Years ago while he was a seminarian (or a just newly ordained priest), Fr. Taouk was chosen by the SSPX to write an article defending the notion of salvation of the non-baptized peoples, which the SSPX published in the Angelus as their "icon of doctrine".
It is no surprise to me that he would say modesty had "nothing to do with what we wear", it is just another outward manifestation that he is a blind guide.
All I can say to priests like that is: Thanks for the warning. I say it all the time about "Pope" Frank.
Voting in local and national elections can only be considered a moral obligation when the candidates propose a solidly Catholic, non-liberal platform that truly promotes the Social Kingship of Our Lord Jesus Christ. It is not obligatory to vote for a lesser evil, but simply prudent and permissible.
There's not a blanket grave moral obligation to vote.This is only true if your vote is only affecting politics. Nowadays, politics and sin are intertwined (i.e. abortion) so you do have a moral imperative to vote.
In terms of a moral obligation to (say) vote for Mitt Romney against Obama, I'm incredulous.Many politicians are clearly pro-abortion, so the obligation would be to vote against all openly pro-sin candidates.
This is only true if your vote is only affecting politics. Nowadays, politics and sin are intertwined (i.e. abortion) so you do have a moral imperative to vote..
Many politicians are clearly pro-abortion, so the obligation would be to vote against all openly pro-sin candidates.
There is nothing "inherently anti-Catholic" about the concept of the lesser evil nor about the language in which the concept is expressed, certainly not in the cited context.
There's not a blanket grave moral obligation to vote. That's not really how positive precepts typically work. … So any obligation of course presupposes that the system works the way it says it does.This is a thoroughly laudable comment, and I thank Mithrandylan for making it. I completely agree with its thesis, as expressed in the quoted portion, and have only marginal differences with some of the specifics in the remainder.
Well if we're going to talk about the inherent value of choosing a "lesser evil" (divorced from the context of Fr. Tauok) it does have some place in moral theology. St. Alphonsus (per McHugh and Callan) taught that a preplexed conscience which cannot delay a decision must select the lesser of two evils. That goes for individual, private morality. In the public realm, the state is certainly allowed to tolerate lesser evils in the pursuit of staving off a greater one (this of course is a different situation, only bringing it up under the heading of lesser evils in general and their place in Catholic moral theology). So it isn't right to say that it has no place at all, even if it has no place in the current context of there being a moral obligation to vote..
Not to mention that the Utilitarian principles behind this position lead to completely muddled thinking.
On the one hand, Father says that one cannot vote for a candidate if they hold morally-objectionable principles, and yet on the other he states that it's an obligation to vote for the candidate who is "more likely to promote the common good". So do you vote based on the principles to which the candidate adheres or on the likelihood that he would act upon them. It's a murky blur of principle and pragmatism. It's no wonder why Catholics are so confused about this matter.
St. Alphonsus (per McHugh and Callan) taught that a preplexed conscience which cannot delay a decision must select the lesser of two evils.
You'll need to cite the full context of this. I bet that what he's saying is that one must decide on the option that is less likely or less probably evil ... when the conscience is not certain. It's Catholic Theology 101 that one cannot do any positive evil ... even to prevent a greater one..
I don't have a moral obligation to vote for a man who is OK killing a thousand babies when the opposition is OK killing ten thousand.We don't live in a catholic country, nor a moral one. There is no such thing as a perfect candidate. In our present day, ususally the option is for a lessor of 2 evils, but when the choice is openly-evil vs neutrally good, you have to vote AGAINST the openly-evil man every time. That's a moral duty.
That isn't to say that it might not be prudentially wise to vote for a candidate who (say) wants to supremely limit abortions (even if not outlaw them) if they're up against someone who wants to completely open up the abortion industry. I'm only talking about the existence (or lackthereof) of a moral obligation, and that doesn't exist for any politician who would not vote to outlaw abortion entirely.I disagree because the way our system is setup, since this is a democracy, laws get passed by majority. Therefore, if you view each candidate in some super-strict catholic sense, you'd never vote for anyone. On the other hand, if you vote for a bunch of "best available" candidates, and if they have the majority, then good laws can come about, even if the candidates themselves are lacking.
Well if we're going to talk about the inherent value of choosing a "lesser evil" (divorced from the context of Fr. Tauok) it does have some place in moral theology. St. Alphonsus (per McHugh and Callan) taught that a preplexed conscience which cannot delay a decision must select the lesser of two evils. That goes for individual, private morality. In the public realm, the state is certainly allowed to tolerate lesser evils in the pursuit of staving off a greater one (this of course is a different situation, only bringing it up under the heading of lesser evils in general and their place in Catholic moral theology). So it isn't right to say that it has no place at all, even if it has no place in the current context of there being a moral obligation to vote.
612. St. Alphonsus gives the following directions to assist one who is perplexed in conscience:
(a) If without serious inconvenience decision can be delayed, reliable advice should be obtained (e.g., from the confessor).
(b) If decision cannot be delayed, the alternative that seems the lesser evil should be chosen. Example: The natural law requires that Titus should not expose his life to danger unnecessarily. The positive law of the Church requires that he go to Mass on Sunday. It is a less evil to omit what is required by the law of the Church than to omit what is required by the law of God. Hence, Titus should decide that he is not obliged in his circuмstances to go to church.
(c) If decision cannot be delayed and the party cannot decide where the lesser evil lies, he is free to choose either; for he is not bound to the impossible.
1502. Is it lawful to advise another to commit a less evil in preference to a greater evil?
(a) If the other has not made up his mind to commit either evil, it is not lawful to advise that he do either. Thus, to counsel another to steal, and to make his victims the rich rather than the poor, is a species of seduction.
(b) If the person has made up his mind to commit the greater evil and the lesser evil is virtually contained in the greater, it is lawful to advise that he omit the former for the latter. For in thus acting one prevents the greater evil and does not cause the lesser evil, since it is virtually contained in the greater evil which the other person had already decided on. Thus, if Titus is bent on stealing $100, Balbus is not guilty of seduction, if he persuades Titus to take only $10. We are supposing, of course, that Titus is so determined to steal that it is out of the question to deter him from taking at least a small amount.
(c) If the person in question has decided on the greater sin and the lesser is not virtually contained in the greater, it is not lawful to recommend that he commit the smaller instead of the greater sin. For,if one does this, one does not save the other from the internal guilt of the greater sin intended, while one does add the malice of the lesser sin which was not intended. Thus, if Titus plans to kill Caius,it is not lawful to advise that he rob him instead, or that he kill Claudius instead, for robbery is a specifically distinct sin from murder, and Claudius is a different person from Caius. But, if Titus planned to kill Caius in order to rob him, it would not be unlawful to point out that the robbery could be carried out without murder and to advise accordingly.
1503. Not all theologians accept the last solution just given.
(a) Some reject it, and hold that, even when the lesser evil is not virtually contained in the greater, it is lawful to advise the lesser. They argue that what one does thereby is not to commit the lesser evil, to induce it or approve it, but only to permit it in order to lessen the harm that will be done, and they confirm their argument from scripture(Gen., xix. 8 ). According to this opinion, then, which has some good authorities in its favor, it would be lawful to advise robbery in order to dissuade another from the greater evil of murder.
(b) Others modify the solution given in the previous paragraph, and hold that it is lawful to propose the lesser evil or mention it, provided one does not attempt to induce the other person to carry it into effect.
Chapter 1: What is Conscience, how manifold is it, and what must be followed?
10.—Let us proceed to argue the other species of conscience. A perplexed conscience is one in which someone that has been placed in the middle of two precepts believes he sins no matter which side he chooses, e.g. if someone could save the life of the defendant in a trial by perjury, and on the one hand he is distressed by the precept of religion to not commit perjury, while on the other (deduced from an error) by the precept of charity towards his neighbor, and he cannot resolve himself to do one or the other. Thus it is a question of what he ought to do in this case. We respond: If he can suspend an action, he is bound to postpone it until he consults a learned man: but if he cannot suspend it, he is held to choose a lesser evil by avoiding a greater transgression of natural law than of human or divine positive law. Moreover, if he cannot discern what is the lesser evil, and he were to choose either part, he would not sin because in a case of this sort he would lack the freedom necessary for formal sin.
77.—4. It is a mortal sin to cause another man to be drunk, or to challenge him to a drinking contest with the intention of getting drunk, or with the knowledge that drunkenness is going to follow in him or in the other man. Lessius, loc. cit.
5. If for a just cause, e.g. a great evil could be otherwise impeded if the author of it is drunk, it is lawful to induce him to drunkenness, which at least is not voluntary, viz. apart from intention, and therefore he is inculpably drunk; e.g. a very strong wine, or toasting with a medicated drink, when the other man is deceived, not knowing its strength. Wherefore, one can so make others drunk, who otherwise would betray the city or abduct him. (Lessius, loc. cit., and Sanchez, l. 2, de matr. d. 11). But in this case, would it be permitted to induce someone to drunkenness if it were a voluntary act? There is a doubt. Lessius (l. 4, c. 3, d. 4, n. 32), affirms; because, he says, one may persuade and induce to a lesser evil that prevents a greater one. Laymann, (lib. 3, sect. 4, n. 6) more rightly denies it, because in no case may one induce someone to sin.
Quaeritur: Whether it is licit to induce someone to get drunk, to impede him from a more serious evil, say from committing a sacrilege or a homicide?
There are three opinions.
The first upholds it, and Lessius (l. 4, c. 3, d. 4, n. 53) holds it as probable, and Medina, Gob., Diana and others cited by Croix (l. 2, n. 224) think it is probable. The reason is because one may be prapred to commit a greater evil to induce someone to carry out a lesser one.
The second opinion, which Laymann (l. 3, sect. 4, n. 6), Bonacina (tom. 2, d. ult. de praec. eccl., q. 1, p. 1, n. 3), Palaus (t. 7, tr. 50, d. 3, p. 5) and the Salamancans (tr. 25, c. 2, p. 4, n. 51) hold it, saying it is licit to induce another to material drunkenness, i.e. when he would otherwise make himself drunk without sin, say by placing a very strong wine in front of him, or one that is medicated; because then on his side he would not sin, and on the other the damage of drunkenness is permitted to avoid even graver damage to others. But it is not licit to say one can induce formal drunkenness, namely when it is by his own sin, since this is intrinsically evil and therefore never permitted. Nor is it opposed (as they say) the reason of Lessius, for they respond that this avails when a lesser evil is included in a greater evil, precisely when you lead one that wishes to kill his enemy to only strike him; but not when the evil is disparate.
The third opinion, at length, which the Continuator of Tournely upholds (loc. cit., Unde 9), and Holzman (tom. 1 p. 155, 735), along with Arsdek., says it is not permitted to induce anyone to drunkenness whether formal or material, on account of fleeing both evils, because (and in this they speak rightly), an evil, even if it is material, against the natural law is truly an evil, which is why one may never cooperate with it. Still, these not withstanding, the first opinion seems sufficiently probable to me, and other learned men that I have consulted, whether the drunkenness were material or formal, on account of the reasoning that has been provided, because it is licit to induce another to a lesser evil so that he would be impeded from a greater one, according to what we will say in book 3, number 57. Nor is what the Salamancans say (loc. cit., against Lessius) opposed, for, although the evil of drunkenness does not seem included in that greater evil of sacrilege or murder, since they are per se disparate evils; nevertheless, really, virtually it is already included in that greater spiritual evil, since every spiritual evil includes, nay more exceeds, every temporal evil, so much that anyone is held more to suffer every temporal evil to avoid even the lest spiritual evil. Nor does it impede us to say that it is not lawful to persuade a lesser evil to be imposed on a third, because then the one persuading would be the direct cause of damage of the third, because it would not happen to him unless he would persuade, for this occurs when an evil is imposed on a third innocent man, who is not held to suffer the damage, to avoid the spiritual evil of another; but not in our case, where he who is induced to drunkenness, is indeed held to tolerate (as we said above) every temporal evil to put to flight a greater spiritual evil.
57.—Whether it is lawful to persuade or permit a lesser evil to avoid a greater one?
The first opinion rejects this, according to what Laymann (de char. c. 12, n. 7) holds, with Azor and others. The reason is, because the comparative does not abolish the positive; for this reason, one who persuades a lesser evil, truly persuades an evil. Laymann and Azor place the limitation, unless the evil would be virtually included in the other greater act. So, if you could persuade a man prepared to kill someone that he should only cut off his hand, nevertheless it is the same thing, but not planned by the other. So also for one wishing to commit adultery if you could persuade him to commit fornication with someone that was free in general, but not in particular. The Salamancans admit this (loc. cit. § 1, n. 58 ) provided he would decide to carry out both evils. (with Navarre, etc.) But Laymann instinctively says (as well as Sanchez with the second opinion, as will soon be said), that he expressly rejects this limitation because (as he says) then a lesser evil is proposed, not that he would perpetrate another, but that he would withdraw from the greater.
The Second opinion is more probable and holds it is licit to persuade a lesser evil if the other is determined to carry out a greater evil. The reason is because the one persuading does not seek an evil, but a good, namely the choice of a lesser evil. (Sanchez, de matrim. lib. 7, d. 11, n. 15, with de Soto, Molina, Navarre, Medina, Sylvest. and many others, and the Salamancans loc. cit. with Cajetan, Soto, Palaus, Bonacina, etc; Croix thinks it is probable, lib. 2, n. 223, moreover, Sanchez teaches the same thing in n. 19, with Cajetan, de Soto, Vocar, Valent.). It is licit to persuade a man prepared to kill someone that he should steal from someone instead, or that he should fornicate. And the defenders of this opinion argue it from St. Augustine (in c. Si quod verius, caus. 33, q. 2) where he says: “If he is going to do something that is not lawful, now he might commit adultery and not murder, and while his wife is living he marries another, and does not shed human blood.” From such words, “now he might commit adultery,” Sanchez proves (dict. n. 15), with de Soto, Molina, Navarre, Abb., etc., that the Holy Doctor spoke not only about permitting, but even persuading. And Sanchez adds this (n. 23) with Salon, it is not only lawful for individuals, but even for confessors, parents, and others, to whom the duty is incuмbent to impede the sins of subordinates.
Unless there were someone forcing you to pick a candidate under pain of death, you are free not to choose either candidate, to vote for a Third Party candidate, or even write someone in.Exactly.
St. Alphonsus was talking about a scenario where there is no alternative, non datur tertium..
So, for instance, if someone is holding a gun to my family members and telling me I have to rob a bank or else they'll kill them. If there's no way out of that situation, then robbing the bank is permitted since the greater evil would be the murder of my family. This is absolutely not permitted except in a situation where there is no alternative, no third choice. In other words, there is NO MORAL FREEDOM to do anything other than something OBJECTIVE wrong. That is not actually a moral choice, an act of the will; as there's no free choice of evil. In other words, in that scenario, while it would be objectively/materially wrong, it would not be formally immoral. That has absolutely nothing to do with voting ... or with absolutely any other scenario in which one is FREE to do something that is not evil.
This has absolutely no applicability to voting. Unless there were someone forcing you to pick a candidate under pain of death, you are free not to choose either candidate, to vote for a Third Party candidate, or even write someone in.
We're changing the debate here. The original debate was over a 2 party alternative: Evil politician vs neutral/moderately good politician. Mith says he's not obliged to vote, morally. I disagree.
As of last night, Trump is strongly considering sending 120,000 American troops to the Persian Gulf area to wage war against Iran.
That's what voting does for America, it keeps the War Machine going.
Candidate Trump ran on "stop being the policemen of the world, and focus on the America"
Now, Trump is Israel's little orange bich.
Trump's Jєω whore daughter and his Jєω son-in-law make sure Netanyahu's commands are carried out by Trump.
Trump can never say "no" to his Jєω whore daughter. Whatever she demands, Trump fights to make it happen. She's also behind Trump's global campaign to decriminalize sodomy.
There's no such thing as a "non viable" candidate, unless you listen to the media, which uses psychology and fake polls to make people think that "so and so" doesn't have a chance. If people voted for the best candidate instead of who has the best chance of winning, America would be better off. Yes, if you vote for the best candidate, regardless of polls, you fulfill your obligation.
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Another factor which people forget: Typically, only the major races (president, congress, governor) are covered by the media with much effort. Certainly these races are important, but there's usually only 2 candidates which have a chance here. The major opportunity to change america is at the local/state level. The races where no one knows the candidates too well and they are often forgotten (i.e. a state's secretary of state, or state auditor, state senate). If people concentrated as much on these races as they do on the governor or US Congress, each state could be changed for the better, very rapidly. This would have an effect on DC, as state's Attorney Generals and Governors are affected by the state congress and can affect the US Congress through legislation and lawsuits.
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My whole point is that if you get into this mindset where you only have to vote when a candidate "has a chance", or you don't have to vote if there's no good candidate, then you are probably going to avoid voting/caring on the local races, since you don't vote/care about the bigger ones. Not following the local/state races is a major lost opportunity that America's middle class has squandered for the last 50 years.
In any case, Trump did appoint a less-evil Supreme Court Justice than Hillary would have, and may have the chance again if the death of Ginsburg ever sees the light of day.Exactly. There are so many issues at play. So many ways that a candidate can affect good laws indirectly. I did not vote Trump, mainly because I thought he was a neo-con. 2 years in, I'd say I was partially wrong. He's less of a neo-con than Bush Jr, by far, and I voted for Bush Jr.
Would that be a sin, in your opinion, (to vote for a random person) or would it satisfy the obligation of voting?I think it depends on the circuмstances. Do I think that every person has an obligation to vote? Yes. Is that obligation always a GRAVE obligation? No, it depends on the circuмstances. In my state, Trump was going to win, so I voted for a 3rd party candidate, on principle. If it was a close race, i'd have voted for him, since it was a vote against Hillary, who was gravely evil.
To me, if voting for my uncle is permitted, then not voting at all is also permitted ... because it has the same effect, at the end of the day.It depends. Usually when you go to vote, you have many, many races to vote on. If you voted for your Uncle in a race that had 2 mediocre/bad candidates, this is understandable. If you voted for your uncle when there was a legitimately good candidate, that's wrong. If you voted for your uncle in every race, I agree, you might as well have stayed at home.
If voting had any meaning the Jєωs wouldn't allow it.This is true for some races but not all. Don’t overestimate the power of the devil or his minions. Don’t underestimate the power of prayer, hard work and Divine intervention. We are the “Church Militant” and we have to keep fighting. If the joos were as in control as you think, we’d have had WW3 by now and we’d all be incinerated by nukes or in cσncєnтrαтισn cαмρs.
ISIS used US missile strike to launch new offensive near Palmyra, Homs governor tells RT
https://www.rt.com/news/383826-isis-used-us-airstrike-syria/
ISIL takes advantage of US attack on government to storm western Palmyra
https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/isil-takes-advantage-us-attack-government-storm-western-palmyra/
Maillot Jaune
If voting had any meaning the Jєωs wouldn't allow it.They have some power, yes, but they're not invincible or all-powerful.
If voting had any meaning the Jєωs wouldn't allow it.No, other leaders wouldn't. Remember, the Constitution only limited presidents to two terms in the 1950s after FDR. If a president wanted to make himself dictator for life, he could've
They have some power, yes, but they're not invincible or all-powerful.Yes, but today nearly all supposed Christians are either heretics or apostates or sɛҳuąƖ perverts so the Jєωs have a lot of power. We elected Trump, sure and he is better than Hillary. But now that he is elected he seems to be doing more for the good of Israel than for the good of America. I am still waiting for the wall, the deportation of illegals, and for all those mass arrests of Democrats for pedophilia and ritual sacrifices that the patriots were promising.
In fact, they only have power insofar as the Gentiles are apostate from God.
Matthew
Yes, but today nearly all supposed Christians are either heretics or apostatesAmerica is not a catholic country and never has been. The best we can hope for is a country which supports the natural law and this is possible, even if God uses protestants.
4. CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ONE MAY VOTE FOR UNWORTHY CANDIDATES
By the term “unworthy candidates” we do not necessarily mean men whose private lives are morally reprehensible, but those who, if elected, would cause grave injury to the state or to religion, as for example, men of vacillating temperament who fear to make decisions.
In practical life it is often difficult to determine whether a particular candidate is worthy or unworthy because there seems little upon which to judge accurately, especially in local or municipal elections. It does not follow that every Catholic is necessarily the best man for office and that every non-Catholic is not; nor that every Catholic will promote the interests of the common good of the state of religion and that the non-Catholic will not. Even if a man is of sterling character in his private life, he will not by necessity prove competent in public office. Sometimes too, as St. Robert Bellarmine pointed out in his De laicis [175] the so-called evil rulers may do more good than harm, as Saul and Solomon. It is better for the state to have an evil ruler than no ruler at all, for where there is no ruler the state cannot long endure, as the wise Solomon observed: “Where there is no governor the people will fail.” [176]
When unworthy candidates are running for office, ordinarily a citizen does not have the obligation for voting for them. Indeed he would not be permitted to vote for them if there were any reasonable way of electing a worthy man, either by organizing another party, by using the “write in” method, or by any other lawful means. On the other hand, it would be licit to vote for an unworthy man if the choice were only between or among unworthy candidates; and it might even be necessary to vote for such an unworthy candidate (if the voting were limited to such personalities) and even for one who would render harm to the Church, provided the election were only a choice from among unworthy men and the voting for the less unworthy would prevent the election of another more unworthy.
Since the act of voting is good, it is lawful to vote for an unworthy candidate provided there is a proportionate cause for the evil done and the good lost. This consideration looks simply to the act of voting itself and does not consider other factors such as scandal, encouragement of unworthy men, and a bad influence upon other voters. Obviously, if any or all of these other factors are present, the excusing cause for voting for an unworthy candidate would have to be proportionally graver. [177]
Lehmkuhl says that it is never allowed to vote absolutely for a man of evil principles, but hypothetice it may be allowed if the election is between men of evil principles. Then one should vote for him who is less evil (1) if he makes known the reason for his choice; (2) if the election is necessary to exclude a worse candidate. [178] The same author in his Casus conscientiae lists the general argument, adding that there must be no approbation of the unworthy man or of his programme. [179]
Tanquerey declares that if the vote is between a socialist and another liberal, the citizen may vote for the less evil, but he should publicly declare why he is voting this way, to avoid any scandalum pusillorum. [180] Prümmer says the same. [181] Actually, however, in the United States and in other countries where the balloting is secret, there seems to be no need of declaring one’s manner of voting.
Several authors including Ubach, [181a] Merkelbach, [182] Iorio, [183] Piscetta-Gennaro, [184] and Sabetti-Barrett [185] allow for material cooperation in the election of an unworthy candidate when there are two unworthy men running for office. Ubach adds this point: (1) There must be no cooperation in the evil which the man brings upon society after assuming office; (2) The voting must not be taken as an approval of the candidate or of his unworthiness. Merkelbach asserts that such cooperation may be licit per accidens if there is no hope that good men will be elected without voting for the bad ones in the same election.
As a practical point it may be remarked that at times a citizen may have to vote for an unworthy man in order to vote for a worthy one, e.g., when people have to vote a straight party ticket, at least in a primary election when the “split ticket” is not permitted. However the good to be gained would have to outweigh the evil to be avoided, or at least be equal to it.
In his Casus Genicot, [186] sets up a case of an election between a liberal and a Communist. To avoid scandal the citizen should give reasons for voting for the liberal. One does not support the evil candidate but simply applies the principle of double effect. This author also says that a person may use a mental reservation in promising to vote for an unworthy man.
Cardinal Amette, Archbishop of Paris, implies the liceity of voting for an unworthy candidate when he writes of voting for a less worthy one. “It would be lawful to cast them,” he writes,” for candidates who though not giving complete satisfaction to all our legitimate demands, would lead us to expect from them a line of conduct useful to the country, rather than to keep your votes for those whose program would indeed be more perfect, but whose almost certain defeat might open the door to the enemies of religion and of the social order.” [187]
Thus we may say that it is permitted to vote for unworthy candidates (that is, give material cooperation) if these are the only type of men on the ballot lists; in order to exclude the more unworthy; in order to secure the election of one who is somewhat unworthy instead of voting for a good man whose defeat is certain; and when the list is mixed containing both worthy and unworthy men, so that a citizen can vote for the former only by voting for the latter at the same time.
last comment by Maillot JauneDo you know you can tick the box "Post with your username (not anonymous)?"
:applause:
If innocent people died, including Syrian forces, as reported by numerous sources, it was an immoral act. It was murder. The Syrian forces were the good guys fighting ISIS. To kill (murder) them in order to flush out ISIS, who deserved to be annihilated, is an evil deed. Even children and other civilians died.
I don't compartmentalize murder. Those were real people with real families. Not a statistic.
(https://scontent-ort2-2.xx.fbcdn.net/v/t1.0-9/57447294_1713074515504474_4046640722261049344_n.jpg?_nc_cat=106&_nc_ht=scontent-ort2-2.xx&oh=766537ebcebfb60b2996dbc78088a414&oe=5D6DF923)Exactly.
If innocent people died, including Syrian forces, as reported by numerous sources, it was an immoral act. It was murder. The Syrian forces were the good guys fighting ISIS. To kill (murder) them in order to flush out ISIS, who deserved to be annihilated, is an evil deed. Even children and other civilians died.I agree with you that the US has almost no business in the Middle East. However, Syria is a war-zone. People dying from collateral damage during a war is not the same as direct murder. Assuming that Trump is actually fighting against ISIS, had we not gotten involved, then ISIS would be spread all over Syria and they would be slaughtering thousands. If some innocent people die during a military strike against an enemy, this is a tragedy, but it's not murder. If you want to argue that it's not a "just war", then I agree. But global politics has blurred a lot of lines as to what constitutes a "threat" to a particular country, even on the opposite side of the world.
As I posted above, there were numerous reports that Syrian military personnel and civilians died because of the bombing. They weren't ISIS.Who reported that civilians died? The mainstream media? The same media that ideologically supports ISIS so that Syria can be a powder-keg for WW3, which is desired by the deep state...the same deep state that controls the media and funded/started ISIS to begin with?
To attack an airbase that has nothing to do with ISIS, and the result is the death of people who have nothing to do with ISIS, as a tactic to draw out ISIS more in a hubris, is still murder.You are correct, if the following assumptions are correct. Assuming that the airbase was not related to ISIS. Assuming that the "civilians" weren't foreign military who were secretly supporting ISIS. Assuming that the true Syrian citizens hadn't left the area, since Trump and Assad had communicated previously about what was to be bombed.
I support Trump wiping out ISIS, but he attacked a Syrian airbase that belonged to the Syrian military fighting ISIS over a pretext that "Assad used chemical weapons." As I posted above, there were numerous reports that Syrian military personnel and civilians died because of the bombing. They weren't ISIS. They were fighting ISIS. To attack an airbase that has nothing to do with ISIS, and the result is the death of people who have nothing to do with ISIS, as a tactic to draw out ISIS more in a hubris, is still murder.Hmmm! Come on......It is a widely known fact that the RUSSIANS wiped out ISIS from Syria and the US of A was/is actually adding all the terrorists ......! :facepalm: :facepalm: :facepalm: :facepalm: