of man, which is a state of trial upon the earth,( Job vii. 1 . ) he who seems to stand must take heed lest he fall.( 1 Cor. x. 12 . ) Since (as I have already said before)[ 584 ] those who will not persevere are, by the most foreseeing will of God, mingled with those who will persevere, for the reason that we may learn not to mind high things, but to consent to the lowly, and may “work out our own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God that worketh in us both to will and to do for His good pleasure.”( Phil. ii. 12, 13 . ) We therefore will, but God worketh in us to will also. We therefore work, but God worketh in us to work also for His good pleasure. This is profitable for us both to believe and to say,—this is pious, this is true, that our confession be lowly and submissive, and that all should be given to God. Thinking, we believe; thinking, we speak; thinking, we do whatever we do;( 2 Cor. iii. 5 . ) but, in respect of what concerns the way of piety and the true worship of God, we are not sufficient to think anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God.[ 585 ] For “our heart and our thoughts are not in our own power;” whence the same Ambrose who says this says also: “But who is so blessed as in his heart always to rise upwards? And how can this be done without divine help? Assuredly, by no means. Finally,” he says, “the same Scripture affirms above, ‘Blessed is the man whose help is of Thee; O Lord,( Ps. lxxxiv. 5 [LXX.] ) ascent is in his heart.’”[ 586 ] Assuredly, Ambrose was not only enabled to say this by reading in the holy writings, but as of such a man is to be without doubt believed, he felt it also in his own heart. Therefore, as is said in the sacraments of believers, that we should lift up our hearts to the Lord, is God’s gift; for which gift they to whom this is said are admonished by the priest after this word to give thanks to our Lord God Himself; and they answer that it is “meet and right so to do.” [ 587 ] For, since our heart is not in our own power, but is lifted up by the divine help, so that it ascends and takes cognizance of those things which are above,( Col. iii. 1 . ) where Christ is sitting at the right hand of God, and, not those things that are upon the earth, to whom are thanks to be given for so great a gift as this unless to our Lord God who doeth this,—who in so great kindness has chosen us by delivering us from the abyss of this world, and has predestinated us before the foundation of the world?
Augustine, Saint. The Complete Works of St. Augustine: Cross-linked to the Bible and with in-line footnotes (pp. 9478-9479). Kindle Edition.
Pope Pius XI, Studiorum Ducem
19. The other branch of Theology, which is concerned with the interpretation of dogmas, also found in St. Thomas by far the richest of all commentators; for nobody ever more profoundly penetrated or expounded with greater subtlety all the august mysteries, as, for example, the intimate life of God, the obscurity of eternal predestination, the supernatural government of the world, the faculty granted to rational creatures of attaining their end, the redemption of the human race achieved by Jesus Christ and continued by the Church and the sacraments, both of which the Angelic Doctor describes as “relics, so to speak, of the divine Incarnation.”
https://www.papalencyclicals.net/pius11/p11studi.htm
I maintain that the Thomist position on predestination best reflects the teaching of Scripture and the Magisterium, and will attempt to demonstrate the same throughout this book.
Salza, John. The Mystery of Predestination: According to Scripture, the Church and St. Thomas Aquinas (p. 5). TAN Books. Kindle Edition.
". . . there would have been no reason for introducing this unwonted and unhelpful change, if the translators had not been intending to get rid of even the slightest hint of the Catholic doctrine of predestination, and to insinuate the idea of universal salvation instead. There is thus a Pelagian tinge to this flight from an idea of a distinction between some men and others." Iota Unum, translated by Rev. Fr. John P. Parsons (Sarto House, 1996).
Fr. Most claims “that the interpretation of Romans 8-9 which St. Thomas inherited from St. Augustine is erroneous,”90 and he emphatically states, “All exegetes today reject this interpretation.”91
Salza, John. The Mystery of Predestination: According to Scripture, the Church and St. Thomas Aquinas (p. 30). TAN Books. Kindle Edition.
Fr. Most’s rejection of the traditional interpretation of Romans 8-9 is the basis for many of his novel interpretations of St. Thomas and his theories on grace (more on this later). Thirdly, interacting with Fr. Most’s argumentation helps us see more clearly the principles that St. Thomas has left us. These principles help us build our spiritual lives upon a necessary, dogmatic foundation and give the greatest glory to God.
Salza, John. The Mystery of Predestination: According to Scripture, the Church and St. Thomas Aquinas (p. 30). TAN Books. Kindle Edition.
We first note that Fr. Most in GPS [the book cited in reply #45 above] does not provide any meaningful exegesis of Romans 8 or 9. He engages in no contextual, grammatical, or lexical analysis of the applicable texts. This is uncharacteristic of Fr. Most’s otherwise thorough scholarship. One would expect more from a renowned scholar, particularly when he is criticizing a position shared by the two greatest minds of the Church. Yet Fr.Most repeatedly claims that St.Augustine, St.Thomas, and other theologians who followed them “were severely hampered by a formerly current misinterpretation” of the passages.92 Fr.Most says, “Today we know that these interpretations of Scripture were all erroneous for they are rejected with unanimity by all good exegetes of all schools.”93 Fr. Most continues by saying, “[E]xegetes of all schools teach a different interpretation of the passage from the Epistle to the Romans.”94 And again, he says, “[T]his interpretation … is now rightly abandoned, as false and lacking in foundation, by all good exegetes of all schools.”95 Fr. Most makes these kinds of sweeping statements throughout his nearly 700-page book.
Salza, John. The Mystery of Predestination: According to Scripture, the Church and St. Thomas Aquinas (pp. 30-31). TAN Books. Kindle Edition.
***numbers (e.g., 92, 93 etc., are to footnotes to the text)
After summarily dismissing the views of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, Fr.Most appeals to the “modern scholarship” of Père Lagrange, J. Huby, and A.M.Dubarle. Based on this modern scholarship, Fr. Most says, “As a result, we are able to know clearly that which was hidden in the days of St. Thomas, namely:St. Paul, in Romans 8-9, was not speaking about the infallible predestination of individuals to eternal glory, but about the plans of God for the call of peoples to be members of the Church, in the Old or New Testament, in the full sense, and about the divine plans for those who already are members of the Church in the full sense.”96
Salza, John. The Mystery of Predestination: According to Scripture, the Church and St. Thomas Aquinas (p. 31). TAN Books. Kindle Edition.
Continuing with his novel theory about Romans 9, Fr. Most sees a distinction between what he calls the “internal economy” that regards individual salvation (whether a man will go to heaven or hell) and the “external economy” that regards the external order (whether a man or a nation will belong to the Church). Fr. Most applies this concocted paradigm to any verse he thinks speaks of individual predestination (e.g., Rom. 8-9; 1 Cor. 4:7; Acts 13:48).Fr. Most argues that Romans 9 is about the external economy, not the internal economy. Specifically, Fr. Most advances the Arminian argument that St. Paul is speaking about the predestination of “nations” and not individuals.98
Salza, John. The Mystery of Predestination: According to Scripture, the Church and St. Thomas Aquinas (p. 32). TAN Books. Kindle Edition.
Notwithstanding Fr. Most’s assertions, the Council of Valence authentically teaches that Romans 9 is about individual predestination and election! After citing both Romans 9:21 (about the potter’s power over the clay) and Romans 9:22 (about the vessels of mercy and wrath), the council offers its interpretation of those verses: “[F]aithfully we confess the predestination of the elect to life, and the predestination of the impious to death; in the election, moreover, of those who are to be saved, the mercy of God precedes merited good. In the condemnation, however, of those who are to be lost, the evil which they have deserved precedes the just judgment of God.”97 In short, Fr. Most’s interpretation of Romans 8-9 is expressly rejected by the Council of Valence as well as the constant teaching tradition of the Church espoused by Sts. Augustine and Thomas.
Salza, John. The Mystery of Predestination: According to Scripture, the Church and St. Thomas Aquinas (pp. 31-32). TAN Books. Kindle Edition.
When Fr. Most reveals his two categories, he also includes the Church in the category of the “external economy.” However, St. Paul never mentions the “Church” in Romans 8 or 9. Rather, he is focused on the nation of Israel and the Jєωs’erroneous understanding of how God determines His election. Moreover, we fail to understand Fr. Most’s distinction between individual election (internal economy) and membership in the Church (external economy). God predestines people (internal economy) to eternal salvation precisely by bringing them into the Catholic Church (external economy). In light of this truth, we must also disagree with Fr. Most’s assertion that “God has freely decided upon different fundamental principles for the two economies. These principles are quite incompatible with one another.”100
This assertion is problematic because individual salvation is one effect of predestination, and membership in the Church is another effect of predestination. In fact, one effect (Church membership) may be called the cause of the other effect (salvation). As St. Thomas remarks, “[T]here is no reason why one effect of predestination should not be the reason or cause of another.”101 Even if there were two economies as Fr. Most maintains, this does not mean that God would govern them by different principles, since both economies flow from God’s single decree of predestination. This is why St.Thomas says that all the effects of predestination proceed “from its first moving principle,” which is God.102 If God really governed the “external economy” differently than the “internal economy,” one could argue that God wills to save some people (internal economy) but doesn’t will them to be Catholic (external economy). Nevertheless, we do not assume that Fr. Most’s distinction was motivated by any dissent from the Church’s infallible dogma: Extra ecclesia nulla salus est (outside the Church there is no salvation).103
Salza, John. The Mystery of Predestination: According to Scripture, the Church and St. Thomas Aquinas (pp. 32-33). TAN Books. Kindle Edition.
Fr. Most contends that modern scholarship refutes the massa damnata interpretation of Romans 9. He even implies that the Church has overturned this long-standing interpretation. After claiming that “the obstacles that arose from the erroneous interpretations of the Epistle to the Romans (and a few other passages in St. Paul) have been removed,” he says that “the Church, benefiting from the cuмulative light which the Holy Spirit has now sent through so many centuries, teaches many truths more clearly, especially the salvific will of God.”104
Salza, John. The Mystery of Predestination: According to Scripture, the Church and St. Thomas Aquinas (p. 33). TAN Books. Kindle Edition.
Chapter 51 [XX.]—Predestination Must Be Preached.
Wherefore, if both the apostles and the teachers of the Church who succeeded them and imitated them did both these things,—that is, both truly preached the grace of God which is not given according to our merits, and inculcated by wholesome precepts a pious obedience,—what is it which these people of our time think themselves rightly bound by the invincible force of truth to say, “Even if what is said of the predestination of God’s benefits be true, yet it must not be preached to the people”?[ 597 ] It must absolutely be preached, so that he who has ears to hear, may hear. And who has them if he has not received them from Him who says, “I will give them a heart to know me, and ears to hear?”( Baruch ii. 31 . ) Assuredly, he who has not received may reject; while, yet, he who receives may take and drink, may drink and live. For as piety must be preached, that, by him who has ears to hear, God may be rightly worshipped; modesty must be preached, that, by him who has ears to hear, no illicit act may be perpetrated by his fleshly nature; charity must be preached, that, by him who has ears to hear, God and his neighbours may be loved;—so also must be preached such a predestination of God’s benefits that he who has ears to hear may glory, not in himself, but in the Lord.
Augustine, Saint. The Complete Works of St. Augustine: Cross-linked to the Bible and with in-line footnotes (p. 9509). Kindle Edition.
Nevertheless, in respect of a certain other distinction, they were not of us, for if they had been of us, they certainly would have continued with us. What then is this distinction? God’s books lie open, let us not turn away our view; the divine Scripture cries aloud, let us give it a hearing. They were not of them, because they had not been “called according to the purpose;” they had not been chosen in Christ before the foundation of the world; they had not gained a lot in Him; they had not been predestinated according to His purpose who worketh all things. For if they had been this, they would have been of them, and without doubt they would have continued with them.
Chapter 13 [X]—His Seventh Error. (See Above in Book II. 13 [IX.].)If you wish to be a catholic, do not venture to believe, to say, or to teach that “they whom the Lord has predestinated for baptism can be snatched away from his predestination, or die before that has been accomplished in them which the Almighty has predestined.” There is in such a dogma more power than I can tell assigned to chances in opposition to the power of God, by the occurrence of which casualties that which He has predestinated is not permitted to come to pass. It is hardly necessary to spend time or earnest words in cautioning the man who takes up with this error against the absolute vortex of confusion into which it will absorb him, when I shall sufficiently meet the case if I briefly warn the prudent man who is ready to receive correction against the threatening mischief. Now these are your words: “We say that some such method as this must be had recourse to in the case of infants who, being predestinated for baptism, are yet, by the failing of this life, hurried away before they are born again in Christ.” Is it then really true that any who have been predestinated to baptism are forestalled before they come to it by the failing of this life? And could God predestinate anything which He either in His foreknowledge saw would not come to pass, or in ignorance knew not that it could not come to pass, either to the frustration of His purpose or the discredit of His foreknowledge? You see how many weighty remarks might be made on this subject; but I am restrained by the fact of having treated on it a little while ago, so that I content myself with this brief and passing admonition.
Augustine, Saint. The Complete Works of St. Augustine: Cross-linked to the Bible and with in-line footnotes (p. 8846). Kindle Edition.
Working through Mr. Salza's book on Predestination (see reply #43 above). At this point, I definitely would recommend it ...
Mr. Salza has a large section where he basically takes apart Father William Most's book, Grace, Predestination, and the Salvific Will of God. ...
Salza has no business masquerading as a Catholic theologian ... especially after having been completely discredited as a result the anti-SV screed that he co-authored.Bravo!
Stick with Father Garrigou-Lagrange and other approved pre-Vatican II ACTUAL theologians, not this pop arm-chair theological wannabe ... who spent hundreds of pages arguing that St. Robert Bellarmine basically held the same opinion as Cajetan on the pope issue, even though St. Robert explicitly rejected it.
His absurd legalistic principles have now led him to conclude that, while Joe Biden and Nancy Peℓσѕι are Catholics in good standing, Traditional Catholics (even those who aren't SVs) are outside the Church.
Bravo!
THE DEATH of an unbaptized infant presents Catholic theologians with a poignant problem. The dawn star of Christian culture had hardly risen when men first raised the question, and it has continued to echo through the centuries. There are reasons enough for the persistent reappearance of the difficulty. The fate of an unbaptized child is closely tied to several highly volatile questions: original sin, the necessity of baptism, the salvific will of God. Each of these issues is a vital nerve in the body of Catholic doctrine, and each can be studied with clinical precision in the person of an unbaptized child. The question, then, is not pure pedantry; and if it seems a discouraging one, we have the admonition of St. Gregory of Nyssa: "I venture to assert that it is not right to omit the examination which is within the range of our ability, or to leave the question here raised without making any inquiries or having any ideas about it."
(LIMBO: A THEOLOGICAL EVALUATION by GEORGE J. DYER, 1958)
Pius XI, Studiorum Ducem (On St. Thomas Aquinas)
19. The other branch of Theology, which is concerned with the interpretation of dogmas, also found in St. Thomas by far the richest of all commentators; for nobody ever more profoundly penetrated or expounded with greater subtlety all the august mysteries, as, for example, the intimate life of God, the obscurity of eternal predestination, the supernatural government of the world, the faculty granted to rational creatures of attaining their end, the redemption of the human race achieved by Jesus Christ and continued by the Church and the sacraments, both of which the Angelic Doctor describes as "relics, so to speak, of the divine Incarnation."
Library : Studiorum Ducem (On St. Thomas Aquinas) | Catholic Culture (https://www.catholicculture.org/culture/library/view.cfm?recnum=4957)
Part Ia, Q.23, a.4
Whether the predestined are chosen by God? [*"Eligantur."]
Objection 1: It seems that the predestined are not chosen by God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1) that as the corporeal sun sends his rays upon all without selection, so does God His goodness. But the goodness of God is communicated to some in an especial manner through a participation of grace and glory. Therefore God without any selection communicates His grace and glory; and this belongs to predestination.
Objection 2: Further, election is of things that exist. But predestination from all eternity is also of things which do not exist. Therefore, some are predestined without election.
Objection 3: Further, election implies some discrimination. Now God "wills all men to be saved" (1 Tim. 2:4). Therefore, predestination which ordains men towards eternal salvation, is without election.
On the contrary, It is said (Eph. 1:4): "He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world."
I answer that, Predestination presupposes election in the order of reason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that predestination, as stated above (A[1]), is a part of providence. Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering of some things towards an end; as was proved above (Q[22], A[2]). But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end already exists. Whence the predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that God wills their salvation; and to this belong both election and love:---love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of eternal salvation; since to love is to wish well to anyone, as stated above (Q[20], AA[2],3):---election, inasmuch as He wills this good to some in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as stated above (A[3]). Election and love, however, are differently ordered in God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not cause good, but we are incited to love by the good which already exists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election in us precedes love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination. Whence all the predestinate are objects of election and love.
Reply to Objection 1: If the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered, God communicates His goodness without election; inasmuch as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness, as we said above (Q[6], A[4]). But if we consider the communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it without election; since He gives certain goods to some men, which He does not give to others. Thus in the conferring of grace and glory election is implied.
Reply to Objection 2: When the will of the person choosing is incited to make a choice by the good already pre-existing in the object chosen, the choice must needs be of those things which already exist, as happens in our choice. In God it is otherwise; as was said above (Q[20], A[2]). Thus, as Augustine says (De Verb. Ap. Serm. 11): "Those are chosen by God, who do not exist; yet He does not err in His choice."
Reply to Objection 3: God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will, which is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His consequent will, which is to will simply.
Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica - Enhanced Version . Christian Classics Ethereal Library. Kindle Edition.
Part Ia, Question 23, Article 5, Objection 3
Objection 3. Further, "There is no injustice in God" (Romans 9:14). Now it would seem unjust that unequal things be given to equals. But all men are equal as regards both nature and original sin; and inequality in them arises from the merits or demerits of their actions. Therefore God does not prepare unequal things for men by predestinating and reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and demerits.
Reply to Objection 3.The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was said above (Question 22, Article 2). Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying (Romans 9:22-23): "What if God, willing to show His wrath [that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to make His power known, endured [that is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory" and (2 Timothy 2:20): "But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto honor, but some unto dishonor." Yet why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine will. Whence Augustine says (Tract. xxvi. in Joan.): "Why He draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err." Thus too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity of species in things of nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form, and that under another, depends upon the simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part of the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that place. Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted as a debt, and not gratuitously. In things which are given gratuitously, a person can give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he deprives nobody of his due), without any infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house said: "Take what is thine, and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?" (Matthew 20:14-15).
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: Predestination (Prima Pars, Q. 23) (newadvent.org)
This evil and dangerous doctrine of "the final salvation of all mankind," so absolutely at variance with the Church's teaching and so opposed to the clear teaching of Christ Himself, is the actual cornerstone of the whole edifice of heresy being promoted today under the guise of "ecuмenism." Although this doctrine is not preached openly, explicitly, and in these precise terms (at least not yet on a wide scale), nevertheless it is believed by many; it is the animus of what parades as "ecuмenism."
Reply to Objection 1. The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men to be saved," etc. can be understood in three ways.
First, by a restricted application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not will."
Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every class of individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case they mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved, males and females, Jєωs and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of every condition.
Thirdly, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent, but to the things willed.
Ch 3. Children who die without Baptism
Here it only remains for us to answer the objection which is drawn from children being lost when they die before Baptism, and before they come to the use of reason. If God wills all to be saved, it is objected, how is it that these children perish without any fault of their own, since God gives them no assistance to attain eternal salvation? There are two answers to this objection, the latter more correct than the former, I will state them briefly.
First, it is answered that God, by antecedent will, wishes all to be saved, and therefore has granted universal means for the salvation of all; but these means at times fail of their effect, either by reason of the unwillingness of some persons to avail themselves of them, or because others are unable to make use of them, on account of secondary causes [such as the death of children], whose course God is not bound to change, after having disposed the whole according to the just judgment of His general Providence; all this is collected from what St. Thomas says: Jesus Christ offered His merits for all men, and instituted Baptism for all; but the application of this means of salvation, so far as relates to children who die before the use of reason, is not prevented by the direct will of God, but by a merely permissive will; because as He is the general provider of all things, He is not bound to disturb the general order, to provide for the particular order.
The second answer is, that to perish is not the same as not to be blessed: since eternal happiness is a gift entirely gratuitous; and therefore the want of it is not a punishment. The opinion, therefore, of St. Thomas-----is very just, that children who die in infancy have neither the pain of sense nor the pain of loss; not the pain of sense, he says, "because pain of sense corresponds to conversion to creatures; and in Original Sin there is not conversion to creatures" [as the fault is not our own], "and therefore pain of sense is not due to Original Sin;" because Original Sin does not imply an act. [De Mal. q. 5, a. 2]
Objectors oppose to this the teaching of St. Augustine, who in some places shows that his opinion was that children are condemned even to the pain of sense. But in another place he declares that he was very much confused about this point. These are his words: When I come to the punishment of infants, I find myself [believe me] in great straits; nor can I at all find anything to say." [Epist. 166, E. B.] And in another place he writes, that it may be said that such children receive neither reward nor punishment: "Nor need we fear that it is impossible there should be a middle sentence between reward and punishment; since their life was midway between sin and good works." [De Lib. Ar. 1, 3, c. 23] This was directly affirmed by St. Gregory nαzιanzen: "Children will be sentenced by the just judge neither to the glory of Heaven nor to punishment." St. Gregory of Nyssa was of the same opinion: "The premature death of children shows that they who have thus ceased to live will not be in pain and unhappiness."
And as far as relates to the pain of loss, although these children are excluded from glory, nevertheless St. Thomas, [In 2 Sent. d. 33, q. 2, a. 2] who had reflected most deeply on this point, teaches that no one feels pain for the want of that good of which he is not capable; so that as no man grieves that he cannot fly, or no private person that he is not emperor, so these children feel no pain at being deprived of the glory of which they were never capable; since they could never pretend to it either by the principles of nature, or by their own merits.
St. Thomas adds, in another place, [De Mal. q. 5, a. 3] a further reason, which is, that the supernatural knowledge of glory comes only by means of actual faith, which transcends all natural knowledge; so that children can never feel pain for the privation of that glory, of which they never had a supernatural knowledge.
He further says, in the former passage, that such children will not only not grieve for the loss of eternal happiness, but will, moreover, have pleasure in their natural gifts; and will even in some way enjoy God, so far as is implied in natural knowledge, and in natural love: "Rather will they rejoice in this, that they will participate much in the Divine goodness, and in natural perfections." And he immediately adds, that although they will be separated from God, as regards the union of glory, nevertheless 'they will be united with Him by participation of natural gifts; and so will even be able to rejoice in Him with a natural knowledge and love." [In 2 Sent. d. 33, q. 2, a. 2]
http://www.catholictreasury.info/books/prayer/pr18.php#bk3
Salvation in Christ Is Offered to All
10. The universality of salvation means that it is granted not only to those who explicitly believe in Christ and have entered the Church. Since salvation is offered to all, it must be made concretely available to all. But it is clear that today, as in the past, many people do not have an opportunity to come to know or accept the gospel revelation or to enter the Church. The social and cultural conditions in which they live do not permit this, and frequently they have been brought up in other religious traditions. For such people salvation in Christ is accessible by virtue of a grace which, while having a mysterious relationship to the Church, does not make them formally part of the Church but enlightens them in a way which is accommodated to their spiritual and material situation. This grace comes from Christ; it is the result of his Sacrifice and is communicated by the Holy Spirit. It enables each person to attain salvation through his or her free cooperation.
For this reason the Council, after affirming the centrality of the Paschal Mystery, went on to declare that "this applies not only to Christians but to all people of good will in whose hearts grace is secretly at work. Since Christ died for everyone, and since the ultimate calling of each of us comes from God and is therefore a universal one, we are obliged to hold that the Holy Spirit offers everyone the possibility of sharing in this Paschal Mystery in a manner known to God."19
https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/docuмents/hf_jp-ii_enc_07121990_redemptoris-missio.html
This evil and dangerous doctrine of "the final salvation of all mankind,".... and that progression has been a main focus of this thread. I would trace its development as a perversion of God's desire to save "all men" into the idea that God gives all men sufficient grace for salvation. A more traditional understanding of this phrase in various senses is expressed by St. Thomas in the Summa, First Part, Question 19, Article 6, Objection 1:1. God does give all men sufficient grace for salvation; this is infallible from Scripture.
Salvation in Christ Is Offered to AllThe errors of V2/JP2 on salvation is not, in my opinion, that "salvation is offered by God to all". The error lies in the prideful idea that it is "concretely available", or that God's ways can be understood by man, or that God's work in our soul, through our conscience, His Divine Providence, and such "spiritual coincidences" can be known, materially (i.e. that grace can be measured).
10. The universality of salvation means that it is granted not only to those who explicitly believe in Christ and have entered the Church. Since salvation is offered to all, it must be made concretely available to all. But it is clear that today, as in the past, many people do not have an opportunity to come to know or accept the gospel revelation or to enter the Church.
1. God does give all men sufficient grace for salvation; this is infallible from Scripture.
a. St Paul tells us that "God wills that all men be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth." (1 Tim 2)
b. St Paul tells us that "God will not permit you to be tempted beyond your strength."
c. Conclusion - All men, if they respond to grace, can avoid sin, which will merit them sufficient graces to know the Truth (i.e. Church), then persevere to salvation.
d. This is infallible.
If you can't/don't want to follow the natural law, then you've already damned yourself. You don't need to hear about the gospel or the Church, if you're on your 4th marriage or your a drug dealer for life.
1. God does give all men sufficient grace for salvation; this is infallible from Scripture.
If you can't/don't want to follow the natural law, then you've already damned yourself. You don't need to hear about the gospel or the Church, if you're on your 4th marriage or your a drug dealer for life.It's a hypothetical situation.
OK, but how does this apply to infants who die without the Sacrament of Baptism? That's what we're considering here.Infants aren't at the age of reason, so now matter how much grace God gives (except for the grace of baptism), they can't profit from it (assuming they die before reaching reason). They are the exception to the rule.
God WILLS all men to be saved, but He sometimes withholds His grace, out of mercy, for those whom He knows will reject it and therefore merit a greater punishment.This is true, for the present situation of this hypothetical homeless man. But...before he was addicted to drugs, he was given all kinds of graces to resist, which he did not. Had he resisted, and had he followed the natural law, he may have found Catholicism and converted. But he didn't.
I want to give a homeless man $1,000 out of compassion. But I know that he's addicted to drugs, and it's highly likely (God knows with certainty of course) that he's going to end up dead from an overdose if I give him the $1,000. So while I will to show him the mercy of giving him the money, it's mercy also that inspires me to withhold it.
The whole thing above falls apart with 1a, which assumes a false sense - unnecessarily, since there are other credible senses of the verse, as indicated by St. Thomas's quotes above, that don't conflict with the reality at issue, i.e, infants who die in infancy without baptism.Infants are the exception to the rule. I was responding to your commentary on JP2, which was obviously NOT dealing with infants, but those of the age of reason. God DOES will all men to be saved; infants don't have reason, so they wouldn't apply in this case.
I doubt you even read my last post. St. Alphonsus offers the only rational interpretation of the phrase in the context of infants who die without baptism in infancy. You certainly haven't offered a rational alternative.
No one disputes that is what Scripture says, but it can't mean what you think it means. St. Thomas, St. Augustine, St. Alphonsus offer reasonable readings that don't conflict with the facts (again, those infants at issue).
Infants aren't at the age of reason, so now matter how much grace God gives (except for the grace of baptism), they can't profit from it.
Just as well, if an infant who is baptized would grow up and end their lives in mortal sinRight. And God is the only person who can know how a person's life will end up, before they are even born. So, if He withholds certain graces, it's for their benefit. But we can't say that He withheld "sufficient" graces. Everyone (save infants) receives "sufficient" graces, as St Paul tells us.
Strictly speaking, since Limbo is not a doctrine, we don't even know if unbaptized infants go to Limbo. Maybe they are given a choice, before death, (or even after death) to choose Christ or not? We don't know.
If you wish to be a catholic, do not venture to believe, to say, or to teach that “they whom the Lord has predestinated for baptism can be snatched away from his predestination, or die before that has been accomplished in them which the Almighty has predestined.” There is in such a dogma more power than I can tell assigned to chances in opposition to the power of God, by the occurrence of which casualties that which He has predestinated is not permitted to come to pass. It is hardly necessary to spend time or earnest words in cautioning the man who takes up with this error against the absolute vortex of confusion into which it will absorb him, when I shall sufficiently meet the case if I briefly warn the prudent man who is ready to receive correction against the threatening mischief. Now these are your words: “We say that some such method as this must be had recourse to in the case of infants who, being predestinated for baptism, are yet, by the failing of this life, hurried away before they are born again in Christ.” Is it then really true that any who have been predestinated to baptism are forestalled before they come to it by the failing of this life? And could God predestinate anything which He either in His foreknowledge saw would not come to pass, or in ignorance knew not that it could not come to pass, either to the frustration of His purpose or the discredit of His foreknowledge?
St. Augustine:
I'm no so sure the vortex of confusion quote by St. Augustine is something written against baptism of blood or desire, but against proposing that "casualties that which [God] has predestinated [are] not permitted to come to pass", using the sacrament of baptism and infants as an example.
St. Augustine:Where can I find this quote? Confessions? City of God? Thanks
The quote in full, with source, is here:
Where can I find this quote? Confessions? City of God? Thanks
Saint Fulgentius:
“Who will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth.”
-2 Timothy 2:4
“Nevertheless, these “all men” whom God wishes to save include not the entire human race altogether, but rather the totality of those who are to be saved.
So the word “all” is mentioned because the divine kindness saves all kinds from among all men, that is, from every race, status, and age, from every language and every region.”
-St Fulgentius of Ruspe-Correspondence on Christology and Grace.
Saint Fulgentius:
“Who will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth.”
-2 Timothy 2:4
“Nevertheless, these “all men” whom God wishes to save include not the entire human race altogether, but rather the totality of those who are to be saved.
So the word “all” is mentioned because the divine kindness saves all kinds from among all men, that is, from every race, status, and age, from every language and every region.”
-St Fulgentius of Ruspe-Correspondence on Christology and Grace.
Reply to Objection 1. The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men to be saved," etc. can be understood in three ways.
First, by a restricted application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not will."
Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every class of individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case they mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved, males and females, Jєωs and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of every condition.
St. Augustine(https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/15011.htm)
On Merit and the Forgiveness of Sins, and the Baptism of Infants (Book I)
Chapter 30.— Why One is Baptized and Another Not, Not Otherwise Inscrutable.
Now those very persons, who think it unjust that infants which depart this life without the grace of Christ should be deprived not only of the kingdom of God, into which they themselves admit that none but such as are regenerated through baptism can enter, but also of eternal life and salvation — when they ask how it can be just that one man should be freed from original sin and another not, although the condition of both of them is the same, might answer their own question, in accordance with their own opinion of how it can be so frequently just and right that one should have baptism administered to him whereby to enter into the kingdom of God, and another not be so favoured, although the case of both is alike. For if the question disturbs him, why, of the two persons, who are both equally sinners by nature, the one is loosed from that bond, on whom baptism is conferred, and the other is not released, on whom such grace is not bestowed; why is he not similarly disturbed by the fact that of two persons, innocent by nature, one receives baptism, whereby he is able to enter into the kingdom of God, and the other does not receive it, so that he is incapable of approaching the kingdom of God? Now in both cases one recurs to the apostle's outburst of wonder O the depth of the riches! Again, let me be informed, why out of the body of baptized infants themselves, one is taken away, so that his understanding undergoes no change from a wicked life, Wisdom 4:11 and the other survives, destined to become an impious man? Suppose both were carried off, would not both enter the kingdom of heaven? And yet there is no unrighteousness with God. Romans 9:14 How is it that no one is moved, no one is driven to the expression of wonder amidst such depths, by the circuмstance that some children are vexed by the unclean spirit, while others experience no such pollution, and others again, as Jeremiah, are sanctified even in their mother's womb; Jeremiah 1:5 whereas all men, if there is original sin, are equally guilty; or else equally innocent if there is original sin? Whence this great diversity, except in the fact that God's judgments are unsearchable, and His ways past finding out?
CHURCH FATHERS: On Merit and the Forgiveness of Sins, and the Baptism of Infants, Book I (Augustine) (newadvent.org) (https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/15011.htm)
St. Augustine, A Treatise on rebuke and grace, In One Book, addressed to valentine, and with him to the monks of adrumetum.a.d. 426 or 427
Chapter 14 — None of the Elect and Predestinated Can Perish
. . . For whoever are elected are without doubt also called; but not whosoever are called are as a consequence elected. Those, then, are elected, as has often been said, who are called according to the purpose, who also are predestinated and foreknown. If any one of these perishes, God is mistaken; but none of them perishes, because God is not mistaken. If any one of these perish, God is overcome by human sin; but none of them perishes, because God is overcome by nothing. Moreover, they are elected to reign with Christ, not as Judas was elected, to a work for which he was fitted. Because he was chosen by Him who well knew how to make use even of wicked men, so that even by his damnable deed that venerable work, for the sake of which He Himself had come, might be accomplished. When, therefore, we hear, “Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?”( John vi. 70 . ) we ought to understand that the rest were elected by mercy, but he by judgment; those to obtain His kingdom, he to shed His blood!
Augustine, Saint. The Complete Works of St. Augustine: Cross-linked to the Bible and with in-line footnotes (p. 10126). Kindle Edition.
Here it only remains for us to answer the objection which is drawn from children being lost when they die before
Baptism, and before they come to the use of reason. If God wills all to be saved, it is objected, how is it that
these children perish without any fault of their own, since God gives them no assistance to attain eternal
salvation? There are two answers to this objection, the latter more correct than the former, I will state them
briefly.
First, it is answered that God, by antecedent will, wishes all to be saved, and therefore has granted universal
means for the salvation of all; but these means at times fail of their effect, either by reason of the unwillingness
of some persons to avail themselves of them, or because others are unable to make use of them, on account of
secondary causes [such as the death of children], whose course God is not bound to change, after having
disposed the whole according to the just judgment of His general Providence; all this is collected from what
Saint Thomas says: Jesus Christ offered His merits for all men, and instituted Baptism for all; but the application
of this means of salvation, so far as relates to children who die before the use of reason, is not prevented by the
direct will of God, but by a merely permissive will; because as He is the general provider of all things, He is not
bound to disturb the general order, to provide for the particular order.
The second answer is, that to perish is not the same as not to be blessed: since eternal happiness is a gift entirely
gratuitous; and therefore the want of it is not a punishment. The opinion, therefore, of Saint Thomas-----is very
just, that children who die in infancy have neither the pain of sense nor the pain of loss; not the pain of sense, he
says, "because pain of sense corresponds to conversion to creatures; and in Original Sin there is not conversion
to creatures" [as the fault is not our own], "and therefore pain of sense is not due to Original Sin"; because
Original Sin does not imply an act. [De Mal. q. 5, a. 2] Objectors oppose to this the teaching of Saint Augustine,
who in some places shows that his opinion was that children are condemned even to the pain of sense. But in
another place he declares that he was very much confused about this point. These are his words: When I come to
the punishment of infants, I find myself [believe me] in great straits; nor can I at all find anything to say"
Epistle 166. And in another place he writes, that it may be said that such children receive neither reward nor
punishment: "Nor need we fear that it is impossible there should be a middle sentence between reward and
punishment; since their life was midway between sin and good works" [De Lib. Ar. 1, 3, c. 23] This was directly
affirmed by Saint Gregory nαzιanzen: "Children will be sentenced by the just judge neither to the glory of
Heaven nor to punishment". Saint Gregory of Nyssa was of the same opinion: "The premature death of children
shows that they who have thus ceased to live will not be in pain and unhappiness".
And as far as relates to the pain of loss, although these children are excluded from glory, nevertheless Saint
Thomas, [In 2 Sent. d. 33, q. 2, a. 2] who had reflected most deeply on this point, teaches that no one feels pain
for the want of that good of which he is not capable; so that as no man grieves that he cannot fly, or no private
person that he is not emperor, so these children feel no pain at being deprived of the glory of which they were
never capable; since they could never pretend to it either by the principles of nature, or by their own merits.
Saint Thomas adds, in another place, [De Mal. q. 5, a. 3] a further reason, which is, that the supernatural
knowledge of glory comes only by means of actual faith, which transcends all natural knowledge; so that
children can never feel pain for the privation of that glory, of which they never had a supernatural knowledge.
He further says, in the former passage, that such children will not only not grieve for the loss of eternal
happiness, but will, moreover, have pleasure in their natural gifts; and will even in some way enjoy God, so far
as is implied in natural knowledge, and in natural love: "Rather will they rejoice in this, that they will participate
much in the Divine goodness, and in natural perfections". And he immediately adds, that although they will be
separated from God, as regards the union of glory, nevertheless "they will be united with Him by participation of
natural gifts; and so will even be able to rejoice in Him with a natural knowledge and love". [In 2 Sent. d. 33, q.
2, a. 2]
1. God does give all men sufficient grace for salvation; this is infallible from Scripture.I think a sinner should hear the gospel do they can repent. If not, shake the dirt and move on.
a. St Paul tells us that "God wills that all men be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth." (1 Tim 2)
b. St Paul tells us that "God will not permit you to be tempted beyond your strength."
c. Conclusion - All men, if they respond to grace, can avoid sin, which will merit them sufficient graces to know the Truth (i.e. Church), then persevere to salvation.
d. This is infallible.
2. Salvation is a mystery. As Fr Wathen pointed out, no one can fully understand how God works/deals with others in their life, since we don't even understand the ways in which God works in our own life.
3. Since salvation is a mystery, so is the idea of predestination. I don't pretend to understand St Thomas' ideas as they are beyond me.
The errors of V2/JP2 on salvation is not, in my opinion, that "salvation is offered by God to all". The error lies in the prideful idea that it is "concretely available", or that God's ways can be understood by man, or that God's work in our soul, through our conscience, His Divine Providence, and such "spiritual coincidences" can be known, materially (i.e. that grace can be measured).
Thus, this leads to the V2 heresy that those "who do not have the opportunity to come to know or accept the gospel or enter the Church" weren't "given a chance" by God. Horrible blasphemy this is! Because, as St Thomas (and many others tell us), God does not cast pearls before swine, and many do not get graces because of sins. If you can't/don't want to follow the natural law, then you've already damned yourself. You don't need to hear about the gospel or the Church, if you're on your 4th a drug dealer for life.
Scripture's infallible teaching that God gives all men sufficient grace does not lead to V2 errors. :facepalm: I already pointed out that JP2 garbled this truth and corrupted it for ecuмenical purposes.
The point you miss is the Eternal goodness of God's Providence, who sees all things - past, present and future - at the same time. So, for an infant who dies, God forsaw the graces this infant WOULD RECEIVE IN THE FUTURE, and reject them, so He took their life early, so to prevent damnation.
The above is an example of Gods mercy, not a denial of Scripture.
Of course, according to traditional Catholic dogma, men are born into a state of condemnation even before they commit any mortal sins; that's called, "original sin." And to say God foresees the mortal sins that some infants might commit if they were permitted to grow to adulthood and die in mortal sin, and decides to end the lives of those infants early, is a speculation that just proves my main point: God chooses those infants as opposed to others who he lets age and commit mortal sins and go to hell. Thus, He purely gratuitously favors one sinner who deserves hell over another whom He consigns to it.
Of course, according to traditional Catholic dogma, men are born into a state of condemnation even before they commit any mortal sins; that's called, "original sin."Yes. No man is promised, owed or can earn salvation, which is a gift from God.
And to say God foresees the mortal sins that some infants might commit if they were permitted to grow to adulthood and die in mortal sin, and decides to end the lives of those infants early, is a speculationNo, it's not a speculation. Many saints have said it's a fact.
that just proves my main point: God chooses those infants as opposed to othersIf by "chooses" you mean a type of predestination, then yes, there something called 'catholic predestination'. But...this does not mean that God is "not fair" to the damned. It simply means he is "more generous" in grace to those whom He knows will accept such. As in the gospel of man who goes out and hires the idle laborers to work in the field. Christ saves some men in the twilight of their lives, while others come into the Faith from birth.
who he lets age and commit mortal sins and go to hell.But you're denying actual grace here. Everyone who commits a mortal sin was given the grace not to. As St Paul tells us, infallibly, that God will not permit us to be tempted beyond our strength. This is the doctrine of actual grace, which ALL MEN receive, every second of their life, whether catholic, protestant, jew, etc. If anyone commits a mortal sin, it is their choice. If they go to hell, it is ultimately their choice.
Thus, He purely gratuitously favors one sinner who deserves hell over another whom He consigns to it.God does not consign anyone to hell. This is heresy.
Yes. No man is promised, owed or can earn salvation, which is a gift from God.
No, it's not a speculation. Many saints have said it's a fact.
If by "chooses" you mean a type of predestination, then yes, there something called 'catholic predestination'. But...this does not mean that God is "not fair" to the damned. It simply means he is "more generous" in grace to those whom He knows will accept such. As in the gospel of man who goes out and hires the idle laborers to work in the field. Christ saves some men in the twilight of their lives, while others come into the Faith from birth.
This is God's plan, but we can't say it's "unfair" to those laborers who rejected the offer to come work in the field. The gospel does not mention how many laborers turned down the offer to work, but surely there were some. And they were not saved.
But you're denying actual grace here. Everyone who commits a mortal sin was given the grace not to. As St Paul tells us, infallibly, that God will not permit us to be tempted beyond our strength. This is the doctrine of actual grace, which ALL MEN receive, every second of their life, whether catholic, protestant, jew, etc. If anyone commits a mortal sin, it is their choice. If they go to hell, it is ultimately their choice.
God does not consign anyone to hell. This is heresy.
You are denying free will; you are denying actual grace; you are denying God's salvific will. You need a reality check.
Yes. No man is promised, owed or can earn salvation, which is a gift from God.You are confusing sufficient and efficacious grace. Whatever you accuse decemRationis of you are accusing St Thomas and Fr Lagrange as well as a whole host of Dominican and a few Jesuit theologians of not to mention you implicitly condemn all the scotists. You have also dogmatised the molinist conception of free will. Which is by and large rejected by the majority of scholastics including the thomists scotists and Augustinians
No, it's not a speculation. Many saints have said it's a fact.
If by "chooses" you mean a type of predestination, then yes, there something called 'catholic predestination'. But...this does not mean that God is "not fair" to the damned. It simply means he is "more generous" in grace to those whom He knows will accept such. As in the gospel of man who goes out and hires the idle laborers to work in the field. Christ saves some men in the twilight of their lives, while others come into the Faith from birth.
This is God's plan, but we can't say it's "unfair" to those laborers who rejected the offer to come work in the field. The gospel does not mention how many laborers turned down the offer to work, but surely there were some. And they were not saved.
But you're denying actual grace here. Everyone who commits a mortal sin was given the grace not to. As St Paul tells us, infallibly, that God will not permit us to be tempted beyond our strength. This is the doctrine of actual grace, which ALL MEN receive, every second of their life, whether catholic, protestant, jew, etc. If anyone commits a mortal sin, it is their choice. If they go to hell, it is ultimately their choice.
God does not consign anyone to hell. This is heresy.
You are denying free will; you are denying actual grace; you are denying God's salvific will. You need a reality check.
You are confusing sufficient and efficacious grace. Whatever you accuse decemRationis of you are accusing St Thomas and Fr Lagrange as well as a whole host of Dominican and a few Jesuit theologians of not to mention you implicitly condemn all the scotists. You have also dogmatised the molinist conception of free will. Which is by and large rejected by the majority of scholastics including the thomists scotists and Augustinians
You need a reality check.
You are confusing sufficient and efficacious grace.No, not at all.
If it is, as Pax maintains, then of course one can question how it's "fair" for a Mayan, or Incan, etc. who has never heard of Christ to go to hell - what choice did they have if they didn't reject Christ, but never even heard of him? Or someone, as JPII says in one of his encyclicals, whose cultural upbringing and circuмstances "prevent" them from formally converting to Christ, etc.Decem, salvation is a mystery. If you ponder it too deeply, you’ll lose your Faith. It is a doctrine of the Faith that “God wills all men to come to the knowledge of the Truth” as Scripture infallibly tells us. Accept this, with childlike acceptance and move on. Or let the devil an opening for temptation.
My fundamental thesis - and a major reason why I started this thread - is that the rot that has lead to the place we are in the Church post-V2 stems from a dilution and perversion of the purer doctrines of grace which, indeed, can be traced in a strong line from Scripture, through St. Augustine, and then to St. Thomas (and others you note).Yes, this sentiment has been posted many times, by many different people. I agree.
Fr. Feeney famously noted the diminution of EENS, and then the perverse extensions of BoD. Those, in my view, are symptoms of a disease whose cause goes more essentially to a diminution of Predestination and the stricter doctrines of grace, i.e., how God saves. The necessity of "fairness" to man keeps broadening and broadening,Agree.
If salvation is simply in man's hands and must be to be fair,It is in man's hands, in one sense. Because God gave everyone free will. He will not save anyone AGAINST their will, so there MUST be some human cooperation with grace. This cooperation with grace is the part that is "in man's hands".
it is easily seen how one moves from the necessity of being Catholic, to then any "Christian" with faith in Christ, then to non-Christian monotheists, and then, in the Novus Ordo Church, even to atheists of "good will." You see, all men must have a chance, no matter how they were raised, where they were born, etc. Otherwise God is unjust and . . .Yes, I agree. God does give all men "a chance". The error is to suppose that such "chances" can be perceived outwardly, measured, calculated, and compared to other human beings. This type of thinking is just the heresies of rationalism and materialism, thinking incorrectly that God ONLY works through material things, and everything spiritual can somehow be known or compared.
But if you recognize that God has elected those predestined to salvation, the objection to them all being Catholic evaporates. There is no basis for accusations of injustice if the ultimate determinate is not man's choice, his free will. If it is, as Pax maintains, then of course one can question how it's "fair" for a Mayan, or Incan, etc. who has never heard of Christ to go to hell - what choice did they have if they didn't reject Christ, but never even heard of him? Or someone, as JPII says in one of his encyclicals, whose cultural upbringing and circuмstances "prevent" them from formally converting to Christ, etc.God gives ALL men the graces to be saved. To those whom He knows will accept such graces, He gives MORE graces, so that they will make it. This is not a contradiction, nor is it an injustice. It is a mystery.
If God determines the person and the means, there is simply no rational objection for His choice that it be via the Catholic Church, baptism, etc. - the choice, after all, being His, and at His own discretion.God does not determine WHO He will save (He does not pick and choose), but He determines WHO WILL ACCEPT SALVATION. The mystery of salvation is that God has given all men free will and He will not violate this freedom. In his providential omnipotence, He also knows those who will freely choose Him, thus He gives *more* than adequate graces for those to be saved. But to ALL MEN he gives adequate graces, this is infallible.
11 For when the children were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil, (that the purpose of God according to election might stand)
12 Not of works, but of him that calleth,
From Haydock's Commentary:
Not yet born. By this example of these twins, and the preference of the younger to the elder, the drift of the apostle is, to shew that God, in his election, mercy, and grace, is not tied to any particular nation, as the Jews imagined, nor to any prerogative of birth, or any foregoing merits. For as, antecedently, to his grace, he sees no merit in any, but finds all involved in sin, in the common mass of condemnation; and all children of wrath; there is no one whom he might not justly leave in that mass; so that whomsoever he delivers from it, he delivers in his mercy: and whomsoever he leaves in it, he leaves in his justice. As when, of two equally criminal, the king is pleased out of pure mercy to pardon one, whilst he suffers justice to take place in the execution of the other. (Challoner) — Nor had done any good or evil. God was pleased to prefer, and promise his blessings to the younger of them, Jacob, declaring that the elder shall serve the younger; that is, that the seed of the elder should be subject to that of the younger, as it happened afterwards to the Idumeans. And the prophet, Malachias, said of them, I have loved Jacob, but hated Esau, and turned his mountains into a desert, &c. — That the purpose of God, his will, and his decree, (see the foregoing chap. ver. 28.) might stand according to election, might be, not according to any works they had done, or that he foresaw they would do, but merely according to his mercy. And though the preference which God gave to Jacob was literally true, as to temporal benefits; yet St. Augustine observes in divers places, that Jacob was a figure of the elect or predestinate, and Esau of the reprobate; and that as Jacob and his posterity was more favoured, purely by the mercy of God, without any merits on their side; so are God’s elect, whom he has called, and to whom, according to his eternal purpose, he decreed to give eternal glory, and special graces to bring them thither. (Witham)
Pax,It is an infallible doctrine of the Catholic Faith that God wills that all men be saved.
You spin this stuff out of your own head, mostly. Though you pick up the threads spun out of many a head these days, where the tendency to man's "freedom" throws out or ignores most of the Scriptural testimony, the testimony of St. Augustine, St. Thomas, old churchmen who annotated the Haydock and Douay Rheims bibles, etc. So you can simply assert, "he gives all men adequate grace," without citation.
A few posts back I cited St. Alphonsus dealing with the question of whether infants who die without baptism received "adequate grace" regarding salvation. His response, a traditional response: God gives the grace that could save all infants by making the sacrament of baptism "available" to all of mankind without distinction, or, he doesn't damn infants by punishing them in hell (providing a natural peace and joy in Limbo) if they don't have the opportunity to respond to the adequate grace which adults get but they don't. He does not say the infants get "adequate grace" in your sense to "choose" God because, well, they don't.The exception proves the rule, my man. You're arguing about infants, which are an exception. And...you admit they aren't damned. So it's a non-sequitur.
11 (https://www.drbo.org/cgi-bin/d?b=drb&bk=52&ch=2&l=11-#x)For there is no respect of persons with God. 12 (https://www.drbo.org/cgi-bin/d?b=drb&bk=52&ch=2&l=12-#x)For whosoever have sinned without the law, shall perish without the law; and whosoever have sinned in the law, shall be judged by the law. 13 (https://www.drbo.org/cgi-bin/d?b=drb&bk=52&ch=2&l=13-#x)For not the hearers of the law are just before God, but the doers of the law shall be justified. 14 (https://www.drbo.org/cgi-bin/d?b=drb&bk=52&ch=2&l=14-#x)For when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law; these having not the law are a law to themselves: 15 (https://www.drbo.org/cgi-bin/d?b=drb&bk=52&ch=2&l=15-#x)Who shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness to them, and their thoughts between themselves accusing, or also defending one another,
So, EENS, means that no one will go straight to Heaven (be "saved" from the fires) who is outside the Church. It does not mean that a truly "just man" (as rare as they might be) cannot still go to Purgatory or "limbo" before eventually be allowed into Heaven after the Second Coming. Again, most people will not lead a just life and they will not have the true teaching and Sacraments to get them back on track when they fall. So being "outside the Church" is like living in a minefield. Very dangerous for the soul.I agree with most of what you wrote, but for the above, there needs to be a clarification.
I agree with most of what you wrote, but for the above, there needs to be a clarification.
No baptized person can go to Limbo...this is only for the unbaptized/justified.
No unbaptized person can go to Purgatory...this is only for the baptized.
Plato, who was unbaptized, couldn't have been "saved"; he could've gone to limbo, at best.
I agree. Limbo (whatever it is) is for the unbaptized, "just" person with limited "light." That unbaptized person will not have the benefits of Purgatory (correctly understood). He will be stuck in "limbo" until God, in his mercy, decides to "release the prisoners."No. The "Limbo of the Just" was temporary, for the Old Testament 'saints'. It ended when Christ ascended into Heaven and took all of them with him.
The baptized, "just" Catholic, with temporal debt remaining, will spend a time in Purgatory and proceed to Heaven after his "temporal punishment" is paid off.Correct, because Purgatory is a temporal place. When time ends, so will Purgatory.
Correct. Plato could not have been "saved." But he was "just," and justice has its own reward [Proverbs 11:18].It is incorrect to call Plato (or any non-catholic) "just", because Scripture's use of the word "just" means that a person is "justified before God", i.e. has sanctifying grace. No unbaptized person can be "just". And any rewards do not apply to them.
No. The "Limbo of the Just" was temporary, for the Old Testament 'saints'. It ended when Christ ascended into Heaven and took all of them with him.
The current "Limbo" is part of hell, the uppermost part. It will have no end. No one who goes to "Limbo" will ever enter heaven or go anywhere else.
Correct, because Purgatory is a temporal place. When time ends, so will Purgatory.
The 4 last things -- death, judgement, heaven, hell. Limbo is part of hell, which is why it remains forever. Purgatory is a pathway to heaven, which is why it ends.
It is incorrect to call Plato (or any non-catholic) "just", because Scripture's use of the word "just" means that a person is "justified before God", i.e. has sanctifying grace. No unbaptized person can be "just". And any rewards do not apply to them.
And we can't say that Limbo is a reward, for the true reward of heaven is to behold God, which those in Limbo cannot do (and will never be able to).
Heaven = saved
Hell = damned
Limbo = not damned
Limbo isn't a reward; it's a non-punishment. Two different things.
Accordingly, before Christ’s coming the limbo of hell and Abraham’s bosom were one place accidentally and not essentially: and consequently, nothing prevents Abraham’s bosom from remaining after Christ’s coming and from being altogether distinct from limbo, since things that are one accidentally may be parted from one another.
You're missing the point. Whether or not "Abraham's Bosom" remains (as a place) is different from whether it is USED (as a holding place for people). Some say the Garden of Eden still remains (as a place), but it's no longer used (except for maybe Enoch/Elias...waiting for antichrist...but it's not USED in the same way as Adam/Eve used it).
The purpose of Abraham's Bosom was a temporary place of waiting til one can get to heaven...it was a waiting room for Christ. It is no longer used for that purpose, as there is no longer anyone from the Old Testament who is "justified" but unbaptized. And there is no longer a wait for a Redeemer. So, with the termination of the Old Law, so the purpose of the OT Limbo is terminated.
St Thomas' comments on whether or not the place still remains, is irrelevant to my point. The purpose is gone.
Reply Obj. 2: The place of rest of the holy fathers was called Abraham’s bosom before as well as after Christ’s coming, but in different ways. For since before Christ’s coming the saints’ rest had a lack of rest attached to it, it was called both hell and Abraham’s bosom, wherefore God was not seen there. But since after the coming of Christ the saints’ rest is complete through their seeing God, this rest is called Abraham’s bosom, but not hell by any means. It is to this bosom of Abraham that the Church prays for the faithful to be brought.
7 He, that hath an ear, let him hear what the Spirit saith to the churches: To him, that overcometh, I will give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the paradise of my God.
2 In the midst of the street thereof, and on both sides of the river, was the tree of life, bearing twelve fruits, yielding its fruits every month, and the leaves of the tree were for the healing of the nations.
...
14 Blessed are they that wash their robes in the blood of the Lamb: that they may have a right to the tree of life, and may enter in by the gates into the city.
If you will read Aquinas carefully, I think you will see that the purpose of the "limbo of the just" does not go away after the Resurrection of Christ, and therefore, as Aquinas says there is nothing that prevents the "limbo of the just," called Abraham's bosom, from still being there "after Christ's coming."St Thomas isn't the only saint to comment on this theory. There's not a consensus on if the "Limbo of the Just" is still in use AFTER Christ's Ascension.
St Thomas isn't the only saint to comment on this theory. There's not a consensus on if the "Limbo of the Just" is still in use AFTER Christ's Ascension.
This is all irrelevant to my point, which is that a non-baptized person (i.e. Plato) is not in the "Limbo of the Just", as he is not (nor will ever be) on the path to heaven. He would be in the "common Limbo", the upper part of hell, which is distinct from the "Limbo of the Just".
Look, I may be wrong. I don't claim infallibility. But all you do is present your opinion. You don't substantiate your opinion with any Church-approved sources. In fact, you reject the opinion of St. Thomas Aquinas because you claim "there's not a consensus."
What is your proof that there is not a consensus? Show a source. Or did you just make up this "consensus?"Just like the opinion above, you then opine how Plato "is not in the Limbo of the Just." Again, giving no Church-approved support for your argument. But you state it as if it is absolute truth. Why do you do this?Based on the thrice-defined DOGMA of EENS, how can an unbaptized person such as Plato gain heaven? Please explain.
I didn't reject St Thomas. I simply said there's not a consensus. He could be right or wrong. It's not a Church doctrine, so there's room for debate.
Based on the thrice-defined DOGMA of EENS, how can an unbaptized person such as Plato gain heaven? Please explain.
Because St Thomas (and others) describe the post-Resurrection "Abraham's Bosom" as a holding place for the "just" who are waiting to gain heaven, until the world ends/Last Judgement.
Even according to St Thomas, there's no way that Plato can be "waiting for heaven" because he's unbaptized. Ergo, he's NOT/can't be in "Abraham's Bosom". He has to be in the "common limbo" which has been (piously) believed by the Church to contain unbaptized infants and good-willed non-catholics.
Unless you deny EENS and believe that unbaptized persons go to heaven...
I am not questioning the dogma of EENS. I don't know what the reward of the just consists of. I suspect it is Paradise, aka "the New Earth" discussed in Apocalypse 21-22.Adam, Noah, Moses, Isaac, Jacob, Abraham, the Good Thief, St Joseph -- these were all "just" men because....a) they believed in the coming Redeemer, b) practiced God's religion and c) were circuмcised (if applicable).
All of the OT "Fathers" that were in "Abraham's bosom" were unbaptized. They died before the Sacrament was instituted.Of course they were unbaptized. But the fulfilled the OT Law requirements ... a) they believed in the coming Redeemer, b) practiced God's religion and c) were circuмcised (if applicable).
Look, I may be wrong. I don't claim infallibility. But all you do is present your opinion. You don't substantiate your opinion with any Church-approved sources. In fact, you reject the opinion of St. Thomas Aquinas because you claim "there's not a consensus." What is your proof that there is not a consensus? Show a source. Or did you just make up this "consensus?"
Just like the opinion above, you then opine how Plato "is not in the Limbo of the Just." Again, giving no Church-approved support for your argument. But you state it as if it is absolute truth. Why do you do this?
It is an infallible doctrine of the Catholic Faith that God wills that all men be saved.
The exception proves the rule, my man. You're arguing about infants, which are an exception. And...you admit they aren't damned. So it's a non-sequitur.
A. God wills all men to be saved.
B. God gives all men the graces necessary for salvation.
C. Ergo, any man who is damned, is so because he rejected God's grace.
---- The above is catholic doctrine ----
In the case of an infant, the logic is this:
A. Unbaptized infants die before God gives them grace to accept salvation.
B. Unbaptized infants do not have the capacity to sin or to accept grace, therefore they are not damned.
C. Unbaptized infants are neither saved nor damned and thus, are not a contradiction of God's salvific will.
Decem, putting aside all that i've written, what are your comments about my last post? From Denzinger? The Denzinger info is 0% mine and 100% from an article I found.
Forget everything i've said on the topic (I probably don't write clearly enough)...I agree 100% with the post on Denzinger. Do you?
He wills, on the contrary, the salvation of all men (Denz 623).
God sincerely wills the salvation of all men and thus makes the fulfillment of His precepts possible for all.
Article 6. Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?
Objection 1. It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled. For the Apostle says (1 Timothy 2:4): "God will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." But this does not happen. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.
. . .
Reply to Objection 1. The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men to be saved," etc. can be understood in three ways.
First, by a restricted application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not will."
Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every class of individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case they mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of every condition.
Thirdly, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent, but to the things willed.
To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circuмstances are taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circuмstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place.
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: The will of God (Prima Pars, Q. 19) (newadvent.org)
1) How are Job and Plato different from each other? Job believed in God. Did Plato? I thought the assumption is Job is in Heaven and Plato is in the top portion of Hell.Job was an Isrealite who followed God's Law. Plato was a pagan (who some say lived a 'naturally good life'). The difference is night and day. Similar to a Catholic vs a 'good natured Hindu'.
2) As for infants who die before Baptism, I thought it was taught that in God's mercy, He allows this because if they lived they might have a worse spot in Hell. How does this fit with the discussion?Yes, this is the pious belief.
My darker side comes out when I am "discussing" something and my "opponent" fails to appreciate a critical distinction that they either ignore or purposely evade because it is damaging to their inclined view, so reason be damned.I totally understand.
I sometimes feel you do that in discussion, and I get frustrated with you. But again, I've done the same myself in the past.Honestly, many times I don't follow 100% what you're trying to say because you write in generalities too much (for me, personally). I like specific examples, because it makes the conversation clearer. You might object to something I write and say "Well, you're just contradicting St Thomas". I might be, and you might be correct, but if you don't point out the EXACT contradiction, I'm left to ASSUME what you meant. Especially when multiple points are being discussed, many times I'm left to guess what you mean.
As to Denzinger, yes I agree with all of those propositions. Where did you get the list, or how did you put it together? Interesting.I found it on some catholic site. Yes, I agree with all these propositions as well.
I hope we can reach agreement.I thought we were in agreement, just misunderstanding each other.
Job was an Isrealite who followed God's Law. Plato was a pagan (who some say lived a 'naturally good life'). The difference is night and day. Similar to a Catholic vs a 'good natured Hindu'.Ok. Please excuse my ignorance.
Job, wasn't Jєωιѕн? Correct?Job was Jєωιѕн. He followed God's law. In the Old Testament, there was no middle/protestant group. Either Jєωιѕн or Gentile/pagan.
Old Testament
Jew = chosen people
Job (wouldn't Moses wife'sfamily be in this same camp?) = follower of God's law
Plato = pagan
Job was Jєωιѕн. He followed God's law. In the Old Testament, there was no middle/protestant group. Either Jєωιѕн or Gentile/pagan.
I totally understand.
Honestly, many times I don't follow 100% what you're trying to say because you write in generalities too much (for me, personally). I like specific examples, because it makes the conversation clearer. You might object to something I write and say "Well, you're just contradicting St Thomas". I might be, and you might be correct, but if you don't point out the EXACT contradiction, I'm left to ASSUME what you meant. Especially when multiple points are being discussed, many times I'm left to guess what you mean.
Not your fault. It's just this mode of communication, especially on complex topics, leads to misunderstandings.
I found it on some catholic site. Yes, I agree with all these propositions as well.
I thought we were in agreement, just misunderstanding each other.
Job was not Jєωιѕн.(https://www.cathinfo.com/Smileys/classic/facepalm.gif)You are technically correct, but for purposes of this discussion, Job was a follower of God's law.
I totally understand.
Honestly, many times I don't follow 100% what you're trying to say because you write in generalities too much (for me, personally). I like specific examples, because it makes the conversation clearer. You might object to something I write and say "Well, you're just contradicting St Thomas". I might be, and you might be correct, but if you don't point out the EXACT contradiction, I'm left to ASSUME what you meant. Especially when multiple points are being discussed, many times I'm left to guess what you mean.
Not your fault. It's just this mode of communication, especially on complex topics, leads to misunderstandings.
I found it on some catholic site. Yes, I agree with all these propositions as well.
I thought we were in agreement, just misunderstanding each other.
Very interesting discussion.
A couple questions for my own clarity.
1) How are Job and Plato different from each other? Job believed in God. Did Plato? I thought the assumption is Job is in Heaven and Plato is in the top portion of Hell.
2) As for infants who die before Baptism, I thought it was taught that in God's mercy, He allows this because if they lived they might have a worse spot in Hell. How does this fit with the discussion?
Please ignore if you think the answers will derail the conversation.
But Pax was taking a position against God's election being determinative and indeed selective with regard to a man's salvation, without consideration of a particular individual's choices or actions.I still hold this position. God does not save anyone UNLESS they cooperate with grace. There has to be cooperation of the human will to be saved (for those with the use of reason).
So I pointed out to him that God's taking the lives of these infants in their infancy - to prevent their damnation - just proves His particular and selective election of menThe case of infants is not exactly "selective election" since infants aren't saved. But neither are infants damned.
I still hold this position. God does not save anyone UNLESS they cooperate with grace. There has to be cooperation of the human will to be saved (for those with the use of reason).
The case of infants is not exactly "selective election" since infants aren't saved. But neither are infants damned.
In the case of a BAPTIZED infant who dies young, yes, God definitely acted before such infants used their personal free will. But as our Faith teaches, (and allows) the Godparents speak for the infant at baptism and also the prayers of the catholic parents availeth to the salvation of the infant, as is their duty.
Decem, you seem to be attempting to make an "either-or" argument. But the answer is that both views are correct.
1) Free will matters for salvation.
2) God does act, in certain circuмstances, when free will is not involved, in regards to salvation.
Denzinger says the same thing. This is not a contradiction, but a mystery.
Job was not Jєωιѕн.:facepalm:Why do you only talk in green?
Why do you only talk in green?