CathInfo.com

There are several more distinctions that help clarify the point under consideration.

To begin with, good is the object of the will, and truth is the object of the intellect.  The two operations of the will are to desire and to chose; the to operations of the intellect are to consider and to judge.

The Practical Good: Now, within man there is a sensitive appetite (the desires of the flesh), and an intellectual appetite (the judgements of reason).  Our free will stands midway between the two and has the ability to choose either.  For example, our lower nature desires to eat the cherry pie, while our intellect judges that we should eat the vegetables.  In the end, we chose (second act of the will) one or the other. This is the battle between the lower nature and higher nature - the flesh and the spirit - that St. Paul speaks of in Romans, chapter 8. 

This act of the will pertains directly to choosing a practical good (I should do this, and not do that) not to a speculative good, that is, to a truth (I should believe this, and not believe that).

Antecedent and Consequent Actual Grace: Another distinction is between antecedent actual grace and consequent actual grace.  Antecedent grace enlightens the mind to the truth and moves the will to choose the good.  If the person chooses in accord with the antecedent grace, consequent actual grace is given to help the person carry out the good.

The Speculative Good, or Truth: Now, just as some acts pertain directly to the practical good (I should do this and not that), others pertain directly to the the speculative good, or to the truth (I should believe this and not that).  The intellect and will, and the two forms of actual grace, are both involved in this act as well.  Let's use an example to illustrate the point

A Moslem hears the Gospel peached.  He is given an antecedent actual grace which 1) provides his mind with the light to "see" the truth and 2) moves his will to believe it (belief involves a choice of the will).

Yet, at the same time, the Moslem thinks to himself, if I accept this truth, I will have to convert to Catholicism, and if I do that, I will be disowned by my family and possibly be put to death.  He is left with three possibilities:

1) He can embrace the truth in spite of the consequences, at which point he will be given consequent actual grace to help him carry it out. 

2) He can accept the truth interiorly without revealing it publicly ("if he will not confess Me before men, neither will I confess him before My Father"; "he who loves father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me").

3) Or, since the will remains free, he can refuse to believe the truth.

God never forces the will to choose the good or to believe the truth, but he gives everyone the antecedent actual grace needed to make the right choice.



God would only cause it in the sense of giving the antecedent actual grace that moved the person's will to desire to say the Rosary.  But the will nevertheless remains free to cooperate or not.  If his desire to watch the football game is greater than his desire to say the Rosary, you can bet that he will choose to say the Rosary after the game, or chose to not say it at all.



If God forced the person's will to choose to say the Rosary, and forced him to carry it out, neither the choice nor the act would be free, nor would either be meritorious.  God moves us to do what is good and to choose what is true, but he doesn't force either of necessity.



 

But, what about man's freely willed decision to cooperate with grace? What about the voto mentioned by the Council of Trent. God foreknows the will, the voto.

. . . 

God would prefer to predestine all men, since he wills to do so. But he is limited by man, since the predestined have to freely assent to the call (excepting exceptions). God cannot predestine someone who doesn't want to assent (or who later backs down).

I don't understand why St. Thomas doesn't infer that God's foreknowledge of this assent of the predestined is key to solve the "mystery" of predestination.

St. Augustine, A Treatise on the Predestination of the Saints, Book II

Chapter 23.—Why for the People of Tyre and Sidon, Who Would Have Believed, the Miracles Were Not Done Which Were Done in Other Places Which Did Not Believe.

. . . But can we say that even the Tyrians and Sidonians would have refused to believe such mighty works done among them, or would not have believed them if they had been done, when the Lord Himself bears witness to them that they would have repented with great humility if those signs of divine power had been done among them? And yet in the day of judgment they will be punished; although with a less punishment than those cities which would not believe the mighty works done in them. For the Lord goes on to say, “Nevertheless, I say unto you, it shall be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon in the day of judgment than for you.”( Matt. xi. 22 . ) Therefore the former shall be punished with greater severity, the latter with less; but yet they shall be punished. Again, if the dead are judged even in respect of deeds which they would have done if they had lived, assuredly since these would have been believers if the gospel had been preached to them with so great miracles, they certainly ought not to be punished; but they will be punished. It is therefore false that the dead are judged in respect also of those things which they would have done if the gospel had reached them when they were alive. And if this is false, there is no ground for saying, concerning infants who perish because they die without baptism, that this happens in their case deservedly, because God foreknew that if they should live and the gospel should be preached to them, they would hear it with unbelief. It remains, therefore, that they are kept bound by original sin alone, and for this alone they go into condemnation; and we see that in others in the same case this is not remitted, except by the gratuitous grace of God in regeneration; and that, by His secret yet righteous judgment—because there is no unrighteousness with God—that some, who even after baptism will perish by evil living, are yet kept in this life until they perish, who would not have perished if bodily death had forestalled their lapse into sin, and so come to their help. Because no dead man is judged by the good or evil things which he would have done if he had not died, otherwise the Tyrians and Sidonians would not have suffered the penalties according to what they did; but rather according to those things that they would have done, if those evangelical mighty works had been done in them, they would have obtained salvation by great repentance, and by the faith of Christ.


Augustine, Saint. The Complete Works of St. Augustine: Cross-linked to the Bible and with in-line footnotes (pp. 9460-9461). Kindle Edition.