Might get pregnant anyway so then what is he gonna do?

Does he not wish for the honour of having a son? ( or a daughter)

If not why get married?

That is a valid fear with current laws, he is married now though. I don't think the wife can deny him. The idea of "cutting him off" would be cruel treatment IMO. Ovulation is relatively hidden in women, how does he know unless she is sharing it with him?

 His reason:  he's afraid wife will divorce him and "steal" all his money for child support.

If this is his fear, then why did he marry her in the first place? If this fear emerged after marriage, then he should have gotten to know her much more before marrying her. If it is an irrational fear, then he should have resolved issues with himself before getting married; and the woman should have detected such irrationality in him, thus, avoiding such marriage and inevitable resulting problems.

The wife tracks her ovulation with several methods and leaves a Post-It note on the dresser for him listing the days.  He avoids contact with her during this time[...]

He also told the wife he is trying to avoid pregnancy for the reason given.

Sounds like there is a troll!

How is she helping?

12. Must a spouse refrain from sɛҳuąƖ relations with a contracepting spouse?

Yes. The use of contraception is intrinsically evil and always gravely immoral because it deprives the sɛҳuąƖ act of the procreative meaning. Intrinsically evil acts are not justified by intention or circuмstances. So even if the intentions of the one spouse are good, and the circuмstances are very difficult, he or she cannot morally choose to engage in sɛҳuąƖ relations with a contracepting spouse. To do so would be an objective mortal sin.

In one sense, only the contracepting spouse is 'using' the contraception (taking the pill, or using a condom, etc.). But in another sense, both spouses are contracepting because both are knowingly choosing to engage in contracepted sɛҳuąƖ relations. The 'non-contracepting' spouse is deliberately choosing to participate in contracepted sɛҳuąƖ relations, and so he or she is participating in the deprivation of the procreative meaning from the marital act. The lack of an intention to contracept on the part of the one spouse does not change the moral object of the act that he or she has deliberately chosen.

Moreover, if the wife is using an abortifacient contraceptive, such as the birth control pill, both spouses are participating in the sin of direct abortion as well as the sin of contraception. The husband cannot justify continuing to have sɛҳuąƖ relations with his wife if he knows that she is using an abortifacient contraceptive. In the second font, both contraception and abortion have evil moral objects, and so they are intrinsically evil and always gravely immoral. In the third font, the bad consequences of the deaths of prenatal children (due to the abortifacient action of the contraceptives) far outweighs any good consequences. This bad consequences is particularly grave because the human persons who are killed are particularly innocent and defenseless, and because the killing continues to occur as the married couple continue to have sɛҳuąƖ relations while using abortifacient contraception.

It is not possible to redefine what constitutes contraception, or what constitutes abortion, based on intention and circuмstances, so as to somehow permit continued sɛҳuąƖ relations while using contraception, or abortifacient contraception. Intrinsically evil acts are not defined by intention or circuмstances because intrinsically evil acts are independent of intention and circuмstances.

The Catechism of the Catholic Church: "It is therefore an error to judge the morality of human acts by considering only the intention that inspires them or the circuмstances (environment, social pressure, duress or emergency, etc.) which supply their context. There are acts which, in and of themselves, independently of circuмstances and intentions, are always gravely illicit by reason of their object; such as blasphemy and perjury, murder and adultery. One may not do evil so that good may result from it." (CCC, n. 1756.)

If an intrinsically evil act were defined by intention or circuмstances, then an act would only be intrinsically evil if the act were accompanied by a bad intention, or if the bad consequences outweighed the good consequences. The result of this approach would be to justify an intrinsically evil act by basing the moral definition (or 'moral species') of the act on intention and circuмstances, rather than on the moral object. All manner of intrinsically evil and gravely immoral acts would then be said to be justified by being redefined, as if they were a different type of act, based on good intentions or dire circuмstances. But such an approach is contrary to the definitive teaching of the Magisterium on intrinsic evil.

Pope John Paul II: "Consequently, circuмstances or intentions can never transform an act, intrinsically evil by virtue of its object, into an act 'subjectively' good or defensible as a choice." (Veritatis Splendor, n. 81.)

Pope John Paul II: "No circuмstance, no purpose, no law whatsoever can ever make licit an act which is intrinsically illicit, since it is contrary to the Law of God which is written in every human heart, knowable by reason itself, and proclaimed by the Church." (Evangelium Vitae, n. 62.)

All intrinsically evil acts are defined solely by their moral object. So the intentions of the spouses do not determine if the chosen act is the sin of contraception, or the sin of abortion. Even if the one spouse has a good intended end, does not intend to deprive the marital act of the procreative meaning, and does not intend the deaths of any prenatal children, a good intention does not justify the deliberate choice of a gravely-disordered intrinsically evil act. The non-contracepting spouse is deliberately choosing to participate with the contracepting spouse in contracepted sɛҳuąƖ acts, even acts which might result in abortion. And so the 'non-contracepting' spouse is actually a participant in the sin of contraception, and even in the sin of abortion. Though the one spouse is not using the contraceptive, or the abortifacient contraceptive, this same spouse is deliberately choosing to participate in the contracepted sɛҳuąƖ act. This type of participation is intrinsically evil.

Some moral theologians might view the non-contracepting spouse's participation as a form of formal cooperation. However, formal cooperation with an intrinsically evil and gravely immoral act is itself intrinsically evil and gravely immoral. And so, even in this approach, the 'non-contracepting' spouse is committing an objective mortal sin by agreeing to have sɛҳuąƖ relations with the knowledge that the other spouse is contracepting.

Neither the sin of contraception, nor the sin of abortion, can ever be justified by any good intention, nor by any difficult circuмstance, no by any other factors whatsoever. A good intention does not justify an intrinsically evil act. And every human person is obligated by the eternal moral law to avoid committing any and all intrinsically evil acts, regardless of the consequences.